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Abstract
The focus of this paper is on the design of instrument variables (in the mode of
payment for ecosystem services: PES) to achieve optimal service provision (ESS) at farming
community level. These services shall improve production by reducing costs as public
good and divert farmers’ interest from using chemical inputs. In other words, preferring
less costly nature compared to inputs purchased from the market is a vision. Apparently
this depends on farm types and it must be shown how services can be evaluated to
set priorities. We work with shadow prices. ESSs are built around biodiversity BD, its
value and we may see disservices. To solve problems we suggest a programming approach.
Then farmers providing ESSs are compensated and money has to be raised from farmers
benefitting. The approach delineates interest functions and helps to simulate quasimarket
coordination under governance elucidated as actively promoting habitats for ESS.
Instruments are outlined with regards public management for habitat provision,
assuring ESS, which results in spatial organisations. They include land set aside for field
margins (wildflowers), explicit outline of nature elements (hedges, etc.) and waivers on
input use (reduced pesticides). We present the theoretical background for such farm level
analysis in a cultural landscape where managers can address farm and field levels individually.
In order to procure needed finance for payment on the one hand and to use this
money efficiently on the other hand, farmers should be addressed as users and providers.