

NOTA DI LAVORO

66.2009

**Think Again: Higher
Elasticity of Substitution
Increases Economic
Resilience**

By **P. Dumas**, Centre International de
Recherche sur l'Environnement et le
Développement (CIRED)

S. Hallegatte, Ecole Nationale de la
Météorologie, Météo-France and CIRED

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT Series

Editor: Carlo Carraro

Think Again: Higher Elasticity of Substitution Increases Economic Resilience

By P. Dumas, Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Développement (CIRED)

S. Hallegatte, Ecole Nationale de la Météorologie, Météo-France and CIRED

Summary

This paper shows that, counter-intuitively, a higher elasticity of substitution in model production function can lead to reduced economic resilience and larger vulnerability to shocks in production factor prices. This result is due to the fact that assuming a higher elasticity of substitution requires a recalibration of the production function parameters to keep the model initial state unchanged. This result has consequences for economic analysis, e.g., on the economic vulnerability to climate change.

Keywords: Substitution, Calibration, Constant Elasticity of Substitution, Shock

JEL Classification: D24, E17, E23

The authors would like to thank Frédéric Gherzi, Philippe Quirion, Guy Meunier, Franck Nadaud and Nicola Ranger.

Address for correspondence:

P. Dumas
Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Développement (CIRED)
Campus du Jardin Tropical
45 bis avenue de la Belle Gabrielle
94736 Nogent-sur-Marne
Cedex
France
E-mail: dumas@centre-cired.fr

Think again: higher elasticity of substitution increases economic resilience*

P. Dumas[†], S. Hallegatte[‡]

July 24, 2009

1 Introduction

To cope with exogenous shocks, it seems obvious that flexibility, often measured by the elasticity of substitution, is crucial. Indeed, when facing an increase in commodity price or a decrease in a sector productivity, a more flexible economy with a higher elasticity of substitution will be more able to substitute alternative productions or supplies, thereby mitigating the consequence of the shock.

This paper questions this intuition, when different sets of elasticity values are used in the same model to compute the effect of a shock. In the simple model presented in this paper, using an illustrative production structure, calculations even lead to opposite results: a higher elasticity of substitution can cause a higher reduction in production in response to a price or productivity shock. The reason behind this result is that all function parameters have to be calibrated to fit with observed economic conditions. When one assumes a higher elasticity of substitution, *ceteris paribus*, it is necessary to change the parameters of production functions to keep the equilibrium situation unchanged (Klump and Saam, 2008). The point is that, while the direct effect of the elasticity increase is to enhance resilience and reduce the total cost of a shock, the indirect effect through parameter changes is to decrease

*The authors would like to thank Frédéric Gherzi, Philippe Quirion, Guy Meunier, Franck Nadaud and Nicola Ranger.

[†]Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Développement (CIRED), Campus du Jardin Tropical, 45 bis, avenue de la Belle Gabrielle, 94736 Nogent-sur-Marne Cedex, FRANCE, dumas@centre-cired.fr.

[‡]Ecole Nationale de la Météorologie, Météo-France and CIRED. hallegatte@centre-cired.fr.

resilience and increase the total cost. Over all, the latter effect often exceeds the former, and the total effect of an increase in elasticity of substitution is to reduce resilience and increase the vulnerability to supply-side shocks.

2 Model

We consider an economy with two sectors. The first sector produces an intermediate goods that is used by the second sector, which produces a final consumption goods. For instance, the first sector can be the infrastructure sector that produces the services used by the rest of the economy (e.g., electricity, water, transportation services).

The first sector uses a borrowed amount capital K , with constant return to scale to produce the intermediate good M that is sold at price p . The price of the capita K is supposed to be fixed and equal to r . The intermediate good market is supposed to be competitive.

The production function of the first sector is:

$$M = \beta K. \tag{1}$$

The condition of null profit and market clearing leads to the equality:

$$pM = rK, \tag{2}$$

and the equilibrium price is given by:

$$p = \frac{r}{\beta}. \tag{3}$$

The second sector is composed of n identical firms, producing an output Y considered as the numeraire, which is sold at a fixed price set to 1. Production is assumed to be made with two inputs: the intermediate good M that is bought at the price p ; and labor L that is provided with inelastic supply \bar{L} at the equilibrium price w .

