International Quota Transfer and Intermediate Goods

In this paper we use a general equilibrium model to examine the effects of international quota transfer when a quota restricts world commodity production whilst the trade in an intermediate good is not regulated. The analysis shows that, when the quota regime is not internationally transferable, intermediate input trade substitutes for final good trade. In these circumstances, the distortions are lower than expected. International quota transfer increases world welfare proportionally to quota rent gap. Welfare distribution is also conditioned by commodity terms of trade and, particularly, by the outcome of the intermediate good price.


Issue Date:
2002
Publication Type:
Conference Paper/ Presentation
DOI and Other Identifiers:
Record Identifier:
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/24851
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/24851
Total Pages:
17
Series Statement:
Contributed Paper




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2020-10-28

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