The focus of this paper is on the design of instrument variables (in the mode of payment for ecosystem services: PES) to achieve optimal service provision (ESS) at farming community level. These services shall improve production by reducing costs as public good and divert farmers’ interest from using chemical inputs. In other words, preferring less costly nature compared to inputs purchased from the market is a vision. Apparently this depends on farm types and it must be shown how services can be evaluated to set priorities. We work with shadow prices. ESSs are built around biodiversity BD, its value and we may see disservices. To solve problems we suggest a programming approach. Then farmers providing ESSs are compensated and money has to be raised from farmers benefitting. The approach delineates interest functions and helps to simulate quasimarket coordination under governance elucidated as actively promoting habitats for ESS. Instruments are outlined with regards public management for habitat provision, assuring ESS, which results in spatial organisations. They include land set aside for field margins (wildflowers), explicit outline of nature elements (hedges, etc.) and waivers on input use (reduced pesticides). We present the theoretical background for such farm level analysis in a cultural landscape where managers can address farm and field levels individually. In order to procure needed finance for payment on the one hand and to use this money efficiently on the other hand, farmers should be addressed as users and providers.


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