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Abstract
Using micro level data from Cameroon this paper applies the theories of intrahousehold
bargaining to models in which female farmers decide whether to take up cocoa marketing
on their own or to rely on others to sell the product. We analyze the effect of marketing
on control over the proceeds. We find that controlling both production and marketing
provides higher bargaining power over proceeds compared to a situation in which the
farmer participates only in production and delegate the task of marketing to another
family member. Our data also indicate that in the cocoa sector of Cameroon, female
farmers’ market participation is hindered by existing price discrimination, which in turn
reduces their intrahousehold bargaining power. In other words, participating female
farmers receive much lower prices for their produce than participating males. To generate
higher revenue, female farmers hand over the marketing responsibility to a male in the
family. Such non-participation results in lower control over the proceeds by the female
farmer, as the individual doing the marketing can now claim a higher share in the
revenue. Additionally we find that collective marketing contributes to eliminating price
discrimination and promoting female market participation and thus their control over
proceeds.