Equilibrium Agenda Formation

We develop a de¯nition of equilibrium for agenda formation in general voting settings. The de¯nition is independent of any protocol. We show that the set of equilibrium outcomes for any Pareto e±cient voting rule is uniquely determined. We also show that for such voting rules, if preferences are strict then the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with that of the outcomes generated by considering all full agendas for voting by successive elimination and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes corresponds with the Banks set. We also examine the implications in several other settings.


Issue Date:
Dec 11 2001
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
DOI and Other Identifiers:
Record Identifier:
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269402
Language:
English
Total Pages:
42
JEL Codes:
D71; D72




 Record created 2018-03-08, last modified 2020-10-28

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