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Staff Paper Series

Why is Nation Building So Bloody? Two Cases

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Two Cases

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Forward

In this paper I present case studies of the history of Nation Building in the United States and Turkey. In the United States the nation building project involved the transition of thirteen British colonies to a nation state. In the case of Turkey the nation building project involved a transition from a multinational empire to a Turkish Republic

The motivation for writing the two case studies was the abrupt shift in policy by the Bush Administration following the terrorist attack on the New York World Trade Center Towers on September 1, 2001. During his presidential campaign and during his first months in office George W. Bush vigorously criticized what he interpreted as the nation building efforts of the Clinton administration. Before the end of its first year in office the Bush administration had committed American lives and resources to nation building efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.

My first effort was to write a short paper in an op-ed style. “Why Is Nation Building So Bloody?” This paper serves as Chapter 1.0 of this paper. My second effort was to read widely in the classic political science nation building literature and in the more recent policy oriented literature. An example of the first is the collected works of Stein Rokkan, edited by Peter Flora, *State Formation, Nation Building, And Mass Politics In Europe: The Theory Of Stein Rokkan* (Oxford 1999). Rokkan’s work had been published largely between 1960 and the early 1990s. An example of the more policy oriented work was the book edited by Rancis Fukuyama, *Nation Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq* (Johns Hopkins, 2006). I found much of the scholarly work too formal and abstract for my taste. I found the policy oriented work too close to the policy process to provide an objective perspective.

My response was to step back and read in some depth the history of the United States and Turkey nation building projects. The result is this paper. In the case of both the United States and Turkey the nation building efforts were largely a response to internal political and economic forces.

I have not decided what to do next. One possibility is to step back and attempt to do a more thorough review of the theoretical literature on nation building. A second

would be to begin to review more carefully several cases in which external forces were brought to bear on the nation building process.

In the meanwhile I would appreciate critical comments and suggestions on the United States and Turkey case studies.

Vernon W. Ruttan

CHAPTER 1.0

WHY IS NATION BUILDING SO BLOODY?

During the presidential campaign of 2000 George W. Bush vigorously rejected what he interpreted as the “nation building” efforts of the Clinton administration—in Haiti, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. Yet during its first term in office the Bush administration committed American lives and resources to nation building efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.¹

As I write this chapter the administration finds itself committed to assuring that Iraq emerges as a single unified nation state rather than fragmenting into a loose Sunni-Kurd-Shia federation or into separate states. Before a solution finally emerges much more Iraqi and American blood and resources will be spent. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a longer term perspective on what historians and political scientists have termed the “nation building project.”

Nationalism

Nation building is a political ideology that insists on the congruence between the state and the nation. In medieval Europe neither language nor culture served as a basis for political boundaries. State formation was generated by conflicts and bargaining among the hereditary leaders of the distributional coalitions that characterized late feudalism. Cultural differences in the form of estates, guilds and castes defined status within society. People were expected to know their place!

France emerged as a unified nation-state prior to the French revolution. Prior to unification in 1861 Italy was viewed as a geographic expression rather than a nation. Until the 1870s Germany consisted of a federation of kingdoms, duchies and free cities that retained a good deal of autonomy even after unification. The annexation of Austria by Hitler’s Germany was viewed as step toward the completion of the unification of the German state and the German nation. The United States Civil War was justified by

¹ In this chapter I draw heavily on material reviewed in Ruttan (2003: 240-250). See particularly Levy (2000).

Lincoln as necessary to resolve the issue of whether the United States was a federation or a unified nation-state.

Nationalism emerged in Western Europe as a major political movement following the Napoleonic Wars. Nation building became a major theme in the post World War II political development literature and in United States development assistance policy. It was generally assumed that the objective of nation building in the new post-colonial states of Asia and Africa would be the strengthening of the national state. Samuel Huntington, a leading political theorist, defined political development as whatever strengthens the national state (Huntington 1965: 393). The unified nation-state appeared to be the necessary agent for political and economic modernization regardless of its constituent nationalities.

To the extent that geographically based linguistic, religious and ethnic differences were considered, they were viewed as potential threats to the political stability of the state--as obstacles to be overcome during the nation building process. But it was generally anticipated that the endowments of social capital embedded in ethnic or religious identity would erode with the process of modernization. Modern societies would be characterized by patterns of status and identity that were achieved rather than ascribed. Secularization would erode the religious foundations of ethnic identity. Rational self interest would lead to class based rather than ethnic based political and economic commitments (Lerner 1958: 16).

Two Models

In Eastern Europe, ethnic national communities were sustained well into the 20th century within the framework of the multi-ethnic Austrian, Russian and Turkish empires. The intellectual, political and military elites of the new states created after World War I aspired to the French model of a unitary nation state. Ethno-linguistic based regional autonomy, even within a federal system, was viewed as a threat to the nation building project. The leaders of the new states wanted to blend their diverse peoples into a new national identity that would constitute a unified nation-state rather than preside over a federal state with substantial autonomy for its constituent nationalities

One of the few areas of common agreement among the new post colonial governments created after World War II has been that the territorial boundaries that they inherited should not be subject to external or internal challenge. This view has been shared and reinforced by the international community. The prospect of state fragmentation and the redrawing of national political boundaries is a source of uneasy contemplation in the corridors of the United States State Department, the Kremlin, the United Nations and of regional organizations such as the Organization for African Unity.

The leaders of the new states were protected from the external threats that had confronted the builders of nation-states in Europe. External threats could not be used as a political rationale for the development of nationalist ideology. The leaders of new states have been able to direct the limited force available to them to attempts to suppress internal challenges to central authority. With the threat of external aggression largely contained the new nation states have remained free to contain the political aspirations of their constituent nationalities.

Economic Viability

There has been substantial concern about the economic viability of small ethnically based nation states. A large integrated national market, as in the case of the United States, has generally been viewed as an important source of prosperity and growth. The U.S. example was an important inspiration for the establishment and expansion of the European Economic Community.

There is a modest literature that addresses the economic consequences of state integration and disintegration. To the extent that state or market size has been a source of scale economies in the supply of public services or private goods the cost of autarchic economic policies have been smaller in large countries than in small countries—in India as compared to Sri Lanka

Today, however, a constituent nation that separates from a large state can achieve the benefits of greater cultural homogeneity while incurring fewer economic penalties if it can function as part of an open trading system. The process of globalization is eroding the costs previously imposed on small market size by autarchic trading arrangements. The economic costs associated with the disassociation of Singapore and Malaysia or of

the Czech Republic and Slovakia do not appear to have been excessive. It is not difficult to identify a number of other states would benefit both economically and politically if they were partitioned into constituent national states.

The Melting Pot Metaphor

The experience of nation building suggests that ethnic pluralism and cultural blending and melding has been a continuing process in many successful nation states. A multi religio-ethnic identity can itself become over time a source of national identity. But historical experience also suggests that blending and melding can only be forced at high resource and human cost. The “melting pot” metaphor has seldom applied when a state consists of geographically based ethnic nationalities. *“The violence, cruelty, and humiliation that routinely accompany the ethnic politics of nation building can no more be avoided by attacking ethnicity than the violence that has been associated with wars of religion could nor can be avoided by convincing people not to be religious,”* (Levy 2000: 246).

The concept that a people, simply because it considers itself a nation, has a right to its own state remains a revolutionary idea. As long as it remains a revolutionary idea attempts to force the process of nation building will continue to be brutal and bloody. The cases of the former Yugoslavia, Southern Sudan, Chechnya and Iraq are only four recent examples. Constitutional innovations granting greater regional autonomy, as in Spain and Canada, suggests that some ethno-national movements may be prepared to trade off demands for the establishment of a national state for meaningful autonomy within a federal system.

A major challenge confronting the international community is the design and legitimization of constitutional systems that will permit geographically based ethnic communities to meet their civic needs while pursuing sufficiently open economic arrangements to remain, or become, economically viable. The alternative is the continuation of the rising tide of barbarism that has been associated with nation building.

The twenty-first century has been characterized as the most violent in human history (Mazower 2000). In this paper I do not address the entire range of the sources of violence in this bloody century. I focus on two successful cases of nation building. The

Civil War to preserve the Union in the United States and the wars associated with the break-up of the Ottoman Empire and the formation of the Turkish Republic.

Nation building is a continuing process. It is never completed. I have chosen to end the story of nation building in the United States with the end of the post-Civil War Reconstruction in 1878. In the case of Turkey I have chosen to end with the completion of the Ataturk Reforms in 1938.

CHAPTER 2.0

UNITED STATES: FROM BRITISH COLONIES TO NATION STATE

In this chapter I trace the evolution of thirteen British North American colonies from a loose federation of independent states to a nation state with a strong central government. This evolution involved two wars with Great Britain and a Civil War between the states of the North and the slave states of the South. It also involved the emancipation of the slaves, an aborted reconstruction, and a century long struggle to extend civil rights to the former slaves and their descendents.²

Toward a More Perfect Union

In the middle of the eighteenth century British North America consisted of thirteen colonies administered by a governor appointed in London. A quarter century later the colonies were in outright rebellion against the British government. In this section I discuss the events leading up to the Revolutionary War, the Declaration of Independence and the writing and adoption of the Constitution.

Colonial Grievances

The French and Indian War (1754-1760) had the immediate effect of securing and expanding British rule in North America. Its longer run effect, however, was to weaken the ties that bound the British colonies of North America to the Empire. Among the major issues that led to rising tension between the colonist and the British king and Parliament were the imposition of commercial regulations; the levying of taxes to pay for the maintenance of the colonial establishment; restrictions on personal rights that the colonists considered “the rights of Englishmen”; and the control administration and distribution of western lands.³

² I am indebted to Willard W. Cochrane and Richard Levins for comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.

³ This period has been characterized as “the most creative period in the history of American political thought” (Bailyn 1967: 21) Constitutional issues on the relationship between the colonies and the English crown and parliament were addressed in speeches, sermons, and pamphlets that drew on the heritage of classical antiquity, Enlightenment rationalism, the common law and Puritan doctrine.

In the early 1780s Committees of Correspondence were established among leading citizens of the several states to explore the colonial grievances. In September 1774 a Continental Congress, convened by the Committees, was held in Philadelphia with the objective of reconciling British authority with remedies for the colonial grievances. It adopted a declaration of personal rights—including life, liberty, property, assembly and trial by jury. It denounced taxation without representation and the maintenance of the British army in the colonies without their consent.

A Second Continental Convention was convened in Pennsylvania in May of 1775. A few weeks before the Convention opened hostilities between British troops and Massachusetts militias had broken out at Lexington and Concord. Militias from other New England states converged on Boston to support the local militias. Congress appointed George Washington as commander-in-chief and assumed responsibility for the governance of the thirteen colonies. The Congress initially maintained that the Americans were engaged only in a struggle to preserve their rights as Englishmen. Calls for a complete independence strengthened and on July 2, 1776, the Congress resolved that “these United Colonies are and ought to be free and independent states.” Two days later the delegates unanimously signed a Declaration of Independence. By the end of 1776 ten states had drafted and adopted constitutions that addressed the internal organization of the new states and the issue of imperial relations (Bailyn 1967: 231).

Constitutional Design

The Continental Congress also drafted the Articles of Confederation which served as the first national constitution of the United Colonies. In the Congress the “nationalists”, primarily from the Middle colonies and the South, advocated a strong central government. The more radical “republicans” from New England and Virginia who had led the revolutionary movement distrusted centralized executive and legislative power over local government. The republicans prevailed. The Articles of Confederation resembled a “league of friendship” rather than a national government.

The weakness of the Articles as a foundation for a national government did not become fully apparent until after the successful completion of the Revolutionary War. Among the most serious domestic problems was how to service the debt that had been

incurred by the continental and state governments to finance the war. The capacity to establish effective commercial relationships with foreign governments was severely compromised. Other issues included the governance and disposal of western lands. The depressed rural economy led to unrest and even rebellion (e.g. Shays Rebellion in western Massachusetts). In spite of its weakness the Congress did enact several important pieces of legislation, perhaps most notable the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. The Ordinance provided for the admission of new states into the Union and banned slavery from the areas north of the Ohio River.

Concern about its inability to confront the increasing economic and political problems it faced, and prompted by the nationalists, the Congress issued a call for a convention to be held in Philadelphia in May of 1787 that would consider whether the United States should have a national government at all and if so what kind of government it should have. The majority of the delegates, epitomized by Washington and Franklin, were strong nationalists. The delegates also included nationalists committed to a republican ideology. Delegates from the smaller states without western land claims insisted that the western lands should be considered the common property of all the states. There were also a few, such as Alexander Hamilton, that preferred a royalist government and some who strongly opposed any strengthening of central authority.

The constitution that emerged from the convention on September 17, 1787 was approved by 39 of the 42 delegates remaining at the convention. It provided that the new government would be divided into executive, legislative and judicial branches. A compromise on representation was achieved with a bicameral legislature with one house representing population and the other representing states. This division has typically been discussed in terms of disagreements between large states and small states. Ransom insists, however, that the more basic underlying issue was understood to be the protection of property rights in slaves (Ransom 2006, p. 22). In retrospect the failure to directly confront the contradiction between the institution of slavery and the principle of liberty as reflected in the compromise over how to count the slave population for purposes of representation—the three-fifth rule—in which each slave would count as three-fifths of a white person—turned out to be a fatal flaw in the Constitution (Bailyn 1967: 232-246).

An Economic Interpretation

The Constitutional Convention has been described, at least by American historians, as the most gifted group of statesmen ever assembled. They have been viewed as committed to the political philosophy of the English Enlightenment and informed by experience in business and public affairs. This view was challenged by the publication in 1913 of an iconoclastic study by the Columbia University historian Charles Beard, *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States*. Beard attempted to show that the framers were men of affairs who, in addition to political philosophy, were motivated by strong personal (*personality*) and group interests. Beard classified these interests under three main headings: (1) *Personality in Money*. “Money capital ... was handicapped in seeking profitable outlets by the absence of protection for manufactures and the lack of security in investments in western lands, and discrimination against American shipping by foreign countries. It was also being positively attacked by the makers of paper money ... and other devices for depreciating the currency” (p. 31). (2) *Personality in Public Securities*. “The government under the Articles of Confederation was not paying interest on its debt and its paper had depreciated until it was selling from one-sixth to one-twentieth of its par value” (p. 32).⁴ (3) *Personality in Manufacturing and Shipping*. “Supporters of the Constitution were earnest and persistent that commerce was languishing and manufacturers perishing for lack of protection” (p. 41). Attempts by the states to remedy these deficiencies had, in the view of the framers of the new Constitution, been ineffectual.

