Creating WTO Law by Stealth: GSP Conditionalities and the EC - Tariff Preferences Case

The WTO is witnessing an increasing intrusion of its remit into areas that hitherto were the preserve of the state. This makes the legitimacy of its law creation process critical. The article engages in analyses of the conditionalities in developed countries’ Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) schemes, notably those of the EU. It argues that the maintenance of conditionalities in developed countries’ GSP schemes can result in extra regulatory burdens for developing countries and can have the effect of creating WTO law by stealth. The analyses centre on the Appellate Body decision in the EC - Tariff Preferences case.


Issue Date:
2013
Publication Type:
Journal Article
DOI and Other Identifiers:
1496-5208 (Other)
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/161438
Published in:
Estey Journal of International Law and Trade Policy, Volume 14, Number 2
Page range:
133-144
Total Pages:
12
Series Statement:
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy
Volume 14, Number 2, Summer 2013




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2018-01-22

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