@article{Coggins:7463,
      recid = {7463},
      author = {Coggins, Jay S.},
      title = {On the Welfare Consequences of Political Activity},
      address = {1989},
      number = {1702-2016-139845},
      series = {Bulletin 89-6},
      pages = {49},
      year = {1989},
      abstract = {When economic actors are also allowed to become  politically active,
perhaps to influence a government price  policy, they face decision problems
with essentially  simultaneous political and economic features. If,  in
addition, two groups struggle to pull the administered  price level in
opposite directions, an important strategic  component is introduced. On two
levels, then, such  situations depart from the competitive economy framework
of  Arrow and Debreu. The model of this paper is designed to  reconcile the
general equilibrium model with politically  active interest groups. This
model is then used to assess  the welfare consequences of such lobbying
activity. We find  that very often a lobbying program with price  distortions
is not the best means for regulating these  economies. However, there may be
cases in which no  alternative policy could achieve the outcome resulting  from
the lobbying program.
Keywords: Political economy,  lobbying behavior, rent-seeking, distortionary policy.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/7463},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.7463},
}