How Transparency Kills Information Aggregation: theory and Experiment

We investigate the potential of transparency to influence committee decisionmaking. We present a model in which career concerned committee members receive private information of different type-dependent accuracy, deliberate and vote. We study three levels of transparency under which career concerns are predicted to affect behavior differently, and test the model’s key predictions in a laboratory experiment. The model’s predictions are largely borne out - transparency negatively affects information aggregation at the deliberation and voting stages, leading to sharply different committee error rates than under secrecy. This occurs despite subjects revealing more information under transparency than theory predicts.


Issue Date:
Dec 12 2015
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
DOI and Other Identifiers:
Record Identifier:
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/270006
Language:
English
Total Pages:
51
JEL Codes:
C92; D71; D83
Series Statement:
WERP 1088




 Record created 2018-03-27, last modified 2020-10-28

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