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DAIRY FARM TENURE IN THE BIG SCRUB AREA OF THE RICHMOND-TWEED REGION.*

by

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1. SUMMARY.

In this article an attempt has been made to find the causes of the existing tenure pattern of dairy farms in the "Big Scrub" area of the Richmond-Tweed Region and to describe the effects of this pattern. The information used was obtained from interviews with a random sample of 72 dairy operators in the region.

1. *The Existing Tenure Pattern.* Of all operators 34.7 per cent. were owners, 25 per cent. were managerial partners, 12.5 per cent. were tenants and 27.8 per cent. were sharefarmers. Forty per cent. of the farms were therefore operated by a person who did not own the farm. Twenty-seven per cent. of the survey operators were non-owners who were not related to their landlord.

Because they did not have written agreements with their landlords, two-thirds of the non-owner operators could not invoke the provisions of the Agricultural Holdings Act, i.e., they had no legal security of tenure.

*The author desires to thank Mr. F. H. Gruen for helpful criticism during the preparation of this article.

2. *Causes of the Existing Tenure Pattern.* Since 1892 tenancy has increased from nought to 40 per cent. among the farms studied. Whilst tenant farms were originally the most important type of non-owner operatorship, since 1937 sharefarms have become of major importance in the tenancy group.

The prime cause of tenancy has probably been the hard physical work associated with dairy farming which provides an impetus to operators to retire from active physical participation once the goal of farm ownership has been attained. The secondary cause of the increase in tenancy has been the cumulative effect of natural forces such as age, death and variations in the family composition of owner-operators and the individual desires of their children.

The effects of varying economic conditions have been superimposed on this pattern of increasing tenancy. During times of depressed butter prices tenancy formation has slowed down. In these periods most farm incomes were too small to provide a sufficient rent for an owner-operator to live on if he should retire. In periods of prosperity when farm returns were high enough to induce owner-operators to retire and lease their farms the rate of tenancy formation has been accelerated. In periods of exceptional prosperity, such as the period from 1948 to 1952, the pattern of increasing tenancy has been reversed, probably because many sharefarmers and tenants became sufficiently prosperous to be able to buy their own farms.

Landlords in recent years have had greater bargaining power in the leased-farms market than prospective lessees. This fact, combined with seeking of maximum profits by landlords and the breaking down of local prejudice against sharefarming, has led to a relative increase in the proportion of sharefarms and the decline in the proportion of tenant-operated farms.

3. *Agricultural Effects.* Although it has often been asserted that non-owner operatorship leads to exploitation of farms, there was no evidence among survey farms to substantiate this claim. However, sharefarmers and tenants were found to be less efficient in terms of production per man and production per cow than owner-operators. This was probably due to the transient nature of their tenancy situations which prevented the implementation of a continuous programme of herd improvement. Differences between tenure groups with regard to intensity of resource use and production per acre were not significant.

4. *Sociological Aspects.* Non-owner operators unrelated to their landlord had a lower standard of living than other operators. Their homes were older, less attractive and contained fewer amenities, whilst it was more often necessary for their wives to assist in the milking shed. Also, they had enjoyed fewer vacations than those operators who were related to their landlord. Whilst four out of the 50 operators related to their landlord had a child at boarding school, none of the operators unrelated to their landlord had children attending boarding school.

There was no evidence of social discrimination between the operating groups. Due to the differences in wealth between the groups, such discrimination might have been expected. However, there was evidence that those lessees who were unrelated to their landlord were regarded

as socially inferior by their landlord, who was often unwilling to provide household facilities comparable with those on owner-operated farms or farms where the lessee was related to the landlord.

Except that families on partnership farms were older than other tenure group families, there were no significant differences in family size or composition between the tenure groups.

2. INTRODUCTION.

A land-use survey was conducted by the Division of Marketing and Agricultural Economics during 1953 on 72 dairy farms, comprising 6.5 per cent. of the farm universe, in the red basaltic soil or "Big Scrub" area of the Richmond-Tweed Region. A detailed factual account of this group of farms was published in a previous issue of this journal.¹

Because the tenure arrangement under which a farm is operated is an important factor in determining the income earned and the degree of security enjoyed, and hence influences the standard of living, production methods and plans of the farm operator, an understanding of the tenure pattern in the most important butter producing area of New South Wales is desirable. The objects of this study are:

- (a) To describe farm tenure conditions in the "Big Scrub" area.
- (b) To explain the cause of the existing tenure pattern.
- (c) To study some of the agricultural and sociological effects of this tenure pattern.

The survey area was chosen mainly for three reasons. Firstly, the area is one of the principal dairy regions in New South Wales. Secondly, it presents one of the few areas of any significant size which is comparatively uniform in terms of soil type, topography, land use and historical development. Thirdly, the survey would complement current technical research on pasture and soil fertility problems being carried out in the area.

3. DEFINITION OF TERMS.

The following is a brief summary of the sense in which certain terms explaining the tenure pattern have been used in this study.

Operator: A person who was responsible for the day-to-day management of the farm. In all cases the operator was also a member of the farm work force.

Owner-Operator: A person who owned the farm which he operated.

Partnership: A situation where more than one person was associated with the day-to-day management of the farm. Where specified these persons also shared risks and profits.

Tenant: A non-owner operator who paid a fixed cash rent to the landlord.

Sharefarmer: A non-owner who paid a proportion, agreed upon beforehand, of farm proceeds to the landlord. Thus a sharefarmers' rent varied with farm income.

¹ See "Dairy Farming on the Red Basaltic Soils of the Richmond-Tweed Region", *Review of Marketing and Agricultural Economics*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (March, 1954).

Family: When used as an adjective, it designates the existence of relationship between the farm operator and his landlord. Thus, a family tenant.

When used as a noun, it designates the members of the farm household who were related to the farm operator. Thus, the farm family.

4. THE EXISTING TENURE PATTERN.

Farm land in the "Big Scrub" area is owned under freehold title. Owners may use or dispose of their land under conditions of maximum freedom. They may farm it themselves or they may lease it under a variety of terms ranging from a cash rent to a share rent.




Fig. 1.—Tenure Status of Survey Farm Operators.

Tenure Status.

For the 72 survey farms Figure I shows the percentage of operators whose tenure status fell within each of the four basic categories of *owner-operator*, *partnership*, *tenant* or *sharefarmer* as at 30th June, 1952. Each class is also divided on the basis of whether or not the operator belonged to the same family as the farm owner. Of all operators 34.7 per cent. were owners, 25 per cent. were partners, 12.5 per cent. were tenants and 27.8 per cent. were sharefarmers. Forty per cent. of the sample farms were therefore operated by a person who did not own the farm. Approximately three out of every ten operators were not related to the farm owner. Of these, 65 per cent. were sharefarmers.² Two of the sharefarmers interviewed were sub-lessees. In both cases the intermediary was a tenant related to the sharefarmer but not to the land owner.

