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Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Western Europe

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Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Western Europe

Tim Josling

European agricultural policy, in particular the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union, has long been a matter of international interest. Overseas producers have viewed agricultural policy in Europe as being a major impediment to the opening up of international trade in farm products. Internally, the policy has been no less controversial, with several member states seeking to “reform” the CAP and others regarding it as a foundation for economic integration. The overall perception, both within and outside the EU, is of a highly protective policy that shelters a high-cost agricultural sector from the winds of competition blowing from the Americas, Australasia and North Africa. Supporters claim social and political benefits from such protection, arguing that reduction of border protection and cutting of domestic support would lead to the depopulation of rural Europe and the destruction of the bedrock of social stability. Detractors see a policy that encourages overproduction, with surpluses dumped on world markets, and a misallocation of scarce resources from more profitable uses. In short, they view the CAP as a “poster child” for agricultural distortions.

Some facts are un-controversial. The continent of Western Europe made a remarkable recovery from the devastation of its infrastructure and productive capacity in the Second World War to the highly sophisticated economies of the present day. Economic integration, the development of a “single market” within the EU and the common approach taken towards external trade, are widely agreed to have been a part of that success.¹ The agricultural sector has also gone through a dramatic transformation, from isolated national markets and traditional production methods to an integrated EU-wide market and modern farms employing sophisticated technology. To transform agriculture in this way within two generations has been a remarkable feat. Agricultural policy has influenced that role in both positive and negative directions. It has given shelter from foreign competition and

¹ In a recent survey of European economic growth since 1950, Crafts and Toniolo (2008) conclude that incentive structures are a crucial explanator of comparative growth rates of the economies of Europe (east as well as west).

encouraged investment. But it has also encouraged high-cost production of commodities that have shrinking markets. So the story of the policy developments and the distortions that these policies maintain is valuable as a way of explaining some of the links between policy and performance.

This chapter focuses on the developments in agricultural policy, and on the consequent distortions to the economies of the Western European countries. It attempts to answer four related questions.

- Has the level of protection, and the consequent distortion in resource use and consumer purchases, been increasing or decreasing over the five decades from 1955-2007?
- How have the formation and subsequent enlargements of the European Union influenced the patterns of and trends in agricultural protection?
- What have been the main drivers of agricultural policy and to what extent have external influences impacted those forces?
- What can one say about the future trends and protection levels in Western Europe?

The chapter differs in some respects from the others in this volume. Three such differences are worth noting here. Firstly, Western Europe contains a large number of countries, with different agricultural capacity, climatic conditions, structures and political views. The differences among these countries are often as important as the similarities, and therefore generalizations are difficult to make. Inevitably, much of the focus is on the EU as an aggregate unit, rather than on each individual member country, though this misses some of the richness of the diversity of conditions. But from the viewpoint of the rest of the world, it is of interest to see the aggregate impact of the variety of policies implemented in the EU and more broadly in Western Europe.

Secondly, the process of economic integration has been more intensive and comprehensive than in any other region, developed or developing. Agriculture has been incorporated into that process of integration more fully than in most other regions, although even within Western Europe there are differences in this regard. This means that the process of integration plays a much greater role in Western Europe than in other regions in explaining the pattern and trends in distortions. And as the membership in the European Community (later the European Union) grew, countries that had previously autonomous policies adopted the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). So the number of agricultural policies in Western Europe has in effect declined over the period considered by this study. The countries of

Western Europe have been converging over a fifty-year period towards a unified policy towards agriculture.

And thirdly, the external aspects of agricultural policy have played a more significant role in developing domestic policy in Western Europe than in most other regions. This is in spite of the fact that the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has often appeared resistant to pressures from abroad. The narrative of the last fifty years of agricultural policy in Western Europe is closely linked to the development of trade rules for agricultural products in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the subsequent obligations undertaken as a result of the Uruguay Round and the resulting transformation of the GATT Secretariat into the World Trade Organization (WTO). And other trade agreements, notably the obligations to former colonies through successive Lomé Agreements, have played a significant role in driving some commodity programs within the CAP. In the EU, the separation between domestic and foreign policy in the area of agriculture has always been blurred. The Western European countries that are not members of the EU have been influenced by many of the same influences.

Agriculture in Western Europe, 1955 to 2007: an overview

Agriculture in Western Europe enjoys a degree of diversity that reflects a wide variety of soils and climatic conditions ranging from the arid Mediterranean regions to the Arctic Circle. Superimposed on this natural diversity is the complexity of different social, economic and political conditions in the eighteen countries that are the subject of this chapter.² History has played a major part in creating this patchwork, particularly the different paths that countries took from feudalism to independent farming units and the inheritance laws that influenced the extent to which land ownership was transmitted from generation to generation. Average farm size varies considerably in the countries of Western Europe, in turn reflecting

² The countries of Western Europe, for the purposes of this chapter, include the fifteen countries that were members of the EU (the EU-15) in early 2004 along with Norway, Iceland and Switzerland. In terms of policy developments we consider each country to have abandoned its autonomous domestic farm policy when it joined the EU. Thus eighteen countries had independent policies at the start of the period, in 1955, but by 2004 the number of independent policies had dropped to four – the EU, Norway, Iceland and Switzerland. The EU then expanded eastward to embrace eight Central European countries (plus Cyprus and Malta) in May 2004 and also Bulgaria and Romania in January 2007. Most of this chapter thus focuses on the period prior to the EU's expansion eastward, while the chapter by Anderson and Swinnen (2008) focuses on eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union..

the relative political and social importance of landowners and small farmers. By the late nineteenth century, these various factors had determined a structure of farming in the Western European region that is still visible today.

The total utilized farm area in the fifteen countries of Western Europe that are members of the EU was 129 million hectares in 2004, distributed over 6.3 million holdings with an average size of 20.2 hectares.³ The sector gave employment to 6.2 million persons, representing 3.8 percent of civilian employment in the EU (EUROSTAT 2006, Table 2.0.1.2). Including those three countries not in the EU in 2004, agriculture represented 4.9 percent of the labor force, down from 30.0 percent in 1950. The value of output from these farms was 300 billion euro and gross value added was 155 billion euro (at distorted prices), or 1.6 percent of total GDP for those countries.⁴

The total output from Western European farms has increased over the past fifty years by about 2.2 percent each year. However, this growth rate has lagged behind that of other sectors of the economy.⁵ As a result, the share of agriculture in GDP has declined from 13.6 percent in 1955 to 2.9 percent in 2004. Only in Iceland and Greece is the share of output in GDP above 5 percent: Spain, Portugal and Finland have agricultural sectors that contribute between 3 and 4 percent of GDP. In Germany and the UK the share of agriculture in GDP is now below one percent. Participation of agricultural workers in the labor force is highest in Greece and Portugal, with shares in excess of 12 percent of the active population. Finland, Ireland and Spain each has above five percent of the labor force in agriculture. By contrast, the UK has only about one percent of its labor force in agricultural pursuits (Appendix Figure 1).

Productivity growth in Western Europe's agricultural sector compared favorably with that in the manufacturing sector in the immediate post-war period. Over the period 1949 to 1959, by which time the economy had largely recovered from the war-time disruptions, output per person in agriculture had increased by more than that in manufacturing in most of the countries in Western Europe (Appendix Figure 2). The productivity growth was a combination of output increases as a result of mechanization and modernization, and the outflow of labor as other sectors absorbed rural workers.

³ Comparable figures for the US show a utilized agricultural area of 379 million hectares and 2.1 million farms, with an average size of 180 hectares.

⁴ The agricultural sector in the US employs 0.7 percent of the civilian labor force and contributes 0.9 percent of GDP.

⁵ The economy of Western Europe as a whole expanded by 2.7 percent over the period 1955 to 2004.

This productivity increase slowed somewhat in later decades, but remained a key component of the development of the sector and its role in post-war reconstruction. The strong farm productivity increase and accompanying farm labor force decrease is striking. (Appendix Figure 3 shows the period 1955 to 1970.) The decline in the share of agricultural workers in the labor force has continued to the present day. The number of full-time equivalent “annual work units” employed in agriculture in the EU-15, as calculated by EUROSTAT, fell from 8.6 million to 5.9 million between 1991 and 2004 alone (EUROSTAT 2006, Table 3.1.13).

Structural change has also been rapid in European agriculture. The rate of consolidation of farms has risen over the past five decades, but the average size of farm still varies widely among countries, with the UK and Denmark having the largest farms (57 and 55 hectares per farm, respectively) and Italy and Greece having the smallest farms (7 and 5 hectares respectively) (EUROSTAT 2006, Table 2.0.1.2).

The countries of Western Europe differ more in the importance of agriculture to international trade. In 2004, agricultural exports accounted for more than ten percent of total merchandise exports in three countries: Denmark (18.7 percent), Greece (19.9 percent) and Ireland (11.6 percent). By contrast, such exports only accounted for 2.5 percent of German exports, 3.0 percent of Swedish exports, 2.8 percent of Finnish exports and 4 percent of exports from the UK. Agricultural products traded by the EU-15 with other countries accounted for 6.1 percent of all imports and 6.0 percent of all exports. The EU-15 region ran a net deficit with respect to the rest of the world in foodstuffs and other agricultural products of 3.4 billion euro in 2004.

In Europe as elsewhere, agriculture has had to compete with non-farm sectors for labor and capital. The growth rates of the manufacturing and service sectors have therefore been major influences on the economic health of the farming sector. Agriculture has in general provided an outflow of labor, both directly as farmers and farmworkers become a part of the industrial workforce (either by migration or by devoting more of their time each year to non-agricultural employment) or indirectly, by offering a less attractive alternative to young people in rural areas. Though this process has been going on for decades, the post-war period has been remarkable in the magnitude of this exodus. Capital has proved somewhat less of a problem, as farmers have usually been able to raise capital in the financial markets, particularly through dedicated rural lenders, and through retained earnings. Though rates of

return have not been high, non-pecuniary satisfaction and a lingering feeling of security has kept up levels of rural investment.

The result has been a significant transformation and modernization throughout the continent in the sixty years since World War II. Agriculture in Western Europe still has pockets of traditional farming, particularly in the south, that have yet to be transformed. But in general the continent has a high level of technical expertise and a moderate farm size, giving it more of a chance to be internationally competitive in the second half than in the first half of the post-war period.

One major link between the agricultural and non-farm sectors has been through currencies. Strong export performance by the industrial sector tends to appreciate the exchange rate and reduces the domestic cost of commodities whose prices are set in international markets. So agriculture in the strong currency countries has tended to be under pressure from reduced price levels as a result of export success in the non-farm sector. For countries with weak currencies, exchange rate developments will tend to raise the price levels for imports and exports, so the agricultural sector faces less competition from abroad -- although governments may take action to lower domestic food prices. Thus the developments in foreign exchange markets are crucial factors in looking at the competitiveness of the agricultural sector in particular countries, and have played a significant role in policy developments in the EU.

Agricultural policy prior to the mid-1950s

Western European agricultural policy reflects the economic and social conditions of rural areas as well as the political realities of the day. But many of these factors are deeply rooted in experience and history. Some of this experience is shared among the countries of Western Europe, but much is peculiar to the ways in which the countries concerned reacted to historical trends and events. Many of these events were a product of the broad economic and political developments in the nineteenth century, as the pattern of land ownership became established and transportation and education systems extended into rural areas. But policy influenced the reaction to these developments and led to significant disparities among neighboring countries.

In addition to these social and political conditions that governed such policy, two other factors recur as being pervasive in Western Europe: the colonial experience of the countries concerned, and the reaction of those countries to the industrial revolution.⁶ The United Kingdom, with its extensive Empire from which it could import both tropical and temperate agricultural products, was in a good position to take advantage of the benefits of trade. As the leader in both the technological revolution in agriculture and the industrialization of manufacturing processes, a policy of low-priced food played to the strengths of the economy. By contrast, Germany (and the numerous small states that preceded the creation of the Federal state) had few overseas territories and lagged the UK in manufacturing technology. As a result, German agriculture remained a protected sector. Political ideas reinforced these differences. In the UK the “free trade” movement had won widespread following by promising better living conditions for the urban workforce. Landowners resisted but were losing ground to manufacturing interests. German intellectuals pushed for a different strategy, based on protection of “infant industries,” and large landowners found such a policy of developing behind tariff walls to be in line with their own interests. So, by the end of the nineteenth century, significant differences between the UK and Germany had emerged in the prevailing economic paradigm and the agricultural policies that supported it.

All of European agriculture was impacted by the growth of trade in temperate agricultural products from the New World in the 1870s, made possible by the opening up of new territory and by lower rail and ocean transport costs. The introduction of refrigeration began to make livestock products as well as grains profitable to transport from the Americas and Australasia. In the case of the UK, the high tariffs that had been embodied in the Corn Laws had already been repealed, in 1846. As a result, the political climate was such that manufacturing interests prevailed over agrarian pressures, and agriculture shrank in the face of overseas competition. But much of the cereals and meat came from colonies, and could be paid for in pounds sterling, so import substitution did not become a priority. In addition, the structure of farming in the UK was generally more able to withstand the low prices.⁷ As a result, pressures for protection were perhaps less than in many other European countries.

⁶ For a discussion of the different reactions of the Western European countries to the mid-nineteenth century period of relatively free trade, see Kindleberger (1975).

⁷ The eighteenth century Enclosure Acts had given UK agriculture a farm structure that had allowed it to take advantage of the emerging technologies (mechanization) and farming practices of the period (Orwin 1949).

Other countries followed the lead of the UK and more or less reluctantly accepted the benefits of cheap grain from the New World. Denmark stands out as the country that embraced the new relative price structure most completely, and the Netherlands reacted in a similar way. Livestock farming received a boost from the lower feed costs, in particular the rearing of cereal-fed livestock such as pigs and chickens. In addition, Denmark had inherited an efficient farm structure from the early nineteenth century, and developed a cooperative system that fitted well into the livestock economy that flourished on the cheap grain of the 1890s.⁸

French agricultural markets had also been relatively open to trade in the middle of the nineteenth century, but protection increased sharply with the tariff of 1881 which imposed high duties on livestock imports (Tracy 1989, p. 20). The level of protection peaked with the Meline tariff of 1892, and remained high until the First World War. However, industrial tariffs were also increased over that time, modifying the distortive impact of agricultural protection.

German farming benefited significantly from higher protection in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. As livestock from America and grain from Russia threatened to depress domestic prices, tariffs were introduced in 1879, initially at a moderate level but they were increased over the next decade. Bismark himself was adamant that farm imports be controlled, and presided over a bitter trade dispute with America over the sanitary conditions under which US pork was produced for export to Germany (Snyder 1945). On his ouster in 1890, Germany briefly returned to more open agricultural trade, against the opposition of the Prussian landowners (Tracy 1989, p. 20). For the next twenty years liberal and protectionist economic paradigms clashed and different views on the desirability of industrialization kept the issue of agricultural policies to the political forefront.

These nineteenth century differences between the “adjusters” and the “protectors” remained through the first half of the twentieth century. The prime factors that played a role in the development of agriculture in that period included the economic impact of the First World War and the Great Depression.

The UK attempted to expand production after the First World War by granting farmers subsidies to supplement their market earnings. These deficiency payments, introduced in 1917, were accompanied by a liberal import regime for farm products (except

⁸ Output per hectare in Denmark more than doubled between 1880 and 1930, whereas the same measure stayed steady in the UK (Ingersent and Rayner 1999, p. 10). Agriculture accounted for 45 percent of Danish GDP in 1880.

sugar). An attempt to introduce price guarantees in 1920 was repealed the next year (Tracy 1964, p. 149). Protection did emerge in the 1930s, as a result of depressed world prices, but the effect was mitigated by Imperial Preferences that allowed agricultural products in from the Dominions (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa) and the colonies. Domestic marketing became the focus of farm policy, and was institutionalized through the introduction of Marketing Boards in 1931, several of which remained in place until the 1970s.

French agriculture had been badly damaged by the First World War, with both infrastructure and productive capacity destroyed (Tracy 1964, p.273). It did not get much assistance from trade protection in the 1920s, as protection in the non-farm sector was higher than that in agriculture (Tracy 1964, p. 171). However, the reaction to the Depression was to introduce quotas on imports and to intervene in the domestic market. State marketing became established through such institutions as Office National Interprofessionnel du Blé, founded in 1936.

Germany instituted a Ministry of Agriculture in the wake of the war, and the Weimar Republic attempted to take over responsibility for agricultural policy from the states. Rapid industrialization, however, reduced the significance of the farming sector, and low prices in the Depression took their toll on farm incomes (Roesener 2000, p. 13).⁹ The Third Reich attempted to capitalize on the decline of agriculture by promising state protection and higher social standing for the rural population. They introduced policies designed to promote self-sufficiency and to increase the control of the state over marketing and trade. Production, however, did not reach planned targets, and at the outbreak of war in 1939 the level of farm output was no higher than in 1935. Labor shortages and the need to keep urban prices down had undermined the National Socialist Party's attempt to return Germany to its rural past.

Denmark remained neutral in the First World War, and expanded its sales to both the UK and to Germany in the post-war period (Tracy 1989, p. 205), despite the increase in German tariffs in 1925. The Depression, however, hit Danish livestock production by 1931. Efforts to improve trade relations with the UK (so as to offset the preferences granted to competitors such as New Zealand) and with Germany were partly successful, but Denmark eventually had to compromise on its traditional liberal trade policy and introduce tariffs on grain. Later in the decade it began subsidizing producers of livestock products and restricting production by means of marketing quotas. Eventually, in 1938, grain imports were

⁹ Rural incomes in Germany declined by almost 40 percent between 1929 and 1932.

discouraged by compulsory mixing requirements for millers. Along with the Netherlands, the Danish agricultural experiment of trading at world prices appeared to be at an end.

The influence of these political and economic trends in the early twentieth century were disrupted by the impact of the Second World War on Western European agriculture. To an extent probably not experienced in any other region, the Second World War had a significant impact on the agricultural sector. Not only did the war itself cause havoc with infrastructure and destroy productive land, but the sector was drawn in to the war effort to provide food and industrial raw materials.

The UK, with its vulnerability to blockades of imports, began to mobilize the civilian population to grow more food. In the post-war period, production rebounded rapidly to its pre-Depression levels, assisted by the introduction of guaranteed prices in the 1947 Agriculture Act. The need for additional domestic production was premised in part on the chronic shortage of foreign exchange in the early post-war period, as exports failed to finance the imports needed for reconstruction and to service the debt that had been accumulated in the war. Devaluation of the Pound Sterling, being a global currency, was rejected as an option. So successive governments pursued a policy of high domestic prices as a way of saving on imports.

Occupied France, under the Vichy Regime, attempted to restore the country's agricultural destiny.¹⁰ However, the devastation of the infrastructure delayed the restoration of the sector in the immediate post war period. France began a period of national planning, which included goals for the agricultural sector. The first Agricultural Plan (1948-52) called for an expansion of exports, the Second Plan (1954-57) established a fund for market intervention. As economic integration became a reality, the opening up of markets in Europe to French farm products became an important goal. The salvation of rural France was to be in exporting products to the industrial heartland of Europe, assisted by some protection against overseas suppliers.

German agriculture maintained production levels through most of the war but food shortages emerged in 1944. By the end of the war, nutritional deprivation was an acute problem and the relief of hunger became an international issue. Wartime controls over trade were maintained and the new government in West Germany (established in 1949) encouraged domestic production by price incentives linked to their production costs, with little regard to competitiveness. By the time that the agricultural sector had to face the prospects of opening

¹⁰ Marshall Petain in particular had a vision of the agricultural destiny of France, reviving the notion of agricultural protection that had been promoted by Meline in the nineteenth century.

their markets to French and Dutch farm products, the predominance of inefficient small-scale German farms became a major political “hot potato”.

Policy distortions 1955 to 2004: a chronology

The current map of agricultural protection was drawn in the early post-war period, as the countries of Western Europe struggled to rebuild their economies and restore commercial and political relationships. The defining moment in the development of Western European agricultural policy was undoubtedly the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. No discussion or analysis of the distortions caused by agricultural policy in Western Europe can avoid a detailed examination of the development of the Common Agricultural Policy and of the process of enlargement of the EEC from the original six countries (Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) to the fifteen that were members of the European Union (EU) in 2004.¹¹ The stages in the enlargement of the EEC/EU provide the backdrop to any timeline of the description and tabulation of the changing pattern of direct and indirect distortions to farm incentives. Not only did each enlargement cause an examination of the EEC/EU policy towards agriculture, but it changed the reach of that policy by including more farms under its umbrella. Thus the nature and magnitude of the incentives faced by domestic producers and consumers of primary agricultural and processed food products in Western Europe changed as much by the wider adoption of the CAP as through more traditional agricultural policy processes.

The other side of this coin is that the number of countries that remained outside the EU has steadily declined.¹² Three of these Western European countries, Norway, Iceland and Switzerland, have stayed outside the EU and their agricultural policy choices are still autonomous despite them being members since 1960 of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). So even though EFTA members have a declining share of total agriculture in Western Europe, their decisions on policy are of particular interest. It would be too simplistic to say that they represent the “control group” in the experiment of designing and

¹¹ The enlargement to include ten new members in May 2004 is discussed in the context of its influence on policy later in this chapter, and the implications for the new members themselves are dealt with in detail in Anderson and Swinnen (2008).

¹² The abbreviation EU will sometimes be used even for the period before the transformation of the European Economic Community into the European Community and later into the European Union.

implementing a common policy for agriculture, but some lessons can still be learned from those that remain outside the EU.

In this section, the distortions from 1955 to 2004 are discussed in the context of each of the five decades, to make easier comparisons with other regions and events. The discussion relates this timeline to the evolution of the EU as it expanded membership and of the CAP as the dominant vehicle of support for Western European agriculture. Emphasis is placed on the levels of support and key policy prices in the prospective members relative to that of the EU as a whole. As each new group of countries gained access to the EU, so the geographical reach of the CAP changed. In turn, the CAP became the focus of much of the external pressure that faced the EU as it grew in significance in world trade. But the macroeconomic conditions, including inflation, exchange rate changes and non-farm growth in Western Europe were a vital backdrop to the agricultural policy decisions, and need to be considered in parallel with the more specifically agricultural aspects of the development of the CAP.¹³

1955 to 1964: agriculture in a period of rapid economic growth

The period of post-war reconstruction was followed by a rapid expansion of economic activity throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s. This was the period of the German and Italian “miracles”, as both these economies grew at rates far above those of the UK and France. In turn, this growth provided the demand for consumer goods that allowed neighboring countries to expand their own economies. Trade within the newly-created European Economic Community expanded rapidly as trade barriers in manufactured goods were removed over the period 1957-64.

The formation of the EEC in 1957 set the scene for the integration of Western European agricultural markets.¹⁴ For this to happen, agricultural trade had to be included in the move toward the free flow of goods among the original six countries.¹⁵ This was finally agreed, but such an agreement on free internal trade was only possible by erecting a protective border around the EEC to shelter agriculture from foreign competition. The development of a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was therefore the result of a

¹³ See Josling (2007) for a fuller discussion on “external” influences on CAP reform.

¹⁴ The original six countries were Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. In economic terms, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands had already agreed to an economic union (the BENELUX Union) in 1948, and so were on the road to becoming a single unit.

¹⁵ The inclusion of agriculture in the free movement of goods within the EEC was at the insistence of the Dutch, who had struggled with the same issue in the formation of the BENELUX Union.

compromise between those who wanted to see agriculture a full part of the free internal market and those that preferred a more interventionist system. A common market organization (CMO) was developed for each of the main commodities. Administered prices were related to a “target” price level for each commodity. Imports were only allowed in at “threshold” price, calculated on the basis of the target price and transport costs. A “variable levy” was charged on the basis of the gap between offer prices on the world prices and the threshold price. Excess production could be taken off the market by national agencies at “intervention” prices, again fixed relative to the target price.¹⁶ Prices were to be set each year by the Council of Ministers on the proposal from the European Commission.

The period 1955-64 was one of policy initiatives for agricultural integration as well as the restoration of trade flows across the Continent. National farm prices differed considerably across the six countries of the EEC and between those countries and those that had chosen not to join in the integration experiment. Hence the path toward more integrated internal markets for agricultural goods proved rocky. Different farm structures, commodity balances and historical protection levels provided a minefield for those advocating a free internal agricultural market and common prices. But eventually, in 1962, common rules for agricultural markets were agreed. A transition period was instituted ending in 1967, when all prices were supposed to have been harmonized.

A look at selected Western European countries will illustrate the wide differences in circumstance over this period, and illustrate the difficulties of achieving a common policy. West Germany, at its creation in 1949, found itself with a structure of small farms because the most productive and largest farms were now in East Germany. Meanwhile German industry was being encouraged to expand into other markets in the region and overseas, and its success added to the strains on agriculture. Tight controls over imports of cereals and the use of marketing boards to regulate the domestic market kept agricultural prices high and production was encouraged from every small farm. The choice of a common price for wheat (and other grains) in 1961 was a major political issue in Germany: soft wheat prices were about \$110 per ton at that time, a level only matched by Italy of the six EEC members.¹⁷ In the end the German government resisted calls for the common price to be set at a lower level, and thus set the stage for the development of surplus production in the EEC within the decade.

¹⁶ This terminology is the one that was used for the cereal market regime: some differences in instruments and nomenclature were introduced in the other commodity market organizations.

¹⁷ The world price over this period was about \$60 per ton.

France had a better farm size in the Paris Basin, but was hampered by the remnants of feudal strip farming in Normandy and Brittany and low productivity in the Massif Central and the Midi. Cereal farming in particular had recovered from the wartime disruption and by the 1960s had surpluses to send to the deficit areas of Europe such as Germany. Soft wheat prices averaged only \$81 per ton at the start of the transition period, and thus had to move sharply up to reach the agreed price levels in the young CAP.

The Netherlands shared with Denmark an efficient farming structure based on milk and poultry and eggs. It had already made roads into the German market, and looked for continued market access. The fact that Denmark stayed out of the EEC, preferring to hang on to the British market, gave Dutch farmers a welcome degree of preference. The Netherlands (and Belgium) had a soft wheat price level in the early 1960s somewhat between the high German price and the low French price, and so experienced some significant increases in the cost of animal feed in the movement to common prices.

Italy shared with Germany some significant structural problems, with small farms dominating the southern part of the country and relatively high cost cereal production in the center and the north of Italy. However, expansion of the livestock sector in the north, based on imported grains, linked its interests with that of the Netherlands. In fact, in the move to common prices, Italy was allowed to maintain imports of feedstuffs at a lower tariff than the northerly countries.

