Imperfectly Informative Equilibria for Signalling Games

I analyze the equilibria of signalling games in which initially uninformed players may choose to become informed from an external source at a cost. It is shown that the lower this cost, the greater the extent to which the informed player's actions reveal its private information and the more the outcome resembles the symmetric information equilibrium.


Issue Date:
1995-05
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
DOI and Other Identifiers:
Record Identifier:
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/275603
Language:
English
Total Pages:
26
Series Statement:
Working Paper No. 17-95




 Record created 2018-08-01, last modified 2020-10-28

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