In a forthcoming paper, Chow and Sheldon (2024) conclude that US challenge(s) to Canada’s dairy tariff rate quotas (TRQs), under the US-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) preferential trade agreement’s (PTA) dispute resolution mechanism, are really a “fuss about nothing”, and no more than a response to lobbying by its dairy industry. However, this conclusion misses the possibility that the United States, in its enthusiasm for using the USMCA mechanism, is revealing a key component of its approach to settlement of trade disputes. In this context, the current paper focuses on answering two related questions: (i) are proponents of reviving the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Appellate Body acting in the vain hope of securing US support for its reform; and (ii), has the United States irrevocably moved on by creating and using parallel dispute resolution mechanisms in US-led PTAs, that can be used to revolve WTO-type disputes as well as specific PTA disputes?