TABLE I.

Average Scale of Operation by Tenure Groups During 1951-52.

Average Farm Characteristic.	Unit.	Tenure Group.			
		Owner-Operator (25 farms).	Partnership (18 farms).	Tenant (9 farms).	Sharefarmer (20 farms).
Area	Acres	126	163	99	154
Herd Size ...	Cows Milked ...	52	69	49	61
Labour Force	Adult Male Equivalents ...	1.43	2.30	1.37	1.83
Production ...	lb. Commercial Butter ...	7,581	9,247	5,876	7,586

Scale of Operation.

On the average, partnership farms were the largest. They were followed by share, owner and tenant operated farms in that order. Table I shows the average area, herd size, labour force and butter production of survey farms during the 1951-52 season. Herd size, labour force and production are mainly determined by the area of the farm. Within the tenant and sharefarm groups no significant differences in the scale of operation existed between family and non-family farms.

Tenure Agreements.

On 30 of the 72 sample farms the tenure arrangement was such that a detailed written agreement could be said to be unnecessary. This applied to the 25 owner-operated units and the five family partnerships where the non-owner partners were paid a weekly wage.

Details of the type of agreements in force on the remaining 42 farms are given in Table II which distinguishes between verbal agreements, contracts supported by a vaguely written agreement and those arrangements which were expressed in detailed written contracts.

² A detailed classification of the tenure status of survey farm operators is given in the Appendix.

TABLE II.
Number of Verbal, Vaguely Written and Detailed Written Agreements on 42 Farms.

Type of Agreement.	Partnerships.		Tenants.		Sharefarmers.		Total.
	Family.	Non-Family.	Family.	Non-Family.	Family.	Non-Family.	
Verbal	No. 9	No. ...	No. 2	No. 1	No. 5	No. 11	No. 28
Vaguely Written	1	2	1	...	4
Detailed Written	3	1	1	4	1	2	12
Total	12	1	4	7*	7†	13	44

* Includes the two tenants who were intermediaries between sharefarmers and farm owners.

† Includes the two sharefarmers who had tenant intermediaries.

Only one-third of the leased farms were operated under a written agreement. Of these, three-quarters had detailed contracts in the sense that they contained clauses dealing with building repairs, noxious weeds, cultivation, access of the landlord to the property, duration of tenancy, period of notice and other matters of a particular nature.

Written agreements were found mainly among non-family tenants—probably because the agreement is the only measure of control a landowner retains over his farm asset when it is leased to a non-family tenant. With family tenants there is a degree of family control while with sharefarmers the landlord has some control through his ownership of the stock and plant.

TABLE III.
Duration of Agreements on 42 Non-Owner Operated Farms.

Length of Agreement.	Number.
Partnerships—	
No fixed period	13
Tenants—	
No fixed period by a non-relative of landlord	3*
Three years	3
Five years	3
No fixed period by a relative of landlord	2
Sharefarmers—	
No fixed period by a non-relative of landlord	9
One year	3
Four years	1
Until one party dies	1
No fixed period by a relative of landlord	6

* Includes two farms where the tenant had engaged a sharefarmer to operate the farm.

Non-family sharefarmers had the smallest proportion of written agreements, 11 out of 13 having only a verbal contract. Most "Big Scrub" sharefarmers who have no family ties with their landlords are working their farms without that degree of security provided by a written agreement.³

Duration of Agreements.

In only 11 of the 44 situations where tenancy agreements were in vogue was a definite term of tenure stipulated. Thus three-quarters of the non-owner operators would be classed as having tenancies at will. Of the 33 farmers in this category, 20 belonged to the same family as the landlord and operated their farms on the assumption of continued occupancy. The other 13 were subject to short notice to quit. Where a definite term was recorded it ranged from one year to the rather specific indefinite period terminated by "when either the owner or sharefarmer should die." Table III lists the duration of tenancy agreements on the 42 non-owner operated farms.

Profit Sharing Arrangements.

Agreements of this nature were found in two of the basic tenure categories: partnerships and sharefarms. In general, items of a capital nature were the landlords' responsibility and did not enter into share agreements. Details of the sharing of receipts and expenses on 33 sample farms are given in Table IV. The contracts show variation both between and within groups. At the same time two basic types of arrangement can be distinguished. They are those in which the apportioning is on an equal share basis and those where the landlords portion is two-thirds. All of the contracts vary slightly from either of these two types, and, it is interesting to note, usually in favour of the landlord. This is explicable because in recent years landlords have had greater bargaining power than prospective sharefarmers.

Tenant Rents.

As mentioned previously nine of the 72 farms studied were operated by tenants whilst on two farms there was a tenant intermediary between a sharefarmer-operator and the farm owner. Table V shows the annual farm rental and, for comparative purposes, the rent per acre per annum for each of the tenant farms. On the average, family tenants paid a slightly higher rent per acre for their farms—£2.07—compared with non-family tenants—£1.9.

³ A written agreement is necessary before the parties to a share-farm agreement can invoke the provisions of the New South Wales Agricultural Holdings Act.

TABLE V.
Annual Farm Rental and Rent per Acre per Annum of 11 Tenant Farms.

Relationship between Tenant and Farm Owner.	Annual Rental.	Rent per Acre per annum.	Relationships between Tenant and Farm Owner.	Annual Rental.	Rent per Acre per annum.
Non-family * ..	£ 159 240 300 192 96 124 165	£ 1·6 1·6 1·9 1·9 1·9 2·0 2·4	Family	£ 192 192 240 324	£ 1·7 1·9 2·0 2·7

* Includes two farms where the tenant had engaged a sharefarmer to operate the farm.

5. CAUSES OF THE EXISTING TENURE PATTERN.

Owner-operatorship of farms has been an accepted value in the agricultural development of New South Wales. As a means to this end most farm land has been settled under freehold title. The "Big Scrub" area was no exception in this regard and in the early years of settlement all farms were owner-operated. But, as Figure 2 shows, since 1892 tenancy has increased from nought to 40 per cent. among the farms studied and the tenancies themselves have become more complicated with the passage of time. What has caused these complexities in the tenure pattern and what is likely to happen to it in the future?