At symmetric equilibrium on the labor market, all firms use $\hat{L} = \bar{L}/n$ units of goods L . The firms are price takers on all the markets. The production of final goods is integrally used by the workers and the capital owners.

The production function of the second sector is a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function (Arrow et al., 1961), with an elasticity of substitution $\sigma = \frac{1}{1-\rho}$:

$$Y(M, L) = (\lambda M^\rho + \mu L^\rho)^{1/\rho}. \tag{4}$$

If $\rho = 1$, we have $\sigma = +\infty$ and the production function is linear with perfect substitution; if $\rho \rightarrow -\infty$, we have $\sigma = 0$, and the production function is given by a Leontieff production function, with fixed factors and no substitution. If $\rho \rightarrow 0$, we have $\sigma = 1$ and the function is a Cobb-Douglas:

$$Y(M, L) = \gamma M^\lambda L^{1-\lambda}. \quad (5)$$

Firm profits are given by:

$$\Pi = Y(M, L) - wL - pM. \quad (6)$$

Firm profit maximization, with equilibrium on the market of L gives the first order condition:

$$\frac{\partial Y}{\partial M}(M, \hat{L}) = p. \quad (7)$$

This determines the value M^* , the total consumption of goods M by all firms:

$$M^* = \bar{L} \left(\frac{\mu}{\left(\frac{p}{\lambda}\right)^{\frac{\rho}{1-\rho}} - \lambda} \right)^{1/\rho}. \quad (8)$$

The quantity of borrowed capital is K^* :

$$K^* = \frac{M^*}{\beta}. \quad (9)$$

Total production at equilibrium is Y^* :

$$Y^* = \bar{L} \left(\frac{\lambda\mu}{\left(\frac{p}{\lambda}\right)^{\frac{\rho}{1-\rho}} - \lambda} + \mu \right)^{1/\rho}. \quad (10)$$

In the Cobb-Douglas case, one gets:

$$M^* = \bar{L} \left(\frac{p}{\lambda\gamma} \right)^{\frac{1}{\lambda-1}} \quad (11)$$

$$Y^* = \bar{L} \left(\frac{p}{\lambda\gamma} \right)^{\frac{\lambda}{\lambda-1}}. \quad (12)$$

The value added created by this economy, i.e., the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), is the sum of the two sector values added:

$$\text{GDP} = Y^* - pM^* + pM^* = Y^*. \quad (13)$$

3 Calibration

We assume that initial equilibrium conditions are fixed: production is equal to Y_0 , total supply of labor L is \bar{L} , initial consumption of goods M is M_0 , and initial price of the goods M is p_0 .

Such a calibration makes sense from a practical point of view: considering any economic sector, national accounts can provide an assessment of how much input M is consumed by this sector (M_0) at what price (p_0), how much labor (\bar{L}) is consumed, and how much is produced (Y_0). The elasticity of substitution and the parameters of the production function, on the other hand, are difficult to measure and often have to be calibrated (Magnus, 1979). Also, the elasticity is sometimes modified to account for various mechanisms. For example, Rose et al. (2007) divide the elasticity of substitution by 10 to take into account short-term rigidities in the economic system in the aftermath of a disaster.

Here we assume that the elasticity of substitution is chosen first (in an *ad hoc* manner or from econometric analyses), and the other parameters are then calibrated from economic data.

When the elasticity of substitution has been chosen (through the choice of ρ), the values of parameters λ and μ (or, equivalently, λ and γ), are chosen as a function of $X_0 = (Y_0, M_0, \bar{L}, p_0)$ and of ρ . First order conditions (7) gives, after reintroducing Y_0 :

$$\lambda = \left(\frac{Y_0}{M_0} \right)^{\rho-1} p_0. \quad (14)$$

Substituting λ back in the production function leads to:

$$\mu = \left(\frac{Y_0}{\bar{L}} \right)^{\rho} - \left(\frac{M_0}{\bar{L}} \right)^{\rho} \left(\frac{Y_0}{M_0} \right)^{\rho-1} p_0. \quad (15)$$

With a Cobb-Douglas function, one gets in a similar way:

$$\lambda = \frac{M_0}{Y_0} p_0 \quad (16)$$

$$\gamma = \frac{Y_0}{M_0^{\lambda} \bar{L}^{1-\lambda}}. \quad (17)$$

As shown in Fig. 1, λ and μ increases when ρ increases and the elasticity of substitution is larger. For instance, if ρ tends to $-\infty$, i.e., if the production function is a Leontieff function, then λ and μ tend to zero. If ρ is close to zero, i.e., if the production function is close to a Cobb-Douglas with an elasticity of substitution tending to one, then $\lambda = p_0 M_0 / Y_0$ and $\mu = (Y_0 - M_0) / \bar{L}$.




