A Neo2Bayesian Foundation of the Maximin Value for Two-Person Zero- Sum Games

A joint derivation of utility and value for two-person zero-sum games is obtained using a decision theoretic approach. Acts map states to consequences. The latter are lotteries over prizes, and the set of states is a product of two finite sets (m rows and n columns). Preferences over acts are complete, transitive, continuous, monotonic and certainty-independent (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)), and satisfy a new axiom of strategic flexibility which we introduce. These axioms are shown to characterize preferences such that (i) the induced preferences on consequences are represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, and (ii) each act is ranked according to the maxmin value of the corresponding m x n utility matrix (a two-person zero-sum game). An alternative statement of the result deals simultaneously with all finite two-person zero-sum games in the framework of conditional acts and preferences.


Issue Date:
1990-11
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
DOI and Other Identifiers:
Record Identifier:
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/275500
Language:
English
Total Pages:
21
Series Statement:
Working Paper No. 38-90




 Record created 2018-07-31, last modified 2020-10-28

Fulltext:
Download fulltext
PDF

Rate this document:

Rate this document:
1
2
3
 
(Not yet reviewed)