@article{Gupta:6238,
      recid = {6238},
      author = {Gupta, Sonam and Innes, Robert},
      title = {Determinants and Impact of Private Politics: An Empirical  Analysis},
      address = {2008},
      number = {382-2016-22407},
      series = {Selected Paper},
      pages = {48},
      year = {2008},
      abstract = {This paper studies the links between private politics,  environmental performance of firms and regulatory activity  by the government. Following the terminology coined by  Baron (2001), "private politics" refers to the individual  or collective actions initiated by public interest and  activist groups to further their objectives without relying  on the law or regulation. In this paper, we focus on the  determinants and effects of two such private political  actions, boycotts and proxy contests. We have unique data  on boycotts for the time period 1988-95 and on proxy votes  for the time period 1988-2000. We find that the size of a  firm is an important predictor of the fact if a firm will  be chosen as a target of an activist campaign. We find  MIXED support for Baron's (2006) theory that activist  campaigns will focus on "soft targets" (progressive firms).  Our preliminary findings show that private politics does  
spur the firms to adopt voluntary environmental systems.  
Specifically, we find that the boycotts increase the  probability of adoption of an environmental management  system by 27-33 percent.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/6238},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.6238},
}