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POWER RELATIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND: A STUDY OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF A PRIORI VOTING POWER USING THE THEORY OF SIMPLE GAMES
Leech, D.
1997
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Title
POWER RELATIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND: A STUDY OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF A PRIORI VOTING POWER USING THE THEORY OF SIMPLE GAMES
Keywords
Weighted Voting
;
Power Indices
;
Simple Games
;
Empirical Game Theory
;
International Monetary Fund
Author(s)
Leech, D.
Subject(s)
Financial Economics
Political Economy
Issue Date
Dec 12 1997
Publication Type
Working or Discussion Paper
DOI and Other Identifiers
10.22004/ag.econ.268776
Record Identifier
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/268776
Language
English
Total Pages
56
JEL Codes
F0
C7
Record Appears in
University of Warwick - Department of Economics
>
Economic Research Papers
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