@article{Schilizzi:59159,
      recid = {59159},
      author = {Schilizzi, Steven and Breustedt, Gunnar and  Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe},
      title = {Should we combine incentive payments and tendering for  efficiently purchasing conservation services from  landholders?},
      address = {2010},
      number = {421-2016-26840},
      pages = {33},
      year = {2010},
      abstract = {Policy makers aiming to get private landholders to provide  non-marketed environmental services need to provide  efficient economic incentives. Two ideas have been explored  to achieve this: linking contract payments to environmental  outcomes and putting the contracts up for tender. This  paper investigates whether there are any gains to be had by  combining the benefits of both approaches. Landholder risk  aversion may offset incentive effects if the fall in  participation outweighs any increases in individual effort.  Using controlled lab experiments in two countries and  across four subject groups, and systematically varying the  rate at which payments are linked to uncertain outcomes,  this paper clarifies the conditions under which incentives  overcome risk-aversion – a parameter which was also  measured. Results show that for risk averse landholders the  most efficient approach is in general to tender contracts  only moderately linked to environmental outcomes – that is,  using a balanced combination of fixed input payments and of  payments linked to uncertain outcomes. This paper also  highlights how experiments can complement the inherent  limitations of a purely theoretical analysis.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/59159},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.59159},
}