@article{Key:6073,
      recid = {6073},
      author = {Key, Nigel D. and MacDonald, James M.},
      title = {Local Monopsony Power in the Market for Broilers -  Evidence from a Farm Survey},
      address = {2008},
      number = {382-2016-22636},
      series = {Selected Paper},
      pages = {24},
      year = {2008},
      abstract = {The exercise of monopsony power by broiler processing  firms is plausible because production occurs within  localized complexes, which limits the number of integrators  with whom growers can contract.  In addition, growers face  distinct hold-up risks as broiler production requires a  substantial investment in specific assets and most  production contracts do not involve long-term purchasing  commitments by integrators. This paper provides an initial  exploration of the links between the local concentration of  broiler integrators and grower compensation under  production contracts using data from the 2006 broiler  version of USDA’s Agricultural Resource Management Survey.   Results of this preliminary study, which accounts for  characteristics of the operation and specific features of  the production contract, suggest a small but economically  meaningful effect of concentration on grower concentration.  Limitations of the current analysis and future possible  model extensions are discussed.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/6073},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.6073},
}