The recent inclusion of exclusive marketing/procurement agreements between meatpacking and feedlot firms has created concern about how the level and variability of fed cattle transaction prices are affected. Existing agreements involve written or verbal contracts that allow the participating firms to market or purchase finished cattle at formula based prices for which the details are not made public. Exclusive marketing/procurement agreements were applied to an experimentally simulated fed cattle market. Two econometric models were developed from previous studies to evaluate price level and variability differences between active and non-active agreement periods. Price level and variability differences between the participating and non-participating firms of the agreements during the agreement and non-agreement periods were also evaluated. The effects of economically rewarding the subjects of experimental simulations studies on fed cattle transaction prices were evaluated. Results indicate that participants of exclusive marketing/procurement agreements realized significantly lower price means and variances than non-participating firms. However, the mean and variance of market prices were found to be higher during the agreement periods than during the non-agreement periods. Economic reward and non-reward periods were not found to have significantly different price levels.