@article{Dissanayake:61820,
      recid = {61820},
      author = {Dissanayake, Sahan T.M. and Nunez, Hector M.},
      title = {Optimal Allocation of Land for Conservation: A General  Equilibrium Analysis},
      address = {2010},
      number = {320-2016-10041},
      series = {Selected Paper},
      pages = {20},
      year = {2010},
      note = {This paper was replaced with a revised version on 7/26/10},
      abstract = {This paper presents a general equilibrium analysis of the  optimal allocation of land to be preserved as natural  habitat for conservation and recreation. Following Anas  (1988) we model the natural habitat as both a congestible  public good due to recreation visits and a pure public good  due to option and existence values. Following Fullerton and  Kinnaman (1995) we analyze the use of tax instruments to  achieve the first best outcome in a private competitive  market. First we present the scenario where the public  good, the environment, is provided by a government or  conservation agency.  We show that a per unit lump sum tax  on the environment similar to Anas (1988) combined with a  recreation tax or a wage subsidy can achieve the first best  allocation. Given the difficulty of charging a lump sum tax  we next show that combining the wage or recreation tax with  a utility maximizing conservation agency achieves the first  best outcome. Next we present the scenario where the public  good, the environment, is privately provided. We show that  a subsidy on the private land set aside for the environment  combined with a recreation or wage tax can achieve the  first best outcome. Given the growing interest in ecosystem  service markets and in providing ecosystem services this  analysis highlights that tax instruments can be used to  provide the optimal amount of land devoted to the  environment.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/61820},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.61820},
}