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Risk Aversion in Nash Bargaining Problem With Risky Outcomes and Risky Disagreement Outcome

Safra, Zvi ; Zilcha, Itzhak

Subject(s):
Financial Economics
Risk and Uncertainty
Issue Date:
1988-05
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
DOI and Other Identifiers:
10.22004/ag.econ.275444
Record Identifier:
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/275444
Language:
English
Total Pages:
16
Series Statement:
Working Paper No. 18-88

Record appears in:
Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers



 Record created 2018-07-30, last modified 2020-10-28

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