We conducted a choice experiment based on the theory of global games to analyze the impact of strategic uncertainty on participation decisions of Florida citrus growers in area-wide pest management programs to control the vector of citrus greening. We found that the farmers average certainty equivalent in a strategically uncertain setting under a high coordination requirement for obtaining a Pareto superior payoff, was lower compared to that of a lottery. Moreover, we found some evidence that the perceived risk of farmers in the strategically uncertain alternative increased as the size of the group increased. Thus, our results help explain why, despite the efficiency of area-wide pest management to control the vector of citrus greening across Florida, farmers participation is not as widespread as one would expect. To avoid the strategic uncertainty involved in relying on neighbors, many farmers choose self-reliance in spraying despite the lower payoff. As a recommendation for policy makers, we propose a top-down regulation so as to generate a bottom-up collective action to deal with the issue of strategic uncertainty in area-wide pest management to avoid the sub-optimal outcome. Acknowledgement :