Format | |
---|---|
BibTeX | |
MARCXML | |
TextMARC | |
MARC | |
DublinCore | |
EndNote | |
NLM | |
RefWorks | |
RIS |
Files
Abstract
Hypothetical bias arises when values which people say they place on a good or service differ systematically
from the values people reveal for the same good or service through actual, binding economic
transactions. Studies of hypothetical bias with respect to public goods often use charitable contributions
or other relatively unique goods and these studies employ a variety of mechanisms to elicit the stated and
revealed values. This study proposes the inclusion of a free-rider barring random dictatorship mechanism
in the standard public contribution game to investigate the issue of bias when a public good involves
immediate monetary returns to subjects. Steps are taken to make the game have the look and feel of a
real-world tradeoff between private investment and public good provision. Data for the experiment were
collected using a sample of students from the University of Alberta. A statistically significant negative
hypothetical bias is found for the first hypothetical and the first real rounds of the game. The bias decays
in subsequent round pairs, oscillating around zero.