Action Filename Size Access Description License
Show more files...


Auctions are common mechanisms for identifying prices and suppliers of commodities and are particularly important in agricultural marketing. Information asymmetries among bidders may be ameliorated over time through some form of learning. In this study, we incorporate prior decisions to participate, information from previous auctions, and firm-specific attributes to explain both the decision to bid and the level of the bid. Our analysis uses data from Egyptian oilseed tenders, an important market both for oilseeds and tendering. Because of the unbalanced nature of the panel data, we are able to evaluate the effects of signals received from previous tenders. We find that firms learn from previous auctions and can gain an informational advantage through some form of representation (e.g., by having an agent and/or direct sales agent to the country). Our results provide strong evidence that learning-by-doing affects the decision to participate and that learning affects the bid value. We also find that firms use outcomes of previous auctions to update information in both their decisions to participate in a market as well as determining the bid level. Finally, we find that firms with representation have a higher probability of participating in auctions and some evidence that they submit higher bids (earning higher returns).


Downloads Statistics

Download Full History