The present research aimed to analyze the impact of opportunistic behavior and bounded rationality impacts in the forms of contract adopted by the Agricultural Consortium of Specialized Farms (C.A.F.E.). For that, a case study was accomplished with the objective to embrace the most important characteristics of the theme as well as its process of development. The theoretical reference that gave support to this study it was the Transaction Costs Economics (TCE). Through the analysis of the variables approached by TCE, more specifically the behavioral factors (bounded rationality, opportunism) and forms of contract, it was concluded that, in the case studied the existence of opportunism interferes in certain way in the trust increasing the transactional costs. In the same sense the informational asymmetry enhances the agents’ bounded rationality; therefore it increases the transaction costs. This makes clear the importance of these elements in the definition in the contract form. In the case studied it was verified the need of a formalized and more specified and detailed contract structure so that it may reduce the transaction costs generated by the opportunistic actions and bounded rationality of the agents. According to the characteristics observed in the Consortium, the contract form that most adapt is the relational one, in which the main reference point is their own relationship when the autonomy among them is maintained. Trust and reputation are relevant elements.