The Effects of ITQ Management on Fishermen’s Welfare When the Processing Sector is Imperfectly Competitive

In this paper we use a general model of imperfect competition to predict welfare changes within an open-access fishery transitioning to individual transferable quota (ITQ) management. Although related research has explored the effects of market power in the harvesting sector on ITQ performance, none have considered the implications of an imperfectly competitive processing sector. This study addresses this question specifically in the context of the Atlantic herring fishery, although its implications are relevant to all fisheries with similar industry structure. Our results show that ITQs could have a negative impact on fishermen’s welfare when processors have market power and the cap on aggregate harvest is binding or becomes binding with the implementation of ITQs.

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Working or Discussion Paper
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JEL Codes:
D43; Q22; Q28; L13
Series Statement:
ResEc Working Paper

 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2020-10-28

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