ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN CATTLE AUCTIONS: THE PROBLEM OF REVACCINATIONS

The paper analyzes the problem of asymmetric information between buyers and sellers in cattle auctions. An illustration is made regarding the vaccinations that the animals receive. Buyers do not know and cannot verify if sellers have vaccinated their animals forcing them to consider revaccination. Revaccination is only a part of the broader problem of information asymmetry that includes other quality issues and costs that can be saved, thereby increasing the welfare of both buyers and sellers. Structural characteristics of ranching, traditions and consumers' preferences are taken into account and a wider approach is attempted to explain the persistence of the problem in light of potential institutional solutions. We argue for a comprehensive empirical study of the incidence and impacts of buyer revaccination.


Issue Date:
2004
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
DOI and Other Identifiers:
Record Identifier:
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/26039
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/26039
Total Pages:
29
Series Statement:
Department of Agricultural Economics Working Paper no. 2004-5




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2020-10-28

Fulltext:
Download fulltext
PDF

Rate this document:

Rate this document:
1
2
3
 
(Not yet reviewed)