Beard’s thesis met with a wave of popular criticism. Former President William Howard Taft accused Beard of muckraking. Nicholas Murray Butler, president of Columbia University where Beard held a professorship, declared: “It is a travesty to dignify so unscholarly an adventure by the title of an economic interpretation of history” (McGuire 2003: 17). Beard’s thesis received a much more favorable reception by students of constitutional and economic history. It did not receive serious scholarly

⁴ Beard commented: “If any one in the country had a justification for being disgusted with the imbecilities of the Confederation it was Washington. He had given the best years of his life to the revolutionary cause and he refused all remuneration for his great services. He was paid his personal expenses to the amount of \$64,355.30 in paper that steadily depreciated” (Beard 1913: 145). In spite of his large land holdings in Virginia and the West he was in arrears in his taxes because he had been unable, because of shipping and trade restrictions, to market the products of his farms for two years.

challenge until the 1950s when authors of several detailed examinations of voting patterns at the federal and state levels questioned the empirical accuracy of Beard's findings. Others questioned the logical consistency of Beard's argument (McGuire 2003: 17-32). Until well into the 1980s the prevailing view was that the design and support for the Constitution could better be understood "in terms of the fundamental social forces underlying the ideological positions of the founders which influenced the designs they made. The Constitution was founded upon these larger sociological and ideological forces" (Wood 1987: 485).

Beginning in the early 1980s, however, a group of younger economic historians employing more sophisticated analytical and statistical skills began to advance a new economic interpretation of the Constitution. The definitive work, drawing on a series of his own scholarly articles, was Robert A. McGuire, *To Form a More Perfect Union: A New Economic Interpretation of the United States Constitution* (2003).⁵ McGuire viewed his work as not merely a resurrection of Beard's thesis but a "new economic interpretation of the Constitution of the United States," (p. 32).

In his book McGuire first analyzes the economic sources of the basic design and specific clauses of the constitution. He then goes on to analyze the voting in the ratification of the constitution at the national and states levels. The regression approach enabled him to quantify the incremental or partial effects of economic and other factors that influenced voting behavior. This method enabled him to show, for example, that while some individual slaveholders and individual delegates from slaveholding states did in fact vote for the Constitution, slave-holding decreased the probability of supporting the Constitution (McGuire 2003: 210). The results of McGuire's analysis confirm that "economic interests in the narrow pecuniary sense of the term, as well as interests in a broader non-pecuniary sense, affected the choices the founders made (p. 208). "Moreover ... a delegate's occupation, assets and wealth *did* significantly influence his votes during the drafting and ratification of the Constitution," (p. 209).

In retrospect it has become increasingly clear that the economic interest that turned out to be most fateful for the founders' efforts to form a more perfect union was

⁵ For a very accessible discussion of the analytical and statistical methodology employed by McGuire see McGuire 2003: 33-45.

the issue of slave property. Slave property accounted for the largest share of personal property owned by southern delegates to the Philadelphia constitutional convention and to the state ratifying conventions. McGuire's analysis indicates quite clearly that the economic interests of the Founding Fathers ensured that slavery would remain constitutionally legal until overturned by the Civil War (2003: 212).

Compromise over Slavery

From its very beginning the new nation was forced to confront the issue of slavery. A series of compromises, beginning with the drafting of the Declaration of Independence itself, led, at first imperceptibly and later more obviously, to the Civil War.

In 1776 Thomas Jefferson, in his first draft of the Declaration, inserted language that indicted the British Crown for supporting the traffic in slaves between Africa and the New World.⁶ At the insistence of several Southern delegations the clause was omitted from the constitution. "The Declaration of Independence made no mention at all that one out of five inhabitants of the newly proclaimed United States of America was, and would remain, a slave" (Ransom 1989: 18). It became apparent to Jefferson and other like-minded delegates that the divisiveness of the slave issue would have to be avoided to assure approval of the Declaration.

The Northwest Ordinance

The slavery issue emerged again in the Confederation congressional debates that led to the passage of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. The issue was whether slavery would be permitted in the territory north of the Ohio and east of the Mississippi River. As the ordinance was being debated slaveholders were already moving across the Appalachians into Tennessee and Kentucky. In 1783 Jefferson was appointed to prepare a plan for the temporary governance of the western territory. He inserted a clause stating that there should be "neither slavery nor involuntary servitude" in the new states that

⁶ The statement of purpose authored by Jefferson asserted: "We hold these truths to be self evident; that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their creator with inherent & inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Jefferson then proceeded to list a number of grievances including the following: "{King George} has waged a cruel war against human nature itself, violating its most sacred rights of life and liberty in the persons of distant people, who never offended him, captivating and carrying them into slavery in another hemisphere, or to miserable death in their transportation thither" (Ransom 1989: 18).

should be created out of the Northwest Territory. The clause was defeated by the vote of one state. In July 1787, when the Ordinance was reported out of committees, antislavery forces succeeded in inserting a more moderate antislavery clause which provided for the capture and return of fugitive slaves. With this provision the Northwest Ordinance was passed by unanimous vote. Ransom has argued that if the clause had not been accepted, Ohio, Indiana and Illinois would almost certainly have entered the Union as slave states (Ransom 1989: 22-27).

The slavery issue remained muted for several decades following the ratification of the Constitution. The shared experience of the Revolutionary War, the adoption of the Constitution, the victory in the war for independence, the repulse of the British in the War of 1812, and the high regard with which the founding fathers were held contributed to a strong sense of nationalism through the latter years of the eighteenth and early years of the nineteenth century. By the early 1820s, however, there was a rising tide of opposition in the South to the expanding power of the national government. These tensions were induced in part to being taxed to support the construction of internal improvements—roads, canals and later railroads—which were regarded primarily as of benefit to the industrializing north. At the same time the North was becoming increasingly industrialized, demand for cotton by the textile mills of Manchester and New England bound the South more firmly to the slave system of cotton production (Cauthen 1950: 1-13; Ransom 2005: 19-71). But the slave trade itself was banned in 1809 with little controversy (Ransom 1989: 33).

The Missouri Compromise

Rapid extension of the agricultural frontier beyond the Mississippi and the petition for Missouri statehood in 1818 forced slavery back onto the political agenda. Under the terms agreed to in the Northwest Ordinance Missouri would clearly have been a free state. By 1818, however, slave owning planters had settled in southern Missouri. Missouri's statehood petition represented the first attempt to establish slavery in an area north of the confluence of the Ohio and Mississippi River.

When it became clear that opponents of slavery would be able to stop the admission of Missouri a compromise was sought. The compromise provided: (a)

admission of Missouri as a slave state; (b) admission of Maine as a free state; and (c) a definition of the territories in the Louisiana Purchase that would be admitted as slave and free. The slave interests got approval of Missouri as a slave state. Opponents succeeded in permanently extending the ban on slavery in the Louisiana territory north of the line of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes (Ransom 1989: 18). For the next several decades the line established by the Missouri Compromise defined the limits of slavery. For the North it meant that while slavery could not be eliminated it could be contained.

The issue emerged again in 1846 when Congressman David Wilmont of Pennsylvania introduced an amendment to the Mexican War appropriation bill that “neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall ever exist in any part of the territory acquired from Mexico” (Goodwin 2005: 123). But expansion of slave holding into new lands in the West was regarded by many southern leaders as essential both to their prosperity and to their political power (Ransom 2005: 45).⁷ South Carolina Senator John C. Calhoun, whose political ambitions had led him to urge caution in earlier calls for secession by South Carolina radicals, now mobilized opposition to the Wilmont Proviso. He supported a resolution by the South Carolina legislature to mobilize a cooperative effort by the southern states to resist the Proviso. Although the Proviso was not adopted the debate over the Mexican War “became a debate over slavery and a threat to the Union itself,” (Goodwin 2005: 124).

The Compromise of 1850

In 1850 the country was faced with the issue of whether the western territories acquired from Mexico and the remaining unorganized territories from the Louisiana Purchase would be open to slavery. Southerners sought assurance that a substantial portion of the new territories would be open to slavery. Opponents of slavery insisted on holding to the Wilmont Proviso—that there be no slavery in the new states. Henry Clay, “the great pacifier,” who had played a facilitating role in earlier compromises proposed

⁷ Intensive tobacco and cotton production resulted in depletion of soil resources in the old South. For example, toward the end of his life Thomas Jefferson noted that a succession of stunted crops and the deterioration of the land was leading him to consider selling Monticello. He was able to meet the demands of his creditors only by selling slaves (Kennedy 2003: 38). Expansion of the cotton-slave economy on to the new areas in the west was seen as necessary to offset the impact of the loss of the area planted to cotton and economic stagnation. For graphic description of agricultural conditions in the old South on the eve of the Civil War see Olmstead (1961).

an Omnibus Bill designed to gain enough support to pass both houses. The Omnibus Bill would include the following provisions:

1. Admit California as a free state.
2. Establish boundaries for the state of Texas and have the United States government assume the debts of Texas incurred during the Texan war against Mexico.
3. Divide the territory acquired from Mexico into a Utah Territory and a New Mexico Territory.
4. Introduce a new and more stringent Fugitive Slave Act.
5. Abolish the slave trade in the District of Colombia (Ransom 1989: **ii**o).

Clay had tried to include something for everyone but the bill was acceptable to almost no one, Senator Stephen Douglas of Illinois realized that while it would not be possible to pass the Omnibus Bill it might be possible to incorporate the basic elements of Clay's bill into separate bills and get them through both houses. During the summer of 1850 Douglas and his allies were able to partition the basic provision of Clay's bill into separate bills and move them through both houses. "This accomplishment established Douglas as a leader who could offer the Democratic Party an agenda for the 1850s that promised to resolve the squabble over slavery" (Ransom 1989: 110).

Ransom has argued that Compromise of 1850 turned out to be more of a truce than a compromise. It spelled the end of the Whig party. The party was unable to maintain an effective coalition between its northern and southern constituencies and disappeared from the national political scene by the mid-1850s (Ransom 1989: 117).

The strength of the secessionist movement in South Carolina, and in the South more generally, receded briefly in the early 1850s. Tension between the South and the North was rekindled again, however, when the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, sponsored by Senator Stephen A. Douglas, repealed the earlier prohibition against slavery in the Northwest Territories. Under the rubric of "popular sovereignty" it authorized residents in these two territories to decide, by majority vote whether to allow slavery or not. As tension over slavery continued to rise the two major parties that had emerged during the Jackson presidency, the Democrat and Whig, began to fragment along sectional lines. The Kansas-Nebraska Act which Senator Douglas had sponsored in anticipation that it

would dampen tension over slavery turned out to be a major political miscalculation. Instead of strengthening the two major parties it inflicted irreparable damage on both (Ranson 1949: 125).

Several splinter parties—the Liberty Party, Free-Soilers, American Party (Know Nothings)—emerged to contest the Whigs and Democrats in state and federal elections. By 1855 the Whig party was so split that it was no longer able to field a slate of candidates in national elections. The Democrats who had been dominant since the Jackson presidency were losing ground. And the newly established Republican Party, fueled by anti-slavery and free-labor appeals, was rapidly becoming the majority party in the North. In 1856 it nominated John C. Fremont of California for president and fielded a large slate of candidates for Congress. In the 1856 election the Republicans and the other anti-Democrat and anti slavery parties received a sizeable majority of popular votes.

Dred Scott, Bloody Kansas, and Harpers Ferry

The newly elected James Buchanan faced several major crises when he took office in March 1857. The first was the pending decision by the Supreme Court on a case brought by a slave named Dred Scott who claimed that since he had lived in a free state since 1834 he was entitled to his freedom. His claim to freedom was upheld by a lower court but was reversed by the Missouri Supreme Court. Scott's appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court was considered a test of the legality of Missouri Compromise. The Court, under Chief Justice Taney ruled on three matters: (a) Dred Scott was not a free man simply because he had lived in a free state; (b) the Congress did not have the authority to legislate on the legality of slavery in the territories—hence the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional; and (c) free blacks could not be citizens of the United States. In the North it was seen a ruling that was blatantly pro-South. "It raised the specter that a sinister *slave power* controlled not only the executive but the judiciary branch of the national government as well" (Ransom 1989: 148). In contrast the southern advocates of slavery called for stricter enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 and increased the determination of proslavery forces to bring Kansas into the Union as a slave state.

A second major crisis faced by the Buchanan administration was the terms under which Kansas would be granted statehood. “For northern and moderate Democrats from the South it would be the first major test of the popular sovereignty issue that they had written into the Kansas-Nebraska Act three years earlier. Pro-slave Southerners regarded Kansas as the only realistic possibility of having a sixteenth slave state admitted into the Union. ... Northern opponents of slavery saw in the issue of Kansas statehood an opportunity to test their strength against the slave power” (Ransom 1989: 149).

In the mid-1850s settlers in the Kansas Territory initiated a process that was expected would lead to statehood. An election for the territorial legislature in March of 1855, characterized by substantial irregularities, produced a pro-slave majority. Free-state supporters then proceeded to hold their own election in early 1856 and elected their own legislature and governor. Political disagreement soon disintegrated into armed conflict among terrorist bands that eventually reached a point where the territory became known as “bloody Kansas.”⁸ A constitution drafted by a proslavery constitutional convention in Lecompton did not provide voters an opportunity to express their preference for or against slavery. Congress responded by passing a bill approving admission providing that Kansas voters first approved the Lecompton constitution. Fearful that the constitution would be defeated in a popular referendum the Kansas legislature refused to submit the constitution to a vote and the Congress denied the statehood application.

“For the South the Lecompton affair was a bitter defeat. If Kansas did not come in as a slave state, and it seemed unlikely that there would be another territory that could be organized as a slave state in the near future. The anti-slavery forces had finally managed to forge a strong enough coalition to obviate the need for compromise,” (Ransom 1989: 154).