Figure 1: Values of the production function parameters, as a function of the elasticity of substitution ρ , for $\rho < 0$ on the left, and $\rho > 0$ on the right. These values are calculated with $Y_0 = 1$, $M_0 = 0.1$, $p_0 = 1$, and $\bar{L} = 0.9$.

In this case, λ is the ratio of intermediate consumption of goods M to total production, i.e., the cost share of goods M . If ρ tends toward 1, i.e., if the production function is close to the linear case, then λ is equal to p_0 and μ is equal to w .

These relationships are also apparent using cost shares, which are often used for calibration of the elasticity of substitution (Frondel and Schmidt, 2002):

$$\ln\left(\frac{p_0 M_0}{Y_0}\right) = (1 - \sigma) \ln(p_0) + \sigma \ln(\lambda). \quad (18)$$

This equation shows that the parameter λ has to be adjusted if σ changes while $p_0 M_0 / Y_0$ and p_0 are unchanged.

More generally, this dependency shows that, when one wants to investigate the influence of the elasticity of substitution using a sensitivity analysis (Rose et al., 2007), it is necessary to take into account the direct effect of an increase in elasticity of substitution (through the production function shape) and the indirect effect of this increase (through the impact on the other parameters of the production function). The combined impact of these two effects is investigated in the next section.

4 Impact of a supply-side shock

We assess the consequence on production Y (i.e., on GDP) of an increase in the price of goods M , for various values of ρ (between $-\infty$ and 1). We assume that the new price of the goods M is $p = \alpha p_0$. This increase in the price of goods M could come from a reduction of the productivity in this sector, for example, one could have $\beta = \beta_0/\alpha$. This is for instance what can be expected if climate change reduces the productivity of infrastructure capital. The amount of borrowed capital changes, and we assume that there is enough unused capacity to respond to this demand, at an unchanged price r .

Since the production Y is used as a numeraire, the price p is measured with respect to the price of final production. Replacing the price in the expression of Y^* leads to:

$$Y^* = Y_0 \left(\frac{1 - \frac{p_0 M_0}{Y_0}}{1 - \frac{p_0 M_0}{Y_0} \alpha^{\frac{\rho}{\rho-1}}} \right)^{1/\rho}. \quad (19)$$

The denominator in (19) cancels out when the cost of intermediate consumption is larger than the value of production. In this case, producing does not make sense, and production reaches zero.

The ratio Y^*/Y_0 is also the ratio of GDP after and before the shock and is therefore a measure of the economic resilience to the price shock. The derivative d_σ of Y^*/Y_0 with respect to σ describes how resilience depends on the elasticity of substitution. This derivative d_σ has the same sign than d_ρ , the derivative of Y^*/Y_0 with respect to ρ .

Elementary calculation gives the expression of d_ρ , with $B = p_0 M_0 / Y_0$:

$$\begin{aligned} d_\rho = & \left((1 - B) \left(1 - B \alpha^{\frac{\rho}{\rho-1}} \right)^{-1} \right)^{\rho-1} \times \\ & \left[- \ln \left((1 - B) \left(1 - B \alpha^{\frac{\rho}{\rho-1}} \right)^{-1} \right) \rho^{-2} + \right. \\ & B \alpha^{\frac{\rho}{\rho-1}} \left((\rho - 1)^{-1} - \frac{\rho}{(\rho - 1)^2} \right) \ln(\alpha) \rho^{-1} \\ & \left. \left(1 - B \alpha^{\frac{\rho}{\rho-1}} \right)^{-1} \right]. \end{aligned} \quad (20)$$

A numerical analysis with $\alpha = 2$, see Fig. 2, shows that the derivative of production with respect to the elasticity of substitution can be either positive