The "Big Scrub" area was one of the most fertile dairy areas developed in New South Wales. It was opened up for dairying only in the late 1860's. The greatest influx of settlers took place in the 1880's and pioneering was not completed until the 1890's. Of the operators interviewed five were sons of original settlers while some original settlers are still living. For these reasons the existing tenure pattern must be regarded as an immature one. This, however, does not prevent the evolution of the present tenure condition being taken as an example of what happens when good dairy farm land is held in freehold title over a period of time

Table VI and Figure 2 show the tenure pattern existing at five-year intervals since 1892 on the survey holdings. Two phenomena are apparent and should be distinguished. They are, firstly, the increasing importance of operation by non-owners (i.e. tenants and sharefarmers) and secondly, the decline of tenant operation and the increasing importance of sharefarmers since 1937.




Fig. 2.—The Tenure Pattern of Survey Farms at five year intervals since 1892.

TABLE VI.
The Tenure Pattern of Sample Farms at Five-Year Intervals since 1892.

Year.	Total Number of Holdings.	Number of Holdings in each Tenure Group.				
		Owner-operator,*	Tenant.	Share-farmer.	Unsettled.	Unknown.
	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.
1892	91	74	11	6
1897	91	80	5	6
1902	90	79	1	1	3	6
1907	89	77	4	...	2	6
1912	88	74	6	1	1	6
1917	88	71	10	2	...	5
1922	87	62	14	6	...	5
1927	85	61	13	6	...	5
1932	85	49	23	8	...	5
1937	84	46	24	10	...	4
1942	80	42	17	19	...	2
1947	76	36	14	25	...	1
1952	72	43	9	20

* Includes partnerships.

The Increase in Non-Owner Operatorship.

There are three complementary causes of the increasing proportion of non-owner operators. They are:

- (a) The nature of the work involved in dairy farming.
- (b) Natural factors such as death, family size and composition, and individual desire.
- (c) Economic conditions.

The Nature of Dairy Farm Work.

Dairy farming necessitates constant work of a routine nature, often under disagreeable conditions. It is this hard physical work which, by providing the impetus to operators to retire from active physical participation once the goal of farm ownership has been attained, is the prime cause of tenancy. Thus sharefarming is also common in the wheat industry but relatively uncommon in the sheep industry.

Natural Causes.

Death and the encroachment of age are important forces to be reckoned with in the evolution of the tenure pattern on the survey farms. As a farmer advances in years he gradually finds he is less capable of operating his farm. He will retire and, if an owner, may either lease or sell the farm. So the advancement of age inevitably causes a transfer of at least operatorship and in some cases ownership.

By 1952 the ownership of the majority of survey holdings had changed hands at least three times while most had had at least four operators since they were originally settled. (See Table VII). On one farm in the space of 62 years there had been nine operators and seven owners. In the same period 26 farms had had but two owners while two had been operated by only two farmers.




Fig. 3.—Shows the percentage of Original Settlers operating sample farms at five-year intervals since 1892.

TABLE VII.

Number of Owners and Operators of Survey Farms since Settlement.

Number of Owners or Operators.	Farms with Various Numbers of—		Numbers of Owners or Operators.	Farms with Various Numbers of—	
	Owners.	Operators.		Owners.	Operators.
2 ...	26	2	7 ...	1	...
3 ...	33	21	8	3
4 ...	9	31	9	1
5 ...	3	10	Unknown	6	6
6	4			

The farmers who pioneered the "Big Scrub" area formed an agricultural community having originally 100 per cent. owner operatorship of land. It was not necessary for them to climb a local agricultural ladder.⁴ They were able to purchase their farms outright or on terms from the Government. As the age of the original settlers increased and death occurred transfers of ownership took place. Some of the new owners did not wish to work farms themselves and thus created a group of non-owner operators. Figure 3 shows the decline in the number of original

⁴The concept of the agricultural ladder is that a prospective farmer gains experience and accumulates the necessary funds to purchase a farm and the working capital to operate it by advancing from an unpaid family labourer or hired hand to sharefarmer, tenant, and finally owner. It is noteworthy that this concept involves tenancy formation. See H. C. and A. D. Taylor, *The Story of Agricultural Economics*, Iowa State College Press, Ames, Iowa, 1952, p. 820.

settler operators. The fact that it is relatively only a few years since the last original settler operators ceased farming emphasises the fact that the present sample tenure pattern may still be capable of changing quite radically.

Just as death has induced tenure complications, so the fact that the number, age and sex distribution of farmers' children differs has also caused changes in the tenure pattern. Some children are born early in marriage, others late. Some marriages produce no children, others only daughters. The effects of these commonplace facts are cumulative. Table VIII shows the number and sex distribution of children born to those sample farm owner-operators over the age of 55, i.e., whose productive marriages could be considered complete. It is noteworthy that in none of these 17 cases was there only one child, so that in all cases there would be some complexity in the passage of the farm to the oncoming owner.

TABLE VIII.
Number and Sex Distribution of the Children of 17 Owner-Operators over the Age of 55 Years.

Number of Children.		Number of Owner-operators.	Number of Children.		Number of Owner-operators.
Sons.	Daughters.		Sons.	Daughters.	
Nil.	Nil.	1	3	Nil.	1
1	1	2	3	1	1
1	2	1	4	2	1
1	3	1	4	3	1
2	Nil.	1	5	4	1
2	1	1	5	6	1
2	3	2	6	2	1
2	4	1			

In cases where there is only one heir he or she may operate, lease or sell the farm. If there are a number of heirs and they desire the farm to continue as a single unit, it would be necessary for one to buy the shares of the others or for the farm to be leased or sold. Alternatively they may sub-divide the farm among themselves with some family members becoming owner-operators and others lessors.

By nature, individuals have different desires. Some farm children do not wish to become farmers, some non-farm children do. Among people who take up farming some will always strive to own a farm, others will be content to farm as tenants or sharefarmers. Four of the seven non-family tenants and five of the 15 non-family sharefarmers interviewed did not desire to become farm owners. In those cases where a person who does not desire to farm inherits a holding he will either sell or lease it. In the majority of such cases the farms have actually been leased and not sold. The children of such absentee owners are less likely to wish to farm the property when they in turn inherit it than if they were raised on the farm so that the holding will tend to remain a rented one. Thus conditions conducive to tenancy formation need to occur only once to leave a relatively permanent effect. Farms C. and D. in Figure 4 show this result. The tenure histories of




Fig. 4.—The Tenure History of Five Sample Farms.




Fig. 5.—Showing the relationship between Butter Price and Net Tenancy Formation in five-year periods since 1892.

two farms (A and B) which followed a simple pattern are also illustrated. There were few such farms among the 72 studied. Example E illustrates a more complex tenure history wherein amalgamation, tenancy, private purchase and inheritance have operated.