On October 16, 1859 abolitionist John Brown, fresh from terrorist activities in Kansas, staged a raid on Harpers Ferry, Virginia, with a band of thirteen white men and five blacks. They seized the federal arsenal at Harpers Ferry with the intention of

⁸In May of 1856 a group of pro-slavery ruffians “sacked” the city of Lawrence which was the center of the free-state supporters. Several days later ardent free-staters led by the abolitionist John Brown killed a number of prominent pro-slave supporters in an incident known as the “Pottawatomie Massacre,” (Ransom 1989: 149-50).

provoking a slave insurrection. The arsenal was swiftly recaptured and Brown and his band were taken prisoner by a federal force under the command of Colonel Robert E. Lee, accompanied by Lieutenant J. E. B. Stuart. Brown was tried and sentenced to death by hanging. In the North the dignity of his conduct during the trial and the eloquence of his statements and letters led many to regard him as a martyr/hero in the cause of anti-slavery. In the South John Brown's raid led to heightened fear of slave insurrection and to severe restrictions on expression of anti-slavery sentiments (Goodwin 2005: 226-228). Many southerners concluded that John Brown's raid on Harper Ferry made secession inevitable.

Preserving the Union⁹

Abraham Lincoln was elected president of the United States on April 6, 1860. "The cornerstone of southern political strategy since the founding of the Republic had been based on controlling the Senate and the presidency. Now they had lost both," (Ransom 1989: 164). When the South Carolina legislature learned of Lincoln's election it met and passed a bill authorizing a convention to consider the matter of succession. On December 20, 1860 delegates to the South Carolina convention voted unanimously to secede from the Union. Within the next two months the seven states of the lower South had left the Union.¹⁰

Succession

Lincoln was inaugurated President of the United States on March 4, 1860. In his inauguration address Lincoln was both conciliatory and firm. He quoted from an earlier speech in which he had promised that "he had no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe that I have no lawful right to do so. And I have no inclination to do so." He also insisted that he "intended to execute the laws, to hold, occupy and possess the property and places

⁹ In this and the next major section of this paper section I have drawn more than I can acknowledge from the work of Doris Kerns Goodwin (2006) and Roger L Ransom (1989).

¹⁰ There had been strong secessionist sentiment in South Carolina since at least the early 1830s. When South Carolina initiated steps toward secession in 1833 President Andrew Jackson stopped the secession by making it clear the effort would be put down. It was anticipated in the 1850s that if succession were to occur it would be led by South Carolina (Goodwin 2006: 337). For a detailed account of the political development in South Carolina that led to the secession see Cauthen (1950: 49-78).

belonging to the government, and to collect the duties and imposts,” (Goodwin 2006: 228).

On the following morning Lincoln was confronted by a letter from Major Robert Anderson who commanded the garrison at Fort Sumter in the Charleston harbor that the forts provisions would be exhausted before relief could arrive. Against the advice of General Winfield Scott and his Secretary of State Charles Sumner, Lincoln ordered an attempt to re-supply Fort Sumter. His decision provided the South Carolinians the excuse they were looking for to start a shooting war.

The Confederate authorities ordered the commander in Charleston, Brigadier General Pierre Beauregard, to attack the fort. “At 3:30 a.m. on April 12, Beauregard sent a note to Anderson announcing his intent to commence firing on in one hour. Anderson’s small garrison of sixty men returned fire but were quickly overcome by the Confederate force of nine thousand. ... Thirty-four hours after the fighting had begun Major Anderson surrendered. In a gesture that endeared him to the North he brought his men together and fired a dignified fifty-round salute to the shredded American flag before hauling it down and leaving the fort,” (Goodwin 2006: 345).

The Civil War had begun. Within a few weeks Virginia, and then three more slave states of the upper South, joined the states of the lower South in succession. The bonds of affection that bound the two sections were broken. In opening remarks to the South Carolina convention R. R. Rhett had declared: “We are two peoples, essentially different in all that makes a people,” (Cauthen 1950: 73). When Colonel Robert E. Lee, who had served in the Mexican War and held the post of superintendent of West Point was offered command of the Union Army Lee responded: “I look upon secession as anarchy. If I owned the four million slaves in the south I would sacrifice them all to the Union; but how can I draw my sword against Virginia, my native state,” (Goodwin, 2006: 350). There were now two states, the Confederates States of America and the United States of America.

Winning the Presidency

When Lincoln began his campaign for the presidency in 1859 he was well aware that he stood only an outside chance of success. His political experience was limited. He

had served several terms as a member of the Illinois state legislature and one rather undistinguished term as a member of the United States House of Representatives. Lincoln's rise to national prominence began on June 16, 1858 when the Illinois Republican state convention, meeting in Springfield, endorsed Lincoln as its choice as nominee for the United States Senate as the successor to the Democrat candidate Stephen A. Douglas (Goodwin 2006: 200).

In accepting the nomination Lincoln attacked Douglas's stand on slavery and articulated a central theme of his candidacy. "A house divided against itself cannot stand ... I believe that this government cannot long endure half slave and half free," (Goodwin 2005: 198). He continued, "Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is on the course of ultimate extinction; or its advocates will push it forward until it shall become alike lawful in all the states, old as well as new, North as well as South," (Ransom 1989: 159). He also reminded his audience that the policies being advocated by Douglas would have the effect of nationalizing slavery.

During the campaign both men traveled the entire state of Illinois. The highlights of the campaign were seven Lincoln-Douglas debates. Each debate followed the same pattern. The first contestant spoke for an hour; the second followed with a half hour response; the first speaker then delivered a half hour rebuttal. The slavery issue dominated all seven debates. Throughout the debates Douglas emphasized his commitment to popular sovereignty. He insisted that the national government had no power to exclude slavery from a territory prior to the adoption of a state constitution. Lincoln made it clear that he had no intention of interfering with the institution of slavery "where it exists." Yet he left little doubt that he believed in the right of blacks to be free. Blacks had every right "to eat the bread which his own hand earns," (Ransom 1989: 161).

Lincoln lost the battle for the Senate in the fall of 1858. But the Lincoln-Douglas debates provided Lincoln with a national platform from which he could launch a campaign for the presidency in 1860. In the fall of 1859 Lincoln gave a number of speeches in Iowa, Ohio, Wisconsin, Indiana and Kansas. He arranged for an invitation to New York to speak at Cooper Union. He purchased a new suit and was photographed by Mathew Brady in New York. In his Cooper Union speech before an audience of some

fifteen hundred, Lincoln recalled that the founders of the nation had marked slavery “as an evil not to be extended—but to be tolerated and protected only because of and so far as its actual presence among us makes that toleration and protection a necessity (Goodwin 2005: 231). He concluded his speech with a dramatic appeal: “Let us have faith that right makes might, and in that faith, let us to the end dare to do our duty as we understand it” (Goodwin 2005: 232). The speech was greeted with thunderous applause. The Cooper Union speech was followed by a triumphal New England speaking tour in which Lincoln extended and elaborated the issues discussed in his Cooper Union speech.

At the time the presidential nomination campaign began the leading candidates included Senator Edwin M. Seward of New York, Governor Salmon A. Chase of Ohio, and Edward C. Bates, a distinguished former state legislator and judge from Missouri. “Lincoln’s gradually evolving political strategy began with an awareness that each of his three rivals had first claim on a substantial number of delegates. If he could position himself as the second choice of those who supported each of the others he could pick up enough votes from one or another of the top candidates to win,” (Goodwin 2005: 212).

Lincoln’s analysis turned out to be correct. At the opening of the Republican convention in Chicago Seward was considered the leading candidate. His campaign stalled and he was unable to attract sufficient votes to clinch the nomination. “On May 19, in a burst of enthusiasm that nearly brought down the canvas roof over the delegates, Abraham Lincoln was nominated,” (Ransom 1989: 163). The Lincoln nomination was a turning point for the Republican party. Because of the divide over slavery there was no longer any need to select a candidate who might appeal to the South. Yet Lincoln was regarded as sufficiently moderate to capture the votes of disaffected northern Democrats.

The Democrats, in contrast, were deeply divided. When they met in Baltimore on June 19 they nominated Stephen Douglas. Disaffected Southerners then held a separate convention and selected John Breckinridge of Kentucky as the nominee of the *southern* Democratic Party. A third party, consisting of what was left of the American (Know-Nothing) Party, remnants of the Whig party, and a few Democrats from border states who chose John Bell of Tennessee as their candidate.

On November 6, 1860 Abraham Lincoln was elected President of the United States. The vote was purely sectional. Lincoln captured barely 40 percent of the popular

vote but received a substantial majority of the electoral vote. Douglas received 30 percent of the popular vote but only 3 electoral votes (Ransom 1989: 162-164).

War Between the States¹¹

In the spring of 1961 neither the North nor the South anticipated a long war. Both Lincoln and Davis issued calls for volunteers in the hope of bringing the fight to a quick conclusion. The two capitals, Washington and Richmond were less than one hundred miles apart. Each side assembled large troop concentrations in front of their own capitals hoping to strike a quick knockout blow by capturing the others capital.¹²

General Winfield Scott, commander in chief of the Union Army, instructed General Irwin McDowell to prepare his troops to engage the Confederate Army. On July 21, 1861, McDowell moved south against the Confederate Army commanded by General P. T. Beauregard. McDowell's action instigated the battle of Bull Run, the first major battle of the Civil War. McDowell was on the verge of success when, late in the day, fresh Confederate troops arrived from the Shenandoah Valley. McDowell began what started as an orderly retreat toward Washington. The retreat by the poorly trained and weary Union troops turned into a full scale route. "The organization of units simply disintegrated, and disorganized and demoralized troops continued to wander back into Washington for the next three days. ... The road to Washington seemed open. But the Confederates themselves were badly bruised and hardly in a position to capitalize on their enormous success," (Ransom 1989: 175-176).

As it became apparent that a quick victory would not be achieved, both sides were forced to consider longer term strategies. In retrospect the Confederate commanders were confronted by two major problems. The first was that time was on the side of the North. Its larger population and growing industrial capacity would bear more heavily on the South as the war continued. If the South was to win it would soon have to carry the war to the North. The second problem confronting the South was that its slave economy made


¹¹ I do not in this section try to provide a detailed account of the Civil War. For an excellent brief account see Ransom (1989: 172 -215).

¹² The South also anticipated on some sort of European intervention. "The leaders of the Confederacy were confident that King Cotton would force the Europeans to take some action to break the Northern blockade that President Lincoln announced in 1961 (Ransom 2005: 162). An embargo on cotton exports by the south failed to produce the desired effect since British and French manufactures had stockpiled cotton in anticipation of hostilities in America.

it vulnerable to attack by the North. To preserve its economic capacity to conduct the war it would have to defend its territory against invasion by the North (Ransom 1989: 177).

The lesson of Bull Run for the North was that it would have to design a strategy that would enable it to conquer the South. The plan developed by General Winfield Scott and President Lincoln involved: (a) gaining control of New Orleans and the Mississippi River; (b) establishing a naval blockade of the Southern coast; (c) attacking the heart of the Confederacy through Tennessee; and (d) capturing the Confederate capital at Richmond.

Map 2.1 The Union Plan for Victory, 1861



Source: Roger L. Ransom. 1989. *Conflict and Compromise: The Political Economy of Slavery, Emancipation, and the American Civil War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 180.

The battle of Bull Run convinced Lincoln that he needed more aggressive leadership of the Union Army. The ailing General Scott retired on November 1, 1861. General George McClellan, who had won several minor victories in western Virginia, was called to Washington to replace Scott. On assuming command he began to mould the Army of the Potomac into an effective fighting force. It took time to organize, drill and discipline his force of more than 100,000 men and to turn it into a well equipped and well trained fighting force. When McClellan finally took his army into the field in the Peninsular Campaign in the spring of 1862, he gingerly forced his way to within a few miles of Richmond before turning back toward Washington. "It would take three more years and hundreds of thousands more deaths for the Union forces to come as close to Richmond as they had in May and June of 1862," (Goodwin 2005: 444).

In the fall of 1862 Lee invaded Maryland. After stopping Lee at Antietam McClellan hesitated and the battered Confederate Army escaped across the Potomac after surviving the bloodiest day of the war. "The two armies suffered a total of twenty-four thousand casualties at Antietam with losses about equal on both sides. For the Confederates that implied a casualty rate of almost twenty five percent," (Ransom 1989: 185). Lincoln urged McClellan to pursue the battered Confederate Army. When McClain hesitated Lincoln was furious. He had lost the opportunity to destroy Lee's Army. Lincoln relieved McClellan of his command.

The two armies resumed their campaign in the spring of 1863. When Lee launched his second invasion of the North on June 5 he moved northward into Pennsylvania. On June 30 he encountered the Union just a few miles north of Gettysburg. After three day of the most intensive battle of the Civil War the commander of the Union forces, General George Mead, telegrammed President Lincoln that the South had been defeated. The outcome of the battle was determined by the failure of "a charge by fifteen thousand infantry, commanded by General George Pickett, across a mile and a quarter of open field into the center of the Union line. Over seven thousand of Pickett's men were left on the field that fateful afternoon--an awesome testimony of the power of rifled muskets and cannon to defend a fixed position," (Ransom 1989: 187). "Both armies were so exhausted by the battle that neither had the strength to carry on the fight. Mead with casualties totaling over 20 percent of his forces, was content to let the Confederates

retreat back across the Potomac to the sanctuary of Virginia. Lee had lost 30 percent of his strength yet his army survived the defeat to fight for almost two more years,” (Ransom 1989: 187).

“On July 4, 1863, while Lee’s weary veterans trudged south from their defeat at Gettysburg the Confederate troops marched out of Vicksburg and surrendered the last major outpost on the Mississippi River to Grants Army,” (Ransom 1989: 183). More than a year earlier Grant had broken the Southern line across northern Tennessee by capturing Ft. Henry on the Tennessee and Ft. Donaldson on the Cumberland and, with considerable difficulty, Shiloh on the west bank of the Tennessee. Grant then advanced on Vicksburg, the last stronghold of the South on the Mississippi. He achieved only limited success during the following winter. But in the spring of 1863 Grant formulated a daring plan to capture Vicksburg by cutting of its southern supply lines and attacking it from the east. A Union fleet under Admiral David Potter succeeded in sailing past the confederate batteries at Vicksburg. Grant was able to land and establish a post south of Vicksburg. Within two weeks he was able to land forty-one thousand troops at Port Gibson. This enabled him to bottle Palmetto’s entire force of thirty-two thousand troops in the city of Vicksburg. “Finding the cities defenses too strong for a direct attack Grant sat back and waited for hunger to take its toll,” (Ransom 1989: 188). In October of 1863 Lincoln placed Grant in charge of the entire western theatre. His victory at Chattanooga in November effectively ended Confederate offensive actions in the West.

