@article{Dall'Asta:50684,
      recid = {50684},
      author = {Dall'Asta, Luca and Pin, Paolo and Ramezanpour, Abolfazl},
      title = {Optimal Equilibria of the Best Shot Game},
      address = {2009},
      number = {838-2016-55819},
      series = {SD},
      pages = {17},
      year = {2009},
      abstract = {We consider any network environment in which the “best  shot game” is played. This is the case where the possible  actions are only two for every node (0 and 1), and the best  response for a node is 1 if and only if all her neighbors  play 0. A natural application of the model is one in which  the action 1 is the purchase of a good, which is locally a  public good, in the sense that it will be available also to  neighbors. This game will typically exhibit a great  multiplicity of equilibria. Imagine a social planner whose  scope is to find an optimal equilibrium, i.e. one in which  the number of nodes playing 1 is minimal. To find such an  equilibrium is a very hard task for any non-trivial network  architecture. We propose an implementable mechanism that,  in the limit of infinite time, reaches an optimal  equilibrium, even if this equilibrium and even the network  structure is unknown to the social planner.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/50684},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.50684},
}