The aggregate effect of these natural forces of age, death, family composition and individual desires acting on an original system of complete owner-operatorship were that the tenure pattern has been transformed into one in which tenancy has become increasingly significant.

Economic Conditions

Added to the effects of these natural forces will be the influence of general conditions of prosperity and depression.

In Figure 5 the price per pound of butter produced in New South Wales is used as an indicator of general periods of relative prosperity and depression in the dairy industry. Except for the period 1947 to 1952 when, due to inflationary price rises, the condition of prosperity is exaggerated, the butter price may be considered a reliable measure of short-run general conditions.

In so far as dairymen and prospective dairy farmers are probably influenced more, in the short run, by changes in the money price of butter, than by changes in the relation between price and cost, this index is advantageous, except, as stated above, for the unprecedented period of price rises from 1947 to 1952.

Net Tenancy Formation.

The transfers of farm operatorship from owners to non-owners and *vice-versa* which have occurred on sample farms since 1892 are shown in Table IX. The net formation of tenancies is obtained by subtracting non-owner to owner transfers from owner to non-owner transfers.

TABLE IX.

Net Tenancy Formation on the Sample Farms since 1892.

Period.	Operational transfers from—		Net Tenancy Formation.
	Owner-operator to Tenancy.	Tenancy to Owner-operator.	
Years.	No.	No.	No.
1893-97
1898-02	2	...	2
1903-07	6	...	6
1908-12	2	...	2
1913-17	6	3	3
1918-22	10	1	9
1923-27	1	3	-2
1928-32	12	3	9
1933-37	10	4	6
1938-42	7	4	3
1943-47	7	2	5
1948-52	6	12	-6
1893-1952	69	32	37

Depression.

Except for the period 1892 to 1902 when the sample farms had not been settled long enough for the natural forces previously discussed to have caused tenancy, Figure 5 shows that net tenancy formation has always declined in times of depressed butter prices. When the butter price is low, most farm incomes are too small to provide a sufficient rent for an owner-operator to live on if he should retire.

Prosperity.

In times of prosperity there are two conflicting tendencies. Firstly, farm rents will be high enough to induce owner-operators to retire and lease their farms. Secondly, sharefarmers and tenants will be in a better financial position to buy farms. Only in the period 1947-52, when an unprecedented rise in price occurred⁶ has this latter tendency predominated. (In these five years more tenants and sharefarmers became owner-operators than in any prior fifteen-year period). In more normal periods of relative prosperity, such as 1917-22 and the late 'twenties, the former tendency prevailed. It may be that only in periods of exceptional prosperity is the number of non-owners able to buy farms sufficient to reverse the natural trend of increasing tenancy. Inconclusive evidence of this is that in the period 1948-52 the turnover of farms by sale was greater than in any prior five year period. (See Table X).

It is noteworthy that, as calculated from Table X, only 14 per cent. of all sales occurring since 1893 were to absentee landlords. Thus sales of land to absentee owners do not explain the 40 per cent. of tenancy present in 1952. This discrepancy can be explained only by the retirement of owner operators and the inheritance of farms by persons not willing to work their farms themselves.

TABLE X.
Farm Sales.

Period.	Farms eligible for Sale.	Farms sold to—		Total Sales.	
		Owner-operators.	Absentee Landlords.	No.	Per cent.
	No.	No.	No.	No.	Per cent.
1893-97	80
1898-02	81	7	1	8	10
1903-07	81	3	2	5	6
1908-12	81	9	...	9	11
1913-17	83	7	1	8	10
1918-22	82	9	...	9	11
1923-27	80	7	...	7	9
1928-32	80	5	3	8	10
1933-37	80	7	1	8	10
1938-42	78	6	2	8	10
1943-47	75	5	1	6	8
1948-52	72	10	...	10	14

⁶ Whilst the butter price more than doubled between 1947 and 1952, it is considered that the profitability of dairying in the area in real terms increased by only 25 to 35 per cent. More than half of the farmers interviewed considered that there had been a 50 per cent. increase in local dairy profitability since 1947.

The Increase in Share Tenancies.

As Figure 2 indicates, the proportion of tenants within the tenancy group has declined relative to sharefarmers. In 1922, 70 per cent. of non-owner operators were tenants whilst in 1952 only 31 per cent. were tenants. In the same period sharefarmers increased from 30 per cent. of the tenancy group to 69 per cent. There are three main reasons for this change—the seeking of a maximum return on their farm asset by landlords, the influence of local custom and the increasing demand for farms by prospective lessees.

The Profit Motive.

Under existing conditions landlords receive more income from their farms when they are share-rented than when they are cash-rented. Table XI compares the rent per acre received by 17 sharefarm and nine tenant farm landlords for the year 1951-52. The fact that the sharefarm landlords had to pay a portion of cash expenses has been taken into account. In only two cases were the share and the cash rent per acre approximately equal. The average cash rent per acre was £1.96 whilst the average share rent was £5.70 per acre. When account is taken of the custom that on sharefarms the landlord supplies the stock, the average cost of which was £2.6 per acre per year,^o the net share rent return to the landlord was £3.1 per acre. This was £1.1 per acre higher than tenant farm rents. A striking illustration of the relative advantage to the landlord of a share lease is the fact that two tenants had assumed the function of landlords by sub-leasing their farms to sharefarmers.

TABLE XI.
Comparison of the Rent per Acre Paid by 17 Sharefarmers and Nine Tenants in 1951-52.*

Rent per acre.	Share-farmers.†	Tenants.	Rent per acre.	Share-farmers.†	Tenants.
£	No.	No.	£	No.	No.
1-1.99	...	7	7-7.99	1	...
2-2.99	2	2
3-3.99	5	...	11-11.99	1	...
4-4.99	4
5-5.99	3	...	13-13.99	1	...
6-6.99			

* Information was not available for three farms.

† Account has been taken of the payment of a portion of cash expenses by the landlord but not of the fact that stock are supplied by the landlord.

Local Custom.

In matters such as tenure practices and landlord-lessee relationship, local custom exerts considerable influence, especially in a community such as the "Big Scrub" which is relatively homogenous. Under such conditions non-compliance with local custom can bring disapproval. In

^o Based on the average sharefarm of 154 acres with 61 cows valued at £40 per head with a life expectancy of six years.

the early days sharefarming was to some extent frowned upon. This disapproval has gradually been broken down so that today the employment of sharefarmers is accepted as normal procedure.