Lincoln then called Grant to Washington, raised him to the rank of Lieutenant General, and appointed him general-in-chief of all Union forces. “As the fourth year of fighting began the South was reduced to hoping that the defense of Richmond and Atlanta would take a sufficient toll of northern casualties to discourage further prosecution of the war,” (Ransom 1989: 189).

In the spring of 1864 Grant approved a plan by General William Tecumseh Sherman to capture Atlanta. In the past Union armies had hesitated to initiate a major drive into the South because of the difficulty of supplying a large force. As he marched south from Chattanooga, following a “scorched earth” policy, he left a trail of destruction. He captured Atlanta on September 1 and then turned north on November 15. Sherman proposed to solve his supply problem by “living off the land.” On December 20

he wired Lincoln that he wished to present him, “as a Christmas gift, the city of Savannah,” (Ransom 1989: 210).

In the meanwhile Grant had assumed direction of the campaign against Lee in northern Virginia. Despite heavy casualties he continued the attack on Lee’s position through the summer of 1864. Grant was convinced by the “terrible arithmetic” of the campaign that if he pressed on he could win. In relative terms Lee and Grant were losing men at approximately the same rate. But Lee had no more men to replace those he lost (Ransom 1989: 211).

By early 1865 Union forces under Grant and Meade reached the outskirts of Richmond and engaged with the Confederate army in a battle around Petersburg, a major rail junction south of Richmond. It was not until early April, after a series of very costly engagements, that Lee finally abandoned Richmond and Petersburg. Lee’s forces were driven southeast along the Appomattox River until they were encircled by Union forces. Lee surrendered the remnants of his Army of Northern Virginia to Grant at Appomattox Court House on April 19, 1865.

Two days earlier Grant had sent Lee a note asking him to surrender and expressing hope that it would be possible to avoid any further bloodshed. Lee’s first inclination was to refuse but by Sunday morning with his troops almost completely surrounded Lee sent word to Grant that he was ready to surrender. In accepting Lee’s surrender Grant followed Lincoln’s generous guidelines. Confederate officers were permitted to return to their homes and were allowed to retain their personal horses, baggage, and side-arms (Goodwin 2005: 725-6). Lee’s surrender set off a wave of celebration in Washington and throughout the nation. On the following evening Lincoln addressed the nation from the White House balcony. Instead of simply celebrating the end of the war Lincoln addressed the issue of how best to incorporate the southern states back into the Union.

With the end of the war much of the tension that had been evident in Lincoln gave way. He looked forward to attending a theatre performance at Ford’s Theatre with Mary and several friends on April 14. “The play had started when the presidential party entered the flag-draped box in the dress circle. ... At about twelve minutes past ten, the impeccably dressed John Wilkes Booth presented his calling card to the footman and

gained admittance to the box. Once inside he raised his pistol, pointed it at the back of the president's head and fired," (Goodwin 2005: 738).¹³

Table 2.1 Losses in Major Civil War Battles, 1862-63

Theater of Action	<u>Union</u>		<u>Confederate</u>	
	Total Losses	Losses as % of Men Engaged	Total Losses	Losses as % of Men Engaged
Virginia				
Peninsula campaign	25,400	14.6	30,500	18.0
Second Manassas	16,000	25.9	9,200	19.0
Antietam	12,400	16.5	13,700	26.5
Fredericksburg	12,700	12.7	5,300	7.3
Chancellorsville	7,300	17.8	13,500	23.5
Gettysburg	22,800	26.6	28,000	37.2
Total ^{a/}	112,400	16.1	105,000	18.8
Tennessee/Kentucky				
Perryville	4,200	18.3	3,400	22.6
Murfreesboro	12,900	31.2	11,700	33.8
Chickamauga	16,200	27.8	18,500	27.8
Chattanooga	5,000	10.3	6,700	14.4
Total ^{a/}	44,500	24.0	40,700	24.1
Mississippi Valley				
Shiloh	13,000	20.8	10,700	26.5
River campaigns ^{b/}	16,600	9.6	24,000	20.7
Total ^{a/}	29,700	12.6	34,700	22.2
Total, all campaigns	186,562	16.6	180,400	20.4

^{a/} Totals include additional battles listed in Table A.1 (see Appendix 1).

^{b/} Totals do not include men surrendering at Vicksburg and Fort Donelson.

Source: Ransom, R. L. 2005. *The Confederate States of America: What Might Have Been*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, pp. 114-115.

¹³ Booth and two co-conspirators planned to simultaneously kill Secretary of State Seward and Vice-President Andrew Johnson. For a very personal and detailed account of the events surrounding the conspiracy and its implementation see Goodwin (2005: 731-745).

Lincoln had preserved the Union. But preserving the Union came at a very high human cost. “Some 1,536,000 men served in the Union armies which suffered a total of 614,703 casualties (359,528 dead and 275,538 wounded). Some 800,000 men served in the Confederate forces which sustained approximately 483,000 casualties (about 258,000 deaths and perhaps 235,000 wounded),” (Civil War, U.S. p. 681). The number of deaths suffered by Union and Confederate forces in the Civil War exceeded the total number of deaths by the United States in all the wars in which it has been engaged from the Revolutionary War through the Vietnam War.

Emancipation and Reconstruction¹⁴

Lincoln had preserved the Union. But his death occurred before he could carry out the task of rebuilding the nation. Before turning to the period of Reconstruction I will step back and trace the events leading up to the emancipation of the slaves during the Civil War. Lincoln’s major concern at the beginning and well into the Civil War was not the elimination of slavery. It was the preserving of the Union.¹⁵ It is tempting to conclude that the Civil War victory by the North completed the United States nation building project. But such a conclusion would be premature. My own view is that the success of the nation building project was not assured until after the Compromise of 1877 that followed the disputed election of 1876 and marked the end of the Reconstruction.

Emancipation

Since his first encounter with slavery, on travel down the Mississippi River to New Orleans on a timber raft in his youth, Lincoln had regarded slavery as morally repugnant. Freeing the slaves was not, however, a primary objective for Lincoln during the initial years of the Civil War.

The emancipation issue was, however, thrust on him almost from the beginning of the war. During the summer of 1861 slaves began fleeing to the Union lines seeking their

¹⁴ In this section I draw heavily on Ransom, 1989: 204-209. For a more detailed and personal account of the events leading up to the Emancipation Proclamation see Goodwin (2005: 459-472, 481-483).

¹⁵ Lincoln maintained support for the war, in spite of the terrible losses sustain during the early years, by insisting that the only objective of the war was the restoration of the union. By the time of the presidential campaign of 1864 he had succeeded in convincing a large number of voters that emancipation was necessary for the preservation of the Union (Oakes 2007: 138-245).

freedom. “By taking matters into their own hands the slaves forced Congress and the president to deal with the question of freeing slaves almost from the onset of the war,” (Ransom 1989: 174). Furthermore, the slave economy was critical to the effort of the South to feed itself and its armies. Anti-black sentiments precluded any step that might have encouraged a large migration of blacks into the North. “Support for containing slavery did not extend to the point of general emancipation of blacks,” (Ransom 1989: 203). It was not until after the battle of Antietam that Lincoln decided to announce his intent to free all the slaves in the rebellious states.

On September 24, 1862, four days after the Battle of Antietam, Lincoln met with his cabinet and read a draft of a proposed Emancipation Proclamation. In order to diffuse the opposition to emancipation he stressed that his decision was based primarily on the impact of emancipation on the war effort. It would weaken the agrarian economy of the South and provide additional manpower to the Union armies. Lincoln informed members of the cabinet that he was not asking for their approval of the draft. It was released to the press the following day. In spite of the boldness of its language the proclamation had very little immediate effect. It could not emancipate slaves in the secession states until Union armies occupied those states. It did not emancipate slaves in the border states that remained loyal to the Union.

Lincoln insisted that only a constitutional amendment would fully resolve the emancipation issue. It was not until after the large Republican victory in the November 1864 congressional election that passage of a constitutional amendment was assured. On January 11, 1965 the House of Representatives approved the Thirteenth Amendment, that provided for total emancipation of all slaves, for ratification by the states. The south could no longer hope for a negotiated settlement that did not involve complete emancipation.

The assassination of Abraham Lincoln was a catastrophe for both the North and the South. The assignation removed the one political leader who might have possessed both the stature and the leadership skills to formulate and implement a policy for Reconstruction acceptable to a broad spectrum of people in the North and possibly even in the South.

Reconstruction

The task of reconstruction involved both repairing the physical infrastructure and building a new institutional infrastructure in the South. The task of repairing the physical damage to productive capacity resulting from the neglect and destruction of farms and factories during the war was a formidable task. An even more significant problem was that the social, political and economic infrastructure in the South had been completely destroyed by the war and abolition. The problem was not simply that of reconstruction but of the construction of new institutions.

The Reconstruction Era extended from the mid-1860s until the inauguration of Rutherford B. Hayes as President in 1877. The process occurred in three stages: (a) Presidential Reconstruction, 1863-66; (b) Radical Reconstruction, 1866-1873; and (c) Redemption (1873-1877).

Presidential reconstruction. Lincoln favored a flexible and pragmatic approach to Reconstruction. As the North gained secure control of border and secessionist states he appointed military governors to supervise their reconstruction. Lincoln selected as his Vice-Presidential candidate, Andrew Johnson, a Unionist who had served as war-time governor of Tennessee.

As early as December 1863 Lincoln had announced a general plan for the orderly reconstruction of the southern states, promising to recognize the government of any state that pledged to support the Constitution and the Union and to emancipate the slaves if it was backed by at least 10 percent of the number of voters in the 1860 presidential election. In both Arkansas and Tennessee loyal governments were formed under Lincoln's plan. They sought admission to the Union with the seating of their senators and representatives.

Radical Republicans in the Congress were outraged over Lincoln's proposals. They viewed it as leaving the Southern political system unchanged and political power in the hands of the Southerners who had led their states out of the Union. On July 2, 1864, Congress passed legislation, the Wade Davis Bill, that required 50 percent of white male citizens to sign an oath of both past and future loyalty. Lincoln objected that the bill was too punitive and inflexible. Lincoln pocket vetoed the bill. During the 1864-65 the

Radicals defeated the president's proposal to reorganize the Louisiana government under the 10 percent rule.

When Johnson became president the Congress was not in session. He moved rapidly, on his own authority, to implement what he considered to be the Lincoln agenda. On May 6, 1865 he issued a general proclamation of pardon and amnesty for most Confederates and authorized the provisional governor of North Carolina to proceed with the organization of that state. Shortly afterward he issued similar proclamations for the other former Confederate states. In each case a state constitutional convention was to be chosen for by the voters who pledged loyalty to the U.S. Constitution. The conventions were expected to repeal the ordinances of secession, to repudiate the Confederate debt, and to accept the thirteenth amendment abolishing slavery. Johnson's proclamations did not, however, require them to enfranchise the blacks. As the new state governments assumed office it became clear that the traditional pre-war political leadership had regained power and that they were not prepared to assure the negroes even a minimum of civil rights.¹⁶

Radical Reconstruction. Republican victories in the fall 1866 mid-term election placed the Congress in a position to devise a more radical program of Reconstruction. The First Reconstruction Act of 1867 removed the state governments the President had set up in the South. It put the former Confederacy back under military control, and required new constitutions that would include both Negro suffrage and disqualify former Confederate leaders from holding office. By July 1870 all Southern states had been reorganized and readmitted. The delegates to the state constitutional conventions and the members of the state legislative bodies included a substantial number of blacks.

The Reconstruction Era has been characterized as a period in which corrupt politicians, scheming carpetbaggers from the North, and vindictive southern scalawags manipulated illiterate black voters to control southern political and economic affairs.¹⁷

¹⁶ The radical reconstructionist's initially welcomed the Johnson presidency. It rapidly became apparent, however, that while, in many respects Johnson shared the progressive populism of the Jefferson-Jackson Democrats, his democratic impulses were limited to white men only. During his presidency antipathy toward landed and moneyed aristocracy weakened while his antipathy toward the negro remained strong. The tension between Johnson and the radicals led to his impeachment, but not his conviction, in 1868.

¹⁷ See, for example, Bowers (1929). Early in the twentieth century Professor William A. Dunning of Columbia University and a group of graduate students wrote a series of monographs that presented a

This view has been at least partially corrected by revisionist historians who have emphasized the positive accomplishment of the Reconstruction. The Radical's supported more progressive constitutions. One of the most important accomplishments of the deconstructionist governments was the establishment of public school for black children. An aspect of the slave system that had been particularly resented by blacks was the legal provisions against teaching slaves to read.¹⁸ Radical idealism was also largely responsible for two Constitutional amendments. The 14th Amendment, ratified in 1868 guaranteed citizenship to all persons born or naturalized in the United States, except Native Americans, and granted them federal civil rights. The 15th Amendment, passed in 1870 decreed that the right to vote could not be denied because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, (Stampp 1982: 9-18). These gains were largely nullified, however, when the "Redeemers" gained control of the southern governments in the mid-1870s.

Redemption (1873-77). Between 1873 and 1877 white supremacist Southerners, calling themselves "Redeemers," defeated the Republicans and took control of each southern state. The Panic of 1873 had weakened the Republican party in the rural areas of the South and the Great Plains. It had been discredited by the corruption of the Grant administration associated with the funding of internal improvements such as the construction of canals and railroads. After the Republican candidate, Rutherford Hays, was declared winner of the disputed Presidential election of 1876 the Compromise of 1877 was reached where by the South agreed to accept Hays' victory if he withdrew the last Federal troops from the South.

crushing indictment of the Republican administrations of the South during the Reconstruction. For references see Stampp (1982: 224-225).

¹⁸ The situation with respect to education in the South had been little better for poor whites. Prior to the war no southern state had a statewide public system for supporting education.