Figure 2: Sign of d_ρ , the output ratio derivative with respect to the parameter ρ , with $\alpha = 2$. Parameter ρ is varied on the x-axis, while the y-axis is the initial share of M in output, i.e., $B = p_0 M_0 / Y_0$. In region (1) production is impossible, in region (2) the derivative is positive, and in region (3) the derivative is negative.

or negative¹. The figure shows three regions:

- In region (1), the denominator in (19) is negative, and Y^* is not defined (i.e., production becomes impossible after the shock). It is the case when $(p_0M_0/Y_0)\alpha^{\frac{\rho}{\rho-1}} \geq 1$. In that case, the price of intermediate consumption is too large with respect to the price of production, production is not possible and the economy collapses.
- In region (2), Y^* is positive, production remains possible, and the derivative of production with respect to the elasticity of substitution is positive. In this parameter domain, easier substitution smoothes the shock, as the intuition suggests. For high ρ , i.e., near perfect substitution, this region spans the entire range. But for lower ρ , this region is included in the domain where $(p_0M_0/Y_0)\alpha \geq 1$ and $(p_0M_0/Y_0)\alpha^{\frac{\rho}{\rho-1}} < 1$, i.e., in the domain where the shock would make production impossible in absence of substitution but where substitution makes production possible.
- In region (3), Y^* is positive, production remains possible, and the derivative of production with respect to the elasticity of substitution is negative. In this parameter domain, increasing ρ or σ , i.e., increasing substitution, reduces resilience. Contrary to the intuition, an easier substitution makes worse the consequences of the shock. Importantly, this is the case for all values of $\rho < 0$, provided that $(p_0M_0/Y_0)\alpha < 1$, i.e., provided that production would remain possible even in absence of substitution.

In the extreme case of no substitution (the Leontieff case), the price shock has simply no impact on production level. For any value of α , indeed, when $\rho \rightarrow -\infty$ (i.e., $\sigma = 0$) and $(p_0M_0/Y_0)\alpha^{\frac{\rho}{\rho-1}} \leq 1$, the production limit is Y_0 . In fact, the additional cost of goods M is fully compensated by a decrease in the cost of labor L , i.e., on w , because this goods is inelastically provided.

Most of the cases that are analogous to our illustrative production structure are to be found in region (3). Assuming that $\rho < 0$ ($\sigma < 1$), i.e., that substitution is not too large, as found by most analyses (Kemfert and Welsch, 2000), and considering a large increase in the price of goods M by 100% ($\alpha = 2$), the model parameters would be in region (3) if $(p_0M_0/Y_0) < 1/2$, i.e., if the initial consumption of goods M represents less than half of the value of production (i.e., if the cost share of goods M is lower than 50%).

As a comparison, according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis data, the manufacturing sector in the US (in the 15-sector level of aggregation)

¹Other values give the same result.

consumes intermediate goods from the utilities sector for a value equal to 1.1% of its total production. Its largest client is itself (i.e., the manufacturing sector), for a value of only 33% of its total production. In France, according to INSEE, the industrial sector consumes energy for a value equal to 3.4% of its own production in 2006 (it was only 1.6% in 2004).

It seems, therefore, that in this simple general equilibrium setting, consistent with the US manufacturing sector or the French industrial sector and their infrastructure-service supply, the larger the elasticity of substitution between energy and labor, the larger are the consequences of an increase in infrastructure-service prices (or, equivalently, of a reduction in infrastructure-service production productivity). This counter-intuitive result is not due to the direct effect of substitution, which tends to smooth the shock when the elasticity is larger, but to the indirect effect of substitution, which makes the two other parameters of the CES production function change.

In this setting, however, the hypothesis of perfect wages adjustment is certainly exaggerated, at least in the short term. With less flexible wages, this mechanism should be reduced but remains present. Similarly, an unchanged capital price after the shock is a special case, as is the existence of unused capital. If there is no available capital, some investment (i.e., reduction in consumption) would have to be spent in order to reach the capital stock level that corresponds to the after-shock situation. In many cases, and in absence of rapid depreciation, this amount of transient investment should however be very low compared with the change in production.

5 Conclusion

This paper shows that, counter-intuitively, a higher elasticity of substitution in production function can lead to a reduced economic resilience and a larger vulnerability to shocks in production factor prices. This result is due to the fact that assuming a higher elasticity of substitution requires a recalibration of the production function parameters to keep the model initial state unchanged.

