000090908 001__ 90908
000090908 005__ 20180122213043.0
000090908 037__ $$a831-2016-55373
000090908 041__ $$aen
000090908 084__ $$aJ
000090908 084__ $$aJ2
000090908 084__ $$aJ4
000090908 245__ $$aFamily Values and the Regulation of Labor
000090908 260__ $$c2010-06
000090908 269__ $$a2010-06
000090908 270__ $$malesina@fas.harvard.edu$$pAlesina,   Alberto
000090908 300__ $$a61
000090908 336__ $$aWorking or Discussion Paper
000090908 490__ $$aGC
000090908 490__ $$a56.2010
000090908 520__ $$aFlexible labor markets requires geographically mobile workers to be efficient. Otherwise, firms can take advantage of the immobility of workers and extract monopsony rents. In cultures with strong family ties, moving away from home is costly. Thus, individuals with strong family ties rationally choose regulated labor markets to avoid moving and limiting the monopsony power of firms, even though regulation generates lower employment and income. Empirically, we do find that individuals who inherit stronger family ties are less mobile, have lower wages, are less often employed and support more stringent labor market regulations. There are also positive cross-country correlations between the strength of family ties and labor market rigidities. Finally, we find positive correlations between labor market rigidities at the beginning of the twenty first century and family values prevailing before World War II, which suggests that labor market regulations have deep cultural roots.
000090908 542__ $$fLicense granted by Nancy Elera (nancy.elera@feem.it) on 2010-06-11T15:11:49Z (GMT):

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000090908 650__ $$aLabor and Human Capital
000090908 6531_ $$aFamily Values
000090908 6531_ $$aRegulation of Labor
000090908 6531_ $$aLabor Markets
000090908 700__ $$aAlesina, Alberto
000090908 700__ $$aAlgan, Yann
000090908 700__ $$aCahuc, Pierre
000090908 700__ $$aGiuliano, Paola
000090908 8564_ $$s498172$$uhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/90908/files/NDL2010-056.pdf
000090908 887__ $$ahttp://purl.umn.edu/90908
000090908 909CO $$ooai:ageconsearch.umn.edu:90908$$pGLOBAL_SET
000090908 912__ $$nSubmitted by Nancy Elera (nancy.elera@feem.it) on 2010-06-11T15:16:55Z
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  Previous issue date: 2010-06
000090908 982__ $$gFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)>Global Challenges Papers
000090908 980__ $$a831