Box 2.1 The Failure of Reconstruction

It became apparent even before the end of the Civil War that the only significant economic opportunities for the freed slaves would continue to be in agriculture. It also became apparent that the former slaves would resist work on the plantations under the same conditions of servitude that prevailed before the war. During the war, as slave refugees crowded to the Union lines for protection, there were a number of abortive attempts by military commanders to resettle the former slaves.

In early 1865, General Sherman, faced with destituted Negroes who had escaped from plantations, took a first step toward land distribution. Sherman issued a Special Field Order to General Rufus Saxton to set aside the South Carolina and Georgia sea islands south of Charleston and the abandoned rice lands along the rivers to a distance of thirty miles inland for the settlement of Negroes. The lands were divided into farms of not more than 40 acres. Negro families were given “possessionary titles” to the land. Under the Johnson presidency the lands were returned to their original owners, (Stampp 1982: 125). A smaller experiment took place late in the war at Davis Bend about twenty five miles south of Vicksburg. “Government Officials seized a large tract of land embracing six plantations, including those owned by Jefferson Davis and his brother. ... Most of this land was divided among some 1,800 Negroes who organized themselves into companies and partnerships that were generally economically viable. President Johnson pardoned the owners of the Davis Bend plantations and returned the land to them (Stampp 1982: 125-126).

In 1865 Congress established as an agency of the War Department, a Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned Lands (the Freedman’s Bureau) to assist both freedmen and white Southerners who had lost their means of subsistence. It was often the first and most visible evidence of northern military presence in the South. General O. O. Howard, the first commander of the Freedman’s Bureau thought that a major task of the bureau would be to distribute confiscated land to the blacks. His initial report to President Johnson Howard stated “with respect to abandoned lands it was evidently the intent {of Congress} to give the bureau control, solely for the purpose of assigning, leasing or selling to refugees or freedmen” (Ransom 1989: 224). In 1866 President Johnson vetoed

a bill to extend the powers of the Freedman's Bureau. Congress overrode the veto and continued to extend the life of the Bureau until 1869.

The Bureau was vigorously criticized by the Southern Redeemers for corruption and inciting the Negroes to violence. Stampp insists that a balanced appraisal would credit the Bureau with three major accomplishments. "*First*, while trying to make the Negroes self supporting as soon as possible the Bureau provided emergency relief to those in desperate need. ... *Second*, it spent more than \$5,000,000 for Negro schools—a pitifully inadequate amount but as much as Congress would grant. *Third*, the Bureau tried to prevent landowners from taking advantage of the Negroes. It set aside some of the provisions of the Black Codes that limited freedmen's choice of employers, fixed the conditions of labor, and supervised the making and enforcement of labor contracts. *Finally*, the Bureau tried to protect the Negroes civil rights," (Stampp 1982: 134-135).

Senators Charles Sumner and Thaddeus Stevens were the leading advocates of a more radical land reform. Sumner insisted that confiscation was a logical part of emancipation. Stevens proposed that confiscation apply to the landed property of about 70,000 of the leaders of secession—about five percent of the South's white families. He insisted that the whole fabric of society must be changed. "How can republican institutions—free schools, free churches, free social intercourse exist in a mingled community of serfs. ... If the South is ever to be made a safe republic let her lands be cultivated by the toil of free labor," (Stampp 1982: 127).

In retrospect it is clear that the Negroes understood that the security of land ownership was essential if they were to be able to sustain political freedom. The white leadership in the South understood that white ownership of the land assured that white Southerners would retain control over the economic and political structure of southern society. To many northern Republicans the political guarantees incorporated in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendment would enable the freed slave to "earn" any economic security that they deserved. Only a few recognized that the failure of land reforms assured the failure of reconstruction. And those who understood, such as Sumner and Seward, were unable to mobilize sufficient political resources. As it became apparent that the radical reform would not occur share cropping emerged as a

dominant institutional arrangement for providing freedmen with access to land and landowners with access to and control over labor.

By the time of the presidential election of 1976 it was clear that the South had won the battle for Reconstruction. Violent resistance by ex-Confederates to the effects of Congress to reconstruct the South on the basis of equal civil and political rights for freed slaves produced a level of peacetime violence unparalleled in American history,” (McPherson 2006: 47).

President Grant was either unable or unwilling to devote the level of military resources that would have been required to suppress the violence against the freedmen and the Republican administrations in the Southern states (Lemann 2006).

In this box I have drawn heavily on:

Nicholas Lemann. 2006. *Redemption: The Last Battle of Civil War*. New York: Farrar Straus and Giroux.

Roger L. Ransom. 1989. *Conflict and Compromise: The Political Economy of Slavery, Emancipation and the American Civil War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 216-252.

Kenneth M. Stampp. 1982. *The Era of Reconstruction, 1865-1877*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

The Compromise of 1877

The presidential election of 1876 was the most inconclusive, and arguably the most corrupt, in the history of the office. “When the electoral votes were counted, Democrat Samuel Tilden (New York) had 184 votes while the Republican candidate, Rutherford B. Hayes (Ohio) had 165 votes. Twenty votes from four states—Florida, Louisiana, Oregon and South Carolina—were claimed by both candidates. The Republican party national chairman, Zachariah Chandler, closed up his headquarters and went home believing that Hays had lost the election.

Early the next morning William E. Chandler of New Hampshire and John C. Reid, managing editor of the *New York Times*, awakened Chandler at his New York hotel and sought his permission to wire Republican officials in Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina, suggesting that they arrange to withhold reporting the votes from their states (Woodward 1951: 17). Later that day Zachariah Chandler announced that Hays had been elected.

The matter of the election remained unresolved, however, until March 2, 1877 when the electoral votes were finally counted and Hays was declared the winner. Two days later, as Hays was being sworn in the Democrats in the House passed a resolution that Tilden had been duly elected. The resolution could have been a basis for a revolutionary action if Tilden had been of a revolutionary turn of mind (Woodward 1951: 2002-03). The Democrats were successful, however, in passing an Army appropriation bill that denied the Army funding for well into the Hays presidency. Hays commitment to the South was guaranteed by the fact that, as Mrs. Hays remarked to a friend, “He had no army.”¹⁹ Meanwhile the Democrat governors in the South were in command of the National Guard forces in their states.

The negotiation that led to the compromise that resulted in Hays election were exceedingly complex—extending back several years before the election of 1876. They have been documented in excruciating detail by C. Vann Woodward in *Reunion and*

¹⁹ At a Democratic caucus on February 19, 1877, a majority of the members voted for a resolution to write into the pending army appropriation bill a clause forbidding the troops the use of troops to support any state government in the South until it should be recognized by Congress. A bill containing such a clause was passed by the House. ... When the Republican Senate refused to accept the clause the House stood its ground and adjured without making any appropriation for the army whatever,” (Woodward 1951: 8-9). The army remained unpaid until November 30, 1877.

Reaction: The Compromise of 1877 and the End of Reconstruction (1951). The issues were both political and economic. On the political side the Compromise marked the end of Reconstruction. It recognized the new regimes in the South that returned substantial political power to the prewar landed slave owning families. It had the effect of profoundly shaping the economic and political future of four million freedmen and their families for generations to come.

On the economic side it extracted a commitment from the Hays administration to support the internal improvement in the form of railroads, levies and ports that had been neglected in the South during the Civil War and Reconstruction (see p. 10). The funding and construction of the Texas Pacific and Southern Pacific railroads were central to the resolution of a dispute that had been a source of major sectional conflict. The commitment by Hays also included the appointment of a Southern Democrat to the position of Postmaster General, an office that was traditionally a major patronage source (Woodward 1951: 167-215).

The Compromise of 1877 had provided the political foundation for the reunion of the North and the South. Woodward has raised and attempted to answer the question of why in view of its importance the details of the Compromise have been so little discussed in comparison to the other great political compromises between the North and the South during the nineteenth century. His answer—it was because the participants were so fearful of the dangers of war and anarchy if a compromise could not be arrived at that they proceeded either secretly or in an extremely guarded manner that emboldened the southern Democrats to abandon Tilden and assure election of the Republican candidate. These same considerations were important in the abandonment of the principles that had led to the emancipation of the slaves and the reforms of the reconstruction

The diplomacy that led to Compromise of 1877 marked the abandonment of principles and force and a return to the traditional ways of expediency and concession. The Compromise established a new sectional truce that proved more enduring than any previous one and provided a settlement for an issue that had troubled American politics for more than a generation. It wrote an end to Reconstruction. It recognized a new regime in the South. It shaped the future of four million freedmen and their progeny for generations to come,” (Woodward 1951: 3-4). It also resolved the question of whether the

United States had regained the capacity to conduct elections without resort to force by the federal government (Woodward 1951: 13).

The settlement was, however, hardly consistent with the principles of democracy. “So dangerous was believed the menace of war or anarchy that negotiations were for an agreement conducted secretly or in an extremely guarded fashion. The fact that Southern Democrats were in effect going behind the backs of the Northern members of their own party to arrive at an understanding was not conducive to publicity. Nor was the fact that the Republican managers were abandoning the platform on which they were elected and for principles to which a part of their party still clung. The diplomacy of 1877 was described by Woodward as “secret covenants privately arrived at,” (1951: 4).

Was the Civil War Inevitable?

Was the Civil War inevitable? And was it necessary for the success of the United States nation building project? Or was it simply a result of the failure of inept politicians to arrive at what might have been the Compromise of 1860? Ransom has argued that with the passage of the Kansas Nebraska Act of 1854 war became inevitable.

“The situation in the 1850s was such that if either side was prepared to press the issue of limiting or expanding slavery. Armed conflict would surely result. In the crisis of 1850 neither side was prepared to take that step. What had changed by 1860 was that both sides were prepared to fight. Southerners had decided that leaving the Union was the only sure protection for their slave society. Northerners had come to believe that such an action was detrimental to their interests and should be prevented,” (Ransom 1989: 167).

“The North’s determination to stand up to the southern challenge and keep the Union together rested on more than patriotic ideology or a moral conviction that slavery was evil. ... If they gained status as an independent nation, slave owners would be free to pursue a foreign policy just as inimical to the North’s interests as that pursued by the slave power when it had control of the federal government within the Union. ... Lincoln understood this point quite clearly,” (Ransom 1989: 167).

Woodward is less definitive. He struggles with this issue repeatedly in his book, *Reunion and Reaction* (1951). Looking back from the perspective of the Compromise of 1877 he notes that in the drafting and ratification of the Constitution, in the Missouri

Compromise of 1820, and in the Compromise of 1850 the spirit of compromise triumphed over principle. “In the clash between “right” on the side of the North and “rights” on the side of the South the normal processes of compromise broke down. American resorted to armed force to settle their differences,” (Woodward 1951: 3).

My own sense is that more than the struggle over “right” and “rights” emphasized by Woodward and over political and economic advantage emphasized by Ransom was involved. Both the North and the South made tragic errors in judging the possibility of victory. Both anticipated quick victory in battle and a short war. Would Lee have accepted command if he could have envisaged Grants destruction of the Army of Northern Virginia and the devastation of the old South by Sherman? Would Lincoln have insisted on preserving the Union if he had anticipated that it would require the loss of over 620,000 American lives? How many lives and how much destruction would we be willing to spend today to preserve the Union?

Turkey: From Ottoman Empire to Kemalist Republic²⁰

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire was a dynastic Muslim state ruled by a Sultan. The Sultan was also recognized by the entire Muslim world as Caliph--the spiritual and temporal descendent of the prophet Mohammed. In the sixteenth century the Ottoman Empire had included most of the Middle East, North Africa and what are now the Balkan countries of Eastern Europe. Its system of governance allowed it to accommodate, with relatively limited tension, diverse nationalities, ethnic groups and religious communities (*millets*).²¹

During the nineteenth century central control over the empire was substantially fragmented. The disintegration of the empire was associated with massive population exchanges and ethnic cleansing, first in the Balkans and Russia and later in Anatolia (McCarthy 1995). Nation building in Turkey began in the context of rising national consciousness and nation building efforts by Greeks, Montenegrins, Serbians, and Bulgarians.

The Balkan Wars

In the early 1900s several organizations dedicated to reform of Ottoman governance were formed. One of the first, the Committee on Union and Progress (CUP), was organized by students of the army's Istanbul Medical School. The movement, which became known as the "Young Turks", was particularly active in Salonica and in Macedonia. "The 1908 revolution of the Young Turks was a process of spontaneous combustion rather than a carefully planned operation," (Mango 1999: 76). Although promoted by the CUP "it was essentially a military coup led by officers in their twenties and by some civilians, mainly senior civil servants who came from a similar educational background," (Mango 1999:

²⁰ I am indebted to Tugrul Temel for comment on an earlier draft of this paper.

²¹ Within the Ottoman Empire the term *millet* referred to the organized and legally recognized religious communities. The four *millets* were Armenian, Orthodox, Catholic Christians and Jews rather than ethnic communities. The *millet* system provided for substantial self-governance within the organized religious communities with responsibilities for courts, schools and welfare. Traditionally the Ottoman state did not distinguish among its subjects by their language or ethnic origin nor were their subjects generally conscious of such distinctions. By the middle of the 19th century religion was gradually giving way to nation as the main source of identity in the Christian parts of the empire (Akcam 2004: 62; Clark 2006: 14-15).

78). The leaders in the movement included Adjunct Major Enver Pasa, formerly in charge of 3rd army anti-bandit operations in Macedonia, Cemal Pasa and Talat Pasa. Mustafa Kemal was among a number of younger officers whose position enabled them to play active organizing and staff role in the CUP. The CUP experienced considerable success in infiltrating both the armed forces and the civil bureaucracies in the European provinces (Rumelia) and in western Anatolia.

The CUP demanded a restoration of the 1876 constitution and a reconvening of the General Assembly. On July 24 the Sultan Abdalhamid capitulated and issued a decree restoring the constitution and ordering parliamentary elections. When the news of the proclamation was announced in Salonica “crowds started gathering outside the prefecture building to discuss what was happening. Then at ten in the morning the Greek archbishop, the president of the local Bulgarian Committee and the *mufti*, embraced one another, and called the onlookers do the same in the name of fraternity. ... Soon army and civilian CUP supporters—including Jews, Greeks, and Bulgarians—were speechifying from the steps of public buildings, on café tables and hotel balconies enthusiastically cheered by crowds of all nationalities,” (Mazower 1905: 257).

