@article{Revilla:7443,
      recid = {7443},
      author = {Revilla, Pablo},
      title = {Many-to-One Matching when Colleagues Matter},
      address = {2007},
      number = {826-2016-55104},
      series = {CTN Nota di Lavoro 87.2007},
      pages = {34},
      year = {2007},
      abstract = {This paper studies many-to-one matching market in which  each agent's preferences not only depend on the institution  that hires her, but also on the group of her colleagues,  which are matched  to the same institution. With an  unrestricted  domain of preferences  the non-emptiness of  the core is not guaranteed. Under certain conditions on  agents' preferences, we show that two possible situations  in which, at least, one stable allocation exists, emerge.  The first condition, called Group Togetherness, reflects  real-life situations in which agents are more concerned  about an acceptable set of colleagues than about the firm  hiring them. The second one, Common Best Colleague, refers  to markets in which a workers' ranking is accepted by  workers and firms present in such markets.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/7443},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.7443},
}