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Abstract

El caracter comunal del aqua de riego have que su asignacion eficiente no se produzca a traves del meracdo sino mediante otro tipo de instituciones mas especificas. Estas logran su eficacia integrando la negociacion y la cooperacion entre los agentes implicados y dando cabida a sus multiples objectivos y diversidad de intereses. Por tanto, el paradigma neoclasico de los mercados de competencia perfecta no asegura las garantias de fiabilidad y itulidad deseables para el analisis economico del aqua de riego. Por ello, se aboga por otro marco teorico alternativo que, resolviendo controversias, sea plenamente aceptado y represente mejor los verdaderos mecanismos que determinan la asignacion eficiente del recurso. As a result of the communal character of irrigation water, the efficient allocation of water does not occur through the market, but through the effective operation of other specific institutions. These achieve their efficiency by integrating the cooperation and negotiation of the agents involved, allowing the match between their multiple objectives and interests. Therefore, the neoclassical paradigm of perfectly competitive markets does not ensure the reliability and utility guarantees desirable for economic analysis of irrigation water. Thus, there is a need of an alternative theoretical framework that, resolving disputes, can be fully accepted and can better represent the real mechanisms that determine the efficient allocation of this resource.

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