“The Young Turk revolution started out as an assertion of the values of cosmopolitan loyalty to the empire over the divisive power of nationalism. It replaced the old version of Ottomanism--shared allegiance to the person of the Sultan—with one which stressed common participation in a constitutional government in the name of the people or the Ottoman nation,” (Mazower 2005: 261).

There was a brief window of opportunity between 1909 and 1912 during which the possibility of a multiethnic democratic Ottoman state might have emerged. The parliament functioned properly, the Constitution was in place, and hopes were high. The liberal wing of the Young Turk movement, began to gain ground on the more conservative leaders of the CUP. The Balkan wars spelled the end of the liberal interlude. “During most of the period from June 1913 until the end of World War I, Turkey was governed by a virtual military dictatorship dominated by the three CUP Pashas—Enver, Talat and Djemal (Keyder 1997: 38; see also Lewis 2002: 214-227).

The first Balkan War began in the fall of 1912. “For the Ottoman Empire it was an unmitigated disaster. In just six weeks in the autumn and winter of 1912 a coordinated

offensive by the Balkan states-- Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece--resulted in the loss of almost all of its remaining European territories and “brought invading armies to the edge of the capital itself,” (Mazower 2005: 275-276).²² The objective pursued by the invading Balkan states was consistent with the patterns developed in earlier conquest of Ottoman lands—complete ethnic cleansing in the territories they occupied. They pursued this objective by massacre and expulsion of Muslim populations. Homes, villages, towns and crops were destroyed (McCarthy 1995: 134-177).

The second Balkan War broke out when, on June 20, Bulgaria launched an attack on the Serbs and Greeks. The Greeks forced the Bulgarian troops in Salonica to surrender. Bulgarian residents either fled the city or were arrested and deported. Many prominent Muslim families emigrated or arranged to change their citizenship. On November 1913 the Greek claims to the city received international recognition (Mazower 2005: 280-281).

The Greek occupiers quickly moved to attempt to destroy the landmarks, including street names, mosques, minarets and cemeteries that identified the city with its Muslim past. This task was facilitated by the great fire of August 18, 1917 which destroyed much of the Ottoman and Jewish parts of the town (Box 3.1). The ethnic cleansing policies by the Greeks, Serbians and Bulgarians followed a pattern developed in their earlier conquest of Ottoman lands.

The Ottoman humiliation in the Balkan Wars created an opportunity for the nationalist wing of the CUP to assume power. A triumvirate of Talat, Enver and Djemal were able to dominate the Central Committee of the CUP. In early January 1914 Enver was appointed war minister and chief of the general staff. His position in the government was enhanced when he married a niece of the Sultan. He continued to hold these positions until the CUP government collapsed at the time of the October 2, 1918 armistice that ended Turkey’s participation in World War I (Mango 1999: 115-122).

²² During the 1877-78 war with Russia the Ottoman Empire had lost substantial territory in Europe and in the Caucasus. Close to a million Muslims had been uprooted and forced to migrate to Macedonia, Thrace and western Anatolia (Keyder 1997: 35).

Box 3.1 Ethnic Cleansing in Salonica

The bloody consequences of the rise of ethnic nationalism in Macedonia has been described in graphic detail by Mark Mazower in his book, *Salonica City of Ghosts: Christians, Muslims and Jews* (2005). Prior to World War I several observers described Salonica not as one city but as a juxtaposition of tiny villages in which Muslim Turks, Orthodox Greeks and Bulgarians and other ethno-religious groups lived and spoke their own languages. A 1913 census enumerated that the “overall population came to 157,889 of whom just under 40,000 were listed as Greeks, 45,867 as Ottomans (Muslims) and 61,439 as Jews,” (Mazower 2005: 184-285).

It was only during the first decade of the twentieth century that the nationalist movements elsewhere in the Balkans gave rise to strong ethno-nationalist sensibilities in Eastern Macedonia and Salonica. “The Macedonian struggle which swept across the city and surroundings started as a religious conflict among the region’s Christians but quickly turned into a way for activists to force national identities—“Greek or Bulgarian or even Macedonian—on those who refused them,” (Mazower 2005: 239).

In April 1906 a terrorist organization, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) carried out a series of bombing attacks on a French ship in the Salonica harbor, the central railway station, the main gas line, and the Ottoman Bank. During the next several years Salonica and the surrounding region experienced a wave of assassinations and other acts of terrorism.

The Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 initiated a period of ethnic cleansing in Salonica and Macedonia that lasted for more than a decade. There was substantial looting and killing both in the countryside and in Salonica by bands of irregulars. Slav and Greek peasants killed Muslim and Jewish landlords. Muslim villagers sold their crops and animals for whatever they would bring, fled their homes and fields, and made their way to Salonica in the hope of finding transport to Anatolia.

Greek refugees flooded into Macedonia from Thrace. By the end of 1914 ethnic cleansing by the Bulgarian and Ottoman armies and irregulars had forced more than one hundred thousand Greeks from Thrace to seek refuge in Salonica. Gangs of ax wielding

Greek refugees roamed the streets, ransacking Muslim shops and homes. “The mother, sister and cousin of Mustafa Kemal made their way to the refugee camps of the Turkish capital,” (Mazower 2005: 318).

Within two years fifteen thousand Muslims had left Salonica. When Prizren in Kosovo was captured by the Serbs some 12,000 local Muslims were slaughtered. Similar cleansing occurred throughout European Turkey. A final, and much more massive ethnic cleansing, would be associated with the expulsion of Armenians from Anatolia in 1916/17 and during the massive exchanges of populations between Greece and Turkey in Eastern Anatolia after the end of World War I.

In this box I draw heavily on Mark Mazower 2004, *Salonica, City of Ghosts: Ottomans, Christians, Muslims and Jews, 1430-1950*. New York: Alfred A Knopf. See also Justin McCarthy 1995 *Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922*. Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press.

The Gallipoli Campaign

In the fall of 1914 the Ottoman navy, prompted by the leaders of the CUP and supported by the German military mission, initiated several deliberately provocative actions against Russian ports and naval forces in the Black Sea.²³ Russia declared war on November 2 followed by Britain and France on November 5. The Ottoman government responded with its own declaration of war on November 11. This was followed shortly later by the issuance by Sultan Mehmet V, in his capacity as caliph, of a proclamation of *jihad* against the allied governments that was published throughout the Islamic world.²⁴

In Istanbul Lyman von Sanders, who headed the German military mission to the Ottoman Empire was immediately placed in charge of the general staff and the war ministry by Enver, then Minister of War. When von Sanders assumed command he was shocked with the demoralization of the Ottoman military establishment. “Families of Ottoman officers could not afford to buy their own food and were fed at the military canteens; soldiers were dressed in rags and some were even barefoot; many officers neglected their men; horses were underfed and mangy; hospitals were filthy (Mango 2002: 126-127). In spite of severe tension between German and Ottoman officers “Ottoman officers swallowed their pride and collaborated with their German mentors. Impressive improvements were realized in a relatively short time,” (Mango 2002: 127).

Although Mustafa Kemal had not been in favor of the war declaration he immediately requested a transfer from his military attaché post in Sofia. In the early winter of 1914 Enver left Istanbul to lead a campaign against the Russian army which had invaded eastern Anatolia. The campaign turned into a disaster. In a battle in the mountains near Sarikamus in January 1915 “between 60,000 and 90,000 soldiers died, most of them from the cold,” (Akcem 2006: 125). At the time Enver left for the campaign against the Russians, Mustafa Kemal was appointed commander of the almost

²³ Enver had developed a close relationship with the German Kaiser and admiration for the German military while serving as Military Attaché in the Turkish embassy in Berlin prior to World War I. A German military mission to the Ottoman Empire arrived in Istanbul in December of 1913. A Turko –German military alliance involving substantial economic and military assistance to Turkey was formalized on August 2, 1914 (Dadrian 1997: 203-205). For the convoluted events leading to the Turko-German alliance see Fromkin (1989: 54-76).

²⁴ In this section I draw heavily on Mango (1999: 141-156). For a detailed account of Gallipoli Campaign see Moorehead (1956). For a sensitive fictional account, focusing on the effects of war and population exchange on the inhabitants of a small rural village in southwestern Anatolia, see *Birds Without Wings*, by Lewis de Bernieres (2004).

nonexistent 19th division on the Gallipoli peninsula.²⁵ General Von Lyman regarded the Gallipoli Peninsula as strategic in any assault that might be made by the British and the French in an attempt to control the Dardanelles and occupy Istanbul.

On January 8, 1915, at the insistence of Winston Churchill, the British War Council responded to a Russian request to ease the pressure on their forces in the Caucasus by deciding to take the Gallipoli Peninsula with the objective of moving on Istanbul. In late February the British and French fleet bombarded forts on both sides of the entrance to the Dardanelles. A pause in the Allied attack enabled von Sanders to send several more regiments to the peninsula and reinforce Kemal's 19th division. On March 18th a joint British-French fleet attempted to force its way through the straits. The attempt faltered at the Kilitbasir narrows. Several battleships were sunk and others badly damaged.

After the failure of the Allied fleet to force the Dardanelles, Enver decided that every effort should be made to hold the straits. On March 5th von Sanders was placed in command of a new 5th Army which included all the forces in the Dardanelles area (Mango 1999: 144). During a four-month pause after their naval defeat while Britain was assembling a landing force in Egypt, von Sanders worked feverously to strengthen defenses and train his Turkish troops for an expected combined naval-land attack. On April 15, 1915, the Allies were able to overcome fierce Turkish opposition and establish beachheads at three points—around Arburnu point (Anzac Cove), at the southern tip of the peninsula and across the straits on the Asian side. The French troops that had landed on the Asian side of the Isthmus were shortly withdrawn. Efforts by the British and French to break out of the beachheads on the north and of the British and Anzacs to advance across the peninsula were repulsed in a series of extremely bloody engagements.

²⁵ Mustafa Kemal was born during the winter of 1881 in Salonica. His father was a junior civil servant and some time timber merchant. After attending a military high school in Salonica he was admitted to the War College in Istanbul where he ranked near the top of his class. After graduation he went on to attend the staff college. Many of the future leaders of the nationalist movement were his colleagues at the War College and the Staff College. The comment by Mango that it was "in the classrooms of the War College and the Staff College that the war for Turkey's independence was won" was only a slight exaggeration (Mango 1999: 48). Between his graduation from the Staff College in 1904 and the outbreak of World War I Mustafa Kemal had served in military postings in Syria, Libya, Macedonia and Bulgaria (Mango 1999: 84-92).

Mustafa Kemal was personally involved in the fighting around Anzac Cove where his 17th regiment was almost completely wiped out.²⁶ In fighting on April 24 he succeeded in holding a strategic hill (Conk Bayiri). The fighting then settled down in a bloody stalemate of trench warfare that lasted into early August during which the Turks prevented the Allies from moving beyond their beachheads. On June 1 Mustafa Kemal was promoted to the rank of full Colonel. He also was awarded the sultans gold and silver medals and the German Iron Cross (Mango 1999: 148-149).

“A second stage of the Gallipoli campaign opened on August 6 when Anzac and Indian forces started landing at Sulva Bay just north of the Ariburnu sector defended by Mustafa Kemal,” (Mango 1999: 151). The landings were supported by a push northward from Anzac Cove. von Sanders placed Mustafa Kemal in charges of the forces (the Anafartalar {Army} Group) resisting the Allied offensive. He was given charge of six divisions which succeeded in repulsing the Allied attack. On August 10 his forces won control of the ridges on the southern end of his front and on August 16 his forces repelled an Allied attempt to gain a hold on the northern end.

From the beginning of the Gallipoli campaign an important British objective had been to capture Chunuk Bair, the highest ridge on the Gallipoli Peninsula. It was felt that if they could capture and hold Chunuk Bair they could dominate the peninsula, cut off the southern beachheads, and open the way for an advance on Istanbul. On August 8 a small contingent did manage to occupy the Sari Bar ridge but were driven off on August 10 in a battle personally led by Mustafa Kemal (Moorehead 1956: 281-286).

An Allied attempt to break out of the beachhead was defeated on August 21 as the campaign again settled into indecisive trench warfare. Kemal's success led to increased tension with both Enver and von Sanders. Incapacitated by an attack of malaria Kemal secured a transfer to Istanbul. The Allies successfully evacuated the Anzac Cove and Sulva Bay beachheads on December 19/20 and the southern beachhead around Cape Hellas on January 8/9, 1916. The human cost of Churchill's Gallipoli campaign was

²⁶ Mustafa Kemal reportedly instructed his troops on the Anzac northern flank. “I don't order you to attack. I order you to die. By the time we are dead, other units and commanders will have come up to take our place,” (Mango 1999: 146).

almost incalculable. Ottoman and Allied casualties were each estimated in the 250,000 range—roughly half of the soldiers engaged in the campaign.²⁷

In assessing the contributions to the defeat of the Allies Mango credits Lyman von Sanders for his role in managing logistics, troop deployments and overall strategy. Turkish commanders in both the north and the south, working effectively with their German mentors, performed admirably.²⁸ Mustafa Kemal emerged as the “outstanding front line commander on the northern front. ... He displayed personal courage and inspired his men who were fighting under appalling conditions. ... Gallipoli became the foundation of Mustafa Kemal’s career,” (Mango 1999: 116). At first, however, his accomplishments did not travel much further than the ranks of the Turkish military. “Enver had no wish to see potential rivals build up a popular following,” (Mango 1999: 116).²⁹

²⁷ The official casualty figures were:

	Allies		Turks	
Soldiers engaged:	British	410,000	Soldiers engaged:	
	French	<u>79,000</u>	Approximately	500,000
		489,000	Casualties killed:	55,127
Casualties:	British	205,000	Wounded	100,177
	French	<u>47,000</u>	Missing	10,067
		252,000	Died of disease	21,498
			Evacuated sick	<u>64,440</u>
				251,309

Moorehead 1956: 354.

²⁸ Moorehead compares Von Sanders decisive battlefield performance very favorably relative to the indecisive performance of the leaders of the British forces (Moorehead 1956: 280-282).

²⁹ For a more detailed account of Mustafa Kemal’s career from the end of the Gallipoli campaign ‘til the 1918 armistice see Mango (1999: 157-182).