The Western Europe agricultural market was in effect split by the decision to push for a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) for the six members of the EEC. The UK chose to stay outside the EEC, concerned about the element of “supra-nationality” introduced in the Treaty of Rome. The CAP was therefore negotiated in a setting without the major Western European food import market. In any case, the EEC was not entirely agreed over the prospect of the UK joining.¹⁸ The UK had its own troubles, with macroeconomic imbalances proving difficult to control. The balance of payments was chronically in deficit, and remained a problem until the devaluation of 1967. The 1957 Agriculture Act had introduced deficiency payments as a way of maintaining high producer prices whilst keeping consumer prices close to world market levels. As much of the imported food came from former colonies, this trade was an important aspect of foreign policy. The significance of this influenced the attitude towards the

¹⁸ The “Non” from de Gaulle in 1963 that ended the first set of talks about UK accession reflected a fear that the nature of the EEC, and in particular the CAP, would be compromised by the admission of a country that boasted of its “special relationship” with Washington. The UK was widely seen as a “Trojan Horse” for US policy interests, and accession a sure recipe for continued pressure on the CAP.

formation of the EEC, and was one of the reasons that the UK chose not to join. But, in an attempt to show leadership among the countries that chose not to participate in the EEC, the UK sponsored the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1960. Seven countries signed up to this “integration-lite” experiment, which differed from the EEC both in terms of its lack of a common tariff and supranational institutions and because it excluded agricultural (and fisheries) trade from its provisions.

The concerns of the UK with the prospect of having to phase out preferential access from Dominions and former colonies, as well as the recurrent balance of payments problems and the fear of food price led inflation, led to significant debate on the costs of agricultural protection. Sparked off by a paper by Nash (1955), there were several attempts to calculate the value of British farm output at “world” prices and compare the result with actual farm values. Nash and Attwood (1961) repeated the same calculation later using Danish prices, where distortions were noticeably less, to value British production. McCrone (1962) elaborated these studies into a comparison of 13 countries in 1955-56. Howarth (1971) followed the same method and added an estimate for 1966. According to Howarth’s estimates, agricultural protection levels increased markedly from 1956 to 1966, at a time when trade in non-agricultural goods was being liberalized.¹⁹

More evidence of the increase in protection was found in a study by Anderson and Hayami (1986). The level of protection (as measured by the Nominal Protection Coefficient) was calculated for eight Western European countries in the period 1955-1980. Switzerland stood out as having the highest level of protection, though this did not increase over the first decade of the period, 1955 to 1965. By contrast, estimated protection did increase in Italy, Sweden, Germany, and the Netherlands over this decade. In France and the UK, protection actually decreased in the decade up to 1965.

The estimates made for the present study broadly confirm the conclusions of the Howarth and the Anderson/Hayami studies.²⁰ Figure 1(a) shows the Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA, the percentage by which a product’s domestic price exceeds the price at a country’s border), including non-product-specific support and aggregated over all commodities, for four of the original six members of the EEC.²¹ At the time when the Treaty

¹⁹ The UK appeared to be an exception to this trend, though Howarth’s price support measures did not reflect the full range of input subsidies that were introduced over those years.

²⁰ The present study has a broader product coverage than the earlier attempts to measure protection.

²¹ Independent data for the other two much-smaller members, Belgium and Luxembourg, are not included in this study. It is likely that the distortions are similar in those two countries, as they have been in an economic union since 1922 (to which Luxembourg contributes just 4 percent of the union’s population of less than 11 million).

of Rome was being discussed, assistance levels were modest (by later standards) and not too widely dispersed.²² The CAP was “launched” in 1962, with prices that reflected political compromise rather than economic foresight, and by the time the common price regime was in place European agriculture was operating on a price plateau for the major products that was well above world market levels.

The corresponding calculations of the Nominal Rate of Assistance for the EFTA countries (those that chose the path of less institutional integration and no free trade in agriculture) are shown in Figure 1(b). Austria, Denmark and the UK had NRA levels in the same range as in the EEC. Portugal was in effect taxing its agricultural sector by holding down prices below their full market value - a stance that reflected both its own political structure and its level of development.²³ Sweden increased its assistance to agriculture over the decade, and gave incentives to its agricultural sector to an even greater extent than the countries that formed the EEC. But the countries with the highest level of support by far were Norway and Switzerland, where domestic prices were around twice as high as in other EFTA countries.²⁴

The pattern for these countries is what one would expect from their experience in the pre-war period. The UK, the Netherlands and Denmark had lower levels of protection, reflecting their history of imports of grains, and France emerges in that decade as an exporting country that has lower production costs and less opportunities for protection at the border. Indeed, one of the main attractions for France of the EU was to be able to sell French products abroad without having to bear the costs of subsidies. Switzerland, Norway, Sweden and Germany have higher levels of protection, as one might expect from predominantly importing countries attempting to generate acceptable incomes for farmers. The countries that made up the EEC increased their protection on average over the decade from 1956-64, explaining in large part the chorus of complaints from overseas suppliers about the protectionist nature of the emerging CAP.²⁵

²² Italy, however, had low rates of assistance through the 1950s.

²³ Portugal was one of the countries studied in the study led by Kreuger, Schiff and Valdes (1988). Its income level was below that of Brazil at the time, and the country had many of the features common to developing countries.

²⁴ Price data for Switzerland and Norway for some products were not available prior to the latter 1970s so the NRAs for them were assumed to be similar to the earliest years for which data are available. Hence the lesser degree of fluctuation in their lines in Figures 2(b) and 3(b).

²⁵ The Kennedy Round of GATT talks (1963-68) took place over this time, and the main focus of the exporting countries was to constrain the protectionist tendencies of the CAP. In this they were largely unsuccessful.

If the UK stayed out of the EEC in part because agricultural protection was higher in the Six, the same could not be said of all the other EFTA members.²⁶ Protection levels in Norway and Sweden were high, as they were in Finland, which joined EFTA in 1965 (Gulbrandsen and Lindbeck 1973). In fact, in these countries the prospect of joining the EEC was seen as a threat to their agricultural sectors as they would have had to reduce prices and face competition from the grains of France and the livestock products of the Netherlands. Only Denmark looked favorably on the prospect of expanding its sales to the EEC countries, but chose to stay with the UK as its traditional market for farm products.

One other country that was among the “charter members” of EFTA, reflecting its historic trade ties (with the UK) was Portugal. The country had been under a dictatorship since 1928, when the military suspended democratic processes. The economy had been run on a corporatist model with strong central control. The African colonies had provided an income and Brazil had remained a source of capital and a link with Latin America. But Portugal was outside the mainstream of Western Europe and remained a relative backwater until the return of democracy in 1974 (Avillez, Finan and Josling 1988, Corkhill 1995).

Spain also had been shunned by many European governments and was also hampered by a rigid corporatist economic policy. Innovation and social mobility were discouraged and central and southern landed interests dominated political life well into the 1960s. The Franco regime controlled wages, prices, and trade, and large state corporations were preferred over smaller urban enterprises. Spain had been excluded from the Marshall Plan in 1948, and it was not until 1958 that agricultural output regained the level of 1929, before the Civil War. But farm structure was better in that country than in many parts of Western Europe, and by the 1970s investment in fruit and vegetable production had begun to increase production. The transition to democracy in 1975 gave hope that accession to the EU was possible, though economic growth stalled for much of the period from the death of Franco to the accession to the EU (Lieberman 1995). For both Spain and Portugal, the oil price increases of 1973 and 1975 were a major shock to their economies.

Iceland in the period up to 1965 was predominantly an agricultural and fisheries economy, with meagre amounts of arable land and extensive imports of cereals. Dairy and

²⁶ The major political reason for the decision of Sweden and Norway not to join the EEC was the requirement for neutrality that each had enshrined in their constitution. Finland was even more constrained, as it bordered on the Soviet Union, and was accordingly inhibited in foreign policy initiatives. Likewise, Austria was also constrained by the post-war treaties, and Switzerland by its determination not to join alliances or even multilateral organizations. Ireland stayed out both to keep in step with the UK, its major market, but also to retain its neutrality. Ireland did not join EFTA in spite of the links with the UK, but it did retain some preferences into that market.

sheep production was able to supply domestic needs and provide exports of wool and meat. An Agricultural Development Plan for 1951-60 had tried to increase farm size (to ensure that every farm had at least ten hectares) but had not had complete success (OECD 1966). A 1960 Law instituted fixed wholesale and retail prices for major food items and offered export subsidies to dispose of surpluses. Consumer subsidies were also used in this period. However, public investment in agriculture decreased under the 1963-66 Plan as the burden of supporting high cost production became apparent.

Greece in the 1950s was still a largely agricultural country, with important exports of cotton and tobacco. Most temperate zone foods were imported, and domestic production was hampered by low productivity and a fragmented farm structure, in part as a result of pre-war land reform. Association with the EEC in 1961 promised to expand exports, and the government began to increase incentives for producers and to fix minimum prices for domestic output (OECD 1966, p. 283). But this program was carried out in the context of an economic strategy that gave predominance to the manufacturing sector as the engine of growth (Pepelasis et al. 1980, p. 53).

1965 to 1974: agriculture in a period of macroeconomic instability

The price levels that had been set under the CAP were at the high end of the range of existing prices in the members states, and strong upward convergence was evident over the period from 1962 to 1967. Price differences within the EEC reflected the gradient of prices from surplus to deficit areas, though this was modified by setting intervention prices in the surplus areas that did not always reflect transport costs. Achievement of a single support price in 1967, set in “units of account” with a value equal to the US dollar, was a major political success, but the uniformity of the Common Agricultural Policy was short-lived. Currency instability was to undermine the realization of an open internal market for agricultural products and a common price support scheme.

The devaluation of the Pound Sterling in 1967 heralded a period of financial instability in Europe. The revaluation of the German DMark in 1968 and the devaluation of the French Franc the same year caused havoc in the operation of the CAP, and led to the introduction of artificial “green” exchange rates for the conversion of administered prices decided in Brussels by the Council of Ministers into local currencies (Josling 1970, Josling and Harris 1976). The currency changes in 1968 also exposed the problems of administering

regional price differentials. Grain from France had flooded Germany earlier in the year to be taken into intervention, as a form of arbitrage (the relative intervention prices were different from the relative values of the DMark and the Franc on money markets), causing serious storage problems. When the currency changes took place, compensation for what would have been price declines in Germany was granted by some *ad hoc* tax relief for German farmers, and a system of border taxes and subsidies was introduced to offset the exchange rate changes. This was generalized to other members by the device of converting common prices through “green rates” which lagged the developments in the market rates. The border tax/subsidy regime was known as Monetary Compensatory Amounts (MCAs) and were charged or paid at the internal borders and on international trade. The effect was to undermine the central concept of free trade within the EEC, to challenge the notion of common price levels, and in essence give some control over price policy back to the member states (Heidhues et al. 1978).

The level of protection in the UK had remained low over the last half of the 1960s, relative to that of the major European countries (FAO 1973). Nevertheless the debate heated up over the desirability of expansion of UK agriculture to help with the balance of payments. The 1967 devaluation had helped to correct a misalignment of the exchange rate, but inflation reduced the competitive advantage of British exports. Agriculture was caught up in a wave of “Buy British” sentiment in the late 1960s, and price supports were increased in the Annual Price Reviews. The debate on “import saving” exposed the economic costs of agricultural protection and led to a re-evaluation of the role of the relatively small agricultural sector in the UK economy. The government moved to stabilize the costs of the “deficiency payment” program employed since 1947 by negotiating “minimum import prices” for cereals with exporting countries. Later, the policy of allowing relatively free import access was replaced by a system of variable levies, to generate some revenue from imports. But it was the prospect of entry into the EEC that dominated the agricultural policy debate in the UK in the late 1960s.

The first enlargement of the EU took place in 1973, when the UK, Denmark and Ireland joined the Community. The CAP had proved a major problem for the negotiations. On the one hand the UK was under pressure to accept the CAP as part of the “*acquis communautaire*”, the accumulated regulations and directives of the existing Community, and the enlargement process was supposed to focus merely on changing the language of regulations so as to reflect the new membership. Any change in the policy itself would have

to be deferred until the newcomers were inside the tent. But at the political level, the UK was determined to protect as far as possible the preferential access of its former Dominions and colonies, though this clearly was unacceptable to the European suppliers for whom the prospect of free access to the UK, a large importer, was attractive. The compromise was to negotiate some assurances for traditional suppliers (New Zealand for specific quantities of meat and dairy goods, for example) and to incorporate the UK ex-colonies into the arrangements that had already been set up for those of France, Holland and Belgium.

The negotiations with Ireland and Denmark were of a different nature. For those two countries, traditional exporters of livestock products to the UK, diversifying to the Continental market, was a welcome prospect. The higher farm support prices in the EEC were not a major hurdle, and tilted the balance of economic advantage in favor of accession. Norway also participated in the negotiations, and an agreement was reached among the governments. But the question of Norwegian accession was put to a popular vote, and the referendum allowed the concerns of Norwegian farmers and fishermen to be fully vented. The vote went against membership, and the government withdrew from the tentative accession agreement.

The internal debates about accession to the EU have often been focused on the impact of price changes, particularly for farmers and consumers. (Appendix Figure 4 shows the relative prices for wheat and for beef, in the three new members and the EEC, over the period from 1956-1972.) EU prices for most farm products had been considerably higher during the 1960s than in the applicant countries (except Norway). But the aspiring members had agricultural support systems that were more in touch with the conditions on world markets. So the high world prices in 1973-75 for many commodities masked the full impact of the price increases expected from accession. As a result, the additional distortions due to the CAP were relatively small over the first two years of the EC-9.

The countries that remained in EFTA made hurried arrangements to preserve at least some of their access into the UK and Denmark. A series of bilaterals was implemented shortly after the enlargement. However, these agreements did not cover agricultural products (as they had been excluded from EFTA trade liberalization). In the case of Portugal, some concessions were agreed: in 1972, a trade agreement was signed between the EC and Portugal to allow for continued access into the EC for Portuguese exports. But the domestic farm policies of Sweden, Switzerland and Norway, along with Finland and Austria, continued to be determined largely on a national basis.

These developments in rates of assistance are shown in Figure 2. The NRA for the EU-6 (and the Western Europe average, heavily weighted by the EU countries) hovered a little below 80 percent over the decade 1965-1974, plunging at the end of that period as world prices rose in 1973-74.²⁷ The entry of the three new members did not cause this drop, even though it brought some new constraints to the development of the CAP. Meanwhile the EFTA countries that chose to stay outside continued with their own policy trajectories (Figure 2(b)). Switzerland and Norway kept domestic prices at more than twice the level of those on world markets, while Portugal continued to tax its farmers whatever the price levels on world markets. Rates of assistance to farmers in Sweden, Finland and Austria were reduced somewhat in the early years of the 1970s as the high world prices substituted for some of the protection given by policy interventions.

1975 to 1984: agriculture out of control

The macroeconomic instability that followed the first “oil shock” of October 1973 had a significant impact on the level of policy prices set under the CAP. Farm input costs rose sharply and the real value of price supports declined. Politicians responded by increasing prices sharply to keep up with costs. In addition, the fear of worldwide food shortages made price restraint less attractive as a political argument. As a result, those that had been arguing for moderation in price increases had a harder row to hoe. When commodity prices declined, the EU was left seriously un-competitive in many temperate zone products.

The UK was now a member of the EU and was expected to assert a moderating influence on agricultural policy. Indeed much of the opposition to UK accession from countries such as France was that the UK would come in with its tradition of low market prices and high payments from the exchequer and demand the same approach in the CAP. But these fears proved unfounded. The UK found a convenient way of keeping its own prices down through the medium of the “green money” system mentioned above, and turned its attention to limiting the budget cost of membership through a budget “rebate”.

The impact on agricultural distortions of the first enlargement was therefore somewhat mixed. Protection levels went up in the UK and in Denmark and Ireland. But as a result of the transition arrangements, the UK was able for a time to avoid the impact of high

²⁷ It may seem that the measure of assistance used in this study is unduly influenced by world price movements. But the NRA indicates the distortions at any particular level of world prices: if world prices change then so do the distortions caused by policy. This phenomenon appeared again during the world food price hike of 2005-08.

EU prices. The accession period negotiated for the UK (seven years) called for import subsidies paid by the EC on farm products entering the UK. Coupled with the subsidies to offset the depreciation of the pound in the mid-1970s, the price of food rose by less than had been feared at the time of the Entry Debate. Denmark and Ireland made good use of their expanded opportunities for livestock exports, selling to the Continent as well as to the UK.

The green money system continued to add to the level of internal distortion in the late 1970s. In February 1979 a “common price” of 100 ECU by the Council of Ministers would have translated into the equivalent of 110.8 ECU in Germany and 71.8 ECU in the UK. Thus support prices were maintained in Germany at a level of 54 percent higher than that in the UK. Only Denmark eschewed the political convenience of masking exchange rates by the use of fictional green rates. The system was to linger on for another decade until modified by the single market of 1992 and then eliminated by the single currency from 1999.

The “outsiders” had the liberty of being able to run their agricultural policy without the need to comply with the CAP. EFTA had no direct impact on agriculture over this period. Switzerland maintained high prices in the late 1970s, with a support price for wheat of \$398 per tonne, compared to \$200 in Germany and \$190 in the UK (Hallett 1981, p. 343, based on numbers from the International Wheat Council). So any form of opening up of trade in grains between the EEC and Switzerland would have been difficult to envisage.

Norway, having chosen not to join the EEC in 1973, was able to pursue an autonomous policy, based on the perceived need to keep population in the northern areas of the country. Protection levels were almost as high as Switzerland, though Sweden resisted the temptation to farm the cold northern regions as a matter of national security. Finnish experience fell somewhere in between that of its Scandinavian neighbors. Though it had an extensive area of high cost agriculture in the northern parts of the country, rural interests were not able to maintain such high levels of protection against imports as were granted in Norway.

The EC did welcome one new member over this period. Greece, for long an Associate member, was welcomed into full membership in 1981, after political freedoms were reestablished. In agricultural terms, Greece posed no problems with respect to the temperate zone products, as it was likely to increase its imports of them from the EU as its own protection was withdrawn. But exports of Greek fruits and olives posed a problem for the EU, and southern members argued (successfully) for extensive transition periods before opening

up to Greek competition. This set up the scene for similar arrangements when Spain and Portugal followed Greece in to the EU five years later.

The situation was somewhat different in Spain and Portugal, as neither had negotiated associate membership status in the 1960s. Both countries had moved from dictatorships to democracy in the mid-1970s, but their agricultural policy was still focused on domestic concerns, including structural issues. In Portugal, following the 1974 Revolution, land reform became a major preoccupation. The breakup of the large farms caused a significant drop in output of grains, and a succession of droughts made matters worse. Prices were increased in an attempt to generate adequate income for the new class of small farmers generated by land reform and rose above those in Spain and the EU (Appendix Figure 5). Dairy production was encouraged in the north and in the Azores. Processing tomatoes had become a significant export industry in the 1960s, but other Mediterranean products were less advanced (Avillez, Finan and Josling 1991). By the mid-1980s, Portugal was not in a position to compete in Europe, or in its own market with European produce, and needed a significant transition period to develop the institutional capacity to administer the CAP.

In Spain, the period before accession also was one of economic stress and relative stagnation. Cereal and livestock production lagged behind that of the rest of the continent, and marketing systems required modernization. Imports of feed grains and oilseeds, mostly from the US, faced little in the way of trade barriers. Prices for other commodities did not differ greatly from those in the rest of Europe: wheat prices in Spain had been similar to those in the EU since the early 1970s (Appendix Figure 5). But investment in the fruit and vegetable sector had accelerated and both wine and olive production was undergoing structural change. As a result, the prospect of substantial exports of these products loomed over the accession negotiations. The issue of the entry of Spanish farm products into the EC took on a political significance particularly in Italy and France, as well as in North Africa.

The changes in the level of assistance in Western Europe over the period 1975-84 reflects these developments (Figure 3). The EU-9 had NRA levels that increased steadily over the decade, as a result of cost-based price decisions in a situation of inflation and lack of effective budget constraints. From a level of about 40 percent in 1975 the NRA increased to above 80 percent by 1983. Overall support levels were very low for the applicant countries of Southern Europe, leading to political tensions over the adoption of the CAP by these countries. A transition period was needed both to cushion domestic consumers and to grant the producers in the EU-9 time to gear up for competition from Spain and Portugal. Of the

EFTA countries, Switzerland, Norway and Iceland continued to give high support to farmers, while Sweden, Finland and Austria assisted their farmers at similar rates to those in the EU.

1985 to 1994: agriculture as an international concern

By the mid-1980s, the issue of domestic agricultural policy in Western Europe had become a central topic of concern in the multilateral trade system. The twin reasons were the high levels of border protection that had been retained to give a broad umbrella of protection against overseas competition under which the market orders could continue, and the increasing surpluses of cereals, meat, dairy products and sugar, all of which other OECD countries produced for export. As a result the CAP came under criticism abroad as a major cause of low world prices and at home for high support costs and (at least in the UK) for high consumer prices (Tyers and Anderson 1992).

In 1984 the GATT began to discuss and the OECD to measure the extent of the distortions generated by domestic policy and by border instruments. The consensus was that for several markets the impact of domestic policies spilled over to the world market in a way that caused a reaction by other countries, either to subsidize exports or to add protection against imports. So a common solution seemed to be the answer. If all domestic policies could be brought under control, and if the nature of border measures could be disciplined, then the situation would be ameliorated. But the CAP was singled out as the policy that needed to change the most, and so the policy was firmly on the international agenda. Attempts to argue that US support per farmer was significantly greater than in the EU (as a result of larger farm size) garnered little sympathy. So long as the focus was on the impact on world markets, rather than the impact on domestic incomes, then the CAP was on the hot seat. Hence, the attitude of the EU in the Uruguay Round was largely defensive, and the CAP was eventually forced to adjust its own policies in 1992, with the adoption of the MacSharry reforms. This allowed the EU to agree to the negotiated strictures of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture on export subsidies and domestic support payments.

The 1992 CAP reforms marked a change in instrumentalities as well as price levels. In compensation for a price drop, farmers received a direct payment based on their historical hectareage under cereals and oilseeds and a regional yield. Headage payments were also introduced for beef and sheep. The milk and sugar regimes were not included in this reform. The lower price for cereal-based animal feed led to an increase in the use of barley, wheat

and corn, and helped to reduce cereal stocks. The incentive to produce was also reduced, as marginal output increases were effectively sold at lower prices.²⁸

The adoption of the CAP by the Southern countries (Portugal and Spain joined in 1986) posed few problems for the major crops and livestock product markets, and did not raise the level of distortion overall. The main impact was on the Mediterranean products, particularly olive oil, wine, citrus and tobacco. Here the stimulus was in the direction of increasing the pressure on markets and hence the need to review policy.

The period up to 1994 saw some changes with respect to the position of the EFTA countries. They had been offered, and negotiated, an industrial free trade area (the European Economic Area, or EEA) with the EU. The EEA allowed free trade in manufactured goods and cooperation in regulatory issues: in effect it extended the previous bilaterals to include several aspects of trade that had been incorporated in the EU's 1992 Single Market. Though some quotas on agricultural goods were expanded, there was no progress toward the incorporation of the rural sector in economic integration such as would be stimulated by EU enlargement. The EFTA countries still did not have a say in EU decisions, and thus were unable to influence regulations that would apply to them. The political stance of neutrality that had prevented several EFTA countries from having too close a tie with the EU countries became of less importance with the end of the Cold War. So, before the ink was dry on the EEA, Sweden made the decision to apply for full membership, and three other EFTA countries followed suit.

The path toward EU accession was attractive to many countries of Western Europe, but some had more difficulty making the journey. Norway, once again, chose to stay out. Switzerland also found that membership was problematic, and even membership of the EEA was rejected in a referendum, particularly by the rural German-speaking Swiss cantons. The problems of farming in Finland in remote areas, and that of preserving the Austrian countryside, made the negotiations more complex. A subsidy system, in part paid by the new entrants themselves, was implemented to allow marginal farms in disadvantaged areas to continue in business.

Sweden faced a different dilemma: that it would have to reverse an agricultural policy reform that was generally in the direction that the EU wished to go. Sweden had maintained a policy much like the other Nordic countries until the late 1980s. Suffering from overproduction, Sweden tried voluntary milk quotas and cereal set-asides to no avail. In June

²⁸ Livestock protection was changed only incidentally, as tariffs and levies on pigs, poultry and eggs had been tied to the levies on cereals.

1990 the Parliament passed a bill that dramatically altered Swedish farm and food policy, abolishing agricultural support and export refunds. Direct payments in compensation were paid, and an early retirement scheme for farmers was introduced. The export subsidies were reinstated when Sweden joined the EU, and prices rose somewhat as a result.

One impact of accession can be gauged by comparing the cereal prices in the acceding countries and the EU (see Appendix Figure 6 for the period 1986-1994). Finland in particular had to reduce price levels, and had to set the burden on the farm sector against the apparent benefits that the Finnish manufacturing sector would receive from better access to the rest of Europe. Nevertheless the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden went smoothly, and the fact that the Alpine and Nordic countries were able to pay for schemes that sheltered temporarily the northern farmers helped to make this a success. These countries have not used their membership to press for higher agricultural prices at the EU level.

The pattern is illustrated in the calculated NRA for the EU and EFTA. Figure 4 shows the level of NRA for the EU-12 peaking at close to 100 percent in 1986, when world prices were at historical lows, and generally declining thereafter. By 1994 the NRA for the EU was down to 40 percent, a major decline over the decade. Finland had the highest assistance among the next three accedants in the 1985-94 period, and so had the most adjustments to make on EU accession. In the case of Austria, protection levels increased in the five years up to membership, causing some concern that Austrian agriculture would be adversely effected after joining the EU. But the new EU members were not among the highest supporters of agriculture in the EFTA countries, and so the tensions were controllable by means of transitional arrangements. As a result, there was very little impact on the EU from the enlargement from 12 to 15 members, in terms of either reducing or increasing the level of protection.²⁹

The EFTA members that chose not to join the EU maintained their high protection levels for agriculture. Levels of NRA in Switzerland fell a little in 1989 but rebounded by 1990. Some slight downward trend is apparent for Iceland and Norway over the period 1985-1994, but the rate of assistance was still far above the average for Western Europe.³⁰ The bipolar nature of support in the region was by that time firmly established.

