Finite State Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information: A Framework for Applied Work

With applied work in mind, we define an equilibrium notion for dynamic games with assymetric information which does not require a specification for players’ beliefs about their opponents types. This enables us to define equilibrium conditions which, at least in principal, are testable and can be computed using a simple reinforcement learning algorithm. We conclude with an example that endogenizes the maintenance decisions for electricity generators in a dynamic game among electric utilities in which the costs states of the generators are private information.


Issue Date:
2008-11
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
DOI and Other Identifiers:
Record Identifier:
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/275718
Language:
English
Total Pages:
45
Series Statement:
14-08




 Record created 2018-08-09, last modified 2020-10-28

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