@article{Weikard:6293,
      recid = {6293},
      author = {Weikard, Hans-Peter and Dellink, Rob B.},
      title = {Sticks and Carrots for the Design of International Climate  Agreements with Renegotiations},
      address = {2008-03},
      number = {826-2016-55145},
      series = {CTN Nota di Lavoro},
      pages = {31},
      year = {2008},
      abstract = {This paper examines stability of international climate  agreements for carbon abatement under an optimal transfer  rule and renegotiations. The optimal transfer rule  suggested to stabilise international environmental  agreements (Weikard 2005, Carraro, Eyckmans and Finus 2006)  is no longer optimal when agreements are renegotiated. We  determine the conditions for optimal self-enforcing  sequences of agreements. If these conditions are met, then  transfer payments can be arranged such that no country  wants to change its membership status at any stage. In  order to demonstrate the applicability of our condition we  use the STACO model, a 12-regions global model, to assess  the impact of welldesigned transfer rules on the stability  of an international climate agreement. Although there are  strong free-rider incentives, we find a stable grand  coalition in the first commitment period in a game with one  round of renegotiations.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/6293},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.6293},
}