²⁹ Another member of EFTA, Iceland, did not participate in the talks about possible enlargement. The concern that that country would have to adhere to the Common Fisheries Policy has always been a major political hurdle. Lichtenstein, an independent country in a customs union with Switzerland, joined the EFTA-EU accord even though Switzerland did not.

³⁰ Estimates for Iceland are included only from 1979, when comparable data became available from the OECD.

1995 to 2007: agriculture restrained

The coming into force of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) in 1995 brought with it significant changes to the instrumentalities of the CAP. First, it obliged the EU to remove the variable levy and convert it into a fixed tariff. Thus the threshold price, from which the variable levy was calculated, ceased to be the central determinant of protection levels. The URAA obliged the EU to reduce tariffs. However, as a result of the careful choice of reference prices to calculate the tariff equivalent (known as “dirty tariffication”) and the convenience of using an unweighted average for tariff reductions, the impact on the price levels of sensitive goods, such as sugar, beef and dairy products, was not great. For cereals, the creation of a special category of domestic support that was associated with output controls (the Blue Box) and hence deemed to be less distorting to trade meant that the new MacSharry payments were not required to be reduced. Moreover, a remnant of the “variable levy” was retained (at the insistence of the United States) as the tariff-inclusive import price was not allowed to rise above 150 percent of the intervention price.

The time horizon of the URAA tariff and support reductions was from 1995 through 2000, and that of the application of the MacSharry CAP reforms was from 1994-1996. So it became clear that though the 1992 CAP reform may have allowed the EU to have agreed to the URAA, the process would need to be continued if the WTO constraints were to be respected over the decade. Even more significant was the prospect of enlargement to the East, with ten countries already having an explicit promise of membership. These countries, though not large agricultural exporters, did have significant farming populations. Farmers in the EU focussed on additional competition in some commodities, but the Commission was concerned about the potential burden of paying subsidies to farmers in the prospective entrant countries. It was clear that the enlargement would have significant effects on the viability of the CAP.

In 1995 Franz Fischler took over as Commissioner for Agriculture and articulated a vision of an agriculture that was competitive and market-oriented, while at the same time being environmentally sustainable and socially acceptable. The chosen route was to continue down the path of the MacSharry reforms, by reducing support prices and substituting direct payments tied by “cross-compliance” obligations to environmental goals. The Commission’s proposals for agricultural reform were included in the Agenda 2000 document, that also dealt with the budget and regional policy challenges facing the EU (Moyer and Josling 2002). The primary focus of Agenda 2000 was on the enlargement of the EU to include the Central and

Eastern European countries. Ten of these countries had already negotiated “Europe” agreements that were to lead to bilateral free trade (including most of agriculture) over a period of ten years. The pressure was mounting to fulfill the political pledge to allow for the reuniting of East and West Europe, but concern with the impact on both agricultural markets in the EU and the financial cost of extending the CAP to the new members was also rising. Agenda 2000 was the Commission’s suggestion as to how the budget and agricultural challenges could be met.

The agricultural reform component of Agenda 2000 was presented to the Council of (Agriculture) Ministers in 1997, and eventually endorsed with much of the Commission’s ideas intact in 1999. Though the Agriculture Ministers’ plan was modified by the European Council (a regular meeting of Heads of State or Government), the agreement that emerged was a major step in the evolution of the CAP.

One important concession was won by those that favored even more reform of the CAP: there would be a “mid-term review” of the effectiveness of the Agenda 2000 reforms in 2003 (at the half-way stage of the 2000-2006 fiscal horizon). Fischler was able to convert what could have been a routine review of progress into a further step along the path set by the MacSharry and Agenda 2000 reforms, by shepherding through the Council of Ministers a proposal for consolidating the direct payments associated with the compensation for price decreases in particular crops into a “Single Farm Payment” that was even more remote from farmers’ production decisions and market prices. This 2003 reform package also began to tackle the difficult issue of reform of the dairy sector.

Following on the heels of the 2003 reform the Commission proposed changes in the regimes for the Mediterranean crops, specifically for cotton, tobacco, rice and hops. The thrust of the reforms in these products was to blend them with the Single Farm Payment system, while reducing distortions in the market. New proposals for fruits and vegetables were adopted in 2004, with subsidies for processing being converted into producer payments and those for the withdrawal of fresh produce from the market being channeled through producer organizations. Wine and sugar reform proposals were introduced in 2005 and the sugar reform was agreed in 2006. This new regime aimed to eliminate the production quota system, paying compensation to those adversely impacted – producers, crushers and refiners, and overseas producers that rely on sales to the EU market – and cutting support prices. The wine reforms were still under discussion as of early 2008.

The aggregated impact of these various policy changes is shown in Figure 5. The EU-15 exhibits an NRA of around 40 percent following its absorption of three new members (and the introduction of the disciplines of the URAA) in 1995. By 2004 this had declined to around 30 percent. The reforms combined with higher world prices to lower the distortion to about 13 percent by 2007. The same trend is seen in the calculation of NRAs for the EFTA countries that have retained their agricultural policy autonomy. Norway and Switzerland have reduced the distortions as measured by the NRA to about one-half of the levels seen in the late 1990s. Iceland seems to be the one country where the tendency toward more moderate levels of assistance has been resisted most.

Detailed estimates of nominal assistance, 1955 to 2007

Having calculated the NRAs to inform the above description of the evolution of agricultural policies in Western Europe, it is now possible to make more use of that database to illustrate several additional points.

First, the NRA calculations need to be qualified by the change in the nature of the policy instruments adopted.³¹ In the latter 1980s, direct payments were limited to such products as olive oil and durum wheat, with market price support making up the bulk of assistance given to agriculture. From 1992 the total support (including direct payments and non-product-specific support) and the market price support (limited to price support for individual commodities) began to diverge. By 2004 almost one-half of the 100 billion euro in assistance to agriculture came in the form of income payments and provision of services on a non-product-specific nature (OECD 2006, see Appendix Figure 7). There is no doubt that such payments benefit agriculture and keep resources in the sector that might otherwise leave, but the direct distorting impact on commodity output, consumption and trade is less, and arguably a much smaller source of the programs' economic cost.³² If the assistance from

³¹ The NRA was calculated with non-product-specific payments and direct 'decoupled' payments both included and excluded to help identify the importance of these policy changes.

³² The extent to which a payment is production-neutral (the degree of decoupling) differs depending on the way it is administered and the expectations of the recipient, so the categorization of policies by the degree of production-neutrality is a hazardous endeavor. No attempt is made here to evaluate the extent of the distortion that might still be present from policies defined as decoupled from output price and quantity produced. Rather, we include as 'decoupled' the value the OECD estimates under certain categories of support. For the years 1979-85 there was just one category, called 'direct payments'; from 1986, those payments are specified to

these somewhat decoupled measures had been included in the calculation of support for Western European farmers, their NRA would have declined much less after 1992 (see Figure 6).

Second, when products are classified as exportables, importables and nontradables (see the Appendix for the precise classifications for each non-EU country and for the EU bloc), it becomes clear that exportables are assisted far less than import-competing farm industries in the case of the EU – but exporters are assisted only slightly less in the case of non-EU countries of the region (Figure 7).

Third, the rate of assistance to Western Europe's farmers dwarfs the small and declining NRAs for producers of non-agricultural tradable products, and so the Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA) is almost the same as the NRA for agriculture (Table 1).

Fourth, the NRA varies greatly across the range of covered farm commodities (which account for more than 75 percent of the region's agricultural production when valued at undistorted prices). The extent of that dispersion in NRAs for the EU increased up to the 1980s before decreasing, but it has continued to increase in non-EU countries (see second to last row of Tables 2 and 3). This suggests there is great scope to improve the efficiency of resource use within each country's farm sector.

Fifth, leaving aside non-product-specific and decoupled support, most of that assistance to farmers for covered products has come from border measures rather than domestic price supports (see near bottom of Tables 2 and 3). This aspect of European policies is in sharp contrast to the situations in the United States where domestic support plays a major role (c.f. Gardner 2008).

Sixth, the average rate of assistance to farmers varies by country even among the EU members (Table 4). This is because the commodity composition of farm output varies across countries and over time, and hence so do the weights (based on value of production at undistorted prices) used to calculate the average.

Sixth, the gross subsidy equivalent of the support provided to Western Europe's farmers varies hugely across countries (Table 5(a)) and across commodities (Table 5(c)). The

comprise the OECD's items C (payments based on area planted/animal numbers), D (payments based on historical entitlements), F (payments based on input constraints) and G (payments based on overall farming income); and for 2005-07, those items replaced by similar but newly defined items C to E. While the administration of the EU's direct payments policies varies among the member countries, we have insufficient data to do more than assume the percentage points of NRA from decoupled payments is the same for all EU members. This categorization for economic purposes (and that for 'non-product-specific' assistance) should not be confused with the legal allocation of domestic support measures into the WTO colored "boxes" in the context of international commitments.

biggest recipients among the commodities are milk, beef and wheat. When expressed per person engaged in farming, it is highest in Norway and Switzerland but, within the EU, it is almost as high in Denmark, the Netherlands and France (Table 5(b)). Note that the subsidy equivalent per EU farmer drops by two-thirds in 2005-07. This is much bigger than the 45 percent drop in the aggregate value compared with 2000-04, because the number of EU farmers has expanded hugely with eastern enlargement (even though strictly speaking they are not in Western Europe). These are not actual cash transfers from the EU's budget in Brussels, but simply the value equivalent of the price support provided primarily via protection from non-EU imports.

And finally, since most of the assistance to farmers comes from border measures, those same measures also raise consumer prices of farm products. The extent of the consumer tax equivalent is similar to that of the NRA for covered products in percentage terms (although less so the further a country is from self sufficiency), but vary considerably across countries when expressed on a per capita basis: after Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, it is Ireland, Denmark and the Netherlands where consumers are most harmed (Table 6). Note that the value of the implicit transfer from consumers is very small on a per capita basis, at about \$100 for EU countries and \$300 for EFTA countries in 2000-04 (valued at 2000 US dollars). Since this is less than 0.5 percent of per capita income, it is not surprising that consumers see little benefit in getting together to lobby collectively against agricultural supports.

Policy trends and turning points since 1955

This section attempts an analytical explanation of the reasons behind the evolution of policy and policy-related distortions since the mid-1950s. It complements the historical/institutional narrative and NRA estimates of the two previous sections by emphasizing the political economy forces behind the long-run trends and turning points. It focuses on the CAP as the main policy for an increasing number of Western European countries, but the policy developments in the countries that opted to stay outside the EU show some similarity. Emphasizing the trends in policy allows for a consideration of the changes in policy instruments over time and the role of instrument change in improving efficiency in meeting

the various objectives of policy. Discontinuities in the trends can also come from the impact of changes in ideas among the domestic political forces that impact on farm policy in Western Europe and of the introduction of international rules and institutions and the impact of bilateral and other trade agreements.

Long-run trends

Several important trends can be identified as have shaped Western European agricultural policy in the post-war period: the production increases in European agriculture that have transformed the sector from a significant importer of temperate zone agricultural products to a major exporter; the changing emphasis over time away from the production of undifferentiated farm commodities towards quality and other attributes that allow for product-differentiation; the increasingly globalized market that both provides raw materials and intermediate inputs for the European food system and offers expanding access to consumers in other countries; and the increasing concern with environmental and other objectives that are constantly changing the nature of the coalition of interests necessary for the support of agricultural policy. The reinstrumentation of agricultural policy has been a consequence of these trends away from import protection that allowed the sector to have a sheltered environment for growth and towards direct payments that are supported as rewards for socially-responsible farming practices. Intervention in the market and the dumping of surpluses abroad has largely given way to a regulatory approach that is encouraging quality foods that have a ready market and protecting locational and other indicators that are associated with such quality attributes. The reinstrumentation itself has largely been responsible for the moderation of the levels of protection relative to non-agricultural sectors and for less consumer taxation mentioned above.

Production increases

Somewhat ironically, it has been the strong growth of agricultural production in Western Europe that has brought about the most intractable policy problems. The policies introduced in the EEC were premised on the fact that agriculture needed support because it could not compete with domestic industry for labor and capital or with production from overseas farms that were larger and perhaps less constrained by social and environmental factors. The instruments used were designed to insulate domestic producers from developments on world

markets. World prices were seen as too volatile to act as a basis for stable domestic markets. When prices were held up by imports entering over the protective wall, this system was at least manageable, if not efficient. But when production outstripped demand, surpluses began to accumulate. New instruments had to be developed and those that had been intended as occasional market supports undertook new functions.

These pressures arising from production increases were noticed first in the cereals market. As a result of the initial decision on cereal prices, production of wheat, barley and maize (corn) increased sharply. Use of grains for animal feed dropped rapidly, and the search for alternative feeds began in earnest. One external factor played a significant role in the development of such alternatives: the level of protection of several non-grain feedstuffs had been fixed at zero or low levels in the Dillon Round of the GATT (1962). Feed compounders in Europe found that soybean meal (from imported soybeans) and cassava chips (from Thailand and Indonesia) made a cheaper feed for livestock than (domestic) corn and barley. The expanded imports that followed exacerbated the domestic supply imbalances, adding to the growing stocks of cereals.³³

Dairy prices had also been set high in the EEC, encouraging production and discouraging consumption. Structural change in the dairy sector added to the increase in production.³⁴ Surpluses showed up early, and various mechanisms were suggested to get rid of the “butter mountains” that had resulted from intervention buying. Taxes on the use of non-dairy products were suggested but not approved. Subsidies for the use of skimmed milk powder in animal feed were effective but did not discourage production. Modest price cuts (through co-responsibility levies) also were too small to curb production. Finally, in 1981, quotas on milk production were introduced. These have been in place ever since, and have been effective if inefficient as a way to restrain production.

Beef production also expanded rapidly in the EU, in part as a reflection of the increase in dairy production (most beef in Europe comes from the dairy herd) and in part a reaction to hill farming and other livestock subsidies. But in the 1970s consumption of veal slumped as a result of health concerns related to the use of growth hormones, and in the 1990s beef consumption plummeted following the discovery of a probable link between Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in cattle and a new variant of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease

³³ In addition, the soybean oil produced along with the soybean meal was a major competitor for butter and for olive oil, increasing the surpluses of these crops.

³⁴ Trade issues also played a role here, as the UK insisted on continued preferential access for New Zealand for butter as part of its accession arrangements.

(nvCJD) disease in humans. So the policy response had to focus on reassuring consumers rather than discouraging producers from overproduction.

Another product where surpluses appeared was sugar, where beet had been grown for 150 years as a rotation crop for Northern Europe and a valuable calorie source in times of interruption in trade.³⁵ But both France and the UK had former colonies that depended on the European market to sell their sugar cane. When the UK acceded to the EEC in 1973, a guaranteed market was conceded for its overseas suppliers. So the EU has struggled with an import commitment alongside a growing export surplus. When other exporters challenged the legality of the EU's policy of re-exporting the imported sugar, a panel found that the EU had exceeded its export subsidy commitment under the WTO. The sugar policy has now been reformed, by reducing support prices and paying compensation to growers and beet crushers, so that it is less obtrusive on world markets.

In each of these cases, the main problem was that prices were rigid downwards, largely as a result of the decision making system. Farm ministers were reluctant to return from the annual price negotiations in Brussels having agreed to price cuts. And financial control was also lacking, largely because the impact of price decisions on spending were not apparent to those (the farm ministers) making the decisions. As the budget cost of export subsidies was shared among all members (and the import levies pooled) the true (foreign exchange) cost to each country was the internal price. Under these circumstances, it was not surprising that price cuts were rare. Productivity growth put pressure on the costs of the policy and on the external impact, but the lack of financial accountability and the difficulty of getting the political support needed for a major policy change led to a continual air of crisis and controversy.

Comparisons with other high-income countries

The predominant feature of agricultural policy in Western Europe over the past fifty years has been the relatively high levels of support given to most sectors of agriculture. Support has been high relative to other temperate zone producers of agricultural goods. Though agricultural protection in East Asia rose from low levels in the 1950s to be well above those in Western Europe (Honma and Hayami 2007), protection in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States was generally at a much lower level (Gardner 2008, Anderson et al. 2008).

³⁵ Sugar beet production was developed and encouraged in the Napoleonic era as a food security strategy.

Including agriculture in the experiment of economic integration was a bold leap into the dark for the EEC. The economic rationale was similar to that in other sectors: the agricultural sector would gain from rationalization on a continent-wide basis and would lower costs. This in turn held out the hope that an integrated European agriculture could compete with the Americas and the temperate zone producers of the Southern Pacific. But this would have required real competition among EEC farmers, with the less efficient leaving the sector. The main explanatory factor for the level of protection in the fifty years of Western European agricultural policy under discussion has been the reluctance of politicians (and to a large extent, of society in general) to expose the sector to this degree of competition. Integration of agricultural markets has indeed taken place, but in an environment where inefficiencies were able to survive and production decisions did not reflect the realities of the market. In short, the distortions that have continued in European agriculture have been as a result of the political reluctance to encourage the needed adjustments in the sector. The social costs of such adjustments played a dominant role in shaping the crucial decisions. But as a result, fresh resources have been attracted into the industry that could have had greater benefits to society elsewhere. The process of outmigration from agriculture has undoubtedly been slowed by the incentive structure of the CAP. Thus the policy has been successful in its own terms, by mitigating the adjustment cost, but expensive in societal terms by delaying changes that would have been beneficial.

The unwillingness of governments to subject their agricultural sectors to the rigors of the market was also evident in the decisions of those countries that chose not to join the EU. The need to lower support prices in Norway and Switzerland in the event of membership was a major factor in generating opposition to EU accession in rural communities. These high-cost countries have been reluctant to expose their farmers to competition from the EU and to induce the structural changes and entrepreneurial initiatives that offer the chance for competitiveness. Each has protected its agriculture behind high tariffs, thus blunting market signals and burdening the downstream sectors with higher costs.

Environmental and quality objectives

The five decades discussed above cover a period of a major transformation of agricultural policies not just in terms of the instruments used but in the objectives that lie behind government intervention in the agricultural sector. The focus of agricultural policy has over the period swung away from a narrow focus on the income level of farmers toward a raft of

policy objectives ranging from the preservation of the countryside and the provision of healthy food to rural development and animal welfare. Farm incomes have over time become more of a constraint on policy change than a rationale for the existence of policy. Those who benefit financially from the policy have been able to slow down the shift in emphasis (and budget allocation) but not stop it altogether.

The need to include incentives for the improvement of farm structures was recognized in the 1960s, when the Mansholt Report emphasized the dangers of pursuing all objectives through price support. The introduction of a structural program proved slow, as it was in competition with funds for market management. Similarly the need was realized for funds for rural development in part as a way of helping agriculture adjust. Eventually, the “Second Pillar” of the CAP was constructed and supplied with enough funds to make it a significant aspect of policy. National funds are also now authorized, subject to constraints, to be shifted from price and income support to rural development programs (modulation) that meet other objectives.

Environmental objectives have also become important in shaping the CAP (and policies in the EFTA countries). Originally the thrust was to prevent the negative impacts of intensive farming on the countryside (and adjacent urban areas) and on soil, air and water pollution. Over time this has changed into an emphasis on the positive contribution of agriculture as the dominant activity in much of the Europe’s more scenic rural areas. In the 1990s this became associated with the term “multifunctionality,” reflecting appropriately the range of public goods provided by rural businesses. But other exporters pointed to the risk that this could become an excuse for a blank cheque to policy-makers who were looking for reasons to continue income support in a more acceptable guise – thus perpetuating the distortions to resource allocation.

The first evidence of major changes to the politics and political economy of the CAP that came as a result of public concerns over food safety. Building on public reactions to some reported instances of human exposure to hormones used in livestock production, the EU banned the use of such substances in animal production. Apart from the international ramifications of this decision (US and Canadian beef and beef products were banned) the impact on domestic policy was noticeable. It ushered in perhaps the most significant change in the perception of the CAP, its link with food quality and the production practices employed by farmers. The advocates of more emphasis on local foods and on more animal-friendly livestock practices joined up with those that opposed the use of transgenic technology in

foodstuffs to form a formidable new voice in agricultural policy. The CAP has become complemented with increasingly centralized food safety and quality policies and regulations on animal welfare. The policy has itself been redefined as one that emphasizes quality (over quantity) and the promotion of foods that reflect the cultural richness of rural Europe. Farmers spotting this trend have shifted their own production and marketing practices toward these new demands. It could be argued that this market orientation reduces distortions, though others might regard the policy-supported changes in demand as themselves “distortions” for the consumers that cannot or do not wish to shift their eating habits in this way.

Reinstrumentation

The original policy instruments chosen by the EEC were intended to provide a stable price environment for the agricultural sector. The variable levy smoothed out the fluctuations that would have otherwise been transmitted to the domestic market. The export subsidies (restitutions) allowed goods to be withdrawn from the domestic market and sold at lower world prices. Only dairy (after 1981) and sugar (strictly speaking a “temporary” market order) were subject to supply controls. Some producer subsidies existed, including those for durum wheat and for olive oil, but these were also backed up by tariff protection. Wine was regularly taken off the internal market for distillation, and producer groups could withdraw fruits and vegetables with assistance from the Commission if prices fell to “crisis” levels. The changes that have come about in the instruments used in the CAP are as important in their impacts as the levels of protection themselves. These changes have not come easily, but they have had a lasting impact on the shape of the CAP.

The most significant modification of policy instruments came in 1992, with the MacSharry reforms.³⁶ Direct payments in compensation for price declines added flexibility to the policy, as described above. But this transition also followed a pattern observed in other countries. The US began to move from price supports to direct payments, and to decouple those payments from production and prices during the 1980s (Moyer and Josling 1990). And at the time of the Uruguay Round it became apparent that one way to reduce overseas threats to the CAP was to make the instrumentality more similar to those of trading partners.

³⁶ A change in the oilseeds policy preceeded that in the cereals market, as a GATT panel ruled that payments to processors tied to the use domestic raw material were inconsistent with GATT obligations. This change allowed the EU to gain experience with a direct payment program

Since the mid-1980s the gap between total producer support and that derived from market price support has widened, particularly after the 1992 reforms. Currently, market price support accounts for just over one-half of total CAP support, compared to 90 percent twenty years ago. To the extent that the new instruments are significantly less trade distorting, they also are less distorting for the domestic economy. A similar trend is noticeable for Switzerland: the “decoupling” of payments from output and price has been introduced even though the absolute level of support is still greater in that country than in the EU. Norway has not increased its degree of decoupling, but the absolute level was in any case lower as a result of subsidies that were aimed at keeping population in the North of the country regardless of their levels of output (Appendix Figure 8). The decoupling of support from price and output has also allowed for a trend to attach payments to other policy objectives in these EFTA countries as it has in the EU.

Turning points

Though these trends have continued over the five decades, several turning points have also been crucial in influencing the CAP and the level of distortions that have been a feature of agricultural policies in Western Europe over the period since 1955. These include the increase in the price of oil in 1973 that changed not only the macroeconomic picture in Western Europe but also the perception about commodity markets and food prices.

The oil price increase impacted the CAP in two respects. It increased costs to farmers in a way that was readily apparent and led to compensating price increases. Coming not long after the end of the transition period (1967), at a time when policy-makers were attempting to reduce price incentives, and the exchange rate changes of 1968, when prices diverged again within the EU, the pressures for price adjustments was difficult to resist. Moreover, the oil price increases coincided with the sharp rise in cereal and sugar prices on world markets, thus fuelling fears of longer term shortages and masking the level of underlying distortions that were present in the system. The opportunity to make use of the high price period to reduce the support prices was lost. Instead, support prices followed the world market upward, to be left isolated when world prices declined again.

The oil price hike also coincided with the accession of the UK to the EEC. The UK was expected to bring a new look at farm policy based on its history of international openness. Some countries welcomed this (such as the Netherlands) while others were prepared to resist

(notably France but also Germany). However, the period of inflation and currency movements that followed in the 1970s overwhelmed the possibility of policy improvements and left the UK reluctantly accepting the CAP so long as the budget cost to the UK was constrained and so long as it controlled the pace of adjustment of the “green” rate of exchange. This compromise lasted through the run up to monetary union, when policy prices in the EU became “common” again.

Political changes also have had an impact on the CAP and hence on the level of distortion in Western European agriculture. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent unification of Germany offered an opportunity for the return of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) to the mainstream of economic and political life. This has governed the basic approach to agricultural policy since that date. Europe Agreements were negotiated with those CEECs that were deemed to be ready for accession, and agricultural products were included, albeit with some restrictions of a quantitative nature. All agricultural policy decisions since that time have had to be taken in the light of their implications for the larger European market. This has acted as a disincentive to increase support levels in the existing EU.

To an extent unmatched in most other developed regions, the CAP has been influenced by external pressures as well as by those of a more domestic nature. A major turning point came in the mid-1980s as a direct result of this external pressure. The decision making of the CAP always took place within the context of the state of world markets, which effected budget costs in particular. But the Uruguay Round introduced, in the Agreement on Agriculture (URAA), a legal framework that restricted the scope for domestic action. It also gave domestic policy makers a lever on the policies of other countries, through the negotiation and enforcement of tariff reductions and scheduled cuts in subsidies. Thus the CAP, along with the policies of other countries, was subject after 1995 to challenge, and policy changes that would have been of mainly internal interest became of international significance.

Prospects for future reform of Western European policy

The essential nature of the CAP is that it represents a bargain among member countries. Each country in the EU has its own agricultural policy objectives even if it has ceded the ability to

use many instruments to achieve those objectives. The CAP is a reflection of the bargaining process within the EU as much as a coordinated and consistent European view of appropriate role for government in agriculture. Reform can come about as a result of changes in the terms of the bargain just as much as a shift in the model of agriculture that underlies policy or the reactions to exogenous events. However, it is still possible to speculate on the change in underlying attitudes to agriculture in the development of the CAP, and hence hazard a guess as to where those trends might be leading. In the light of the political economy constraints and incentives mentioned above, this section attempts to draw out the prospects for further policy reform in Western Europe.