Increasing Demand for Farms.

Coastal farmers have always considered the Richmond red soil area to be very good dairying country. This, coupled with the normal increase in demand for farms caused by population growth and periods of relative profitability in the dairy industry, has ensured a continuous and increasing demand pressure for dairy farms in the region. Landlords under these conditions have had an increasing degree of power in the leased farm market. This, combined with the seeking of maximum profit and the breaking down of local prejudices against sharefarms, has caused the increasing proportion of sharefarms compared with tenant holdings.

The major factor operating against these three forces is the family bond. A landlord may forgo maximum profits if the lessee is his son. This explains why four out of nine tenant-operators (44 per cent.) were sons of the farm owner but only five out of 18 sharefarmers (28 per cent.) belonged to the same family as the landowner. (See Figure 1.)

6. AGRICULTURAL EFFECTS OF THE TENURE PATTERN.

It has often been asserted that tenancy is largely responsible for the bad management which characterizes many dairy farms.⁷ Theoretically, such an influence might be expected because of two basic differences between the tenure groups. Firstly, compared with owners, the tenure situations of non-owners are transient, and secondly, an operator receiving only a share of farm income may behave differently to an (owner or tenant) operator marketing the whole of the farm production.

The Transient Nature of Tenancy Situations.

There are two reasons why the tenure situations of non-owners are transient. In the first place the majority operate under agreements which provide no tenure security. Of the 31 share and tenant operators interviewed, 20 had only tenancies at will. Also, the climbing of the agricultural ladder often necessitates moves from farm to farm.

Exploitation.

Because of their tenure insecurity and the fact that they do not own their farms, coupled with a desire to maximize income, non-owners have less reason than have owner-operators to follow a course of management which safeguards future fertility and minimizes depreciation of farm assets. They may pursue an exploitative short-range management policy. If the lessee is related to the farm owner, and expects that eventually he will inherit the farm, the inclination to exploit may be mitigated.

⁷For example: Final Report of the Select Committee on the Conditions and Prospects of the Agricultural Industry, N.S.W. Government Printer, Sydney, 1921, p. 72.

Report of the Federal Dairy Investigation Committee, Government Printer, Canberra, 1930, Part I, p. 97.

A. W. Moodie and J. R. Butler, *Farm Tenancy in New South Wales*, New South Wales Department of Agriculture publication, Sydney, 1945, p. 7.

Exploitation follows a pattern of overstocking, leading to a decline in soil fertility which over a period is reflected in decreasing production. Long-term figures of production per farm were not obtainable. However, in the "Big Scrub" area, where dairy production is pasture produced, a comparative measure of farm exploitation is obtainable from the production decrease caused by a drought. The 1951-52 season was a very bad one, the 1950-51 a very good one. Rainfall at Lismore during the latter season was 72 inches, whilst during the former it was only 26 inches.

Using only those farms which had belonged to the same tenure group for ten years or more, the decline in production in 1951-52 compared with 1950-51 has been calculated as a percentage of 1950-51 production for each tenure group, as shown in Table XII. On this basis there were no significant differences between groups. Contrary to expectation, the average decline on owner-operated farms (33.2 per cent.) was greater than that on sharefarms (30.9 per cent.) and tenant-operated farms (29 per cent.).

TABLE XII.

Decline in Butter Production Between 1950-51 and 1951-52 as a Percentage of Production in 1950-51 by Tenure Groups.

Tenure Group.	Number of Farms.	Production Decline.	Tenure Group.	Number of Farms.	Production Decline.
	No.	Per cent.		No.	Per cent.
Owner-operators	11	33.2	Tenants	5	29.0
Partnerships ...	3	28.1	Sharefarmers ...	10	30.9

Another measure of the exploitativeness of management is the stocking rate. In calculating stocking rates, a cow has been taken as the standard grazing unit. Numbers of other stock have been corrected to the approximate grazing equivalent of a cow in accordance with the following scale:— Heifers in calf, bulls and light horses have all been taken as equivalent to one grazing unit, other weaned heifers have been rated at one-half of a grazing unit, unweaned young stock at one-tenth of a grazing unit, and draught horses at $1\frac{1}{2}$ grazing units. On this basis, sharefarmers had the lowest stocking rate and tenants the highest. Average stocking rates were as follows:—

Owner-operators	2.12 acres per cow unit.
Family partnerships	2.05 acres per cow unit.
Tenants	1.90 acres per cow unit.
Sharefarmers	2.17 acres per cow unit.

There were no significant differences in stocking rates between tenure groups. It must be concluded that there is no evidence that those sample farms operated by non-owners were managed exploitatively in comparison with owner-operated farms.

Efficiency of Management.

Although there were no fundamental differences in the type of management practised on the different tenure group farms in the sample, there were real differences in managerial efficiency between owner-operated and rented farms.

The measures of efficiency studied were production per adult male equivalent, production per acre, production per cow and degree of farm subdivision. The first three measures are indicators of overall efficiency whilst subdivision is a particular management practice which is important in the "Big Scrub" area where production is mainly from the pasture. Apparently significant differences⁸ between owner and non-owner groups were found in production per adult male equivalent and per cow. Because the number of cows milked per adult male equivalent in each tenure group was very nearly the same (see page 260), differences in production per labour unit must be due to differences in production per cow. Tenants probably have poor cows (in terms of production compared with owner-operators' cows) because they cannot afford the best stock, and also because their transient tenure situation makes it more difficult to build up a good herd. On sharefarms the landlord is often unwilling to provide good stock whilst the sharefarmer may regard herd testing as an extravagance. Due also to the changes of operatorship on sharefarms, there is little chance to implement a long-range plan of herd improvement. In Table XIII the measures of efficiency and the standard errors of their means are shown.

TABLE XIII.

Averages of Production per Adult Male Equivalent, Production per Cow, Production per Acre and Subdivisional Score by Tenure Groups in 1951-52 Season.

Farm Tenure.	Average Production per A.M.E. and Standard Error of the Mean.	Average Production per Cow and Standard Error of the Mean.	Average Production per acre and Standard Error of the Mean.	Subdivisional Score.
Owner-operators	lb. C.B. 5490 ± 413	lb. C.B. 150 ± 6	lb. C.B. 62 ± 4	66
Family Partner-ships ...	4047 ± 321	132 ± 7	56 ± 3	67
Tenants ...	4020 ± 212	124 ± 5	56 ± 7	67
Sharefarmers ...	4184 ± 200	124 ± 4	52 ± 3	66

The Sharing Effect.

