Home > University of Warwick - Department of Economics > Economic Research Papers > POWER RELATIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND: A STUDY OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF A PRIORI VOTING POWER USING THE THEORY OF SIMPLE GAMES
 

POWER RELATIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND: A STUDY OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF A PRIORI VOTING POWER USING THE THEORY OF SIMPLE GAMES

Leech, D.

Keywords:
Weighted Voting ; Power Indices ; Simple Games ; Empirical Game Theory ; International Monetary Fund
Subject(s):
Financial Economics
Political Economy
Issue Date:
Dec 12 1997
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
DOI and Other Identifiers:
10.22004/ag.econ.268776
Record Identifier:
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/268776
Language:
English
Total Pages:
56
JEL Codes:
F0; C7

Record appears in:
University of Warwick - Department of Economics > Economic Research Papers



 Record created 2018-02-26, last modified 2020-10-28

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