One issue is whether the consolidation of Western Europe in the EU, and by implication the extension of the CAP to all Western European agriculture, will in the foreseeable future be completed. This implies the entry of Norway and Switzerland to the EU. Norway has resisted so far in part because its position as an exporter of oil and gas has enabled it to have a high level of income as an “adjunct” to the EU market. Investment could be stimulated by accession, but that is not enough to convince the electorate to “share” its fish resources, subject its farmers to price decreases and possibly have to modify its control and use of its energy supplies. But the possible end to the oil reserves and an autonomous reform of its agriculture (and a more acceptable fisheries policy in the EU) could change the situation. The level of protection is still considerably higher in Norway than in the EU. Significant policy adjustments would be needed before Norwegian agriculture could be assimilated into the CAP.³⁷

Switzerland has been steadily converging with the EU in most aspects of policy, both industrial and agricultural. As a result, one would expect the economic aspects of accession to be less significant than its political aspects. Not only does Switzerland have a strong history of avoiding foreign entanglements but its constitution (as a participatory democracy) poses some problems for the transfer of some sovereignty to the EU level. If a time comes when major sectors of the Swiss economy are harmed by exclusion from the EU, one might expect to see an application to join. However, as in the case of Norway, the level of farm protection is still considerably higher than in the EU.³⁸

³⁷ Much the same could be said for Iceland.

³⁸ However, due to the smaller size of these two non-members, Norway and Switzerland, the absolute value of the subsidies is much smaller than that of the EU (see Appendix Figure 8(b)). As a result the international implications of such protection are less immediate.

An enlargement issue of a different kind is the prospect of the accession of Turkey to the EU. The impact on the level of distortion in Western Europe may well be significant. Turkey poses an economic and political dilemma for the EU. On the one hand, the geopolitical argument point to the benefits of offering membership to a strategically important country. On the other hand, Turkey has an income level of about one-third of the level of the EU, and would add some 20 percent to the population. So the impact on the EU economy could be considerable (in a positive as well as a negative direction), with the challenge to agriculture being a major consideration. For these reasons, one might expect a long period of transition before Turkey were to be fully incorporated into the single EU market (see also Anderson and Swinnen 2008).

More trade agreements are on the cards for the EU, as it consolidates its relations with its neighbors in North Africa and the Middle East and extends its “neighborhood policy” to include Central Asia and the Caucasus. The current wave of trade agreements under negotiation also include arrangements between the EU and the countries of Latin America, through an EU-MERCOSUR trade pact. The trade policy plans of the Commission include agreements with major Asian countries, to avoid getting left behind relative to competitors in North America and East Asia. All these agreements will tend to put a downward pressure on agricultural distortions where they include improved market access for farm products. The extent to which this pressure is reflected in real changes will depend on the political significance attributed to the FTAs themselves. Domestic agricultural policy has proved resistant to many such trade policy developments, but not all. The Everything But Arms agreement that gave the Least Developed Countries tariff- and quota-free access to the EU market included agricultural products, and led in turn to the reform of the politically-sensitive sugar policy in 2006.

The CAP has always absorbed a major share of the EU budget, though that share, once above 75 percent, has now been reduced to about 55 percent. More countries are being included in the activities funded from the budget, without corresponding increases in the level of funding. The prospect of substantially increased funds available for agricultural policy is slim. But this in turn means that shifts in instruments toward the less distorting direct (decoupled) payments is increasingly difficult. More likely is the addition of funds for such projects as the development of biofuels which could benefit agriculture in a more acceptable way, depending on how the perception of the environmental effects of such interventions evolve.

The impact of the Uruguay Round on the CAP has been emphasized above. Negotiations have been underway for seven years in the Doha Round, the WTO's follow-up to the UR. The Doha Round would cut tariffs, eliminate export subsidies and reduce the scope for trade-distorting domestic support. Though the talks are presently on hold, there is still the possibility that they may be concluded by the end of 2009. If an agreement is eventually reached within the range of options on the table, the EU would phase out its export subsidies altogether by 2013 and significantly cut its ability to support prices. Though much of the domestic policy is now sheltered in the Green Box (and not subject to reductions), the Doha Round would "lock in" those aspects of reform. Tariffs would be cut by about 60 percent, with some exceptions for the most sensitive products (such as dairy and beef). WTO dispute settlement panels have already found that the sugar and banana regimes were inconsistent with WTO obligations: other countries will no doubt explore further challenges where they consider the CAP too distortive in world markets.

One vital question with respect to the future of the CAP is whether the trend is toward a renationalization of the policy. There has been some small move in this direction, with flexibility built in to the direct payments. The degree of decoupling, for some commodities, is at the discretion of the member countries. How far this trend will go is a matter of political decisions well above that of the agricultural policy. But there is a logic to the renationalization of payments that are not related to farm output so long as they do not influence competition. So there is the possibility of an eventual division between the market mechanisms that would be controlled at the EU level and the payments for public goods that may revert to the national level.

There could therefore be a convergence of the likely and the desirable policy directions in the period up to 2020. A continuation of decoupling of support from price and output should over time significantly reduce distortions, though if such payments are "recoupled" to other objectives there could be some economic cost. Trade agreements will reinforce this trend, as access to the EU market will be an important inducement for other countries to conclude such agreements.

What, if any, are the policy lessons for developed, developing and transition economies of the trends and turning points in Western Europe's agricultural policies? In many ways the EU is unique in having agreed at its founding on a system of internal free trade and a common policy for market management and external protection. In that regard the lessons are less likely to be directly applicable. But the development of the CAP does offer

some generalizable lessons. Among the most important of these has to do with the pitfalls of attempting to manage markets in such a way as to give farmers adequate incomes. Technical advances, demand shifts and the natural responses by private actors to incentives offered by policy will undermine the ability of policy administrators to achieve the required outcome. The CAP was too inflexible to adapt to changes in the internal or external market: Ministers of agriculture meeting periodically are unlikely to be able to adjust policy instruments and price levels in the face of such changes. So the policy is always a step behind the market. And the income streams generated by the policy ensure that there are always interests lined up against change. The combination of inflexible decision making and a bias toward the *status quo* made it impossible for the CAP to keep its relevance over the decades. But external pressure through the GATT talks and the WTO, as well as a feeling that the CAP was no longer viable in its original form, have induced a series of changes that have shifted the nature of agricultural policy in Europe. The policy is still somewhat inflexible, and changes may be even harder now with twenty-seven members, but the reduction of prices of most of the main products to near world market levels has given much more scope for creative policy making. The flexibility of direct payments, though it can be overused, gives the hope of a policy for agriculture that is less distortive of world markets and less obtrusive of economic adjustments on the domestic front. The way in which this was accomplished should indeed be of interest to other countries.

Conclusions

Three main conclusions emerge from this chapter. First, the level of distortions to the Western European economies resulting from direct and indirect policy interventions in agriculture has been declining in recent years. Protection of agriculture was highest in the 1960s but fell in the 1970s as world markets became tight and European agriculture appeared, temporarily, to be more competitive. But reaction to the period of high world prices and inflation at home led to a rapid increase in distortion from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s. That the level of distortion remained high for several years attracted criticism from at home and abroad. These levels have been steadily declining in the EU since the mid-1980s and become much more stable. In the countries that decided to stay outside the EU, distortions

remain high and more variable, although in the last few years there have been signs of convergence with the EU.

Secondly, the act of joining the EU has had a mixed impact on country levels of distortion, and hence on the total level of distortion in the region. In some cases the accession of new members has raised the protection level and in others it has decreased it. Protection levels in Western Europe increased as a result of the 1973 accession of the UK, Denmark and Ireland. Agriculture in each of these countries expanded and their competitiveness with respect to world markets was eroded. The entry of Southern European countries in the 1980s also increased the overall level of protection by including in the CAP countries such as Spain and Portugal that had relatively low levels of assistance. But, many of the countries that chose to stay outside the EEC in the 1960s were also those countries with high-cost farming sectors. The high levels of protection were not “imported” into the EU from countries such as Finland and Austria. Hence, the overall result of the incorporation of the many of the Nordic and Alpine countries has been to reduce overall protection in Western Europe somewhat when they eventually joined the EU. This is confirmed by the nature of the two major countries in Western Europe that have remained outside the EU (Switzerland and Norway) both of which have far higher levels of distortion than the EU itself. This suggests that their eventual accession could play some role in reducing distortions in these countries, even if not in the current EU countries.

The accession of the ten new members from Central and Eastern Europe posed a challenge for the CAP and the process of reform. Though producers in the EU expressed the fear that the competition from those countries would oversupply markets in the EU, particularly for products such as pigmeat, the European Commission was more concerned with the implied commitment to pay direct payments to the large number of farmers that were about to join the EU and come under the political umbrella of the CAP. As it happened, prices rose steadily in the new entrants, but surplus production has not been a problem. Market disruption has been limited to isolated cases, and the eastern half of the Continent is rapidly becoming integrated with Western markets. The prospect of additional costs under the CAP proved a real stimulus for reform: it had already been decided to spread funds allocated for a EU of 15 over all 27 countries. So one can reasonably conclude that the latest enlargement has tightened the constraints already limiting the CAP, even though it has raised farm protection in the CEECs (Anderson and Swinnen 2008).

The third conclusion is that domestic policy operates in an international environment, even as domestic politicians proclaim their autonomy. The development of policy in Western Europe has become in itself an international issue, and external pressures could not be ignored. This posed a major challenge for policy-makers, who could have used the external pressure as a reason for positive change or as a negative force that call for defenses that deflect its impact. The EU for many years attempted the latter strategy, but since 1990 has made significant use of bilateral and multilateral agreements to guide agriculture in a direction that makes it compatible with a more open trade system. So economic distortions have been reduced as compatibility issues with the international economic system have been resolved. The pace of such developments has been dictated by those who were gaining most from the unreformed policy, but in the end the political benefits that flowed from reforming the policy came to outweigh the costs of change. Though considerable distortion in Western European agriculture still exists, the path to reducing that distortion is opening up. Allowing farmers to respond to consumer demands, where not artificially stimulated by government regulations, is the most desirable way to point agricultural policy. The rhetoric of the CAP has adopted this approach for the past five years, and the policy is slowly moving in that direction.

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Figure 1: NRAs to agriculture, EU-6 and Western European average, 1956 to 1964
(percent)

(a) EU-6 members

(b) Other European Countries

Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on author's spreadsheet which draws heavily on OECD (2008) for calculations from 1979

Figure 2: NRAs to agriculture, EU-9 and Western European average, 1965 to 1974
(percent)

(a) EU-9 members

(b) Other Western European countries

Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on author's spreadsheet which draws heavily on OECD (2008) for calculations from 1979

Figure 3: NRAs to agriculture, EU-12 and Western European average, 1975 to 1984
(percent)

(a) EU-12 members

(b) Other Western European countries

Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on author's spreadsheet which draws heavily on OECD (2008) for calculations from 1979

Figure 4: NRAs to agriculture, EU-15 and Western European average, 1985 to 1994
(a) EU-15 members

(b) Other Western European countries

Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on author's spreadsheet which draws heavily on OECD (2008) for calculations from 1979

Figure 5: NRAs to agriculture, EU-15/25/27 and Western European average, 1995 to 2007
(percent)

(a) EU-15 to 2004, then EU25 for 2005-06 and EU27 for 2007, then EU27 for 2007

(b) Other Western European countries

Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on author's spreadsheet which draws heavily on OECD (2008) for calculations from 1979

Figure 6: NRAs to agriculture without and with decoupled payments, Western Europe, 1956 to 2007

Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on author's spreadsheet which draws heavily on OECD (2008) for calculations from 1979

Figure 7: Nominal rates of assistance to exportable, import-competing and all^a agricultural industries, EU and other Western European countries,^a 1956 to 2007 (percent)

(a) European Union

(b) Other Western European countries

^a All non-product-specific assistance is apportioned to tradables. The EU is the original six countries to 1972, then 9 to 1985, then 12 to 1994, then 15 to 2004, then 25 to 2006, then 27 thereafter. The other Western European countries in our study comprise the original 7 EFTA members (Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK) plus Finland, Iceland, Ireland and Spain to 1970, then without Denmark, Ireland and the UK from 1973 when they joined the EEC6, then without Portugal and Spain from 1986 when they joined the EC, then without Austria, Finland and Sweden from 1995 when they joined the EU. Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on author's spreadsheet which draws heavily on OECD (2008) for calculations from 1979

Table 1: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural relative to non-agricultural industries, EU-15 and EFTA-3, 1956 to 2007
(percent)

(a) EU-15 member countries (weighted average)

	1956-59	1960-64	1965-69	1970-74	1975-79	1980-84	1985-89	1990-94	1995-99	2000-04	2005-07
Covered products	49.0	61.9	72.4	47.3	56.3	69.9	79.8	60.8	39.8	32.9	14.7
Non-covered products	14.1	28.2	38.4	26.0	33.3	39.1	45.8	32.7	23.3	19.3	na
All agriculture (excl NPS)	39.8	53.6	64.4	42.5	51.3	62.7	72.6	54.6	36.2	30.0	11.2
All importables	56.0	74.3	80.2	52.9	58.8	76.5	84.0	63.8	50.4	48.2	28.6
All exportables	3.9	13.0	27.4	18.5	30.0	27.3	44.5	33.3	12.0	6.0	0.5
All agriculture (incl NPS)	39.8	53.6	64.4	42.5	53.3	71.0	76.8	59.2	40.4	34.2	15.4
Decoupled payments	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	1.7	2.3	8.1	16.7	17.9	19.5
All agric (incl NPS & dec)	39.8	53.6	64.4	42.5	53.5	72.6	79.1	67.3	57.0	52.1	35.0
All ag tradables (inc NPS)	39.8	53.6	64.4	42.5	53.3	71.0	76.8	59.1	40.4	34.2	15.4
All nonag tradables	8.2	7.4	5.7	3.8	2.5	1.4	1.7	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.1
RRR ^a	29.2	43.1	55.5	37.3	49.7	68.5	73.9	57.1	38.4	32.4	14.1

Table 1 (continued): Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural relative to non-agricultural industries, EU-15 and EFTA-3, 1956 to 2007
(percent)

(b) Iceland, Norway and Switzerland (weighted average)

	1956-59	1960-64	1965-69	1970-74	1975-79	1980-84	1985-89	1990-94	1995-99	2000-04	2005-07
Covered products	256	257	255	252	256	232	339	295	204	171	99
Non-covered products	169	172	173	179	166	169	150	111	78	64	141
All agriculture (excl NPS)	228	230	230	230	230	218	282	236	165	137	79
All importables	220	221	221	220	227	211	262	234	169	149	114
All exportables	247	249	249	255	239	240	334	242	159	119	70
All agriculture (incl NPS)	228	230	230	230	233	233	313	266	197	164	90
Decoupled payments	0	0	0	0	11	56	31	32	48	68	68
All agric (incl NPS & dec)	228	230	230	230	244	289	344	298	245	233	158
All ag tradables (incl NPS)	228	230	230	230	233	233	313	266	197	164	90
All nonag tradables	4.0	4.3	4.2	3.0	2.5	2.1	1.8	1.9	2.1	2.1	1.6
RRA ^a	216	216	217	220	225	226	306	259	191	159	87

^a The relative Rate of Assistance (RRA) is defined as $100 * [(100 + \text{NRA}_{\text{ag}}^t) / (100 + \text{NRA}_{\text{nonag}}^t) - 1]$, where NRA_{ag}^t and $\text{NRA}_{\text{nonag}}^t$ are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.

Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), drawing on authors' spreadsheet.

Table 2: Nominal rates of assistance to covered farm products, European Union,^a 1956 to 2007
(percent)

	1956-59	1960-64	1965-69	1970-74	1975-79	1980-84	1985-89	1990-94	1995-99	2000-04	2005-07
Exportables	-17	-12	4	7	17	11	8	10	6	2	1
Barley	nap	nap	nap	35	45	14	nap	nap	nap	1	0
Rapeseed	nap	nap	nap	nap	nap	nap	nap	nap	0	0	0
Rice	-48	-41	-1	-23	-6	2	146	136	34	17	2
Tomato	9	16	nap	nap	nap	nap	nap	4	0	1	0
Wheat	nap	nap	nap	nap	nap	nap	nap	nap	16	4	0
Wine	-16	-13	4	4	4	11	1	11	4	2	1
Import-competing	60	90	103	68	70	93	93	70	56	55	28
Barley	39	59	66	nap	nap	nap	108	104	32	nap	nap
Beef	20	79	62	52	12	120	150	93	100	132	86
Egg	28	18	20	1	23	17	22	10	9	1	0
Maize	-9	24	55	37	56	43	90	89	31	25	19
Milk	259	301	314	269	431	335	291	122	87	61	19
Oat	3	34	46	20	45	0	37	47	47	23	8
Oilseed	55	2	0	0	0	0	109	55	0	0	0
Pigmeat	28	75	139	113	88	111	24	13	25	28	17
Potato	na	na	na	43	90	48	16	16	13	10	10
Poultry	130	64	54	88	55	75	79	105	81	64	78
Sheepmeat	170	197	343	340	277	189	164	97	45	38	65
Soybean	13	11	na	0	0	0	121	61	0	0	0
Sugar	137	121	295	23	131	140	227	162	167	191	111
Wheat	11	52	67	5	2	38	84	75	nap	nap	nap
All covered	44	63	82	54	61	78	81	58	40	33	15
Domestic market support	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	2	0	0	0
Border market support	44	63	82	54	61	78	77	56	40	33	15
Dispersion of NRA of covered products	81	85	120	99	116	90	82	51	45	53	38
% coverage at undistorted prices	74	77	78	80	79	78	78	78	79	79	74

^a Weighted averages, with weights based on the unassisted value of production. Dispersion is the standard deviation shown is the simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation around the weighted mean. The EU is the original six countries to 1972, then 9 to 1985, then 12 to 1994, then 15 to 2004, then 25 to 2006, then 27 thereafter.
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), drawing on authors' spreadsheet.

Table 3: Nominal rates of assistance to covered farm products, non-EU Western European countries,^a 1956 to 2007

	(percent)										
	1956-59	1960-64	1965-69	1970-74	1975-79	1980-84	1985-89	1990-94	1995-99	2000-04	2005-07
Barley	36	39	29	18	34	5	223	219	186	105	76
Beef	65	81	29	59	130	186	161	166	174	225	149
Egg	-64	-69	-71	80	321	328	145	148	296	161	186
Maize	91	53	47	34	48	34	51	89	124	89	64
Milk	259	275	251	262	301	223	227	240	242	181	73
Oat	23	48	71	58	132	34	103	115	154	113	83
Oilseed	28	18	14	8	7	14	58	126	334	260	287
Pigmeat	51	63	74	38	12	45	71	82	180	172	116
Potato	130	144	167	59	63	63	38	35	na	na	na
Poultry	56	52	25	101	188	207	104	74	370	437	383
Rice	-18	-25	-14	-29	-21	-12	52	na	na	na	na
Sheepmeat	110	81	78	64	75	80	168	170	101	68	51
Soybean	na	na	na	-28	25	30	13	na	na	na	na
Sugar	265	253	446	47	126	121	250	198	233	255	173
Tomato	0	0	0	5	4	4	4	na	na	na	na
Wheat	29	42	43	7	14	46	126	170	195	91	61
Wine	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	na	na	na
Wool	na	na	na	na	124	36	78	207	187	167	207
Exportables	37	43	55	37	35	30	98	133	236	172	70
Import-competing	82	81	66	43	57	61	169	191	194	171	114
All covered	68	69	63	41	50	51	119	152	204	171	99
Domestic market support	0	0	0	0	2	12	-20	-17	7	12	11
Border market support	68	69	63	41	46	33	138	169	198	159	88
Dispersion of NRA of covered products	90	91	125	67	109	103	81	73	84	105	112
% coverage at undistorted prices	73	73	74	75	74	75	86	75	69	69	80

^a Weighted averages, with weights based on the unassisted value of production. Dispersion is the standard deviation shown is the simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation around the weighted mean. The other Western European countries in our study comprise the original 7 EFTA members (Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK) plus Finland, Iceland, Ireland and Spain to 1970, then without Denmark, Ireland and the UK from 1973 when they joined the EEC6, then without Portugal and Spain from 1986 when they joined the EC, then without Austria, Finland and Sweden from 1995 when they joined the EU.

Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), drawing on author's spreadsheet.

Table 4: Nominal rates of assistance to all agriculture,^a individual Western European countries,^a 1956 to 2007

	(percent)										
	1956-59	1960-64	1965-69	1970-74	1975-79	1980-84	1985-89	1990-94	1995-99	2000-04	2005-07
Austria	25	33	36	12	17	17	49	71	45	41	19
Denmark	29	33	37	37	78	86	81	54	41	34	15
Finland	81	93	101	73	75	37	136	134	52	41	17
France	41	49	70	43	50	74	82	64	40	33	15
Germany	52	83	99	63	68	89	83	62	46	38	16
Iceland	na	na	na	na	229	252	346	289	173	144	153
Ireland	20	41	49	43	84	117	132	83	67	62	34
Italy	5	30	48	32	37	61	60	46	32	27	11
Netherlands	43	78	104	80	89	107	80	53	48	42	21
Norway	188	193	196	201	219	240	259	235	191	165	98
Portugal	-6	4	7	9	24	15	41	37	28	26	15
Spain	13	14	12	-2	-4	-1	53	44	31	26	14
Sweden	87	113	120	77	85	79	90	88	48	41	18
Switzerland	253	251	249	244	243	229	349	285	201	165	83
UK	65	60	43	32	68	83	95	70	47	40	20
Total Western Europe, wted av	44	57	68	46	56	74	82	64	44	37	17
EU countries ^c	40	54	64	43	53	71	77	59	40	34	15
Other Western Europe ^c	228	230	230	230	233	233	313	266	197	164	90

^a Weighted averages, with weights based on the unassisted value of production. Dispersion is the standard deviation shown is the simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation around the weighted mean. The other Western European countries in our study comprise the original 7 EFTA members (Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK) plus Finland, Iceland, Ireland and Spain to 1970, then without Denmark, Ireland and the UK from 1973 when they joined the EEC6, then without Portugal and Spain from 1986 when they joined the EC, then without Austria, Finland and Sweden from 1995 when they joined the EU. For 2005-07, the 'EU members' and 'Total Western Europe' aggregates also include the most recent 12 that joined the EU in May 2004 and January 2007.

Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) based on author's spreadsheet.

Table 5: Gross subsidy equivalents of assistance to farmers, total, per farm worker and by product, Western European countries,^a 1956 to 2007

(a) Total (constant 2000 US\$ million)

	1956-59	1960-64	1965-69	1970-74	1975-79	1980-84	1985-89	1990-94	1995-99	2000-04	2005-07
Austria	422	566	651	192	462	440	8184	3108	1715	1338	541
Denmark	1439	1667	1983	2403	5719	5660	4133	3804	2565	1920	888
Finland	1219	1416	1820	1733	2185	932	3644	3685	1000	730	287
France	9866	14437	22418	17393	26423	31314	26608	25399	15707	11012	5225
Germany	8735	18158	25895	21893	32312	33297	24905	21113	13869	10125	3975
Iceland	na	na	na	na	314	246	245	177	113	96	123
Ireland	254	572	710	1235	3744	4026	3553	3421	2646	2035	837
Italy	651	6596	11772	8903	13826	17067	13585	13061	8728	6257	2646
Netherlands	1812	3778	5634	6153	9735	10432	7083	6695	5228	3593	1483
Norway	1432	1497	1710	1924	2898	2876	3061	3437	2566	1836	1208
Portugal	-58	70	170	295	858	416	1218	1579	1194	924	509
Spain	841	911	919	-816	-741	-604	8792	9431	6446	5440	3372
Sweden	2573	3323	3832	3050	4229	3363	3180	3096	1499	1047	413
Switzerland	3148	3486	3981	5130	5599	5817	6491	6541	4438	3014	1945
UK	8937	9177	7181	6915	16530	17597	14013	12752	8138	5498	2411
Total, Western Europe	41271	65653	88676	76403	124095	132880	128695	117300	75850	54866	31173
EU members ^a	21065	42969	65718	54342	108415	119393	103890	97256	68734	49920	27618
Other Western Europe ^a	20206	22685	22957	22061	15680	13487	24805	20044	7116	4946	3555

Table 5 (continued): Gross subsidy equivalents of assistance to farmers, total, per farm worker and by product, Western European countries,^a 1956 to 2007

(b) Per person engaged in agriculture (constant 2000 US\$)

	1961-64	1965-69	1970-74	1975-79	1980-84	1985-89	1990-94	1995-99	2000-04	2005-07
Austria	805	1161	409	1257	1361	28429	12023	7947	7661	3468
Denmark	5240	6627	10339	26813	30680	24401	25217	20676	18950	9865
Finland	2820	3853	4267	6547	3340	15411	18224	6160	5659	2540
France	4285	6571	6223	11736	16887	17304	20111	15437	13678	7412
Germany	4303	6894	7235	11707	13875	13252	14324	11891	11069	4938
Iceland	na	na	na	24186	19696	17016	11597	8195	7529	10223
Ireland	1752	2169	5026	14801	17647	17261	18759	15662	12680	5363
Italy	1445	2514	2350	4373	6288	5825	6731	5632	5176	2524
Netherlands	10230	15336	18827	30384	33320	22665	22195	19561	15434	6928
Norway	5992	7945	10489	17122	18461	21634	26848	22641	18274	12988
Portugal	39	143	276	765	357	839	1925	1668	1492	891
Spain	182	230	-255	-259	-218	2973	5303	4364	4418	3024
Sweden	8365	10773	10105	15409	13520	14501	15848	8999	7422	3200
Switzerland	13128	16193	23432	27951	30661	33093	34182	25954	19938	13796
UK	10358	8954	10507	23461	25825	22013	21525	14852	10863	4971
Total, Western Europe	2957	4258	4433	8164	10089	11392	12425	9612	8369	2471
EU members ^a	3323	5348	5501	11090	14295	10193	11504	9051	7935	2256
Other Western Europe ^a	2395	2689	2999	2908	2799	22448	20325	23927	18664	13316

Table 5 (continued): Gross subsidy equivalents of assistance to farmers, total, per farm worker and by product, Western European countries,^a 1956 to 2007

(c) by product (constant 2000 \$US millions)

	1956-59	1960-64	1965-69	1970-74	1975-79	1980-84	1985-89	1990-94	1995-99	2000-04	2005-07
Barley	1649	2866	3627	2072	5456	1707	6532	6361	1621	120	50
Beef	2529	7192	7950	7914	6252	13145	19075	16169	12144	9877	6177
Egg	-604	-817	-534	-893	1808	1436	1673	1037	571	130	123
Maize	57	557	1323	1396	2715	2204	3589	3297	1394	1036	1020
Milk	20793	23917	28101	31074	45150	41790	37896	32811	22919	15418	2822
Oat	405	1229	1611	1081	2027	229	812	849	335	144	70
Oilseed	83	23	27	29	84	66	2833	1899	44	32	41
Pigmeat	3936	8899	14823	14400	15941	15699	7011	4732	5175	5401	4051
Potato	2653	2804	2841	2518	5846	2802	1127	1221	912	465	735
Poultry	1863	1973	1987	3229	3717	4060	4337	5687	4492	3424	4042
Rice	-246	-267	-62	-578	-126	-104	529	598	220	84	12
Sheepmeat	1194	1562	1997	3195	5274	4064	3163	2581	1432	1087	1458
Soybean	0	0	na	-2	2	1	571	337	0	0	0
Sugar	2354	2433	4151	-518	4772	4087	5091	4807	4229	3232	1351
Tomato	44	387	710	1046	1539	1345	887	356	44	75	0
Wheat	1706	4943	6559	-1229	304	6465	9849	9114	2039	546	126
Wine	-1630	-998	568	681	664	847	399	1707	721	240	267
Wool	na	na	na	na	26	2	18	16	11	8	9
Total, Western Europe	36784	56703	75678	65415	101451	99844	105391	93581	58303	41319	21916
EU members ^a	19158	36948	55749	47291	88543	88805	84016	77079	53218	37773	19033
Other Western Europe ^a	17626	19755	19929	18124	12908	11038	21375	16502	5086	3546	2883

Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) based on author's spreadsheet.