Even though the analysis presented in this paper uses restrictive hypotheses, this analysis is sufficient to show that the relationship between elasticity of substitution and resilience is not automatically positive.

This result has consequences that are important for economic analysis. For instance, it is likely that climate change will affect primarily the infrastructure sector, which has a long capital lifetime and will reveal at least partly ill-adapted to new climate conditions, reducing its productivity. In such a situation, a larger elasticity of substitution in the production function

of the rest of economy that relies on infrastructure services may lead to a higher vulnerability.

References

- Arrow, K. J., Chenery, H. B., Minhas, B. S., Solow, R. M., 1961. Capital-labor substitution and economic efficiency. *Review of Economics and Statistics* 43, 225–250.
- Frondel, M., Schmidt, C. M., 2002. The capital-energy controversy: An artifact of cost shares? *The Energy Journal* 23 (3), 53–79.
- Kempfert, C., Welsch, H., 2000. Energy-capital-labor substitution and the economic effects of CO₂ abatement: Evidence for Germany. *Journal of Policy Modeling* 22 (6), 641–660.
- Klump, R., Saam, M., 2008. Calibration of normalised CES production functions in dynamic models. *Economics Letters* 99 (2), 256–259.
- Magnus, J. R., 1979. Substitution between energy and non-energy inputs in the Netherlands 1950–1976. *International Economic Review* 20 (2).
- Rose, A., Oladosu, G., Liao, S.-Y., 2007. Business interruption impacts of a terrorist attack on the electric power system of Los Angeles: Customer resilience to a total blackout. *Risk Analysis* 27 (3), 513–531.

NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper Series

Our Note di Lavoro are available on the Internet at the following addresses:

