Asymmetric Parametric Division Rules

We describe and characterize the family of asymmetric parametric division rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims on a divisible homogeneous good. As part of the characterization, we present two novel axioms which restrict how a division rule indirectly allocates between different versions of the same claimant. We also show that such division rules can alternately be represented as the maximization of an additively separable social welfare function.


Issue Date:
Apr 23 2013
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
DOI and Other Identifiers:
Record Identifier:
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/270537
Language:
English
Total Pages:
38
Series Statement:
WERP 1012




 Record created 2018-04-03, last modified 2020-10-28

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