^aThe EU is the original six countries to 1972, then 9 to 1985, then 12 to 1994, then 15 to 2004, then 27 thereafter. The EFTA countries are the original 7 to 1970, then 8 with Iceland to 1972, then 6 from 1973 (when the UK and Denmark joined the EEC) to 1985, then 5 from 1986 (when Portugal joined the EC) to 1994, then 3 after Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU in 1995. For 2005-07, the 'EU members' and 'Total Western Europe' aggregates also include the most recent 12 that joined the EU in May 2004 and January 2007.

Table 6: Consumer tax equivalents of policies assisting farmers, covered products, total and per capita and by product, Western European countries, ^a 1956 to 2007

(a) Aggregate CTE by country (percent)

	1956-59	1960-64	1965-69	1970-74	1975-79	1980-84	1985-89	1990-94	1995-99	2000-04	2005-07
Austria	74	88	77	22	24	22	63	88	39	35	17
Denmark	42	44	39	41	95	79	70	48	38	32	12
Finland	113	123	132	91	93	45	202	201	46	40	17
France	49	52	75	50	54	76	61	45	34	30	15
Germany	65	95	107	67	67	82	59	41	35	30	13
Iceland	na	na	na	na	42	72	272	210	117	95	104
Ireland	25	38	45	43	125	126	115	73	56	46	20
Italy	5	33	52	35	37	58	46	35	29	26	10
Netherlands	52	89	118	82	96	111	83	56	47	38	18
Norway	272	282	285	276	230	70	93	116	114	111	85
Portugal	-1	11	18	11	34	21	37	33	25	24	16
Spain	19	20	19	-4	0	5	36	30	24	21	13
Sweden	104	106	134	76	108	90	124	109	46	44	23
Switzerland	275	271	261	253	223	97	245	215	143	144	83
UK	69	65	46	34	71	89	77	54	44	40	22
Total, Western Europe	53	65	74	49	59	70	65	49	37	33	17
EU members ^a	42	62	80	54	60	78	59	42	34	30	15
Other Western Europe ^a	72	70	62	39	51	37	119	141	133	131	84

Table 6 (continued): Consumer tax equivalents of policies assisting farmers, covered products, total and per capita and by product, Western European countries,^a 1956 to 2007

(b) Total CTE per capita (constant 2000 US\$)

	1960-64	1965-69	1970-74	1975-79	1980-84	1985-89	1990-94	1995-99	2000-04	2005-07
Austria	95	95	26	54	44	1026	354	145	108	46
Denmark	220	211	276	624	498	343	299	221	165	55
Finland	291	353	327	413	181	699	665	717	525	207
France	246	353	283	380	367	259	229	159	115	55
Germany	235	311	261	362	330	211	157	110	82	33
Iceland	na	na	na	1070	969	937	465	310	277	379
Ireland	94	114	252	792	696	495	435	299	221	65
Italy	125	218	165	226	243	178	162	117	87	33
Netherlands	228	322	290	439	408	271	245	188	129	48
Norway	319	367	446	593	333	374	447	326	241	226
Portugal	19	41	29	121	58	107	134	105	84	48
Spain	32	34	-29	0	6	146	150	108	89	56
Sweden	256	346	254	457	311	303	284	138	119	52
Switzerland	708	704	843	790	627	820	792	486	354	266
UK	185	135	136	302	272	188	157	111	86	41
Total, Western Europe	162	205	198	306	276	226	207	138	103	46
EU members ^a	161	232	240	339	319	209	178	128	96	41
Other Western Europe ^a	165	156	119	193	128	293	488	422	310	254

Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) based on author's spreadsheet.

^aThe EU is the original six countries to 1972, then 9 to 1985, then 12 to 1994, then 15 to 2004, then 27 thereafter. The EFTA countries are the original 7 to 1970, then 8 with Iceland to 1972, then 6 from 1973 (when the UK and Denmark joined the EEC) to 1985, then 5 from 1986 (when Portugal joined the EC) to 1994, then 3 after Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU in 1995. For 2005-07, the 'EU members' and 'Total Western Europe' aggregates also include the most recent 12 that joined the EU in May 2004 and January 2007.

Appendix:

Annual estimates of rates of assistance, Western European countries, 1956 to 2007

Compiled with the assistance of Uli Kleinwechter and Teresa Rojas Lara of Humboldt University and, at the University of Adelaide, Kym Anderson, Johanna Croser, Esteban Jara, Signe Nelgen and Ernesto Valenzuela

Appendix Figure 1: Agriculture's shares of national GDP and employment, Western European countries, 2003-05

Source: World Bank (2007)

Appendix Figure 2: Increase in farm and non-farm output per person, Western European countries, 1949 to 1959

Source: Ingersent and Rayner (1999)

Appendix Figure 3: Agricultural productivity growth and farm employment decline, Western European countries, 1955 to 1970

(a) Agricultural productivity growth (1952-56 = 100)

(b) Farm employment (1955 = 100)

Source: OECD (2005)

Appendix Figure 4: Producer prices of wheat and beef , EU-9 members, 1956 to 1972
(ECU per ton)

(a) Wheat

(b) Beef

Source: EUROSTAT (2006)

Appendix Figure 5: Producer prices of wheat, Portugal, Spain and EU-9, 1956 to 1985
(ECU per ton)

Source: EUROSTAT (2006)

Appendix Figure 6: Producer prices of wheat, Austria, Finland, Sweden and EU-12, 1956 to 1993

(ECU per ton)

Source: EUROSTAT (2006)

Appendix Figure 7: Value of market price support and total farm support, European Union, 1986 to 2004

(million ECU)

Source: Author's calculations based on OECD (2006)

Appendix Figure 8: Share of market price support in total farm support, European Union, 1986 to 2004

(percent)

Source: Author's calculations based on OECD (2006)

Appendix Table 1: Annual distortion estimates, **Austria**, 1956 to 2007

(a) Nominal rates of assistance to covered products

(percent)

	Barl ey	Bee f	Egg	Mai ze	Mil k	Oat	Pig mea t	Pota to	Pou ltry	Rap esee d	She epm eat	Sug ar	Sun flo wer	Wh eat	Win e	All cov ered
1956	48	na	na	110	na	47	na	0	na	53	na	179	53	44	0	31
1957	81	na	na	170	na	65	na	0	na	55	na	98	55	59	0	33
1958	97	na	na	211	na	68	na	0	na	55	na	177	55	59	0	39
1959	88	na	na	184	na	81	na	0	na	47	na	220	47	58	0	44
1960	87	na	na	179	na	66	na	0	na	45	na	220	45	62	0	47
1961	122	na	na	256	na	108	na	0	na	41	na	248	41	64	0	55
1962	101	na	na	116	na	97	na	0	na	40	na	240	40	109	0	57
1963	99	na	na	95	na	94	na	0	na	38	na	24	38	102	0	44
1964	98	na	na	106	na	119	na	0	na	37	na	92	37	103	0	51
1965	98	na	na	113	na	121	na	0	na	34	na	432	49	120	0	68
1966	82	na	na	92	na	98	na	0	na	32	na	471	47	87	0	60
1967	91	na	na	93	na	94	na	0	na	33	na	325	48	77	0	52
1968	104	na	na	96	na	87	na	0	na	34	na	200	50	73	0	48
1969	66	na	na	87	na	80	na	0	na	32	na	162	47	74	0	47
1970	70	na	na	66	na	83	na	0	na	31	na	97	46	37	0	35
1971	93	na	na	68	na	61	na	0	na	29	na	58	43	59	0	43
1972	42	na	na	103	na	54	na	0	na	27	na	40	39	9	0	26
1973	6	na	na	27	na	14	na	0	na	19	na	-14	28	-28	0	-3
1974	4	na	na	-2	na	12	na	0	na	15	na	-52	23	-23	0	-13
1975	25	na	na	17	na	33	na	0	na	18	na	12	24	-9	0	8
1976	17	na	na	25	na	9	na	0	na	19	na	81	25	-19	0	6
1977	67	na	na	66	na	38	na	0	na	16	na	205	27	-22	0	26
1978	66	na	na	79	na	89	na	0	na	19	na	212	30	21	0	42
1979	83	na	na	62	na	99	na	0	na	19	na	50	28	41	0	41
1980	21	na	na	54	na	-23	na	0	na	19	na	-10	31	49	0	19
1981	7	na	na	30	na	0	na	0	na	16	na	47	23	44	0	20
1982	8	na	na	56	na	30	na	0	na	16	na	124	22	60	0	32
1983	36	na	na	25	na	8	na	0	na	16	na	182	21	44	0	31
1984	10	na	na	7	na	5	na	0	na	10	na	230	14	48	0	22
1985	31	na	na	25	na	15	na	0	na	12	na	251	16	72	0	40
1986	203	70	12	32	128	134	23	0	5	23	0	332	24	70	0	62
1987	323	51	3	75	91	109	41	0	-1	34	0	302	28	136	0	66
1988	137	78	58	41	78	40	28	0	58	25	10	275	21	115	0	64
1989	82	85	76	24	71	49	8	0	97	47	23	206	47	29	0	47
1990	153	94	56	67	129	108	19	0	79	94	19	143	62	109	0	70
1991	179	93	61	61	129	96	33	0	67	85	15	191	49	201	0	79
1992	166	105	68	113	144	104	27	0	77	82	14	219	58	171	0	85
1993	206	113	79	33	151	96	75	0	65	50	14	208	32	114	0	96
1994	176	124	104	103	157	101	53	0	71	78	16	194	50	170	0	98
1995	41	69	12	53	79	40	16	15	129	0	77	119	0	16	4	43
1996	2	68	5	14	70	34	16	14	77	0	45	140	0	0	4	35
1997	7	117	1	19	78	25	13	12	55	0	27	147	0	0	5	38
1998	64	121	11	32	100	50	22	11	51	0	38	186	0	26	3	53
1999	44	125	16	39	106	84	57	11	90	0	37	245	0	37	2	66
2000	3	113	3	27	57	59	32	10	57	1	26	176	0	11	2	43
2001	0	140	0	14	40	29	24	10	52	0	48	138	0	4	2	34
2002	0	157	0	9	75	0	24	10	56	0	35	161	0	0	2	44
2003	1	157	0	34	70	1	33	10	54	0	46	240	0	2	2	48
2004	1	92	0	39	62	23	27	10	101	0	33	238	0	2	1	40
2005	0	109	0	19	33	24	19	10	69	0	54	168	0	0	2	24
2006	0	81	0	19	25	0	14	10	69	0	74	66	0	0	1	20
2007	0	71	0	23	0	0	18	10	100	0	68	99	0	0	1	15

Appendix Table 1 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **Austria**, 1956 to 2007
 (b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all^a agricultural products, to exportable^b
 and import-competing^b agricultural industries, and relative^c to non-agricultural
 industries (percent)

	NRA, all agric products, ^a by component					NRA, agric tradables			NRA, all non-ag tradable goods (9)	RRA ^b (10)
	NRA, covered products (1)	NRA, non-covered products (2)	NRA, non-product-specific support (3)	NRA, all ag products (incl NPS and decoupled) (4)=1+2+3 (5)	NRA, all ag products (incl NPS and decoupled) (5)	NRA, ag exportables (6)	NRA, ag import-competing (7)	NRA, all agric tradable goods ^c (8)=6+7		
1956	31	4	na	21	21	0	26	21	3	17
1957	33	5	na	23	23	0	30	23	3	20
1958	39	5	na	26	26	0	34	26	3	22
1959	44	6	na	29	29	0	40	29	4	24
1960	47	6	na	31	31	0	40	31	4	26
1961	55	6	na	35	35	0	47	35	4	29
1962	57	7	na	37	37	0	49	37	4	32
1963	44	6	na	29	29	0	39	29	4	24
1964	51	7	na	33	33	0	49	33	4	28
1965	68	8	na	42	42	0	60	42	4	37
1966	60	8	na	39	39	0	54	39	4	34
1967	52	8	na	35	35	0	50	35	4	30
1968	48	7	na	32	32	0	47	32	4	27
1969	47	7	na	31	31	0	45	31	3	27
1970	35	5	na	24	24	0	35	24	3	20
1971	43	6	na	29	29	0	40	29	3	25
1972	26	4	na	18	18	0	25	18	3	15
1973	-3	0	na	-2	-2	0	-3	-2	3	-4
1974	-13	-2	na	-10	-10	0	-12	-10	2	-11
1975	8	1	na	6	6	0	8	6	2	4
1976	6	1	na	4	4	0	6	4	1	3
1977	26	4	na	18	18	0	24	18	1	17
1978	42	7	na	28	28	0	40	28	1	27
1979	41	6	na	27	27	0	38	27	1	26
1980	19	3	na	13	13	0	17	13	1	12
1981	20	3	na	13	13	0	18	13	1	13
1982	32	5	na	23	23	0	32	23	1	22
1983	31	5	na	22	22	0	30	22	1	21
1984	22	4	na	16	16	0	21	16	1	15
1985	40	5	na	27	27	0	35	27	1	26
1986	62	14	1	55	55	56	50	55	1	55
1987	66	17	1	59	59	69	42	59	1	58
1988	64	11	1	64	64	61	78	64	1	63
1989	47	6	1	40	40	39	39	40	1	39
1990	70	9	2	57	57	56	56	57	1	57
1991	79	11	2	67	67	68	52	67	1	66
1992	85	9	4	71	71	46	92	71	1	70
1993	96	10	3	81	81	67	94	81	1	80
1994	98	0	4	80	80	76	124	80	1	79
1995	43	0	5	38	55	4	46	38	1	37
1996	35	16	4	34	50	10	38	34	1	33
1997	38	21	4	39	55	13	42	39	1	38
1998	53	30	4	52	68	21	57	52	1	51
1999	66	37	4	63	81	24	72	63	1	62
2000	43	23	3	42	59	11	50	42	1	41
2001	34	18	4	34	51	8	39	34	1	33
2002	44	23	5	44	61	10	51	44	1	43
2003	48	25	5	47	67	10	56	47	1	46
2004	40	21	4	40	58	7	49	40	1	39
2005	24	11	4	22	41	1	34	22	1	21
2006	20	10	4	19	40	1	28	19	1	18
2007	15	7	4	16	34	0	22	16	1	15

- a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and via inputs and other forms of non-product-specific (NPS) assistance without and (in column (5)) with decoupled support.
- b. The Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA) is defined as $100 * [(100 + \text{NRA}_{\text{ag}}^t) / (100 + \text{NRA}_{\text{nonag}}^t) - 1]$, where NRA_{ag}^t and $\text{NRA}_{\text{nonag}}^t$ are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors (columns 8 and 9), respectively, so it excludes decoupled payments but includes all NPS support.
- c. Including NPS but excluding decoupled payments, so more than the weighted average of columns (6) and (7).

Appendix Table 1 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **Austria**, 1956 to 2007
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered^a and non-covered products (percent)

	Barl ey	Bee f	Egg	Mai ze	Mil k	Oat	Pig mea t	Pota to	Poul try	Rap esee d	She epm eat	Sug ar	Sun flow er	Wh eat	Win e	Non - cov ered
1956	8	na	na	2	na	8	na	29	na	0	na	2	0	12	1	38
1957	6	na	na	2	na	6	na	31	na	0	na	4	0	10	5	36
1958	6	na	na	1	na	6	na	30	na	0	na	3	0	11	5	38
1959	5	na	na	2	na	6	na	25	na	0	na	3	0	11	8	40
1960	8	na	na	2	na	6	na	27	na	0	na	3	0	12	3	39
1961	7	na	na	2	na	5	na	24	na	0	na	2	0	14	5	41
1962	8	na	na	3	na	5	na	26	na	0	na	2	0	11	4	40
1963	8	na	na	3	na	5	na	21	na	0	na	8	0	9	7	39
1964	8	na	na	3	na	4	na	18	na	0	na	5	0	10	12	40
1965	9	na	na	5	na	4	na	19	na	1	na	2	0	11	8	43
1966	10	na	na	4	na	4	na	19	na	1	na	2	0	13	7	41
1967	9	na	na	4	na	4	na	17	na	1	na	2	0	14	12	39
1968	8	na	na	4	na	4	na	18	na	0	na	2	0	13	12	39
1969	11	na	na	8	na	3	na	15	na	0	na	3	0	11	11	38
1970	10	na	na	7	na	3	na	14	na	0	na	3	0	12	14	37
1971	10	na	na	8	na	3	na	15	na	0	na	4	0	12	9	38
1972	12	na	na	6	na	3	na	12	na	0	na	5	0	14	11	36
1973	12	na	na	10	na	3	na	10	na	0	na	7	0	16	7	34
1974	13	na	na	10	na	3	na	9	na	0	na	12	0	16	5	32
1975	10	na	na	11	na	3	na	9	na	0	na	8	0	14	8	37
1976	13	na	na	9	na	3	na	8	na	0	na	4	0	20	8	34
1977	10	na	na	10	na	3	na	8	na	0	na	3	0	20	8	38
1978	12	na	na	10	na	2	na	9	na	0	na	2	0	14	10	40
1979	9	na	na	13	na	2	na	11	na	0	na	5	0	10	9	41
1980	15	na	na	10	na	5	na	7	na	0	na	8	0	10	8	37
1981	15	na	na	14	na	4	na	7	na	0	na	6	0	10	6	38
1982	16	na	na	13	na	3	na	5	na	0	na	4	0	10	12	36
1983	14	na	na	16	na	4	na	6	na	0	na	3	0	14	9	34
1984	16	na	na	17	na	3	na	7	na	0	na	2	0	14	6	34
1985	14	na	na	18	na	3	na	6	na	0	na	2	0	13	4	38
1986	3	16	4	9	16	1	20	3	4	0	0	1	0	7	3	15
1987	2	17	4	7	19	1	19	2	4	0	0	1	0	5	3	16
1988	0	18	3	11	25	0	25	0	3	0	1	1	0	8	1	2
1989	4	12	2	7	17	1	20	2	2	1	0	1	0	7	4	19
1990	4	12	2	6	13	1	19	3	2	1	0	1	0	5	7	24
1991	3	14	3	6	15	1	20	3	3	1	1	1	0	3	6	21
1992	3	12	2	3	15	1	22	2	3	1	1	1	0	4	5	24
1993	2	14	3	8	17	1	17	2	4	1	1	2	1	4	3	21
1994	3	12	2	3	17	1	19	3	3	2	1	1	1	4	6	22
1995	3	10	2	5	17	0	20	4	1	2	0	2	0	5	6	22
1996	4	9	3	6	16	0	22	2	2	1	0	2	0	5	5	22
1997	4	7	3	5	16	1	25	2	2	1	1	2	0	5	5	23
1998	3	8	2	5	17	0	20	3	2	1	1	2	1	4	8	23
1999	3	8	2	5	18	0	16	4	2	1	1	2	1	4	9	23
2000	3	8	2	5	21	0	19	2	2	1	1	1	0	4	8	22
2001	3	6	2	5	21	0	22	2	2	1	1	2	0	5	6	22
2002	3	6	3	6	18	0	21	2	2	1	1	2	1	5	6	23
2003	3	6	3	5	19	0	20	2	2	1	1	1	1	5	7	24
2004	3	7	2	4	19	0	19	3	2	1	1	1	1	6	7	23
2005	4	6	4	6	7	0	21	3	2	1	1	1	1	7	12	24
2006	4	8	3	6	8	1	20	4	1	1	1	2	1	7	10	24
2007	5	7	2	7	15	1	15	3	1	1	1	1	1	9	9	24

Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on author's spreadsheet a. At undistorted prices

Appendix Table 1 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **Austria**, 1956 to 2007
(d) Trade status of covered products^a

[illegible]

	Sheep meat	Sugar	Sunflo wer	Wheat	Wine	Wool
1956	na	M	X	M	X	na
1957	na	M	X	M	X	na
1958	na	M	X	M	X	na
1959	na	M	X	M	X	na
1960	na	M	X	M	X	na
1961	na	M	X	M	X	na
1962	na	M	X	M	X	na
1963	na	M	X	M	X	na
1964	na	M	X	M	X	na
1965	na	M	X	M	X	na
1966	na	M	X	M	X	na
1967	na	M	X	M	X	na
1968	na	M	X	M	X	na
1969	na	M	X	M	X	na
1970	na	M	X	M	X	na
1971	na	M	X	M	X	na
1972	na	M	X	M	X	na
1973	na	M	X	M	X	na
1974	na	M	X	M	X	na
1975	na	M	X	M	X	na
1976	na	M	X	M	X	na
1977	na	M	X	M	X	na
1978	na	M	X	M	X	na
1979	na	M	X	M	X	na
1980	na	M	X	M	X	na
1981	na	M	X	M	X	na
1982	na	M	X	M	X	na
1983	na	M	X	M	X	na
1984	na	M	X	M	X	na
1985	na	M	X	M	X	na
1986	M	M	X	X	X	M
1987	M	X	X	X	X	M
1988	M	M	X	X	X	M
1989	M	X	X	X	X	M
1990	M	M	X	X	X	M
1991	M	X	X	X	X	M
1992	M	M	X	X	X	M
1993	M	X	X	X	X	M
1994	M	M	X	X	X	M
1995	M	M	M	M	X	na
1996	M	M	M	X	X	na
1997	M	M	M	X	X	na
1998	M	M	M	X	X	na
1999	M	M	M	X	X	na
2000	M	M	M	X	X	na
2001	M	M	M	X	X	na
2002	M	M	M	X	X	na
2003	M	M	M	X	X	na
2004	M	M	M	X	X	na
2005	M	M	M	X	X	na
2006	M	M	M	X	X	na
2007	M	M	M	X	X	na

a. Exportables (X), import-competing products (M) and nontradables (H).
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on author's spreadsheet

Appendix Table 2: Annual distortion estimates, **Denmark**, 1956 to 2007

(a) Nominal rates of assistance to covered products

(percent)

	Barle y	Beef	Egg	Milk	Oat	Pigm eat	Potat o	Poult ry	Rape seed	Shee pmea t	Suga r	Tom ato	Whe at	All cove red
1956	-4	-3	-8	157	-12	39	-24	8	5	na	135	na	-3	30
1957	7	-9	-4	174	-13	23	-6	6	5	na	43	na	1	29
1958	38	-13	8	96	6	22	52	11	5	na	102	na	3	34
1959	26	-9	-19	199	-32	22	88	-4	5	na	138	na	0	42
1960	9	2	-15	127	-12	15	-32	-5	5	na	120	na	-1	22
1961	49	-9	-15	202	17	22	47	-13	4	na	150	na	-1	41
1962	-1	1	-9	240	-8	68	124	-29	4	na	184	na	25	52
1963	5	-6	-6	210	-3	57	40	-17	4	na	-3	na	19	42
1964	-1	-27	5	146	4	53	30	-26	4	na	42	na	13	34
1965	-2	-39	6	173	3	73	86	-25	3	na	301	na	14	40
1966	1	-39	-1	162	4	90	49	-23	3	na	388	na	6	43
1967	5	-38	1	175	2	88	67	-43	3	na	249	na	6	44
1968	19	-35	7	177	3	84	43	-39	3	na	177	na	12	46
1969	17	-32	-9	163	19	88	167	-36	3	na	161	na	7	45
1970	6	-30	-6	257	9	28	94	-21	3	na	99	na	6	37
1971	26	-32	-10	263	0	37	20	15	3	na	50	na	29	46
1972	12	-14	-8	232	-3	27	43	-15	3	na	37	na	0	37
1973	-7	34	-17	208	0	106	57	74	0	322	-30	22	-30	49
1974	3	-4	30	210	7	69	18	54	0	255	-51	22	-23	33
1975	23	11	16	264	23	65	49	60	0	267	28	22	-9	58
1976	20	26	5	366	10	122	327	69	0	342	99	22	-16	85
1977	56	11	41	598	35	65	71	61	0	281	230	22	-21	83
1978	49	11	13	488	74	78	-15	49	0	263	230	22	23	84
1979	75	0	41	440	80	109	17	38	0	230	70	22	35	91
1980	17	-1	22	434	-27	71	7	37	0	207	13	22	45	58
1981	7	23	2	330	-2	148	73	72	0	183	74	11	44	80
1982	8	49	18	313	22	125	95	99	0	181	152	31	51	81
1983	32	264	40	287	-1	129	87	73	0	203	196	19	28	116
1984	6	265	3	311	8	81	-24	95	0	172	268	26	20	74
1985	18	293	8	282	-6	22	11	91	0	95	297	26	31	65
1986	157	188	31	361	83	40	17	79	153	134	247	17	119	120
1987	233	107	21	533	77	11	17	90	145	211	301	15	143	106
1988	85	80	21	192	14	34	17	69	112	215	201	15	94	82
1989	45	79	29	84	15	14	17	66	140	167	90	0	31	45
1990	94	98	12	125	48	7	16	100	200	154	109	2	57	58
1991	119	157	13	128	39	20	16	83	97	128	191	0	146	73
1992	103	93	15	118	63	0	17	118	0	112	212	0	65	42
1993	105	63	10	123	44	18	17	110	0	38	169	8	58	54
1994	100	53	0	117	43	18	16	114	0	55	129	11	48	49
1995	41	69	12	79	40	16	15	129	0	77	119	0	16	37
1996	2	68	5	70	34	16	14	77	0	45	140	2	0	27
1997	7	117	1	78	25	13	12	55	0	27	147	0	0	29
1998	64	121	11	100	50	22	11	51	0	38	186	0	26	48
1999	44	125	16	106	84	57	11	90	0	37	245	0	37	66
2000	3	113	3	57	59	32	10	57	1	26	176	0	11	37
2001	0	140	0	40	29	24	10	52	0	48	138	0	4	28
2002	0	157	0	75	0	24	10	56	0	35	161	0	0	35
2003	1	157	0	70	1	33	10	54	0	46	240	2	2	37
2004	1	92	0	62	23	27	10	101	0	33	238	2	2	33
2005	0	109	0	33	24	19	10	69	0	54	168	0	0	18
2006	0	86	0	24	0	15	10	69	0	74	62	0	0	14
2007	0	66	0	0	0	17	10	100	0	68	99	0	0	11