It has been suggested by Heady⁹ that sharefarming is likely to have an effect on the overall level of production from the farm and the intensity of resource use on the farm.

From marginal cost analysis it follows by definition that a sharefarmer who receives a share of gross income from a farm, but pays the majority of variable costs (when the cost of his own labour is

⁸ Exact tests of significance are difficult to apply due to the non-normality of the parent distributions and the variability in the magnitude of the standard errors. In dealing with normally distributed variables and standard errors of the same order, an approximate rule is that a difference between two means is significant if it exceeds three times the standard error of a mean. This test has been used as a rough guide in singling out real differences between the means.

⁹ See: Earl O. Heady, *Economics of Agricultural Production and Resource Allocation*, Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, 1952, p. 593.

taken into account) will not maximize net income at the same level of output as an owner-operator on the same farm. This may be stated in another way. The level of production where the irksomeness of work predominates over the extra return gained by working harder is lower for a sharefarmer than it is for an owner or tenant-operator because the sharefarmer is working for both himself and the landlord, whereas owner-operators are working only for themselves.

However, there were no significant differences in production per acre between share and owner or other operators. (See Table XIII.) The reasons why the sharing of production had no effect on the level of production on sharefarms are probably the insistence of landlords on a certain level of output, and the fact that since sharefarmers have lower incomes than owner-operators, they probably place a higher value on every extra pound earned than owner operators do.

Resource Use.

In typical sharefarming situations the landlord supplies the land and the fixed capital, and the sharefarmer supplies the labour and a share of the operating capital. The optimum combination of these resources would be obtained theoretically in the case of an efficient owner-operator. With a sharing arrangement the sharefarmer will desire the major contribution to production to come from the landlord's resources, whilst the landlord will desire the major contribution to come from the sharefarmer's labour. Sharefarmers therefore have an interest in working sharefarm properties at a lower level of intensity, provided they can obtain remuneration from other sources for that portion of their labour not used on the sharefarming property. However, in most cases this proviso does not apply. Also, the productive use of resources is largely under the control of the landlord who owns and controls the number of stock run. Thus the sharefarmer cannot affect the utilization of the land resources nor can he greatly influence labour use because the main physical work on a dairy farm is milking and the number of cows milked is controlled by the landlord. As shown below, the average number of cows milked per adult male equivalent was approximately the same for each tenure group.

Tenure Group.	Number of Cows Milked per A.M.E.	Tenure Group.	Number of Cows Milked per A.M.E.
Owner-operators	28.4	Tenants	28.8
Partnerships	28.6	Sharefarmers	28.7

However, sharefarmers can work less by not doing those chores which help to make the farm attractive. Why should they paint the bails or plant trees in the drive-way? That sharefarmers do not generally do this is obvious from the dilapidated appearance of many sharefarms, especially their buildings. (See Table XIV.)

7. SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE TENURE PATTERN.

Two characteristics of the existing tenure pattern are important sociologically. They are, firstly, differences in wealth between tenure groups and, secondly, the high proportion—33 per cent.—of non-owner operators who belonged to the same family as their landlord.

In general, owner-operators are the wealthiest and share-farmers the poorest of the tenure groups. Tenants occupy an intermediate position. Differences in wealth give rise to differences in living standards. To obtain evidence of any such differences that might exist between tenure groups, all survey operators were asked for information regarding their farm house, the size of their families, the education of their children, literature available for reading by the farm family, vacations taken within the last three years and participation by school-age children and the farm wife in routine farm work.

However, for obvious reasons, the sociological effects arising from these differences in wealth between the basic tenure groups are mitigated if the share or tenant-operator belongs to the same family as the farm owner. Because of this it is more pertinent to discuss such sociological aspects of the tenure pattern as living standards and the formation of social groups in terms of family and non-family farms, a family farm being one on which the operator owns the farm or is a son of the farm owner.

Social Discrimination.

It is common experience that within a community the richer groups often discriminate socially against poorer groups. However, in so far as expressions of opinion by the survey farmers and impressions gained by the survey interviewer may be correct, the Big Scrub dairy community is free of such group discrimination. There are probably two main reasons for this. Firstly, the actual differences in wealth between owner and non-owner operators may not be so great as to give rise to discrimination. Also, when an owner-operator has cleared his property of encumbrances and begins to reach a degree of wealth where discrimination might be expected, he will usually retire from dairying and sell or lease his farm. Secondly, there is a strong bond of common interest between owner and non-owner dairy farm operators. Both are doing exactly the same constant routine work, usually on adjoining properties so that social contact is easily made and maintained.

Some evidence, however, of discrimination against non-family farm operators by their landlords was found. More than half of such operators complained that their landlords regarded them as socially inferior. While they, the non-family operators, were expected (and often by virtue of their economic circumstances were compelled) to give of their best in operating the farm, their landlords felt in no way bound to maintain the farm house and other permanent improvements for which they were responsible in a condition comparable with such improvements on owner-operated farms. Rutherford in a survey of Lower North Coast dairy farms found a similar state of affairs¹⁰.

¹⁰See: J. Rutherford, "Further Aspects of Dairy Farming on the Lower North Coast", *Review of Marketing and Agricultural Economics*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (March, 1952), p. 83.

TABLE XIV.

Comparison of the Homes and Household Amenities on Family and Non-Family Farms.

Particulars of Dwelling.	Family Farms (56 dwellings).	Non-family Farms (22 dwellings).	All Farms (78 dwellings).
Age (years)	32	43	35
Period since renovated (years) ...	5	14	7
Period since roof painted (years) ...	8*	19	11
Period since exterior walls painted (years)	5	21	10
Number of bedrooms	3.4	3.6	3.5
Number of persons per bedroom ...	1.38	1.50	1.41
	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.
Electricity from main	84	70	80
Telephone connected	71	36	62
Heating unit in addition to stove ...	48	9	37
Septic tank installed	18	5	14
Running cold water in—			
Kitchen	71	27	59
Bathroom	87	77	84
Laundry	86	91	87
Running hot water in—			
Kitchen	16	...	12
Bathroom	32	...	23
Laundry	16	...	12
Refrigerator installed	84	73	81
Radio installed	98	95	97
Washing machine installed	37	17	33

* Average of 54 dwellings. Two family farm houses had tile roofs.

Table XIV compares certain features of family and non-family farm homes. In general, the homes on non-family farms were older, less attractive in appearance, housed more people per bedroom and contained fewer of those household amenities controlled by the landlord than family farm homes.

With regard to those household amenities controlled by the operator, such as the possession of a refrigerator or a radio, there were no significant differences between family and non-family farm homes. However, there may have been differences in the quality of such amenities.

