@article{Calzolari:52543,
      recid = {52543},
      author = {Calzolari, Giacomo and Scarpa, Carlo},
      title = {On Regulation and Competition: Pros and Cons of a  Diversified Monopolist},
      address = {2009-07},
      number = {832-2016-55423},
      series = {SD},
      pages = {43},
      year = {2009},
      abstract = {We study the regulation of a firm which supplies a  regulated service while also operating in a competitive,  unregulated sector. If the firm conducts its activities in  the two markets jointly, it enjoys economies of scope whose  size is the firm’s private information, unknown either to  the regulator or to the rival firms. We characterize the  unregulated market outcome (with price and quantity  competition) and optimal regulation that involves an  informational externality to the competitors. Although  joint conduct of the activities generates scope economies,  it also entails private information, so that regulation is  less efficient and the unregulated market too may be  adversely affected. Nevertheless, we show that allowing the  firm to integrate productions is (socially) desirable,  unless joint production is characterized by dis-economies  of scope.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/52543},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.52543},
}