Appendix Table 2 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **Denmark**, 1956 to 2007

(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all^a agricultural products, to exportable^b and import-competing^b agricultural industries, and relative^c to non-agricultural industries (percent)

	NRA, all agric products, ^a by component					NRA, agric tradables			NRA, all non-ag tradable goods (9)	RRA ^b (10)
	NRA, covered products (1)	NRA, non-covered products (2)	NRA, non-product-specific support (3)	NRA, all ag products (incl NPS and decoupled) (4)=1+2+3 (5)	NRA, all ag products (incl NPS and decoupled) (5)	NRA, ag exportables (6)	NRA, ag import-competing (7)	NRA, all agric tradable goods ^c (8)=6+7		
1956	30	10	na	26	26	41	-5	26	1	24
1957	29	10	na	25	25	36	1	25	1	23
1958	34	16	na	30	30	34	22	30	2	28
1959	42	16	na	36	36	46	10	36	2	33
1960	22	8	na	19	19	25	3	19	2	17
1961	41	20	na	36	36	40	29	36	2	34
1962	52	19	na	44	44	67	1	44	2	41
1963	42	15	na	36	36	51	4	36	2	33
1964	34	12	na	29	29	43	1	29	2	27
1965	40	15	na	34	34	54	0	34	1	32
1966	43	16	na	37	37	57	2	37	1	35
1967	44	17	na	37	37	56	4	37	1	36
1968	46	19	na	40	40	55	13	40	1	38
1969	45	20	na	39	39	56	14	39	1	38
1970	37	15	na	32	32	48	5	32	1	30
1971	46	20	na	40	40	53	19	40	1	39
1972	37	16	na	32	32	50	8	32	1	31
1973	49	33	na	46	46	10	66	46	1	45
1974	33	30	na	33	33	17	41	33	1	32
1975	58	45	na	55	55	40	62	55	1	54
1976	85	60	na	79	79	93	77	79	1	78
1977	83	65	na	79	79	73	82	79	1	78
1978	84	64	na	80	80	67	86	80	0	79
1979	91	68	12	98	99	86	86	98	0	97
1980	58	57	12	70	72	42	66	70	0	69
1981	80	58	10	85	86	32	100	85	0	84
1982	81	58	9	85	88	31	104	85	0	85
1983	116	63	9	112	115	49	128	112	0	111
1984	74	44	8	76	78	24	91	76	0	75
1985	65	44	10	70	73	37	70	70	0	69
1986	120	70	3	112	114	97	110	112	0	111
1987	106	75	3	102	105	120	96	102	0	101
1988	82	47	3	77	80	64	75	77	0	76
1989	45	22	3	43	46	29	42	43	0	42
1990	58	29	4	55	58	40	52	55	0	54
1991	73	38	5	70	74	51	66	70	1	69
1992	42	27	5	43	51	38	39	43	0	42
1993	54	31	5	54	66	37	51	54	0	53
1994	49	28	4	49	63	39	45	49	0	48
1995	37	19	5	37	54	25	34	37	0	37
1996	27	14	4	28	44	7	33	28	0	27
1997	29	16	4	30	46	9	33	30	0	29
1998	48	25	4	46	63	26	47	46	0	45
1999	66	33	4	62	79	32	66	62	0	61
2000	37	18	3	36	54	11	43	36	0	35
2001	28	14	4	28	45	7	31	28	0	28
2002	35	18	5	36	53	9	41	36	0	35
2003	37	19	5	38	57	8	45	38	0	37
2004	33	16	4	33	51	7	39	33	0	32
2005	18	9	4	18	37	0	25	18	0	17
2006	14	7	4	15	37	0	20	15	0	15
2007	11	6	4	13	31	0	18	13	0	12

- a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and via inputs and other forms of non-product-specific (NPS) assistance without and (in column (5)) with decoupled support.
- b. The Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA) is defined as $100 * [(100 + \text{NRA}_{\text{ag}}^t) / (100 + \text{NRA}_{\text{nonag}}^t) - 1]$, where NRA_{ag}^t and $\text{NRA}_{\text{nonag}}^t$ are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors (columns 8 and 9), respectively, so it excludes decoupled payments but includes all NPS support.
- c. Including NPS but excluding decoupled payments, so more than the weighted average of columns (6) and (7).

Appendix Table 2 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **Denmark**, 1956 to 2007
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered^a and non-covered products,
(percent)

	Barle y	Beef	Egg	Milk	Oat	Pigm eat	Potat o	Poult ry	Rape seed	Shee pmea t	Suga r	Tom ato	Whe at	Non- cover ed
1956	15	6	8	11	6	21	6	1	0	na	1	na	2	23
1957	14	7	7	10	5	23	5	1	0	na	3	na	2	23
1958	13	7	6	12	4	25	4	2	0	na	2	na	2	22
1959	12	7	7	11	3	27	4	2	0	na	1	na	2	23
1960	13	7	6	11	4	27	6	2	0	na	1	na	2	22
1961	12	8	7	9	3	28	3	3	0	na	1	na	3	23
1962	17	9	5	8	3	22	3	3	1	na	1	na	3	24
1963	15	10	5	9	3	23	3	3	0	na	3	na	2	24
1964	17	9	3	10	3	24	2	3	1	na	2	na	2	23
1965	19	11	4	9	3	22	2	3	1	na	1	na	3	23
1966	19	12	4	10	4	21	2	3	0	na	1	na	2	24
1967	18	12	4	9	4	21	2	3	1	na	1	na	2	24
1968	19	12	4	9	4	21	2	3	0	na	1	na	2	23
1969	23	12	4	9	3	19	1	3	0	na	1	na	2	23
1970	22	11	4	8	3	20	2	3	0	na	1	na	3	23
1971	21	11	3	9	3	21	2	2	1	na	2	na	3	23
1972	26	8	3	9	3	19	1	2	1	na	2	na	4	23
1973	25	9	3	8	2	19	2	2	1	0	3	0	4	22
1974	25	13	1	8	2	16	2	2	1	0	5	0	4	20
1975	20	14	2	9	1	21	2	2	2	0	3	0	3	21
1976	23	15	2	8	1	18	1	2	1	0	2	0	4	22
1977	20	16	2	5	1	22	2	3	1	0	1	0	4	22
1978	22	16	2	6	1	21	2	3	1	0	1	0	3	22
1979	20	18	2	7	0	19	2	3	1	0	3	0	3	22
1980	23	16	2	6	1	21	2	2	1	0	4	0	2	20
1981	26	13	2	8	1	17	2	2	2	0	2	0	3	22
1982	28	10	2	8	1	16	2	2	3	0	2	0	4	22
1983	19	5	2	11	0	21	2	3	3	0	1	0	7	25
1984	24	4	2	8	1	19	3	2	5	0	1	0	9	23
1985	18	4	2	8	1	29	2	2	5	0	1	0	6	22
1986	10	6	2	9	0	32	3	2	4	0	1	0	6	24
1987	7	9	2	6	0	38	3	2	3	0	1	0	6	23
1988	12	8	1	12	1	27	3	2	3	0	1	0	5	24
1989	10	6	1	15	0	29	3	2	3	0	2	0	8	22
1990	8	5	1	12	0	32	3	2	3	0	2	0	8	23
1991	8	4	1	13	0	33	4	2	3	0	1	0	6	25
1992	4	5	1	12	0	41	3	2	1	0	1	0	7	23
1993	5	7	1	13	0	34	2	2	2	0	1	0	9	23
1994	5	6	2	13	0	34	4	2	2	0	2	0	7	23
1995	7	5	1	14	0	31	5	1	1	0	1	0	10	23
1996	8	4	1	14	0	32	2	2	1	0	1	0	12	22
1997	7	3	1	13	0	35	2	2	1	0	1	0	11	23
1998	5	4	1	15	0	31	4	3	2	0	1	0	10	24
1999	7	4	1	16	0	26	5	2	2	0	1	0	9	26
2000	8	3	1	17	0	30	2	2	1	0	1	0	9	23
2001	7	2	1	16	0	34	3	2	1	0	1	0	8	23
2002	8	3	1	15	1	33	3	3	1	0	1	0	8	24
2003	7	3	2	15	0	30	3	2	2	0	1	0	10	25
2004	6	3	1	16	0	31	4	2	2	0	1	0	10	24
2005	9	2	2	3	0	41	3	2	2	0	0	0	11	24
2006	7	2	1	3	1	40	4	2	2	0	1	0	12	24
2007	10	2	1	10	1	29	4	2	3	0	0	0	14	24

a. At farmgate undistorted prices

Appendix Table 2 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **Denmark**, 1956 to 2007
 (d) Trade status of covered products^a

	Barle y	Beef	Egg	Milk	Oat	Pigm eat	Potat o	Poult ry	Rape seed	Shee pmea t	Sugar	Toma to	Whea t
1956	M	X	X	X	M	X	X	X	X	na	X	na	M
1957	M	X	X	X	M	X	X	X	X	na	X	na	M
1958	M	X	X	X	M	X	X	X	X	na	X	na	M
1959	M	X	X	X	M	X	X	X	X	na	X	na	M
1960	M	X	X	X	M	X	X	X	X	na	X	na	M
1961	M	X	X	X	M	X	X	X	X	na	X	na	M
1962	M	X	X	X	M	X	X	X	X	na	X	na	M
1963	M	X	X	X	M	X	X	X	X	na	X	na	M
1964	M	X	X	X	M	X	X	X	X	na	X	na	M
1965	M	X	X	X	M	X	X	X	X	na	X	na	M
1966	M	X	X	X	M	X	X	X	X	na	X	na	M
1967	M	X	X	X	M	X	X	X	X	na	X	na	M
1968	M	X	X	X	M	X	X	X	X	na	X	na	M
1969	M	X	X	X	M	X	X	X	X	na	X	na	M
1970	M	X	X	X	M	X	X	X	X	na	X	na	M
1971	M	X	X	X	M	X	X	X	X	na	X	na	M
1972	M	X	X	X	M	X	X	X	X	na	X	na	M
1973	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1974	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1975	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1976	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1977	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1978	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1979	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1980	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1981	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1982	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1983	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1984	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1985	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1986	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1987	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1988	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1989	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M
1990	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M
1991	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M
1992	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	M
1993	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	M
1994	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M
1995	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M
1996	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X
1997	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X
1998	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X
1999	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X
2000	X	M	X	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X
2001	X	M	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	X
2002	X	M	X	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X
2003	X	M	X	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X
2004	X	M	X	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X
2005	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X
2006	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X
2007	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X

a. Exportables (X), import-competing products (M) and nontradables (H).

Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on author's spreadsheet

Appendix Table 3: Annual distortion estimates, **Finland**, 1956 to 2007

(a) Nominal rates of assistance to covered products

(percent)

	Barle y	Beef	Egg	Milk	Oat	Pigm eat	Potat o	Poult ry	Shee pmea t	Sugar	Whea t	All cover ed
1956	77	109	na	163	62	57	15	na	na	194	20	83
1957	103	109	na	213	75	57	15	na	na	129	28	103
1958	126	109	na	138	93	57	15	na	na	184	38	94
1959	108	109	na	178	113	57	15	na	na	207	40	107
1960	102	109	na	127	96	57	15	na	na	201	44	89
1961	135	109	na	213	138	57	15	na	na	215	42	121
1962	111	109	na	251	128	57	15	na	na	208	83	131
1963	107	109	na	174	135	57	15	na	na	75	86	113
1964	94	109	na	117	174	57	15	na	na	110	92	106
1965	82	109	na	143	183	57	15	na	na	284	113	116
1966	82	109	na	125	180	57	15	na	na	331	100	109
1967	100	109	na	131	202	57	15	na	na	260	109	118
1968	132	109	na	140	257	57	15	na	na	199	151	139
1969	81	109	na	123	242	57	15	na	na	166	150	126
1970	74	109	na	115	234	57	15	na	na	118	88	116
1971	107	109	na	99	219	57	15	na	na	84	123	120
1972	38	109	na	73	204	57	15	na	na	68	34	89
1973	3	109	na	31	155	57	15	na	na	35	6	61
1974	-8	109	na	18	144	57	15	na	na	20	11	58
1975	8	109	na	20	232	57	15	na	na	45	48	82
1976	-10	109	na	39	189	57	15	na	na	68	37	75
1977	16	109	na	92	240	57	15	na	na	95	27	90
1978	10	109	na	55	370	57	15	na	na	84	98	98
1979	19	109	na	55	430	57	15	na	na	40	131	113
1980	-24	109	na	55	17	57	15	na	na	24	39	40
1981	-37	109	na	55	72	57	15	na	na	42	50	54
1982	-42	109	na	55	149	57	15	na	na	57	82	58
1983	-31	109	na	55	97	57	15	na	na	53	52	46
1984	-44	109	na	55	77	57	15	na	na	69	59	36
1985	135	109	na	55	84	57	15	na	na	70	242	93
1986	414	109	68	195	258	57	15	62	233	325	224	153
1987	581	131	42	230	215	70	15	82	355	489	403	163
1988	302	202	60	227	125	95	15	104	425	204	297	173
1989	242	147	69	200	168	88	15	59	335	124	239	152
1990	345	173	105	213	251	86	15	64	381	103	198	172
1991	339	167	73	226	193	75	15	27	346	216	267	166
1992	277	164	74	207	165	51	15	7	271	372	208	142
1993	258	130	52	182	113	90	15	6	126	243	145	137
1994	305	151	73	194	181	98	15	23	155	208	272	156
1995	41	69	12	79	40	16	15	129	77	119	16	51
1996	2	68	5	70	34	16	14	77	45	140	0	39
1997	7	117	1	78	25	13	12	55	27	147	0	45
1998	64	121	11	100	50	22	11	51	38	186	26	69
1999	44	125	16	106	84	57	11	90	37	245	37	78
2000	3	113	3	57	59	32	10	57	26	176	11	45
2001	0	140	0	40	29	24	10	52	48	138	4	35
2002	0	157	0	75	0	24	10	56	35	161	0	43
2003	1	157	0	70	1	33	10	54	46	240	2	45
2004	1	92	0	62	23	27	10	101	33	238	2	43
2005	0	109	0	33	24	19	10	69	54	168	0	25
2006	0	81	0	24	0	14	10	42	74	66	0	17
2007	0	66	0	0	0	18	10	99	68	99	0	8

Appendix Table 3 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **Finland**, 1956 to 2007

(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all^a agricultural products, to exportable^b and import-competing^b agricultural industries, and relative^c to non-agricultural industries (percent)

	NRA, all agric products, ^a by component					NRA, agric tradables			NRA, all non-ag tradable goods (9)	RRA ^b (10)
	NRA, covered products (1)	NRA, non-covered products (2)	NRA, non-product-specific support (3)	NRA, all ag products (incl NPS and decoupled) (4)=1+2+3 (5)	NRA, all ag products (incl NPS and decoupled) (5)	NRA, ag exportables (6)	NRA, ag import-competing (7)	NRA, all agric tradable goods ^c (8)=6+7		
1956	83	29	na	69	69	50	82	69	10	54
1957	103	38	na	86	86	61	105	86	9	71
1958	94	35	na	78	78	70	84	78	8	64
1959	107	41	na	90	90	77	100	90	8	76
1960	89	31	na	74	74	67	79	74	7	63
1961	121	46	na	101	101	89	109	101	6	89
1962	131	46	na	108	108	76	128	108	6	97
1963	113	41	na	94	94	83	101	94	4	87
1964	106	38	na	88	88	88	88	88	4	81
1965	116	42	na	97	97	100	94	97	5	88
1966	109	38	na	91	91	94	88	91	5	82
1967	118	42	na	98	98	105	93	98	4	90
1968	139	53	na	116	116	137	101	116	7	103
1969	126	46	na	105	105	119	94	105	3	99
1970	116	41	na	96	96	116	79	96	2	92
1971	120	41	na	99	99	122	79	99	2	96
1972	89	29	na	74	74	90	59	74	2	70
1973	61	16	na	50	50	64	39	50	2	48
1974	58	14	na	48	48	57	42	48	1	46
1975	82	24	na	68	68	92	48	68	1	66
1976	75	21	na	62	62	75	48	62	1	60
1977	90	22	na	73	73	83	64	73	1	72
1978	98	26	na	80	80	98	64	80	1	79
1979	113	32	na	93	93	127	65	93	1	92
1980	40	1	na	32	32	9	57	32	1	31
1981	54	2	na	42	42	22	61	42	1	41
1982	58	6	na	46	46	34	58	46	1	45
1983	46	3	na	37	37	32	42	37	1	36
1984	36	-1	na	28	28	17	43	28	1	27
1985	93	21	na	75	75	83	63	75	0	74
1986	153	49	10	148	148	152	45	148	1	147
1987	163	37	15	161	161	155	86	161	1	159
1988	173	27	10	157	157	140	156	157	1	155
1989	152	23	9	137	137	148	56	137	1	135
1990	172	34	8	154	154	174	24	154	1	152
1991	166	27	9	149	149	161	22	149	1	147
1992	142	13	9	126	126	139	35	126	1	124
1993	137	17	6	118	118	134	34	118	1	116
1994	156	0	6	125	125	172	78	125	1	123
1995	51	0	5	43	60	na	51	43	1	42
1996	39	19	4	38	54	12	43	38	1	37
1997	45	22	4	43	60	16	48	43	1	42
1998	69	33	4	63	80	35	64	63	1	62
1999	78	38	4	72	89	38	72	72	1	70
2000	45	22	3	43	60	11	52	43	1	42
2001	35	17	4	34	51	8	39	34	1	33
2002	43	20	5	42	59	12	48	42	1	41
2003	45	22	5	44	63	11	52	44	1	42
2004	43	19	4	41	59	9	49	41	1	40
2005	25	12	4	23	42	0	35	23	1	22
2006	17	8	4	17	39	0	23	17	1	16
2007	8	4	4	10	29	0	13	10	1	9

- a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and via inputs and other forms of non-product-specific (NPS) assistance without and (in column (5)) with decoupled support.
- b. The Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA) is defined as $100 * [(100 + \text{NRA}_{\text{ag}}^t) / (100 + \text{NRA}_{\text{nonag}}^t) - 1]$, where NRA_{ag}^t and $\text{NRA}_{\text{nonag}}^t$ are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors (columns 8 and 9), respectively, so it excludes decoupled payments but includes all NPS support.
- c. Including NPS but excluding decoupled payments, so more than the weighted average of columns (6) and (7).

Appendix Table 3 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **Finland**, 1956 to 2007
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered^a and non-covered products,
(percent)

	Barle y	Beef	Egg	Milk	Oat	Pigm eat	Potat o	Poult ry	Shee pmea t	Suga r	Whe at	Non- cover ed
1956	6	6	na	21	14	7	16	na	na	0	4	25
1957	7	6	na	20	16	8	13	na	na	1	4	26
1958	6	6	na	24	14	8	11	na	na	0	5	26
1959	7	6	na	22	15	8	10	na	na	0	4	27
1960	6	5	na	26	14	8	11	na	na	0	5	26
1961	5	7	na	19	15	9	8	na	na	1	9	27
1962	5	10	na	20	12	8	9	na	na	1	8	27
1963	7	10	na	21	13	7	8	na	na	2	6	27
1964	5	13	na	25	10	8	5	na	na	1	7	26
1965	7	14	na	19	13	6	8	na	na	0	7	26
1966	8	14	na	21	12	6	7	na	na	0	5	26
1967	8	14	na	19	12	8	5	na	na	0	7	26
1968	8	13	na	19	13	7	5	na	na	0	7	27
1969	10	15	na	18	13	7	4	na	na	0	6	26
1970	11	13	na	15	15	7	6	na	na	1	6	26
1971	10	14	na	16	16	8	4	na	na	1	5	26
1972	13	12	na	15	14	8	4	na	na	2	7	25
1973	12	13	na	15	14	8	4	na	na	2	9	24
1974	11	18	na	14	12	7	3	na	na	3	10	22
1975	11	16	na	13	13	9	4	na	na	1	9	24
1976	15	14	na	10	16	7	4	na	na	1	10	24
1977	13	19	na	9	11	12	5	na	na	1	6	24
1978	15	20	na	11	9	11	5	na	na	1	3	25
1979	14	22	na	12	10	10	5	na	na	2	2	24
1980	14	18	na	9	19	9	4	na	na	3	3	21
1981	14	19	na	15	14	9	3	na	na	1	2	22
1982	19	15	na	14	13	8	3	na	na	1	4	22
1983	18	6	na	15	18	9	5	na	na	1	6	22
1984	20	6	na	14	17	10	5	na	na	1	5	22
1985	18	6	na	14	14	13	4	na	na	1	4	25
1986	5	16	5	26	5	19	3	2	0	1	4	14
1987	3	17	6	27	4	21	3	2	0	0	1	14
1988	8	11	5	25	7	17	4	2	0	2	2	18
1989	8	12	4	22	9	15	5	2	0	2	3	18
1990	6	11	3	23	7	16	5	2	0	2	5	19
1991	7	12	4	23	6	17	4	4	0	1	3	19
1992	6	11	4	23	6	19	4	4	0	1	2	20
1993	7	10	4	24	8	14	3	4	0	1	3	20
1994	7	10	3	23	6	13	6	4	0	1	2	24
1995	9	9	3	24	6	11	9	1	0	1	3	24
1996	13	8	4	24	7	12	4	2	0	1	4	24
1997	12	6	3	23	7	14	3	2	0	2	3	24
1998	6	8	3	27	5	12	6	3	0	1	3	26
1999	9	8	3	26	4	9	9	2	0	1	2	27
2000	12	6	3	27	6	10	4	2	0	1	3	24
2001	10	4	3	30	6	12	4	3	0	1	3	24
2002	10	5	3	25	10	11	5	3	0	1	3	25
2003	10	5	4	25	7	10	4	3	0	1	5	26
2004	10	6	3	28	4	11	5	2	0	1	5	25
2005	17	6	4	13	5	15	5	3	0	1	6	24
2006	14	5	3	24	8	9	5	2	0	1	5	24
2007	21	3	2	17	10	7	5	2	0	0	8	24

a. At farmgate undistorted prices

Appendix Table 3 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **Finland**, 1956 to 2007
 (d) Trade status of covered products^a

	Barle y	Beef	Egg	Milk	Oat	Pigm eat	Potat o	Poult ry	Shee pmea t	Sugar	Whea t
1956	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	na	na	M	M
1957	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	na	na	M	M
1958	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	na	na	M	M
1959	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	na	na	M	M
1960	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	na	na	M	M
1961	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	na	na	M	M
1962	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	na	na	M	M
1963	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	na	na	M	M
1964	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	na	na	M	M
1965	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	na	na	M	M
1966	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	na	na	M	M
1967	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	na	na	M	M
1968	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	na	na	M	M
1969	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	na	na	M	M
1970	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	na	na	M	M
1971	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	na	na	M	M
1972	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	na	na	M	M
1973	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	na	na	M	M
1974	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	na	na	M	M
1975	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	na	na	M	M
1976	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	na	na	M	M
1977	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	na	na	M	M
1978	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	na	na	M	M
1979	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	na	na	M	M
1980	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	na	na	M	M
1981	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	na	na	M	M
1982	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	na	na	M	M
1983	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	na	na	M	M
1984	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	na	na	M	M
1985	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	na	na	M	M
1986	X	X	X	X	X	X	M	H	H	M	X
1987	X	X	X	X	X	X	M	H	M	M	M
1988	X	X	X	M	X	X	M	M	M	M	M
1989	X	X	X	X	X	X	M	M	M	M	M
1990	X	X	X	X	X	X	M	M	M	M	X
1991	X	X	X	X	X	X	M	X	M	M	X
1992	X	X	X	X	X	X	M	M	M	M	M
1993	X	X	X	X	X	X	M	M	M	M	M
1994	X	X	X	X	X	X	M	M	M	M	M
1995	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1996	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X
1997	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X
1998	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X
1999	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X
2000	X	M	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X
2001	X	M	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X
2002	X	M	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X
2003	X	M	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X
2004	X	M	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X
2005	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X
2006	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X
2007	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X

a. Exportables (X), import-competing products (M) and nontradables (H).

Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on author's spreadsheet

Appendix Table 4: Annual distortion estimates, **France**, 1956 to 2007

(a) Nominal rates of assistance to covered products

	(percent)									
	Barley	Beef	Egg	Maize	Milk	Oat	Pigmea t	Potato	Poultry	Rapese ed
1956	8	-13	18	-22	196	-24	19	na	190	73
1957	21	-3	38	1	245	6	45	na	198	71
1958	74	17	89	43	154	22	36	na	178	64
1959	30	-5	50	20	187	-7	8	na	124	32
1960	20	9	29	8	91	-22	5	na	61	-46
1961	40	3	26	-9	201	36	25	na	91	21
1962	75	127	22	47	421	49	120	na	80	0
1963	69	103	11	44	339	51	117	na	73	0
1964	60	86	25	41	277	41	87	na	57	0
1965	52	62	32	45	320	48	133	na	61	0
1966	54	51	16	36	296	42	149	na	59	0
1967	69	53	15	49	310	43	129	na	51	0
1968	99	73	20	77	337	54	132	na	51	0
1969	54	73	16	66	307	41	152	na	48	0
1970	54	71	-4	41	308	48	142	na	43	0
1971	89	69	3	48	317	31	136	na	162	0
1972	37	89	-5	73	300	14	114	54	106	0
1973	-7	34	-17	19	208	0	106	57	74	0
1974	3	-4	30	2	210	7	69	18	54	0
1975	23	11	16	22	264	23	65	49	60	0
1976	20	26	5	39	366	10	122	327	69	0
1977	56	11	41	72	598	35	65	71	61	0
1978	49	11	13	81	488	74	78	-15	49	0
1979	75	0	41	67	440	80	109	17	38	0
1980	17	-1	22	62	434	-27	71	7	37	0
1981	7	23	2	43	330	-2	148	73	72	0
1982	8	49	18	66	313	22	125	95	99	0
1983	32	264	40	29	287	-1	129	87	73	0
1984	6	265	3	15	311	8	81	-24	95	0
1985	18	293	8	28	282	-6	22	11	91	0
1986	157	188	31	110	361	83	40	17	79	153
1987	233	107	21	170	533	77	11	17	90	145
1988	85	80	21	79	192	14	34	17	69	112
1989	45	79	29	62	84	15	14	17	66	140
1990	94	98	12	108	125	48	7	16	100	200
1991	119	157	13	120	128	39	20	16	83	97
1992	103	93	15	103	118	63	0	17	118	0
1993	105	63	10	69	123	44	18	17	110	0
1994	100	53	0	45	117	43	18	16	114	0
1995	41	69	12	53	79	40	16	15	129	0
1996	2	68	5	14	70	34	16	14	77	0
1997	7	117	1	19	78	25	13	12	55	0
1998	64	121	11	32	100	50	22	11	51	0
1999	44	125	16	39	106	84	57	11	90	0
2000	3	113	3	27	57	59	32	10	57	1
2001	0	140	0	14	40	29	24	10	52	0
2002	0	157	0	9	75	0	24	10	56	0
2003	1	157	0	34	70	1	33	10	54	0
2004	1	92	0	39	62	23	27	10	101	0
2005	0	109	0	19	33	24	19	10	69	0
2006	0	86	0	19	24	0	15	10	69	0
2007	0	71	0	21	0	0	18	10	100	0

	Rice	Sheep meat	Soybea n	Sugar	Sunflo wer	Tomato	Wheat	Wine	All cover ed
1956	57	222	na	118	5	na	51	-31	32
1957	42	261	na	66	15	na	15	-16	47
1958	25	219	na	153	20	na	33	78	73
1959	9	180	na	205	9	na	23	-6	40
1960	8	118	na	125	9	na	18	-42	16
1961	-9	176	na	160	3	-17	23	-39	32
1962	-15	279	na	185	0	22	78	4	79
1963	-20	231	na	13	0	22	86	4	71
1964	-19	226	na	63	0	22	70	4	67
1965	8	203	na	330	0	22	74	4	72
1966	-12	372	na	410	0	22	63	4	71
1967	-24	373	na	319	0	22	64	4	73
1968	-2	382	na	232	0	22	73	4	82
1969	25	386	na	183	0	22	62	4	77
1970	43	372	na	100	0	22	24	4	60
1971	-12	367	na	47	0	22	55	4	73
1972	-31	385	na	46	0	22	-2	4	59
1973	-61	322	0	-30	0	22	-30	4	24
1974	-55	255	0	-51	0	22	-23	4	16
1975	-19	267	0	28	0	22	-9	4	37
1976	0	342	0	99	0	22	-16	4	52
1977	-10	281	0	230	0	22	-21	4	52
1978	16	263	0	230	0	22	23	4	59
1979	-15	230	0	70	0	22	35	4	57
1980	-38	207	0	13	0	22	45	4	50
1981	1	183	0	74	0	11	44	17	68
1982	17	181	0	152	0	31	51	15	78
1983	-10	203	0	196	0	19	28	10	89
1984	41	172	0	268	0	26	20	7	69
1985	105	95	0	297	0	26	31	-25	61
1986	127	134	211	247	144	17	119	9	114
1987	190	211	169	301	150	15	143	9	118
1988	162	215	108	201	96	15	94	7	82
1989	148	167	118	90	150	0	31	6	50
1990	152	154	147	109	143	2	57	8	66
1991	144	128	159	191	111	0	146	9	90
1992	143	112	0	212	0	0	65	13	62
1993	106	38	0	169	0	8	58	13	60
1994	133	55	0	129	0	11	48	10	50
1995	88	77	0	119	0	0	16	4	39
1996	33	45	0	140	0	2	0	4	28
1997	31	27	0	147	0	0	0	5	32
1998	18	38	0	186	0	0	26	3	43
1999	0	37	0	245	0	0	37	2	49
2000	1	26	0	176	0	0	11	2	33
2001	42	48	0	138	0	0	4	2	27
2002	24	35	0	161	0	0	0	2	32
2003	18	46	0	240	0	2	2	2	36
2004	1	33	0	238	0	2	2	1	31
2005	2	54	0	168	0	0	0	2	17
2006	3	74	0	66	0	0	0	1	15
2007	1	68	0	99	0	0	0	1	11

Appendix Table 4 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **France**, 1956 to 2007

(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all^a agricultural products, to exportable^b and import-competing^b agricultural industries, and relative^c to non-agricultural industries (percent)

	NRA, all agric products, ^a by component					NRA, agric tradables			NRA, all non-ag tradable goods (9)	RRA ^b (10)
	NRA, covered products (1)	NRA, non-covered products (2)	NRA, non-product-specific support (3)	NRA, all ag products (incl NPS and decoupled) (4)=1+2+3 (5)	NRA, all ag products (incl NPS and decoupled) (5)	NRA, ag exportables (6)	NRA, ag import-competing (7)	NRA, all agric tradable goods ^c (8)=6+7		
1956	32	9	na	27	27	-11	41	27	10	15
1957	47	18	na	40	40	1	54	40	11	25
1958	73	36	na	64	64	50	68	64	14	44
1959	40	18	na	35	35	7	45	35	13	19
1960	16	2	na	13	13	-20	25	13	12	1
1961	32	11	na	27	27	-15	46	27	12	14
1962	79	58	na	75	75	20	111	75	12	56
1963	71	49	na	67	67	19	94	67	12	50
1964	67	46	na	62	62	18	85	62	11	46
1965	72	50	na	68	68	22	91	68	11	51
1966	71	49	na	67	67	22	87	67	10	51
1967	73	47	na	68	68	22	87	68	11	51
1968	82	54	na	76	76	22	102	76	8	63
1969	77	51	na	72	72	24	92	72	7	60
1970	60	43	na	57	57	16	77	57	7	47
1971	73	48	na	68	68	31	89	68	6	58
1972	59	36	na	55	55	20	71	55	6	46
1973	24	15	na	22	22	5	31	22	5	16
1974	16	11	na	15	15	8	18	15	4	11
1975	37	25	na	35	35	16	44	35	4	30
1976	52	32	na	48	48	18	58	48	4	43
1977	52	31	na	48	48	26	56	48	4	42
1978	59	37	na	55	55	28	66	55	5	47
1979	57	39	12	66	67	31	63	66	5	58
1980	50	33	12	58	60	29	52	58	4	51
1981	68	39	10	71	73	31	71	71	4	65
1982	78	45	9	80	82	30	86	80	4	73
1983	89	50	9	89	92	30	99	89	4	81
1984	69	39	8	70	72	19	80	70	4	64
1985	61	40	10	67	70	7	81	67	6	58
1986	114	68	3	107	109	38	128	107	6	95
1987	118	70	3	111	113	46	129	111	6	98
1988	82	45	3	77	80	31	87	77	5	68
1989	50	26	3	48	51	15	55	48	5	41
1990	66	35	4	63	67	20	74	63	5	56
1991	90	48	5	85	90	30	96	85	5	76
1992	62	37	5	61	69	24	69	61	5	54
1993	60	35	5	59	72	24	65	59	5	52
1994	50	30	4	50	65	21	55	50	5	43
1995	39	24	5	41	58	13	45	41	5	34
1996	28	16	4	30	46	5	43	30	5	23
1997	32	19	4	34	50	7	47	34	5	27
1998	43	26	4	44	61	15	59	44	5	37
1999	49	32	4	50	67	17	69	50	5	43
2000	33	20	3	34	51	8	50	34	5	27
2001	27	16	4	29	46	5	39	29	5	22
2002	32	19	5	34	51	4	52	34	5	27
2003	36	22	5	38	57	5	59	38	5	31
2004	31	19	4	33	51	4	52	33	5	26
2005	17	9	4	17	36	1	39	17	4	13
2006	15	7	4	16	37	1	33	16	4	11
2007	11	6	4	13	31	0	29	13	4	8

- a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and via inputs and other forms of non-product-specific (NPS) assistance without and (in column (5)) with decoupled support.
- b. The Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA) is defined as $100 * [(100 + \text{NRA}_{\text{ag}}^t) / (100 + \text{NRA}_{\text{nonag}}^t) - 1]$, where NRA_{ag}^t and $\text{NRA}_{\text{nonag}}^t$ are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors (columns 8 and 9), respectively, so it excludes decoupled payments but includes all NPS support.
- c. Including NPS but excluding decoupled payments, so more than the weighted average of columns (6) and (7).

Appendix Table 4 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **France**, 1956 to 2007
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered^a and non-covered products,
(percent)

	Barley	Beef	Egg	Maize	Milk	Oat	Pigmea t	Potato	Poultry	Rapese ed
1956	8	10	5	2	8	6	7	na	3	0
1957	4	10	5	1	8	3	8	na	3	0
1958	4	11	5	1	11	4	9	na	4	0
1959	5	10	5	1	8	3	9	na	3	0
1960	6	9	5	2	10	3	9	na	3	0
1961	5	10	5	1	8	2	8	na	3	0
1962	5	8	4	1	5	2	7	na	4	0
1963	6	9	4	3	6	2	7	na	4	0
1964	5	10	4	2	6	2	7	na	4	1
1965	6	12	4	3	6	2	6	na	4	1
1966	6	13	4	3	7	2	6	na	3	1
1967	7	13	4	3	7	2	6	na	3	1
1968	5	13	4	3	7	2	6	na	3	1
1969	7	13	4	4	7	2	6	na	4	1
1970	5	11	4	5	6	1	5	na	3	1
1971	5	12	4	6	6	2	6	na	2	1
1972	7	10	4	4	6	2	5	2	2	1
1973	6	9	4	5	6	1	5	2	2	1
1974	6	14	2	6	6	1	5	2	2	1
1975	5	15	3	5	6	1	6	2	3	1
1976	6	15	3	4	5	1	6	1	3	1
1977	5	15	2	4	4	1	7	3	3	1
1978	5	16	3	4	4	1	6	3	3	1
1979	5	18	2	5	5	1	5	3	4	1
1980	7	18	3	4	5	2	6	2	4	1
1981	7	16	3	5	7	1	5	2	4	1
1982	7	13	3	5	7	1	5	2	4	2
1983	6	6	3	7	8	1	5	2	4	1
1984	7	5	3	7	7	1	5	3	3	2
1985	6	5	3	7	7	1	7	3	3	2
1986	3	8	3	6	8	0	8	3	5	1
1987	2	11	3	4	5	1	9	3	4	2
1988	3	11	2	6	10	1	6	2	4	2
1989	3	8	2	5	14	0	8	2	4	1
1990	3	9	2	3	12	0	8	2	3	1
1991	3	7	3	5	13	0	8	3	4	1
1992	3	9	2	4	12	0	10	2	3	1
1993	2	10	3	5	13	0	8	1	4	1
1994	2	10	3	5	12	0	8	3	4	2
1995	2	9	2	4	14	0	8	3	3	2
1996	3	7	3	6	12	0	8	2	4	2
1997	3	6	3	6	12	0	9	2	4	3
1998	2	6	2	5	12	0	7	3	5	3
1999	2	6	2	5	12	0	5	3	4	3
2000	3	6	3	5	15	0	7	2	4	2
2001	3	4	3	6	17	0	9	2	5	2
2002	3	5	3	6	13	0	7	2	4	2
2003	3	5	4	4	14	0	7	2	4	3
2004	3	5	3	5	14	0	7	3	3	3
2005	4	4	3	4	4	0	8	2	4	3
2006	4	4	3	4	4	0	7	3	4	4
2007	5	3	3	5	6	0	5	1	3	4

	Rice	Sheep meat	Soybea n	Sugar	Sunflo wer	Tomato	Wheat	Wine	Non- cover ed
1956	0	1	na	1	0	na	8	16	24
1957	0	1	na	2	0	na	15	15	24
1958	0	1	na	2	0	na	14	10	25
1959	0	1	na	1	0	na	15	14	24
1960	0	1	na	1	0	na	13	16	23
1961	0	1	na	2	0	2	12	17	24
1962	0	1	na	1	0	1	12	27	20
1963	0	1	na	3	0	1	8	25	20
1964	0	1	na	2	0	1	11	23	20
1965	0	1	na	1	0	1	11	22	20
1966	0	1	na	1	0	2	9	21	20
1967	0	1	na	1	0	1	11	19	21
1968	0	1	na	1	0	1	11	22	20
1969	0	1	na	1	0	1	11	18	21
1970	0	1	na	2	0	1	11	24	19
1971	0	1	na	3	0	1	11	20	20
1972	0	1	na	3	0	1	16	16	20
1973	0	1	0	4	0	1	16	19	18
1974	0	1	0	6	0	1	16	14	18
1975	0	1	0	3	0	1	12	16	19
1976	0	1	0	2	0	2	17	14	20
1977	0	1	0	2	0	1	18	12	21
1978	0	1	0	2	0	2	14	13	20
1979	0	1	0	3	0	2	11	16	20
1980	0	1	0	5	0	2	12	8	21
1981	0	2	0	4	0	2	13	6	22
1982	0	2	0	2	1	2	14	9	22
1983	0	1	0	2	1	2	17	10	22
1984	0	1	0	1	1	1	19	9	22
1985	0	1	0	2	2	2	15	14	21
1986	0	1	0	2	2	2	11	16	22
1987	0	1	0	2	2	2	10	14	22
1988	0	1	0	2	2	1	11	12	22
1989	0	1	0	2	2	2	14	12	20
1990	0	1	0	3	2	2	13	15	21
1991	0	1	0	2	2	2	10	11	24
1992	0	1	0	2	2	2	11	14	21
1993	0	1	0	2	2	2	11	13	21
1994	0	1	0	2	2	2	10	14	20
1995	0	1	0	2	2	1	12	15	20
1996	0	1	0	2	1	1	15	13	20
1997	0	1	0	2	1	1	13	13	20
1998	0	1	0	2	2	2	12	16	20
1999	0	1	0	2	1	2	11	19	20
2000	0	1	0	2	1	2	12	15	20
2001	0	1	0	2	1	2	10	14	20
2002	0	1	0	2	1	2	13	14	21
2003	0	1	0	1	1	2	11	15	21
2004	0	1	0	1	1	1	14	15	20
2005	0	1	0	1	1	2	13	21	24
2006	0	1	0	2	1	2	15	19	24
2007	0	1	0	1	1	1	19	18	24

a. At farmgate undistorted prices

Appendix Table 4 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **France**, 1956 to 2007
(d) Trade status of covered products^a

[illegible]

	Rice	Sheep meat	Soybe an	Sugar	Sunflo wer	Tomat o	Wheat	Wine
1956	X	M	0	M	M	na	M	X
1957	X	M	0	M	M	na	M	X
1958	X	M	0	M	M	na	M	X
1959	X	M	0	M	M	na	M	X
1960	X	M	0	M	M	na	M	X
1961	X	M	0	M	M	X	M	X
1962	X	M	0	M	M	X	M	X
1963	X	M	0	M	M	X	M	X
1964	X	M	0	M	M	M	M	X
1965	X	M	0	M	M	M	M	X
1966	X	M	0	M	M	M	M	X
1967	X	M	0	M	M	M	M	X
1968	X	M	0	M	M	M	M	X
1969	X	M	0	M	M	M	M	X
1970	X	M	0	M	M	M	M	X
1971	X	M	0	M	M	M	M	X
1972	X	M	0	M	M	M	M	X
1973	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	X
1974	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	X
1975	X	M	M	M	X	M	M	X
1976	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	X
1977	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	X
1978	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	X
1979	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	X
1980	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	X
1981	X	M	M	M	X	M	M	X
1982	X	M	M	M	X	M	M	X
1983	X	M	M	M	X	M	M	X
1984	X	M	M	M	X	M	M	X
1985	X	M	M	M	X	M	M	X
1986	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	X
1987	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	X
1988	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	X
1989	X	M	M	M	M	X	M	X
1990	X	M	M	M	M	X	M	X
1991	X	M	M	M	M	X	M	X
1992	X	M	M	M	M	X	M	X
1993	X	M	M	M	M	X	M	X
1994	X	M	M	M	M	X	M	X
1995	X	M	M	M	M	X	M	X
1996	X	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
1997	X	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
1998	X	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
1999	X	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
2000	X	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
2001	X	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
2002	X	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
2003	X	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
2004	X	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
2005	X	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
2006	X	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
2007	X	M	M	M	M	X	X	X

a. Exportables (X), import-competing products (M) and nontradables (H).
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on author's spreadsheet

Appendix Table 5: Annual distortion estimates, **Germany**, 1956 to 2007

(a) Nominal rates of assistance to covered products

	(percent)									
	Barley	Beef	Egg	Maize	Milk	Oat	Pigmea t	Potato	Poultry	Rapese ed
1956	35	32	33	na	453	15	25	na	23	64
1957	51	41	38	na	434	19	32	na	28	74
1958	74	43	66	na	460	29	19	na	27	75
1959	72	52	37	na	412	44	29	na	23	57
1960	70	80	27	na	390	32	20	na	20	35
1961	96	77	39	na	361	57	39	na	31	24
1962	75	127	22	47	421	49	120	na	80	0
1963	69	103	11	44	339	51	117	na	73	0
1964	60	86	25	41	277	41	87	na	57	0
1965	52	62	32	45	320	48	133	na	61	0
1966	54	51	16	36	296	42	149	na	59	0
1967	69	53	15	49	310	43	129	na	51	0
1968	99	73	20	77	337	54	132	na	51	0
1969	54	73	16	66	307	41	152	na	48	0
1970	54	71	-4	41	308	48	142	na	43	0
1971	89	69	3	48	317	31	136	na	162	0
1972	37	89	-5	73	300	14	114	54	106	0
1973	-7	34	-17	19	208	0	106	57	74	0
1974	3	-4	30	2	210	7	69	18	54	0
1975	23	11	16	22	264	23	65	49	60	0
1976	20	26	5	39	366	10	122	327	69	0
1977	56	11	41	72	598	35	65	71	61	0
1978	49	11	13	81	488	74	78	-15	49	0
1979	75	0	41	67	440	80	109	17	38	0
1980	17	-1	22	62	434	-27	71	7	37	0
1981	7	23	2	43	330	-2	148	73	72	0
1982	8	49	18	66	313	22	125	95	99	0
1983	32	264	40	29	287	-1	129	87	73	0
1984	6	265	3	15	311	8	81	-24	95	0
1985	18	293	8	28	282	-6	22	11	91	0
1986	157	188	31	110	361	83	40	17	79	153
1987	233	107	21	170	533	77	11	17	90	145
1988	85	80	21	79	192	14	34	17	69	112
1989	45	79	29	62	84	15	14	17	66	140
1990	94	98	12	108	125	48	7	16	100	200
1991	119	157	13	120	128	39	20	16	83	97
1992	103	93	15	103	118	63	0	17	118	0
1993	105	63	10	69	123	44	18	17	110	0
1994	100	53	0	45	117	43	18	16	114	0
1995	41	69	12	53	79	40	16	15	129	0
1996	2	68	5	14	70	34	16	14	77	0
1997	7	117	1	19	78	25	13	12	55	0
1998	64	121	11	32	100	50	22	11	51	0
1999	44	125	16	39	106	84	57	11	90	0
2000	3	113	3	27	57	59	32	10	57	1
2001	0	140	0	14	40	29	24	10	52	0
2002	0	157	0	9	75	0	24	10	56	0
2003	1	157	0	34	70	1	33	10	54	0
2004	1	92	0	39	62	23	27	10	101	0
2005	0	109	0	19	33	24	19	10	69	0
2006	0	81	0	19	25	0	14	10	42	0
2007	0	66	0	21	0	0	18	10	99	0

	Sheep meat	Soybea n	Sugar	Sunflo wer	Tomato	Wheat	Wine	All cover ed
1956	-10	na	160	na	na	-16	28	63
1957	-5	na	75	na	na	-18	161	70
1958	-11	na	177	na	na	2	70	80
1959	-5	na	222	na	na	-17	20	75
1960	-6	na	219	na	na	-8	116	75
1961	11	na	246	na	na	15	-8	89
1962	279	na	185	na	22	78	na	136
1963	231	na	13	na	22	86	na	114
1964	226	na	63	na	22	70	na	102
1965	203	na	330	na	22	74	na	119
1966	372	na	410	na	22	63	na	115
1967	373	na	319	na	22	64	na	110
1968	382	na	232	na	22	73	na	122
1969	386	na	183	na	22	62	na	115
1970	372	na	100	na	22	24	na	101
1971	367	na	47	na	22	55	na	107
1972	385	na	46	na	22	-2	na	83
1973	322	na	-30	na	22	-30	4	44
1974	255	na	-51	na	22	-23	4	28
1975	267	na	28	na	22	-9	4	53
1976	342	na	99	na	22	-16	4	92
1977	281	na	230	na	22	-21	4	71
1978	263	na	230	na	22	23	4	71
1979	230	na	70	na	22	35	4	75
1980	207	na	13	na	22	45	4	56
1981	183	na	74	na	11	44	17	85
1982	181	na	152	na	31	51	15	94
1983	203	na	196	na	19	28	10	122
1984	172	na	268	na	26	20	7	87
1985	95	na	297	na	26	31	-25	78
1986	134	na	247	na	17	119	9	123
1987	211	na	301	150	15	143	9	109
1988	215	na	201	96	15	94	7	82
1989	167	118	90	150	0	31	6	49
1990	154	147	109	143	2	57	8	62
1991	128	159	191	111	0	146	9	84
1992	112	0	212	0	0	65	13	59
1993	38	0	169	0	8	58	13	64
1994	55	0	129	0	11	48	10	55
1995	77	0	119	0	0	16	4	43
1996	45	0	140	0	2	0	4	35
1997	27	0	147	0	0	0	5	39
1998	38	0	186	0	0	26	3	54
1999	37	0	245	0	0	37	2	65
2000	26	0	176	0	0	11	2	40
2001	48	0	138	0	0	4	2	31
2002	35	0	161	0	0	0	2	41
2003	46	0	240	0	2	2	2	43
2004	33	0	238	0	2	2	1	36
2005	54	0	168	0	0	0	2	19
2006	74	0	66	0	0	0	1	15
2007	68	0	99	0	0	0	1	11

Appendix Table 5 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **Germany**, 1956 to 2007

(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all^a agricultural products, to exportable^b and import-competing^b agricultural industries, and relative^c to non-agricultural industries (percent)

	NRA, all agric products, ^a by component					NRA, agric tradables			NRA, all non-ag tradable goods (9)	RRA ^b (10)
	NRA, covered products (1)	NRA, non-covered products (2)	NRA, non-product-specific support (3)	NRA, all ag products (incl NPS and decoupled) (4)=1+2+3 (5)	NRA, all ag products (incl NPS and decoupled) (5)	NRA, ag exportables (6)	NRA, ag import-competing (7)	NRA, all agric tradable goods ^c (8)=6+7		
1956	63	7	na	46	46	2	55	46	4	41
1957	70	6	na	50	50	5	58	50	3	45
1958	80	9	na	57	57	5	68	57	3	52
1959	75	12	na	56	56	2	67	56	3	50
1960	75	11	na	55	55	11	64	55	3	50
1961	89	13	na	65	65	-1	80	65	3	59
1962	136	63	na	113	113	67	122	113	3	106
1963	114	51	na	96	96	56	103	96	3	89
1964	102	49	na	88	88	56	93	88	3	83
1965	119	59	na	102	102	70	107	102	2	98
1966	115	58	na	98	98	65	104	98	2	95
1967	110	50	na	93	93	54	99	93	2	89
1968	122	54	na	103	103	56	110	103	1	100
1969	115	58	na	99	99	64	105	99	2	96
1970	101	53	na	88	88	58	93	88	1	85
1971	107	49	na	91	91	62	98	91	1	89
1972	83	41	na	73	73	41	80	73	1	71
1973	44	23	na	39	39	12	46	39	1	37
1974	28	16	na	26	26	16	28	26	1	24
1975	53	30	na	48	48	32	51	48	1	46
1976	92	51	na	82	82	63	85	82	1	81
1977	71	40	na	64	64	50	67	64	1	63
1978	71	39	na	63	63	47	68	63	1	62
1979	75	43	12	80	81	59	70	80	1	79
1980	56	37	12	63	65	41	54	63	1	62
1981	85	48	10	86	88	40	86	86	1	85
1982	94	53	9	94	96	41	98	94	1	93
1983	122	62	9	115	118	48	125	115	1	114
1984	87	44	8	85	87	26	92	85	1	84
1985	78	42	10	79	83	33	80	79	1	78
1986	123	66	3	112	114	72	115	112	1	111
1987	109	63	3	101	103	81	100	101	1	100
1988	82	44	3	76	79	49	77	76	1	75
1989	49	24	3	46	49	25	46	46	1	45
1990	62	31	4	59	62	34	59	59	1	58
1991	84	42	5	78	83	40	79	78	1	77
1992	59	32	5	58	65	33	57	58	1	57
1993	64	33	5	62	74	32	62	62	1	61
1994	55	29	4	53	68	32	52	53	1	52
1995	43	22	5	43	60	21	41	43	1	42
1996	35	17	4	34	51	8	41	34	1	34
1997	39	20	4	38	55	10	46	38	1	37
1998	54	28	4	52	69	21	59	52	1	51
1999	65	34	4	62	79	25	70	62	1	61
2000	40	21	3	39	57	10	50	39	1	38
2001	31	16	4	31	48	6	37	31	1	31
2002	41	21	5	41	58	7	52	41	1	40
2003	43	22	5	43	62	8	55	43	1	42
2004	36	18	4	36	54	6	47	36	1	35
2005	19	9	4	19	37	0	31	19	1	18
2006	15	7	4	16	37	0	24	16	1	15
2007	11	6	4	13	31	0	19	13	1	12

- a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and via inputs and other forms of non-product-specific (NPS) assistance without and (in column (5)) with decoupled support.
- b. The Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA) is defined as $100 * [(100 + \text{NRA}_{\text{ag}}^t) / (100 + \text{NRA}_{\text{nonag}}^t) - 1]$, where NRA_{ag}^t and $\text{NRA}_{\text{nonag}}^t$ are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors (columns 8 and 9), respectively, so it excludes decoupled payments but includes all NPS support.
- c. Including NPS but excluding decoupled payments, so more than the weighted average of columns (6) and (7).

