Probabilistic Sophistication and Reverse Bayesianism

This paper extends our earlier work on reverse Bayesianism by relaxing the assump- tion that decision makers abide by expected utility theory, assuming instead weaker axioms that merely imply that they are probabilistically sophisticated. We show that our main results, namely, (modied) representation theorems and corresponding rules for updating beliefs over expanding state spaces and null events that constitute "reverse Bayesianism," remain valid.


Issue Date:
2013-02
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
DOI and Other Identifiers:
Record Identifier:
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/274623
Language:
English
Total Pages:
26
JEL Codes:
D08; D81; D83
Series Statement:
Working Paper No. 1303




 Record created 2018-06-27, last modified 2020-10-28

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