Crowd Learning without Herding : A Mechanism Design Approach

Crowdfunding, Internet websites, and health care are only a few examples of markets in which agents make decisions not only on the basis of their own investigations and knowledge, but also on the basis of information from a "central planner" about other agents’ actions. While such reciprocal learning can be welfare-improving, it may reduce agents’ incentives to conduct their own investigations, and may lead to harmful cascades. We study the planner’s optimal policy regarding when to provide information and how much information to provide. We show that the optimum policy involves a delicate balance of hiding and revealing information.


Issue Date:
Dec 12 2015
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
DOI and Other Identifiers:
Record Identifier:
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269730
Language:
English
Total Pages:
28
Series Statement:
WERP 1095




 Record created 2018-03-21, last modified 2020-10-28

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