Living Standards.

Whilst the survey was not designed to cover fully the question of farm living standards, details were obtained of some matters of sufficient importance to indicate any differences that might exist in the living standards of the survey farmers. Evidence that the standard of living on family farms was higher than on non-family farms was obtained. Rutherford observed a similar situation among Lower North Coast dairy farmers.¹¹

¹¹*Ibid*, p. 82.

TABLE XV.

Vacations taken by Survey Operators in the Three Years 1950, 1951 and 1952.

	Family Farm Operators.	Non-family Farm Operators.
Percentage of Operators in each group who had had a vacation	66	40
Average total length in weeks of vacations enjoyed by those operators who had had a vacation	3.7	2.6

Family farm homes were better than non-family homes. (See Table XIV.) Within the last three years more family farm operators had enjoyed vacations and had spent longer on such vacations than non-family farm operators. (See Table XV.) As shown in Table XVI the number of newspapers and periodicals regularly received by family farm households was also greater and covered a wider range than those received by non-family farm households. Family farm operators also had the more ambitious plans for the education of their children. (See Table XVII.) In no case was a non-family farm child attending boarding school whilst four out of 50 family farm operators had a child at boarding school. Half of both farm groups employed a school-age child in the milking shed, but on only 6 per cent. of family farms did the homemaker (usually the operator's wife) give assistance compared with 24 per cent. in the case of non-family farms. (See Table XVIII.)

TABLE XVI.

Proportion of Family and Non-Family Households Receiving Newspapers and Periodicals.

Type of Newspaper or Periodical.		Source or Number.	Tenure Group of Operator.	
			Family (50 farms).	Non-family (21 farms).
Non-agricultural Newspapers.	News-	Local Daily	Per cent. 100	Per cent. 100
		Capital City—Daily	22	14
		Capital City—Weekend	50	38
Non-agricultural Periodicals.	Perio-	None	12	29
		One	38	48
		Two	31	10
		Three	15	13
		Four	4	...
Agricultural Newspapers or Periodicals.		None	20	52
		One	38	24
		Two	24	24
		Three	16	...
		Four	2	...

The Farm Family.

Size of Families.

There were 75 families on the 72 farms surveyed. Information on the size and composition of these families was obtained.

The average size of families in each of the tenure groups is shown in Table XIX. The family has been divided into two components, those who were residing on the farm at the time of the survey and those who had left the farm. Differences in family size and the number of family members who had left the farm were mainly a reflection of the age of the family unit. However, whilst sharefarming families were young compared with partnership families, they were the largest. This is a further indication that sharefarmers had the lowest standard of living of the tenure groups.

TABLE XVII.
Intended Education of Children of School Age or Pre-School Age of Family and Non-Family Farm Operators.

Educational Standard.	Tenure Group of Operator.	
	Family.	Non-family.
Leaving Certificate	Per cent.	Per cent.
Intermediate	32	13
Sub-Intermediate	40	56
	28	31
Total.	100	100

Age Composition of Families.

As shown in Table XX the families of owners, tenants and sharefarmers consisted mainly of persons less than 20 years of age. Partnership families were older and contained a significantly greater proportion of persons over the age of 59 than any of the other tenure groups. This is due to the fact that a partnership enables older family members to remain on the farm.

TABLE XVIII.
Part-time Work in Milking Shed by Members of the Operator's Family.

Tenure Group of Operator.	Member of Family.	
	Homemaker.*	School-age Child.†
Family (50 farms)...	Per cent.	Per cent.
Non-family (21 farms)	6	48
	24	52

*In three cases the homemaker was not the wife of the operator but his mother.

†In one case this was the operator's brother. In all other cases the child was a son of the operator.

In all cases where the farm had only one operator (i.e., partnership farms excluded), that person was also the head of the family. The average age of the family head on partnership farms was 58 years. This was significantly different from the age of family heads on owner, tenant and share-operated farms on which average ages were respectively 45, 46 and 43 years.

TABLE XIX.
Average Size of Family by Tenure Groups.

	Tenure Group of Family.			
	Owner (25 farms).	Partner* (18 farms).	Tenant (9 farms).	Sharefarmer (20 farms).
Number of Family Members present on Farm	5.0	4.0	3.6	5.7
Number of Family Members absent from Farm	0.5	2.6	1.2	1.1
Total Number of Family Members	5.5	6.6	4.8	6.8

*On each of three partnership farms there were two families.

TABLE XX.
*Average Age Composition of Families by Tenure Groups.**

Age Group.	Tenure Group of Family.			
	Owner.	Partnership.	Tenant.	Sharefarm.
Years.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.
0 to 9	34 } 53	7 } 19	29 } 44	32 } 51
10 to 19	19 } 20	12 } 52	15 } 38	19 } 34
20 to 29	9 } 24	26 } 13	11 } 11	17 } 11
30 to 39	11 } 3	8 } 16	7 } 7	5 } 4
40 to 49	15 } 3	5 } 4	4 } 3	6 } 1
50 to 59	9 } 3	12 } 4	7 } 1	3 } 1
60 to 69	3 } 3	— } 3	— } 3	— } 1
70 to 79	— } 3	4 } 4	— } 4	1 } 4
Total	100	100	100	100

*Includes children who have left the farm.

Migration off the Farm.

In a farming area, such as the "Big Scrub" where the majority of farms are of a size insufficient to support more than one family, it is necessary for most of the children of a farmer to make their way in life away from the parent's farm. Sons are in many cases compelled by economic circumstances to leave the parent's farm. Where an owner-operator has but one son, that son on reaching maturity will

normally take over the farm. If a farmer has more than one son, the excess, due to the problem of limited area, have to leave the farm. The problem is intensified on share and tenant-operated farms because it is not certain that the operator will be able to transfer a farm to even one son. Where a farm is of sufficient size to support more than one family, a family partnership may be formed. Even in such cases, however, it is usually still necessary for some sons to leave the parent's farm. By the time the youngest son is approaching maturity, the farmer will be of retiring age, and since the other sons have made their way elsewhere, the management of the farm will normally be transferred to the younger son.

In Table XXI, survey farm families are classified by tenure groups on the basis of the extent to which children who have left school have left the farm. As would be expected, migration of sons off the farm occurred least on partnership farms. The only family of which all sons had left the farm was in the sharefarm group. Migration of daughters had been much greater than that of sons. However, because of the small number of families in the owner, tenant and sharefarm groups which had children who had left school, no great significance can be attached to comparisons between these groups.

TABLE XXI.

Classification of Families on the Basis of Migration Off the Farm of Children who have Left School by Tenure Groups.

