@article{Breton:6231,
      recid = {6231},
      author = {Breton, Michele and Sbragia, Lucia and Zaccour, Georges},
      title = {Dynamic Models for International Environmental Agreements},
      address = {2008-03},
      number = {826-2016-55143},
      series = {CTN Nota di Lavoro},
      pages = {22},
      year = {2008},
      abstract = {In this paper we develop a model to analyze, in a dynamic  framework, how countries join international environmental  agreements (IEAs). In the model, where countries suffer  from the same environmental damage as a result of the total  global emissions, a non-signatory country decides its  emissions by maximizing its own welfare, whereas a  signatory country decides its emissions by maximizing the  aggregate welfare of all signatory countries. Signatory  countries are assumed to be able to punish the  non-signatories at a cost. When countries decide on their  pollution emissions they account for the evolution of the  pollution over time. Moreover, we propose a mechanism to  describe how countries reach a stable IEA. The model is  able to capture situations with partial cooperation in an  IEA stable over time. It also captures situations where all  countries participate in a stable agreement, or situations  where no stable agreement is feasible. When more than one  possibility coexists, the long-term outcome of the game  depends on the initial conditions (i.e. the size of the  initial group of signatory countries and the pollution  level).},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/6231},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.6231},
}