@article{Ansink:54292,
      recid = {54292},
      author = {Ansink, Erik},
      title = {Self-enforcing Agreements on Water Allocation},
      address = {2009-10},
      number = {838-2016-55792},
      series = {SD},
      pages = {25},
      year = {2009},
      abstract = {Many water allocation agreements in transboundary river  basins are inherently unstable. Due to stochastic river  flow, agreements may be broken in case of drought. The  objective of this paper is to analyse whether water  allocation agreements can be self-enforcing. An agreement  is modelled as the outcome of bargaining game on river  water allocation. Given this agreement, the bargaining game  is followed by a repeated extensive-form game in which  countries decide whether or not to comply with the  agreement. I assess under what conditions such agreements  are self-enforcing, given stochastic river flow. The  results show that, for sufficiently low discounting, every  efficient agreement can be sustained in subgame perfect  equilibrium. Requiring renegotiation-proofness may shrink  the set of possible agreements to a unique self-enforcing  agreement. The solution induced by this particular  agreement implements the “downstream incremental  distribution”, an axiomatic solution to water allocation  that assigns all gains from cooperation to downstream  countries.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/54292},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.54292},
}