An Empirical Investigation of the Linkages between Government Payments and Farmland Leasing Arrangements

This article investigates the impacts of decoupled and coupled program payments on farmland rental contract choices for a subset of U.S. crop farms using a principal-agent model.We consider cash and share contracts as well as hybrid contracts, which represent an increasingly prominent feature of U.S. agriculture. The conceptual framework suggests that restrictions on payments between contracting parties are ineffective and induce an offsetting contractual rearrangement. Empirical results from a multinomial logit model confirm that government support programs have large, significant effects on contract choices and that these effects vary by types of programs.


Issue Date:
2011
Publication Type:
Journal Article
DOI and Other Identifiers:
Record Identifier:
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/119179
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/119179
Published in:
Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 36, 3
Page range:
536-551
Total Pages:
16




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2020-10-28

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