Box 3.2 Armenian Genocide

The official campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Armenians began in the spring of 1915. “It was not a coincidence that the Armenia genocide took place soon after the Sankamus disaster and was contemporaneous with the empires struggle at Galipoli,” (Akcem 2006: 126). The defeat of Envers army at Sarkamus and the Gallopili battles set off a wave of xenophobia against foreigners and particularly the Armenians who many Turks had come to identify as an internal fifth column. It became the intention of the young Turks CUP government to exterminate or deport them all (Moorehead 1956: 89-92).

During 1915 and 1916, “the Armenians living in Turkey were banished from that country *en masse*. Over 500,000 were massacred and over 600,000 were driven into the deserts of Mesopotamia on the pretense of relocation where most of them perished. A small number found asylum abroad while some 100,000 refugees found shelter in Russia,” (A.A.M. 1974: 25).

Much of the history of what has come to be called the “Armenian Genocide” has suffered from lack of historical perspective and can best be characterized as propaganda. Ethnic cleansing of Turks in the Balkans had been associated with nationalist revolts against Turkish rule in Greece, Montenegro, Serbia and Bulgaria (McCarthy 1995: 1-21). Some respected authors have attempted to avoid the controversy by giving only limited attention to the issue. In his classic, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, Bernard Lewis devotes less than three paragraphs to the Armenian massacres.

Lewis notes that “Turkish weakness and uncertainty in the face of foreign invasion and internal rebellion, often led to terrible oppression and brutality” (Lewis 2002: 356). He also argues that creation of a Russian Armenia on the eastern border of Turkey, where the Armenian Church was established, combined with the penetration of liberal ideas coming from Europe and stimulated the growth of an Armenian nationalist movement in Turkey. These forces combined to initiate “a struggle between two nations for the possession of a single homeland that ended with the terrible slaughter of 1915 ... when more than a million Armenians perished, as well as an unknown number of Turks” (Lewis 2002: 356).

The history of religio-ethnic conflict in the Caucasus and eastern Anatolia during World War I was, however, more complex than portrayed by partisans of either the Armenians or the Turks. Armenians and Turks had shared the same land relatively peacefully until the middle of the 19th century. The Armenians had been viewed as the most loyal of the Ottoman Sultans' Christian subjects. Russian expansion into the northern and western Caucasus resulted in successive waves of population displacement. The Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78 was followed by Russian expulsion of Muslims from the southern Caucasus. Armenian nationalist in western Anatolia began to look to Russia for potential support for their nationalist ambitions.

Beginning in 1894 with a massacre of Armenians in the Sassoun area Sultan Abdul Hamit initiated a series of massacres designed to prevent a repeat in eastern Anatolia of the nationalist uprisings that had occurred earlier in the Balkans (Dadrian 1997: 113-171). "The Sassoun massacre was the first instance of organized mass murder of Armenians in modern Ottoman history carried out in a time of peace and had no direct connection with a foreign war (Dadrian 1997: 117). The Sassoun massacres were followed by a series of incremental massacres and counter massacres during 1891-96. However, by 1897 the Sultan was able to declare that the Armenian question was closed," (Dadrian 1997: 163). While his announcement was premature the massacres of 1896 established a precedent for the Armenian genocide carried out by the Young Turk triumvirate beginning in June 1915.

By the time World War I broke out the Muslims had lost most of their northeastern land to the Russians and the rest was claimed by Armenian revolutionaries. "Muslims knew they were at risk from the Armenians and Armenians knew they were at risk from the Muslims," (McCarthy 1995: 126). After the disastrous defeat of the Ottoman expeditionary forces at Sarikamis the Russians advanced south. By the middle of May a brigade of Cossacks accompanied by Armenian regulars from the Caucasus, and Armenian irregulars from the Caucasus and Anatolia entered Van and massacred much of the Muslim population. By July, however, the Ottomans had driven the Russians and Armenians from Van and the surrounding area. The Russians returned north followed by large numbers of the remaining Armenian population of the occupied region.

The decision to bring about a “final solution” to the Armenian problem by the CUP leaders in the spring of 1915 (at the same time the Battle of Gallipoli was underway) was directed by Interior Minister Talat. It involved the conscription of Armenian men and boys into labor battalions by the army; the massacre of Armenian villagers; and forced migration of elderly men, women, children, under the pretense of resettlement into the deserts of Mesopotamia and northern Syria (Dadrian 1996: 219-234). The first deportation orders went out on May 26. Migrants were expected to provide their own food. Much of what they possessed was stolen from them by their guards or by Kurdish raiders. The Armenian’s genocide was carried out more “efficiently” than the massacres by Sultan Abdul Hamid a generation earlier. Talat is reported to have bragged, “I have accomplished more toward solving the Armenian problem in three months than Abdul Hamid accomplished in thirty years (Moorehead 1956: 91).

A combination of the massacres and deportation left Anatolia a wasteland at the end of the World War I. The Russian revolution in October 1917 led to a disintegration of the Russian army in the Caucasus. Ottoman armies regrouped and by April of 1918 the Ottomans had extended their borders to their pre-1877 limits. In November of 1919, after vetoing several earlier requests, the Nationalist government in Ankara authorized General Karabekir, commander of the army in Eastern Anatolia, to initiate a punitive expedition against Armenia. The Turkish invasion of Armenia was repulsed by the Soviet army and Armenia was incorporated as a republic into the Soviet Union (Dadrian 1996: 356-374).

I now attempt to address a question that continues to puzzle historians of the Armenian genocide: was the Armenian genocide inevitable? It is tempting when one recalls more the century or so that includes the wars of nationalism in western Europe and the ethnic cleansing associated with the nationalist movements in Eastern Europe and the Russian penetration into the Caucasus to believe that similar forces would not give rise to ethnic cleansing or even genocide in Anatolia. Yet an exercise in counterfactual history suggests that there might have been a more favorable resolution.

As noted earlier there was a brief window of opportunity following the deposition of the Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid in 1909. His deposition ushered in a brief period of good feeling among the diverse religious communities of the Ottoman Empire. If during

this period the more liberal wing, rather than the more nationalist wing, of the Committee on Union and Progress (CUP) had gained ascendancy it is possible to imagine the evolution of a multi religious--multiethnic civil society in Turkey.

A second opportunity might have presented itself if Enver had not initiated the disastrous campaign against the Russians in eastern Anatolia in December of 1915. The occupation of eastern Anatolia by the Russian army encouraged the ambitions of the Armenian nationalists. The CUP government in Constantinople characterized the Armenians as a fifth column. The Russian revolution of February 1917 not only removed the Russian threat in eastern Anatolia but also eliminated external support for the Armenian nationalists.

The most objective single history of the sources and the history of Armenian genocide is Tanner Akcam, *A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility* (New York: Henry Holt, pp. 109-204.)

See also:

Justin McCarthy. 1995. *Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 821-1933*, Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press.

Vhakn N. Dadrian. 1996. *The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia and the Caucasus*. New York: Berghahn Books.

Dadrian (pp. 219-247) and McCarthy (pp. 179-253) present almost diametrically opposed views on the Muslim and Armenian expulsion and massacres during and immediately after World War I. Both Muslims and Armenians also suffered from starvation and disease in stupefying numbers (McCarthy 1995: 230).

Saving the State

After recovering his health Mustafa Kemal was first assigned to his old unit at Edirne on the Bulgarian frontier and then reassigned to a post in Syria. He was appointed to the rank of Brigadier General and deputy commander. His initial assignment involved attempting to stem the disintegration of Turkish control in Iraq and Arabia. He was later given the assignment of attempting to stop the Russian advance into eastern Anatolia. On December 17, after the Russian Revolution, the Russians requested an armistice in eastern Turkey and the Caucasus.

In 1917 Mustafa Kemal was assigned the responsibility of accompanying the heir apparent Mehmt Vahdettin, the 56 year old brother of the ailing Sultan Mehmed V, on a trip to Germany. They visited the front line in Alsace and the Krupp industrial complex. An apparent purpose of the trip was to convince the Turks of the continued viability of the German war effort. Following the trip to Germany Kemal fell ill with a kidney infection. He received permission to go to Vienna for treatment. His return was delayed until August because he had contracted Spanish Flue (influenza).

In late 1918 the Ottoman Sultan was forced to initiate armistice negotiations. The armistice proposal was prompted by the collapse of the Bulgarian army in mid-September of 1918. For three years the Bulgarians had held off an allied expeditionary force centered in Salonica. The Bulgarian defense in Macedonia was finally overcome by combined British, French, Serbian and Greek forces. When the Bulgarians sued for an armistice it left Istanbul vulnerable to an Allied advance.

Negotiating the Peace

The armistice that the Ottoman government negotiated with the British provided that the peace treaty, to be worked out later, confirmed that the territorial boundaries of the Ottoman Empire would be based on the territory occupied at the time of the armistice. “The armistice left the Ottoman state in control of its core territory from the Bulgarian frontier to the Caucasus in the east and Syria on the south (Mango 1999: 188).³⁰ This

³⁰ When the Ottoman Empire entered the war in support of Germany the Allies drew up plans to partition the empire among Britain, France and Russia. This plan was abandoned after the Russian Revolution. Among the fourteen points advanced by President Wilson as a basis for negotiations of the Paris Peace conference was a provision that the Ottoman Empire would retain full sovereignty (Mango 1999: 189).

agreement was immediately breached by Britain which stationed forces in Istanbul and on December 8 set up a military administration in Istanbul. Allied control was established over the port, tramways, defenses, gendarmerie, and police.” The British also occupied the Dardenelles, the Anatolian railway, and the Black Sea port of Samsun. French troops advanced from Syria into southwestern Turkey (Mango 1999: 240). An important objective of the British occupation was the prosecution of the war criminals, particularly the officers of the CUP government who were responsible for the Armenian massacres (Akcam 2006: 207-242).

Shortly before the end of World War I Mustafa Kemal was placed in command of a group of armies (the Lightning Group) on the entire southern front running from Mosul to a point south of Iskenderun on the Mediterranean. “The armies manning this long line were weak and hungry—they had been defeated but had not totally collapsed. Kemal now bent his energies on preserving what was still in Turkish lands—territory, people and the military strength to guard them,” (Mango 1999: 282).

When a new government assumed office after the armistice Enver was ousted from his position as war minister and chief of the general staff. He and several colleagues, assisted by the German Embassy, fled to Russia. Enver and several associates were court marshaled (in absentia). Following the appointment of Damat Fared Pasa as Grand Visor in September 1919 many other former leaders of the CUP were dismissed from the army and prosecuted. A number were transferred to British custody and imprisoned in Malta.³¹

With the departure of Enver, Mustafa Kemal viewed himself as an obvious candidate for the position of war minister. However, the new Prime Minister, Izzet Pasha, retained the war ministry for himself. He dissolved the group of armies that Kemal commanded and recalled Kemal to Istanbul where he spent several months attempting to secure an appropriate assignment.

³¹ For a detailed review of the disintegration of the Ottoman government and of the ineffective efforts attempt by the government and by the British occupation force to bring the perpetrators of the Armenian genocide to justice. See Akcam (2006: 244-302 and Dadrian 1997: 303-247).

Declaration of Independence

On April 20, 1919 Mustafa Kemal received notice that he was being appointed Inspector General of the 9th army in Anatolia. The terms of reference were exceedingly broad. He was instructed to restore order, arrange for the collection and storage of weapons, and supervise the disbanding of the army. At the insistence of Kemal the terms specified that the 9th army would be in charge of both military and civil administration in eastern and central Anatolia.³² Commanders and administrators in surrounding areas further west and south were instructed to be “responsive to his communications,” (Mango 1999: 214). In effect Mustafa Kemal had been named the government’s commissioner for the whole of Anatolia to be administered from Ankara.

On May 16, 1919 Kemal, accompanied by his staff, left Istanbul on a small coastal steamer. Three days later he arrived at the port of Samson.³³ After conferring with the governor and the officers of the British contingent located in Samsun about the local security situation he proceeded to the interior on a tour of inspection. Meanwhile, back in Istanbul the British command became concerned about the purpose of his mission and pressured the war ministry to recall Kemal to Istanbul.

Shortly before Mustafa Kemal was assigned to western Anatolia the Allies approved a plan by Greek Prime Minister Venzelos for the Greek army to occupy Ismir and other areas with substantial Greek populations on the west coast of Anatolia. Within days of the Greek landing on May 19, 1919 the government ordered Kemal to return to Istanbul. Instead he met with three colleagues in the ancient provincial capital of Amasagan and drafted a declaration of independence. They declared the Sultans authority, as a captive of the Allies, as no longer valid. Kemal and his colleagues organized a regional congress at Erzurum in the east of Turkey and then a second national congress at Sivas in the interior of Anatolia.

³ During the several months that Mustafa Kemal spent in Istanbul before taking up his assignment in Ankara he had a number of visits with Sultan Vahdettin and the grand vizier. Some reports suggest that the Sultan sent Mustafa Kemal to Anatolia to organize a Turkish national resistance. Kemal himself later referred to being exiled to Ankara. When objections were raised about the broad powers given to Kemal the grand vizier indicated “that the Sultan had taken the decision to test the ability of Mustafa Kemal with whom he had a special relationship of trust,” (Mango 1999: 214). For greater detail see Mango (1999: 185-219).

³³ Ackam notes that the arrival of Kemal at the Anatolian port of Samsun “is considered the beginning of coordinated resistance to Allied control and the fight for independence (Akcan 2006: 206).

Meanwhile Mustafa Kemal, with the support of a number of governors, and Kazim Karabekir, acting inspector of the 3rd army in eastern Anatolia, called for a regional congress of the eastern Committees for the Defense of National Rights to be held in Erzurum on July 23, 1919.³⁴ This was followed by a national conference in Sivas in September. The declaration that emerged from both the national congress proclaimed “the independence and integrity of the Ottoman lands within the armistice lines, fair treatment but no special privileges for minorities, resistance to Greek and Armenian claims, disinterested foreign aid, and the immediate election of parliament,” (Mango 1999: 248).