<http://www.feem.it/Feem/Pub/Publications/WPapers/default.htm>

<http://www.ssrn.com/link/feem.html>

<http://www.repec.org>

<http://agecon.lib.umn.edu>

<http://www.bepress.com/feem/>

NOTE DI LAVORO PUBLISHED IN 2009

- SD 1.2009 Michael Hoel: [Bush Meets Hotelling: Effects of Improved Renewable Energy Technology on Greenhouse Gas Emissions](#)
- SD 2.2009 Abay Mulatu, Reyer Gerlagh, Dan Rigby and Ada Wossink: [Environmental Regulation and Industry Location](#)
- SD 3.2009 Anna Alberini, Stefania Tonin and Margherita Turvani: [Rates of Time Preferences for Saving Lives in the Hazardous Waste Site Context](#)
- SD 4.2009 Elena Ojea, Paulo A.L.D. Nunes and Maria Loureiro: [Mapping of Forest Biodiversity Values: A Plural Perspective](#)
- SD 5.2009 Xavier Pautrel : [Macroeconomic Implications of Demography for the Environment: A Life-Cycle Perspective](#)
- IM 6.2009 Andrew Ellul, Marco Pagano and Fausto Panunzi: [Inheritance Law and Investment in Family Firms](#)
- IM 7.2009 Luigi Zingales: [The Future of Securities Regulation](#)
- SD 8.2009 Carlo Carraro, Emanuele Massetti and Lea Nicita: [How Does Climate Policy Affect Technical Change? An Analysis of the Direction and Pace of Technical Progress in a Climate-Economy Model](#)
- SD 9.2009 William K. Jaeger: [The Welfare Effects of Environmental Taxation](#)
- SD 10.2009 Aude Pommeret and Fabien Prieur: [Double Irreversibility and Environmental Policy Design](#)
- SD 11.2009 Massimiliano Mazzanti and Anna Montini: [Regional and Sector Environmental Efficiency Empirical Evidence from Structural Shift-share Analysis of NAMEA data](#)
- SD 12.2009 A. Chiabai, C. M. Travisi, H. Ding, A. Markandya and P.A.L.D Nunes: [Economic Valuation of Forest Ecosystem Services: Methodology and Monetary Estimates](#)
- SD 13.2009 Andrea Bigano, Mariaester Cassinelli, Fabio Sfera, Lisa Guarrera, Sohbet Karbuz, Manfred Hafner, Anil Markandya and Ståle Navrud: [The External Cost of European Crude Oil Imports](#)
- SD 14.2009 Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro, Romain Duval, Alessandra Sgobbi and Massimo Tavoni: [The Role of R&D and Technology Diffusion in Climate Change Mitigation: New Perspectives Using the Witch Model](#)
- IM 15.2009 Andrea Beltratti, Marianna Caccavaio and Bernardo Bortolotti: [Stock Prices in a Speculative Market: The Chinese Split-Share Reform](#)
- GC 16.2009 Angelo Antoci, Fabio Sabatini and Mauro Sodini: [The Fragility of Social Capital](#)
- SD 17.2009 Alexander Golub, Sabine Fuss, Jana Szolgayova and Michael Obersteiner: [Effects of Low-cost Offsets on Energy Investment – New Perspectives on REDD –](#)
- SD 18.2009 Enrica De Cian: [Factor-Augmenting Technical Change: An Empirical Assessment](#)
- SD 19.2009 Irene Valsecchi: [Non-Uniqueness of Equilibria in One-Shot Games of Strategic Communication](#)
- SD 20.2009 Dimitra Vouvaki and Anastasios Xeapapadeas: [Total Factor Productivity Growth when Factors of Production Generate Environmental Externalities](#)
- SD 21.2009 Giulia Macagno, Maria Loureiro, Paulo A.L.D. Nunes and Richard Tol: [Assessing the Impact of Biodiversity on Tourism Flows: A model for Tourist Behaviour and its Policy Implications](#)
- IM 22.2009 Bernardo Bortolotti, Veljko Fotak, William Megginson and William Miracky: [Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment Patterns and Performance](#)
- IM 23.2009 Cesare Dosi and Michele Moretto: [Auctioning Monopoly Franchises: Award Criteria and Service Launch Requirements](#)
- SD 24.2009 Andrea Bastianin: [Modelling Asymmetric Dependence Using Copula Functions: An application to Value-at-Risk in the Energy Sector](#)
- IM 25.2009 Shai Bernstein, Josh Lerner and Antoinette Schoar: [The Investment Strategies of Sovereign Wealth Funds](#)
- SD 26.2009 Marc Germain, Henry Tulkens and Alphonse Magnus: [Dynamic Core-Theoretic Cooperation in a Two-Dimensional International Environmental Model](#)
- IM 27.2009 Frank Partnoy: [Overdependence on Credit Ratings Was a Primary Cause of the Crisis](#)
- SD 28.2009 Frank H. Page Jr and Myrna H. Wooders (lxxxv): [Endogenous Network Dynamics](#)
- SD 29.2009 Caterina Calsamiglia, Guillaume Haeringer and Flip Klijn (lxxxv): [Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study](#)
- SD 30.2009 Gilles Grandjean, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch (lxxxv): [Connections Among Farsighted Agents](#)
- SD 31.2009 Antonio Nicoló and Carmelo Rodríguez Álvarez (lxxxv): [Feasibility Constraints and Protective Behavior in Efficient Kidney Exchange](#)
- SD 32.2009 Rahmi İlkiliç (lxxxv): [Cournot Competition on a Network of Markets and Firms](#)
- SD 33.2009 Luca Dall'Asta, Paolo Pin and Abolfazl Ramezanzpour (lxxxv): [Optimal Equilibria of the Best Shot Game](#)
- SD 34.2009 Edoardo Gallo (lxxxv): [Small World Networks with Segregation Patterns and Brokers](#)
- SD 35.2009 Benjamin Golub and Matthew O. Jackson (lxxxv): [How Homophily Affects Learning and Diffusion in Networks](#)