I. Sons.

Extent of Migration.	Tenure Group.			
	Owner-operator (7 families).	Partnership (16 families).	Tenant (4 families).	Sharefarmer (7 families).
	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.	Per cent.
Families with all sons left the farm	11
Families with dependent sons at school which have "lost" all sons who have left school ...	44	...	25	34
Families of which only a portion of the sons who have left school have left the farm ...	28	63	25	22
Families of which all sons who have left school have remained on the farm ...	28	37	50	33
Total ...	100	100	100	100

2. Daughters.

	(10 families).	(17 families).	(2 families).	(7 families).
Families with all daughters left the farm ...	40	64	50	28
Families with dependent daughters at school which have "lost" all daughters who have left school	14
Families of which only a portion of the daughters who have left school have left the farm	24	50	44
Families of which all daughters who have left school have remained on the farm ...	60	12	...	14
Total ...	100	100	100	100

The occupation entered by survey operators' sons who had left the home farm are shown in Table XXII. That most sons who had migrated came from partnership farms is due to the fact that partnership families were older than the families of other tenure groups. The occupations of those sons who had migrated appear to be determined largely by the tenure grouping of the home farm. Approximately 50

per cent. of sons who had left owner- or partnership-operated farms took up farming, whilst only one out of the ten sons who had left tenant or share farms became a farmer. This, together with the fact that five out of seven sons who took up semi-professional work came from partnership farms, indicates that parents on owner-operated and partnership farms were more able to assist their sons in becoming farmers or obtaining the necessary education for a semi-professional occupation. Only in the case of sharefarmers were there more sons who took up skilled rather than unskilled work. This, perhaps, is an indication of the feeling of insecurity on sharefarms. Probably because of the family's economic circumstances, no sharefarmer's son received the education necessary for him to obtain a semi-professional position.

TABLE XXII.

Occupation of Operators' Sons who have Left the Farm by Tenure Groups.

Occupation of Sons.	Tenure Group of Operator.			
	Owner.	Partnership.	Tenant.	Share-farmer.
	No. of Sons.	No. of Sons.	No. of Sons.	No. of Sons.
Farmer	3	12	...	1
Semi-professional	5	2	...
Skilled worker	1	1	1	3
Unskilled worker	2	7	1	2
Total	6	25	4	6

The Agricultural Ladder.

The full agricultural ladder concept in relation to dairy farming in Australia envisages the advance of the potential farmer from unpaid family labourer or hired hand to sharefarmer, tenant, owner and finally retired owner. Detailed information as to what extent survey operators had followed this theoretical pattern was not obtained. Evidence has been published which shows that the agricultural ladder has, in the past, been followed by coastal dairy farmers.¹² However, in the "Big Scrub" area there has been a breakdown in this concept, due to the great decrease in the number of farms available for cash renting, i.e., tenant farms, compared with the increasing number of share farms. (See Fig. 2.)

Unless a sharefarmer inherits a farm or receives financial assistance from his parents, he will have to continue sharefarming until he has accumulated the capital to buy a farm. This accumulation period will be considerably greater than if he were operating a tenant farm. If this waiting period is too long he may lose his ambition of farm ownership, as had already happened in the case of five of the 15 non-family sharefarmers interviewed. In the short run a long accumulation period could cause a static sharefarm group, and in the long run, by dissuading prospective sharefarmers from coming forward, cause an increase in the supply of tenant farms.

¹²See: J. Rutherford, "Some Aspects of Land Utilization on Dairy Farms on the Lower North Coast", *Review of Marketing and Agricultural Economics*, Vol. 19, No. 4, December, 1951, p. 245.

8. APPENDIX.

The Tenure Status of the Sample Dairy Farmers.

Tenure Group of Operator.	Characteristics of Tenure Groups.	Number of Farms.	Per cent. of Farms.	Per cent. of Farms.
Owner Operators ...	Farms operated by the owner of the land. Farms on which any labour engaged other than the owner (and wife) was hired non-family labour (other than any part-time work by children of school age)	25	34.7	
Family Partnerships ...	A variable group including all farms on which parent(s) and children were both actively involved in day-to-day management and operation, including : (a) farms on which the interest of the participating children was limited to cash payments at the discretion of the parents ; involving one single son (4 farms) and 2 single sons (1 farm) ... (b) farms on which a profit-sharing arrangement was in operation between participating children and parents :— Involving one single son (5 farms) or daughter (1 farm)... .. Involving one married son ... Involving one married and one single son Group Total	5 6 3 3 —17	23.6	
Family Sharefarmers ...	Farms operated by the son of an owner who did not participate in the day to day management and operation of the farm :— (a) farms on which any labour engaged other than the family sharefarmer (and wife) was hired, non-(share-farmer) family labour (b) farms on which a son of the family sharefarmer was jointly engaged with the latter in full-time operation of the farm Group Total	4 1 —5	6.9	
Family Tenants ...	Farms on which the operator paid a definite cash rent to his parent(s) or the estate of his parent(s) for the right to operate the farm. (On such sample farms no children participated in the full-time operation of farm)	4	5.6	70.8

APPENDIX—*continued.*

Tenure Group of Operator.	Characteristics of Tenure Groups.	Number of Farms.	Per cent. of Farms.	Per cent. of Farms.
Non-family Partnerships	Farms on which the owner together with a non-relative participated jointly in full-time management and operation under a profit sharing arrangement	1	1.4	1.4
Non-family Sharefarmers.	Farms on which the owner did not participate in the day-to-day management or in the operation of the farm but shared the profits with a non-relative operator: (a) farms on which any labour engaged other than the share-farmer (and wife) was hired, non- (share-farmer) family labour (b) farms on which one son (4) or two sons (1) of the sharefarmers jointly engaged with the latter in the full-time operation of the farm (sons in each case unmarried) Group Total	8 5 —13	18.1	
Non-family Tenants ...	Farms on which the operator paid a definite cash-rent to a non-relative owner for the right to use the farm: (a) farms on which any labour engaged other than the tenant (and wife) was hired non-tenant) family labour ... (b) farms on which a son (un-married) of the tenant was engaged with the latter in the full-time operation of the farm Group Total	4 1 — 5	6.9	
Sharefarmers with Tenant Intermediaries.	Farms on which the operator had a profit-sharing arrangement with a second person who in turn had a renting arrangement with the owner. (In the sample cases the tenant was no relation to the owner; did not participate in the operation of the farm; was a relative—father-in-law and foster-father—of the operator)	2	2.8	27.8
Total	72	100.0	100.0