The government in Istanbul ordered the arrest of Mustafa Kemal. When the plot was foiled Kemal, as president of the conference, “cabled all commanders and civil governors on behalf of the congress that they should sever relations with the Istanbul government as the latter had lost its legitimacy by stopping petitions from reaching the palace and engaging in (other) treacherous activities. Then without waiting for the response, he declared the congress closed,” (Mango 1999: 251). By late September it was clear that the Istanbul government was losing its last vestiges of authority.³⁵

One of the remarkable aspects of the events surrounding Kemal’s stay in Istanbul and his role in the organization of the Erzurum and Sivas congresses was that “the British did not yet have Mustafa Kemal in their sights” when he assumed leadership of the Turkish national movement (Mango 1999: 205). As late as February 1920 Allied leaders meeting at a conference in London were amazed to learn that an army under Kemal’s command had defeated the French in Cilicia. Prime Minister Lloyd George expressed surprise that Kemal’s army of regulars even existed (Franklin 1989: 407-408). The British mission in Istanbul had remained uncertain about Kemal’s background and mission. Lloyd George noted in his memoirs, “Our military intelligence had never been more thoroughly unintelligent,” (quoted in Franklin 1989: 408).

³⁴ The Committees for the Defense of National rights were initially established through the efforts of Talat Pasa and the CUP Central Committee. Their purpose was to serve as a basis of Nationalist resistance to the Allied plans for the occupation and dismemberment of the Turkish state. It was closely related to another organization, Karakul, established to conceal and protect the members of the CUP from efforts by the postwar Turkish government and the British occupation to arrest and prosecute war criminals (Akcam 2006: 303-311).

³⁵ For greater detail concerning the complicated events between Mustafa Kemal’s departure from Istanbul to Sivas on May 16, 1919 and the end of the Sivas congress see Mango (1999: 220-221).

“Thus in little more than four months, Mustafa Kemal was able to secure the fall of the prime minister who had dispatched him to Anatolia. The new government now looked to him as ‘commander of the national forces.’ Mustafa Kemal’s political tactics had proved successful,” (Mango 1999: 252). But the establishment and securing of a modern Turkish nation-state still remained. “The establishment of the Turkish nation-state can be seen as the final stage of the nation-building processes—and of the ethnic-religious conflict—in the Balkans and Anatolia” (Akcem 2006: 317).

The Greek-Turkish War

The Greek army, under cover of Allied warships landed at Izmir on May 1919, just a few days before Mustafa Kemal arrived in Samsun. The Greco Turkish war involved three stages, corresponding to the campaigns of 1920, 1921, and 1922 (Lewis 2002: 253-254; Mango 1999: 306-324). “In the first, the Turks were hopelessly outmatched in numbers and material. Greek forces advanced in both Anatolia and Rumelia. The second Greek campaign in 1921 also opened well for the invaders. ...The Turks, however, rallied. On 10 January a Turkish force under Colonel Ismet halted the Greeks in a valley at Inonu. In a second more important battle on 31 March-1 April Ismet again repulsed the invaders. A new Greek advance began in July, and continued until the Greeks met the Turks on the Sakarya River west of Ankara. Then on 24 August ... the Turkish forces under the general command of Mustafa Kemal won a decisive victory. The Greeks withdrew to a new line further west... In August 1922 a third and final phase of the war began. The Turks won a crushing victory at Dumlupinar and, driving the Greeks before them, reoccupied Ismir on 9 September, thus completing the re-conquest of Anatolia,” (Lewis 2002: 253-254).

After the battle of Dumlupinar the Greek retreat turned into a rout. As the Greek army retreated toward Ismir it followed a “scorched earth policy—burning hundreds of market towns and villages and killing their inhabitants. “Until the re-entry of Turkish troops into Ismir it was Muslim civilians who had suffered most at the hands of the Greeks. Now it was the turn of the Christians,” (Mango 1999: 345). Nurettin, the military commander in Ismir, motivated by revenge, encouraged the looting and killing in Greek and Armenian neighborhoods. On September 13 a fire broke out in the Armenian quarter

and quickly spread to other Christian neighborhoods near the waterfront. Allied warships and transports assembled in the harbor to evacuate their own citizens began to accept anyone they could accommodate. "In all, some 213,000 men women and children, the majority of the population of the city were evacuated" (Mango 1999: 146). Two months after the fire Mustafa Kemal belatedly criticized Nurettin for his brutality (Mango 1999: 346).

Armistice

An armistice was signed on October 11, 1922 in which the Allied governments agreed to the restoration of Turkish sovereignty in Istanbul, the Straits and eastern Thrace. The peace treaty opened at Lausanne on November 1923 and after months of diplomatic wrangling was finally signed on July 1923. "Its significance for Turkey was the re-establishment of complete and undivided Turkish sovereignty in almost all the territories included in the present day Turkish Republic. ... Thus, Turkey alone, among the defeated powers of the first World War succeeded in rising from her own ruins and, rejecting the dictated peace imposed on her by the victors, secured the acceptance of her own terms," (Lewis 2003: 254).

At Lausanne both the Greek and Turkish delegations took as their objectives an exchange of populations that would leave Turkey with a religiously homogeneous Muslim population and Greece with a religiously homogeneous Orthodox Christian population. Arrangements were made for the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey to be supervised by the League of Nation High Commission on Refugees. The speed with which the expulsions of Orthodox Christians from Turkey and Muslims from Greece occurred led to a collapse of any orderly arrangements for population exchange and resettlement.

Some 1.1 million former Ottoman citizens professing the Greek Orthodox faith, many who spoke only Turkish, were moved to Greece while some 80,000 Muslims, mainly from Macedonia and Crete were expelled to Turkey (Mango 1999: 390). The

number of Muslim immigrants from Greece was further swollen by refugees from the Balkan countries--Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Romania (Mango 1999: 390).³⁶

Clark notes that October 1930, at Mustafa Kemal's invitation, Eleftherios Venizelos, again Prime Minister of Greece, visited Istanbul and Ankara to celebrate the reconciliation and friendship between Greece and Turkey. The two leaders were attempting to bring to a conclusion the establishment of neighborly relations that were now possible as a result of ethnic cleansing. Complements were exchanged "that were handsome even by the standards of diplomatic *politesse*" (Clark 2006: 201). Venizelos and Kemal were both deeply committed to the proposition that each country could now get on with the business of constructing unitary states where a single language, religion and ethnic consciousness prevailed.

Building the Nation

An initial step in Mustafa Kemal's project of building a Turkish nation state on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire was to make a legal transition from the last Ottoman government to the new government in Ankara. With the defeat of the Greeks and the ending of the Allied occupation it became possible to give attention to the institutional innovations necessary to realize his ambition to transform Turkey into a modern secular republic. In January 1921 the National Assembly had passed a resolution that "established the Grand National Assembly in Ankara as the "only real representative of the people and as holders of both legislative and executive power," (Lewis 2002: 256).

Many of Kemal's closest associates, however, remained committed to the Sultanate and the Caliphate. Kemal's initial proposal was to separate the Sultanate and the Caliphate. After several days of rancorous debate a resolution was brought to the assembly of the Grand National Assembly declaring that "the Sultan's government had ended in March 1920 when Istanbul was occupied by the Allies, that the government of the Grand National Assembly was the only legitimate authority of the country, and that the Caliphate was vested in the Ottoman dynasty but the assembly had the right to chose

³⁶ The several peace conferences following World War I that attempted to address the future of Turkey failed to resolve the Kurdish problem. The British envisaged several Kurdish states to be advised by British political officers. After several Kurdish uprisings the British pulled back from Kurdistan. The Lausanne conference also failed to resolve the Kurdish problem. The Kurds remained the largest ethnic group in the region that were left without a state of their own (Fromkin 1989: 404-405).

the caliph,” (Mango 1999: 364; also Lewis 2002: 257-258).³⁷ In November of 1922 the institution of the Caliphate was itself abolished. All members of the Ottoman dynasty were exiled. Islam remained the official religion of the republic but was placed under state administration (Mango 1999: 494).

During the struggle for national liberation the Association for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia had served as a useful political instrument for Kemal. In 1923 he began to transform it into a real political party—the People’s Party. In early 1923 he began what amounted to an extensive political campaign throughout Anatolia designed to communicate to the people what he regarded as the necessary reforms that confronted the country. On April 8, 1923 he published a manifesto of nine articles that reiterated his views on popular sovereignty, representative government, and administrative and fiscal reforms (Lewis 2002: 259-260).

In October 1922 the 1921 constitution was amended to provide that “the Turkish state was a republic; its president was to be elected by the Assembly from among its members; his term of office would coincide with that of the assembly and he could be reelected, and the president would appoint the prime minister (Mango 1999: 194). On April 6, 1923 the Grand National Assembly dissolved itself in preparation for new elections to be held in June. The new Assembly elected Mustafa Kemal president. Kemal’s election set off a flurry of political, administrative, and cultural reforms that continued until his death in 1938 (Table 3.1).

Many of the reform ideas introduced by Mustafa Kemal had been advanced by the more liberal wing of the young Turks. They were preceded by a long history of reforms dating back to the early nineteenth century. The leaders of the reform movements of the 19th century had been strongly influenced by the French enlightenment and the French Revolution. Reforms instituted by Sultan Mahmud II (1785-1839) earned him the appellation of the “Peter the Great of the Ottoman Empire.” The nineteenth century was characterized by several cycles of reform and reaction. These reforms SET the stage for the much deeper and sustained reforms introduced by Mustafa Kemal.

³⁷ At what became a turning point in the debate Mustafa Kemal made a speech in which he argued that it was by force that the sons of Osman seized the sovereignty and Sultanate of the Turkish nation; they have maintained this usurpation for six centuries. Now the Turkish nation has rebelled, has put a stop to these usurpers, and has effectively taken the Sultanate into its own hand. This is an accomplished fact,” (Lewis 2002: 258).

The major achievement of the Kemalist reforms involved the transformation of a theocratic Ottoman Empire into a secular republic. The major legal administrative and cultural reforms listed in Table 3.1 were all directed to realizing political and cultural reforms. The reforms were not, however, ends in themselves. Kemal's objective was to transform Turkey into a modern secular European nation state capable of commanding the respect of other modern states.³⁸ The major economic policies directed to this objective fell under the rubric of etatism—implying a major role for the state in guiding economic activities.

Table 3.1 Chronology of Ataturk's Reforms, 1922-1935

1922	Sultanate abolished (November 1).
1923	Treaty of Lausanne secured (July 24). Republic of Turkey) with capital at Ankara proclaimed (October 29).
1924	Caliphate abolished (March 3). Traditional religious schools closed. Sheriat (Islamic Law) abolished. Constitution adopted (April 20).
1925	Dervish brotherhoods abolished. Fez outlawed by the Hat Law (November 25). Veiling of women discouraged; Western clothing for men and women encouraged. Western (Gregorian) calendar adopted.
1926	New civil, commercial, and penal codes based on European models adopted. New civil code ended Islamic polygamy and divorce by renunciation and introduced civil marriage. Millet system ended.
1927	First systematic census.
1928	New Turkish alphabet (modified Latin form) adopted. State declared secular (April 10); constitutional provision establishing Islam as official religion removed.
1933	Islamic call to worship and public readings of the Kuran (Quran) required to be in Turkish rather than Arabic.
1934	Women given the vote and the right to hold office. Law of Surnames adopted – Mustafa Kemal given the name Kemal Atatürk (Father of the Turks) by the Grand National Assembly; Ismet Pasha took surname of İnönü.
1935	Sunday adopted as legal weekly holiday. Compulsory adoption by all Turks of surnames. State role in managing the economy written into the constitution.

Source: B. Sansal (undated). "Ataturk's Reforms".

<http://www.allaboutturkey.com/reforms.htm>

³⁸ Following his reelection as President in 1927 Kemal delivered a thirty-six hour address to the Congress of the People's Party in which he detailed a "description and justification of his actions from the moment when he landed in Samsun on May 19, 1919. It is still the classic account of the Kemalist Revolution," (Lewis 2002: 276).

The transition had not been completed at the time of Kemal's death in 1938. During the presidency of Ismet İnönü rule by the Republican People's Party became more authoritarian. It was not until the election of 1950, in the first truly free vote, that the People's Party *allowed* itself to be defeated in a totally free election and, having been defeated, handed over power to the victorious Democrat Party. Turkey has remained, however, what can best be termed an "authoritarian democracy"—with the military remaining the final arbiter of attempts to achieve political reform (Akcam 2004: 11-28).

Perspective

The central figure in defending the Turkish state and in building the Turkish nation in the first half of the 20th century was Kemal Atatürk. His accomplishments have been aptly characterized by Bernard Lewis:

"It was as a soldier that Atatürk first rose to lead his people—as the brilliant and inspired leader who snatched the Sick Man of Europe from his death bed and infused him with new life and vitality. His first great achievements were in the heroic mode—in fashioning an army, a movement, and a nation from the debris of the shattered Empire and driving the invaders from the national soil."

Yet is not these achievements, important as they were, that was the greatest Atatürk legacy. It was that he had the imagination and courage to make a transition to civilian leadership. "The Gazi Pasha (victor in a Holy War), became a civilian President, and setting aside his uniform appeared to his people in a top hat and evening dress. With this new image of himself Kemal Atatürk, the master of social symbolism, made it clear to his people that, for the time being, the age of martial valor in holy war had ended; the time had come for the solid, bourgeois virtues of industry, skill, and thrift, needed in the hard, unglamorous, but urgent task of developing the country and raising the standard of living," (Lewis 2002: 291-92).

The contrast with the other great European dictators of the time—Stalin, Hitler and Mussolini—could not have been greater. Atatürk used his dictatorial powers to prepare his people for democracy and self government. From the very beginning Kemal

insisted that while the military should act as the guardian of the Constitution it should not play a direct role in political affairs.³⁹

The establishment of Turkey as a modern nation-state was not achieved without great personal and physical cost to the Turkish people and to their neighbors. These costs in terms of refugees driven from their homes and of military and civilian casualties have been enormous. Justin McCarthy has presented what he regards as a conservative estimate that upwards of five million Muslim civilians were killed during the century that began with the Greek revolution and extended through the Greek-Turkish war of 1914-22 (McCarthy 1995: 338-340). When one adds to this the deaths of non-Muslims—Greeks, Serbians, Bulgarians and Armenians— of both Turkish and non-Turkish civilians and military personnel—during this same period it is not hard to believe that the total deaths associated with state formation and nation building in Balkan and Anatolian Turkey may have been in the fifteen million range.

³⁹ I have not yet seen an authoritative analysis of the sources of Mustafa Kemal's personal commitment to liberal social and political ideology. See, however, Matescu (2006).

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