SD	36.2009	Markus Kinatered (lxxxv): Team Formation in a Network
SD	37.2009	Constanza Fosco and Friederike Mengel (lxxxv): Cooperation through Imitation and Exclusion in Networks
SD	38.2009	Berno Buechel and Tim Hellmann (lxxxv): Under-connected and Over-connected Networks
SD	39.2009	Alexey Kushnir (lxxxv): Matching Markets with Signals
SD	40.2009	Alessandro Tavoni (lxxxv): Incorporating Fairness Motives into the Impulse Balance Equilibrium and Quantal Response Equilibrium Concepts: An Application to 2x2 Games
SD	41.2009	Steven J. Brams and D. Marc Kilgour (lxxxv): Kingmakers and Leaders in Coalition Formation
SD	42.2009	Dotan Persitz (lxxxv): Power in the Heterogeneous Connections Model: The Emergence of Core-Periphery Networks
SD	43.2009	Fabio Eboli, Ramiro Parrado, Roberto Roson: Climate Change Feedback on Economic Growth: Explorations with a Dynamic General Equilibrium Mode
GC	44.2009	Fabio Sabatini: Does Social Capital Create Trust? Evidence from a Community of Entrepreneurs
SD	45.2009	ZhongXiang Zhang: Is it Fair to Treat China as a Christmas Tree to Hang Everybody's Complaints? Putting its Own Energy Saving into Perspective
SD	46.2009	Eftichios S. Sartzetakis, Anastasios Xepapadeas and Emmanuel Petrakis: The Role of Information Provision as a Policy Instrument to Supplement Environmental Taxes: Empowering Consumers to Choose Optimally
SD	47.2009	Jean-François Caulier, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch: Contractually Stable Networks
GC	48.2009	Massimiliano Mazzanti, Susanna Mancinelli, Giovanni Ponti and Nora Piva: Education, Reputation or Network? Evidence from Italy on Migrant Workers Employability
SD	49.2009	William Brock and Anastasios Xepapadeas: General Pattern Formation in Recursive Dynamical Systems Models in Economics
SD	50.2009	Giovanni Marin and Massimiliano Mazzanti: Emissions Trends and Labour Productivity Dynamics Sector Analyses of De-coupling/Recoupling on a 1990-2005 Namea
SD	51.2009	Yoshio Kamijo and Ryo Kawasaki (lxxxv): Dynamics, Stability, and Foresight in the Shapley-Scarf Housing Market
IM	52.2009	Laura Poddi and Sergio Vergalli: Does Corporate Social Responsibility Affect the Performance of Firms?
SD	53.2009	Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro and Massimo Tavoni: Climate Change Mitigation Strategies in Fast-Growing Countries: The Benefits of Early Action
GC	54.2009	Alireza Naghavi and Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano: Firm Heterogeneity, Contract Enforcement, and the Industry Dynamics of Offshoring
IM	55.2009	Giacomo Calzolari and Carlo Scarpa: On Regulation and Competition: Pros and Cons of a Diversified Monopolist
SD	56.2009	Valentina Bosetti, Ruben Lubowski and Alexander Golub and Anil Markandya: Linking Reduced Deforestation and a Global Carbon Market: Impacts on Costs, Financial Flows, and Technological Innovation
IM	57.2009	Emmanuel Farhi and Jean Tirole: Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch and Systemic Bailouts
SD	58.2009	Kelly C. de Bruin and Rob B. Dellink: How Harmful are Adaptation Restrictions
SD	59.2009	Rob Dellink, Michel den Elzen, Harry Aiking, Emmy Bergsma, Frans Berkhout, Thijs Dekker, Joyeeta Gupta: Sharing the Burden of Adaptation Financing: An Assessment of the Contributions of Countries
SD	60.2009	Stefania Tonin, Anna Alberini and Margherita Turvani: The Value of Reducing Cancer Risks at Contaminated Sites: Are More Heavily Exposed People Willing to Pay More?
SD	61.2009	Clara Costa Duarte, Maria A. Cunha-e-Sá and Renato Rosa: The Role of Forests as Carbon Sinks: Land-Use and Carbon Accounting
GC	62.2009	Carlo Altomonte and Gabor Békés: Trade Complexity and Productivity
GC	63.2009	Elena Bellini, Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano, Dino Pinelli and Giovanni Prarolo: Cultural Diversity and Economic Performance: Evidence from European Regions
SD	64.2009	Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro, Enrica De Cian, Romain Duval, Emanuele Massetti and Massimo Tavoni: The Incentives to Participate in, and the Stability of, International Climate Coalitions: A Game-theoretic Analysis Using the Witch Model
IM	65.2009	John Temple Lang: Article 82 EC – The Problems and The Solution
SD	66.2009	P. Dumas and S. Hallegatte: Think Again: Higher Elasticity of Substitution Increases Economic Resilience

(lxxxv) This paper has been presented at the 14th Coalition Theory Network Workshop held in Maastricht, The Netherlands, on 23-24 January 2009 and organised by the Maastricht University CTN group (Department of Economics, http://www.feem-web.it/ctn/12d_maa.php).