Appendix Table 5 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **Germany**, 1956 to 2007
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered^a and non-covered products,
(percent)

	Barley	Beef	Egg	Maize	Milk	Oat	Pigmea t	Potato	Poultry	Rapese ed
1956	5	10	6	na	6	5	24	na	1	0
1957	4	11	6	na	7	4	24	na	1	0
1958	4	11	5	na	7	4	26	na	1	0
1959	4	11	6	na	7	3	24	na	1	0
1960	4	9	6	na	8	4	25	na	1	0
1961	3	10	7	na	8	3	24	na	1	0
1962	6	11	7	0	9	4	20	na	2	1
1963	5	11	8	0	9	3	20	na	2	1
1964	5	12	6	0	11	3	22	na	2	1
1965	5	15	8	0	10	3	19	na	2	1
1966	5	16	8	0	11	3	18	na	2	1
1967	6	15	8	0	10	3	17	na	2	1
1968	5	14	8	0	10	3	18	na	2	1
1969	6	15	8	0	10	3	18	na	2	1
1970	5	15	9	0	9	2	17	na	2	1
1971	5	15	9	0	9	3	17	na	1	1
1972	6	11	8	0	8	3	15	9	1	1
1973	7	12	7	0	8	3	13	8	1	1
1974	7	15	4	0	7	3	13	8	1	1
1975	6	16	4	0	8	3	17	6	2	1
1976	7	16	6	0	7	2	15	6	2	1
1977	6	17	4	0	4	2	18	8	2	1
1978	7	18	5	0	6	2	17	8	2	1
1979	5	21	3	0	6	2	14	9	2	1
1980	8	19	4	0	6	3	16	6	2	1
1981	9	17	5	1	9	3	13	6	2	1
1982	11	16	4	1	10	3	13	5	2	1
1983	9	7	5	1	12	2	15	6	2	1
1984	11	6	5	1	9	3	16	9	2	2
1985	9	5	4	1	10	3	22	8	1	2
1986	5	9	4	1	10	1	23	8	2	2
1987	3	13	4	0	7	1	25	9	2	1
1988	5	13	3	1	14	2	18	7	2	1
1989	5	10	2	1	18	1	20	6	1	1
1990	4	10	3	1	15	1	22	6	1	1
1991	5	9	3	1	16	1	20	6	1	2
1992	4	10	3	1	16	1	24	4	1	2
1993	4	11	3	1	18	1	18	4	2	3
1994	3	10	3	1	17	1	17	7	1	3
1995	4	9	2	1	19	0	16	8	1	3
1996	5	8	3	1	19	1	17	4	2	2
1997	6	6	3	1	18	1	19	4	2	3
1998	4	7	3	1	19	0	15	7	2	4
1999	5	7	2	1	19	0	12	8	2	4
2000	5	6	3	1	21	0	16	4	2	3
2001	5	4	3	1	22	0	18	4	2	3
2002	4	5	3	2	19	0	17	5	2	4
2003	5	5	4	2	20	0	16	4	3	4
2004	5	5	2	1	19	0	15	7	2	4
2005	7	4	4	2	3	0	23	6	2	6
2006	6	5	3	1	7	0	20	7	2	6
2007	7	4	3	2	11	0	15	6	1	6

	Sheep meat	Soybea n	Sugar	Sunflo wer	Tomato	Wheat	Wine	Non- covere d
1956	0	na	2	na	na	8	1	31
1957	0	na	2	na	na	8	1	32
1958	0	na	2	na	na	7	1	32
1959	0	na	2	na	na	8	2	31
1960	0	na	1	na	na	8	2	32
1961	0	na	2	na	na	7	3	32
1962	1	na	2	na	0	7	na	32
1963	0	na	5	na	0	6	na	29
1964	0	na	3	na	0	6	na	28
1965	0	na	1	na	0	6	na	29
1966	0	na	1	na	0	6	na	29
1967	0	na	1	na	0	7	na	29
1968	0	na	2	na	0	8	na	28
1969	0	na	2	na	0	7	na	28
1970	0	na	2	na	0	8	na	28
1971	0	na	3	na	0	8	na	27
1972	0	na	3	na	0	10	na	25
1973	0	na	5	na	0	11	2	22
1974	0	na	7	na	0	10	1	21
1975	0	na	4	na	0	9	2	22
1976	0	na	2	na	0	11	2	24
1977	0	na	2	na	0	11	2	23
1978	0	na	2	na	0	8	2	23
1979	0	na	3	na	0	7	2	23
1980	0	na	5	na	0	6	1	22
1981	0	na	4	na	0	7	1	23
1982	0	na	2	na	0	7	1	24
1983	0	na	2	na	0	10	2	25
1984	0	na	2	na	0	10	1	24
1985	0	na	2	na	0	8	1	24
1986	0	na	2	na	0	7	2	25
1987	0	na	2	0	0	6	2	25
1988	0	na	2	0	0	6	2	24
1989	0	0	2	0	0	7	2	23
1990	0	0	3	0	0	6	2	23
1991	0	0	2	0	0	5	3	25
1992	0	0	2	0	0	7	2	24
1993	0	0	2	0	0	7	2	24
1994	0	0	2	0	0	7	3	23
1995	0	0	2	0	0	8	3	23
1996	0	0	2	0	0	10	3	22
1997	0	0	2	0	0	10	3	23
1998	0	0	2	0	0	8	4	23
1999	0	0	2	0	0	8	5	24
2000	1	0	2	0	0	9	3	23
2001	0	0	2	0	0	9	3	22
2002	1	0	2	0	0	9	3	23
2003	1	0	1	0	0	9	3	24
2004	1	0	1	0	0	11	3	23
2005	1	0	1	0	0	13	5	24
2006	0	0	1	0	0	12	4	24
2007	0	0	1	0	0	15	4	24

a. At farmgate undistorted prices

Appendix Table 5 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **Germany**, 1956 to 2007
(d) Trade status of of covered products^a[illegible]

	sheep meat	soybea n	sugar	sunflo wer	tomato	wheat	wine
1956	M	na	M	na	na	M	X
1957	M	na	M	na	na	M	X
1958	M	na	M	na	na	M	X
1959	M	na	M	na	na	M	X
1960	M	na	M	na	na	M	X
1961	M	na	M	na	na	M	X
1962	M	na	M	na	X	M	na
1963	M	na	M	na	X	M	na
1964	M	na	M	na	M	M	na
1965	M	na	M	na	M	M	na
1966	M	na	M	na	M	M	na
1967	M	na	M	na	M	M	na
1968	M	na	M	na	M	M	na
1969	M	na	M	na	M	M	na
1970	M	na	M	na	M	M	na
1971	M	na	M	na	M	M	na
1972	M	na	M	na	M	M	na
1973	M	na	M	na	M	M	X
1974	M	na	M	na	M	M	X
1975	M	na	M	na	M	M	X
1976	M	na	M	na	M	M	X
1977	M	na	M	na	M	M	X
1978	M	na	M	na	M	M	X
1979	M	na	M	na	M	M	X
1980	M	na	M	na	M	M	X
1981	M	na	M	na	M	M	X
1982	M	na	M	na	M	M	X
1983	M	na	M	na	M	M	X
1984	M	na	M	na	M	M	X
1985	M	na	M	na	M	M	X
1986	M	na	M	na	M	M	X
1987	M	na	M	M	M	M	X
1988	M	na	M	M	M	M	X
1989	M	M	M	M	X	M	X
1990	M	M	M	M	X	M	X
1991	M	M	M	M	X	M	X
1992	M	M	M	M	X	M	X
1993	M	M	M	M	X	M	X
1994	M	M	M	M	X	M	X
1995	M	M	M	M	X	M	X
1996	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
1997	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
1998	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
1999	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
2000	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
2001	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
2002	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
2003	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
2004	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
2005	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
2006	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
2007	M	M	M	M	X	X	X

a. Exportables (X), import-competing products (M) and nontradables (H).

Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on author's spreadsheet

Appendix Table 6: Annual distortion estimates, **Iceland**, 1979 to 2007

(a) Nominal rates of assistance to covered products

(percent)

	Beef	Egg	Milk	Pigmea t	Poultry	Sheep meat	Wool	All covere d
1979	74	296	430	146	552	192	0	219
1980	101	233	407	130	475	199	32	233
1981	143	268	344	168	466	137	50	192
1982	156	326	305	219	634	275	58	267
1983	134	290	291	209	682	207	23	225
1984	185	276	407	251	684	227	15	269
1985	267	243	1032	233	524	256	57	390
1986	203	456	592	337	624	167	39	279
1987	134	354	858	306	744	323	20	379
1988	103	463	387	427	629	352	2	298
1989	95	493	272	228	573	282	-8	237
1990	129	377	589	203	530	248	32	319
1991	234	355	538	276	497	314	70	373
1992	121	417	431	196	681	236	99	295
1993	64	372	449	297	660	109	97	207
1994	30	345	402	227	633	100	26	171
1995	33	420	276	176	615	139	39	172
1996	45	277	361	106	524	0	148	116
1997	99	279	299	112	521	0	128	115
1998	117	350	390	229	595	109	213	206
1999	128	395	395	339	571	108	185	214
2000	110	240	192	179	614	84	141	142
2001	95	153	133	95	494	75	153	115
2002	95	146	430	101	471	26	87	141
2003	94	171	378	85	377	20	115	135
2004	71	174	340	140	534	0	97	141
2005	108	288	422	182	648	3	148	162
2006	70	210	339	170	634	11	142	149
2007	57	177	154	197	516	14	170	113

Appendix Table 6 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **Iceland**, 1979 to 2007

(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all^a agricultural products, to exportable^b and import-competing^b agricultural industries, and relative^c to non-agricultural industries (percent)

	NRA, all agric products, ^a by component					NRA, agric tradables			NRA, all non-ag tradable goods (9)	RRA ^b (10)
	NRA, covered products (1)	NRA, non-covered products (2)	NRA, non-product-specific support (3)	NRA, all ag products (incl NPS and decoupled) (4)=1+2+3	NRA, all ag products (incl NPS and decoupled) (5)	NRA, ag exportables (6)	NRA, ag import-competing (7)	NRA, all agric tradable goods ^c (8)=6+7		
1979	219	219	10	229	229	na	229	229	10	199
1980	233	233	11	243	245	na	243	243	10	213
1981	192	192	10	202	202	na	202	202	10	175
1982	267	267	15	282	282	na	282	282	11	244
1983	225	225	17	242	243	na	242	242	11	209
1984	269	269	20	290	290	684	262	290	9	259
1985	390	390	43	434	435	292	411	434	9	392
1986	279	279	25	303	303	276	337	303	6	280
1987	379	379	26	405	408	341	539	405	6	376
1988	298	298	23	321	324	370	161	321	6	298
1989	237	237	27	264	266	226	246	264	6	243
1990	319	319	26	345	348	213	437	345	4	329
1991	373	373	21	394	397	418	288	394	4	376
1992	295	295	14	310	311	313	266	310	4	295
1993	207	207	9	216	216	70	264	216	4	204
1994	171	171	8	179	179	29	239	179	4	169
1995	172	172	7	179	179	218	156	179	4	169
1996	116	116	7	123	149	150	107	123	4	115
1997	115	115	6	121	147	49	234	121	6	109
1998	206	206	12	218	247	154	284	218	4	205
1999	214	214	9	223	253	157	377	223	4	210
2000	142	142	8	149	175	100	201	149	4	140
2001	115	115	7	122	155	107	126	122	3	115
2002	141	141	8	150	179	70	362	150	3	142
2003	135	135	10	146	179	60	277	146	3	139
2004	141	141	12	153	185	68	247	153	3	146
2005	162	162	16	178	211	83	308	178	2	172
2006	149	149	10	159	194	91	235	159	2	153
2007	113	113	8	121	155	96	131	121	2	116

a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and via inputs and other forms of non-product-specific (NPS) assistance without and (in column (5)) with decoupled support.

b. The Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA) is defined as $100 * [(100 + \text{NRA}_{\text{ag}}^t) / (100 + \text{NRA}_{\text{nonag}}^t) - 1]$, where NRA_{ag}^t and $\text{NRA}_{\text{nonag}}^t$ are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors (columns 8 and 9), respectively, so it excludes decoupled payments but includes all NPS support.

c. Including NPS but excluding decoupled payments, so more than the weighted average of columns (6) and (7).

Appendix Table 6 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **Iceland**, 1979 to 2007
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered^a and non-covered products,
(percent)

	Beef	Egg	Milk	Pigmea t	Poultry	Sheep meat	Wool	Non- covere d
1979	10	3	19	2	1	37	8	20
1980	7	4	20	3	1	39	6	20
1981	6	3	19	2	1	44	5	20
1982	6	4	25	3	1	37	5	20
1983	7	4	27	3	1	34	5	20
1984	6	4	23	4	1	34	7	20
1985	7	6	15	5	3	38	6	20
1986	8	3	17	4	2	42	6	19
1987	12	4	15	5	2	35	7	20
1988	12	2	27	4	1	26	9	20
1989	11	2	31	5	1	25	6	19
1990	13	3	23	7	2	32	5	15
1991	10	4	28	7	2	32	3	15
1992	15	3	32	8	2	18	5	17
1993	19	4	16	7	2	27	4	23
1994	19	4	15	8	2	24	6	24
1995	16	3	19	9	2	19	6	26
1996	13	3	13	9	2	30	2	28
1997	9	3	15	9	2	34	2	26
1998	10	2	16	7	3	37	2	23
1999	10	2	16	6	3	39	2	22
2000	9	2	22	7	2	42	2	13
2001	7	2	23	10	3	35	2	17
2002	7	3	14	9	3	38	1	24
2003	8	4	18	9	4	41	2	15
2004	10	3	21	9	3	34	3	18
2005	10	2	17	8	4	40	2	16
2006	12	3	20	10	4	37	2	12
2007	12	3	30	8	4	31	2	12

a. At farmgate undistorted prices

Appendix Table 6 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **Iceland**, 1979 to 2007
 (d) Trade status of covered products^a

	Beef	Egg	Milk	Pigme at	Poultr y	Sheep meat	Wool
1979	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1980	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1981	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1982	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1983	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1984	M	M	M	M	X	M	M
1985	M	X	M	X	X	M	M
1986	X	X	X	M	X	X	X
1987	M	X	M	X	X	X	H
1988	M	M	X	M	M	X	M
1989	X	M	M	M	M	X	M
1990	X	M	M	M	M	X	M
1991	M	M	X	M	M	X	H
1992	X	M	X	M	M	M	X
1993	X	M	M	M	M	M	X
1994	X	M	M	M	M	M	X
1995	M	X	M	X	X	M	X
1996	M	X	M	X	M	M	X
1997	X	M	M	M	X	X	X
1998	M	M	M	X	X	X	M
1999	X	M	M	X	X	X	M
2000	M	M	M	X	M	X	X
2001	M	M	M	X	X	X	X
2002	X	M	M	X	X	X	M
2003	M	M	M	X	X	X	X
2004	M	M	M	X	X	X	X
2005	M	M	M	X	X	X	X
2006	M	M	M	X	X	X	X
2007	M	M	M	X	X	X	X

a. Exportables (X), import-competing products (M) and nontradables (H).
 Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on author's spreadsheet

Appendix Table 7: Annual distortion estimates, **Ireland**, 1956 to 2007

(a) Nominal rates of assistance to covered products

(percent)

	Barle y	Beef	Egg	Milk	Oat	Pigm eat	Potat o	Poult ry	Rape seed	Shee pmea t	Suga r	Tom ato	Whe at	All cover ed
1956	6	na	na	5	1	36	na	na	na	na	257	na	11	16
1957	22	na	na	25	6	36	na	na	na	na	153	na	21	28
1958	35	na	na	-5	11	35	na	na	na	na	269	na	23	22
1959	25	na	na	11	16	36	na	na	na	na	314	na	27	31
1960	21	na	na	-9	3	25	na	na	na	na	295	na	21	21
1961	41	na	na	25	27	41	127	na	na	na	322	na	27	62
1962	27	na	na	40	19	91	95	na	na	na	316	na	59	70
1963	24	na	na	10	16	68	126	na	na	na	51	na	53	57
1964	16	na	na	-13	23	66	167	na	na	na	143	na	44	54
1965	9	na	na	-3	17	114	141	na	na	na	556	na	51	68
1966	9	na	na	-10	14	96	141	na	na	na	687	na	58	61
1967	20	na	na	-7	17	103	144	na	na	na	508	na	56	65
1968	39	na	na	-4	22	145	153	na	na	na	364	na	57	77
1969	9	na	na	-11	13	144	139	na	na	na	295	na	29	61
1970	5	na	na	-14	8	149	138	na	na	na	171	na	-2	55
1971	24	na	na	-20	0	183	121	na	na	na	91	na	17	60
1972	-17	na	na	-31	-14	205	109	na	na	na	53	na	-21	41
1973	-7	34	-17	208	0	106	57	74	na	322	-30	22	-30	74
1974	3	-4	30	210	7	69	18	54	na	255	-51	22	-23	42
1975	23	11	16	264	23	65	49	60	0	267	28	22	-9	62
1976	20	26	5	366	10	122	327	69	0	342	99	22	-16	109
1977	56	11	41	598	35	65	71	61	0	281	230	22	-21	87
1978	49	11	13	488	74	78	-15	49	0	263	230	22	23	88
1979	75	0	41	440	80	109	17	38	0	230	70	22	35	81
1980	17	-1	22	434	-27	71	7	37	0	207	13	22	45	60
1981	7	23	2	330	-2	148	73	72	0	183	74	11	44	94
1982	8	49	18	313	22	125	95	99	0	181	152	31	51	109
1983	32	264	40	287	-1	129	87	73	0	203	196	19	28	177
1984	6	265	3	311	8	81	-24	95	0	172	268	26	20	152
1985	18	293	8	282	-6	22	11	91	0	95	297	26	31	161
1986	157	188	31	361	83	40	17	79	153	134	247	17	119	194
1987	233	107	21	533	77	11	17	90	145	211	301	15	143	180
1988	85	80	21	192	14	34	17	69	112	215	201	15	94	112
1989	45	79	29	84	15	14	17	66	140	167	90	0	31	73
1990	94	98	12	125	48	7	16	100	200	154	109	2	57	96
1991	119	157	13	128	39	20	16	83	97	128	191	0	146	116
1992	103	93	15	118	63	0	17	118	0	112	212	0	65	87
1993	105	63	10	123	44	18	17	110	0	38	169	8	58	77
1994	100	53	0	117	43	18	16	114	0	55	129	11	48	72
1995	41	69	12	79	40	16	15	129	0	77	119	0	16	64
1996	2	68	5	70	34	16	14	77	0	45	140	2	0	54
1997	7	117	1	78	25	13	12	55	0	27	147	0	0	67
1998	64	121	11	100	50	22	11	51	0	38	186	0	26	85
1999	44	125	16	106	84	57	11	90	0	37	245	0	37	93
2000	3	113	3	57	59	32	10	57	1	26	176	0	11	63
2001	0	140	0	40	29	24	10	52	0	48	138	0	4	56
2002	0	157	0	75	0	24	10	56	0	35	161	0	0	75
2003	1	157	0	70	1	33	10	54	0	46	240	2	2	76
2004	1	92	0	62	23	27	10	101	0	33	238	2	2	59
2005	0	109	0	33	24	19	10	69	0	54	168	0	0	57
2006	0	81	0	25	0	14	10	69	0	74	62	0	0	37
2007	0	71	0	0	0	17	10	100	0	68	99	0	0	24

Appendix Table 7 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **Ireland**, 1956 to 2007

(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all^a agricultural products, to exportable^b and import-competing^b agricultural industries, and relative^c to non-agricultural industries (percent)

	NRA, all agric products, ^a by component					NRA, agric tradables			NRA, all non-ag tradable goods (9)	RRA ^b (10)
	NRA, covered products (1)	NRA, non-covered products (2)	NRA, non-product-specific support (3)	NRA, all ag products (incl NPS and decoupled) (4)=1+2+3 (5)	NRA, all ag products (incl NPS and decoupled) (5)	NRA, ag exportables (6)	NRA, ag import-competing (7)	NRA, all agric tradable goods ^c (8)=6+7		
1956	16	6	na	14	14	13	14	14	12	1
1957	28	11	na	23	23	24	23	23	13	9
1958	22	11	na	19	19	10	32	19	12	6
1959	31	13	na	26	26	18	34	26	11	14
1960	21	9	na	17	17	7	27	17	9	7
1961	62	20	na	48	48	56	38	48	9	37
1962	70	22	na	54	54	64	41	54	9	42
1963	57	16	na	43	43	55	26	43	8	32
1964	54	16	na	41	41	47	30	41	8	30
1965	68	18	na	50	50	62	32	50	8	39
1966	61	17	na	44	44	52	31	44	9	32
1967	65	19	na	47	47	52	41	47	9	35
1968	77	24	na	58	58	62	50	58	8	46
1969	61	16	na	45	45	58	26	45	7	35
1970	55	12	na	39	39	58	14	39	7	30
1971	60	14	na	43	43	58	23	43	7	34
1972	41	5	na	28	28	55	-7	28	7	20
1973	74	41	na	66	66	29	76	66	6	57
1974	42	33	na	40	40	33	42	40	3	36
1975	62	48	na	59	59	58	59	59	5	51
1976	109	76	na	102	102	125	98	102	1	100
1977	87	71	na	83	83	94	81	83	0	82
1978	88	71	na	84	84	92	82	84	0	83
1979	81	70	12	91	92	105	73	91	0	90
1980	60	65	12	73	75	68	60	73	0	72
1981	94	68	10	98	100	56	99	98	0	97
1982	109	71	10	110	112	57	115	110	0	109
1983	177	90	9	163	165	69	183	163	1	161
1984	152	78	8	141	143	46	167	141	1	140
1985	161	83	10	150	153	61	166	150	1	149
1986	194	104	3	173	175	130	176	173	0	172
1987	180	112	3	166	168	167	162	166	0	165
1988	112	59	3	102	105	77	102	102	1	101
1989	73	36	3	66	70	36	68	66	1	66
1990	96	48	4	87	91	52	88	87	0	86
1991	116	57	5	105	110	54	107	105	0	104
1992	87	45	5	81	89	51	80	81	0	81
1993	77	41	5	73	85	54	70	73	1	72
1994	72	38	4	68	83	50	66	68	1	67
1995	64	32	5	61	77	35	59	61	1	60
1996	54	27	4	51	67	18	54	51	1	50
1997	67	33	4	63	79	23	67	63	1	62
1998	85	42	4	78	95	39	80	78	1	77
1999	93	46	4	85	102	44	87	85	1	84
2000	63	31	3	58	76	18	64	58	1	58
2001	56	29	4	53	70	12	58	53	1	52
2002	75	37	5	70	87	20	77	70	1	69
2003	76	39	5	71	91	18	80	71	1	70
2004	59	28	4	55	73	13	61	55	1	54
2005	57	28	4	47	66	0	67	47	1	47
2006	37	19	4	33	54	0	42	33	1	32
2007	24	12	4	22	41	0	30	22	1	22

- a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and via inputs and other forms of non-product-specific (NPS) assistance without and (in column (5)) with decoupled support.
- b. The Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA) is defined as $100 * [(100 + \text{NRA}_{\text{ag}}^t) / (100 + \text{NRA}_{\text{nonag}}^t) - 1]$, where NRA_{ag}^t and $\text{NRA}_{\text{nonag}}^t$ are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors (columns 8 and 9), respectively, so it excludes decoupled payments but includes all NPS support.
- c. Including NPS but excluding decoupled payments, so more than the weighted average of columns (6) and (7).

Appendix Table 7 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **Ireland**, 1956 to 2007
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered^a and non-covered products,
(percent)

	Barle y	Beef	Egg	Milk	Oat	Pigm eat	Potat o	Poult ry	Rape seed	Shee pmea t	Suga r	Tom ato	Whe at	Non- cover ed
1956	8	na	na	23	15	14	na	na	na	na	1	na	12	27
1957	9	na	na	21	11	15	na	na	na	na	3	na	14	28
1958	7	na	na	26	11	19	na	na	na	na	2	na	9	27
1959	10	na	na	21	11	18	na	na	na	na	2	na	10	28
1960	9	na	na	16	11	20	na	na	na	na	2	na	12	31
1961	8	na	na	10	6	16	16	na	na	na	1	na	10	33
1962	10	na	na	9	7	13	19	na	na	na	2	na	7	33
1963	10	na	na	12	6	14	15	na	na	na	4	na	5	34
1964	10	na	na	16	5	16	11	na	na	na	3	na	5	35
1965	11	na	na	15	5	15	13	na	na	na	1	na	4	36
1966	11	na	na	16	5	14	13	na	na	na	1	na	3	37
1967	10	na	na	17	5	11	13	na	na	na	1	na	5	38
1968	10	na	na	18	4	12	11	na	na	na	2	na	7	37
1969	12	na	na	18	4	14	10	na	na	na	2	na	6	36
1970	12	na	na	17	3	13	10	na	na	na	2	na	7	36
1971	11	na	na	17	3	12	10	na	na	na	4	na	6	37
1972	15	na	na	18	3	13	7	na	na	na	3	na	6	36
1973	9	23	3	13	2	7	6	2	na	4	4	1	4	23
1974	8	36	2	11	1	6	4	1	na	3	3	1	3	21
1975	7	41	2	10	1	5	4	1	0	3	2	1	2	21
1976	8	35	2	11	1	5	5	2	0	3	2	1	3	23
1977	8	41	1	7	1	6	6	2	0	3	1	1	3	22
1978	8	42	2	9	1	6	4	2	0	3	1	1	2	21
1979	7	43	1	10	0	5	4	2	0	3	2	1	2	21
1980	10	43	1	8	1	5	3	2	0	3	2	1	1	19
1981	13	31	2	14	1	5	2	2	0	4	2	1	2	22
1982	13	29	1	15	1	5	3	2	0	4	1	0	2	23
1983	13	15	2	21	1	6	4	3	0	4	2	1	4	27
1984	15	14	2	18	1	6	5	2	0	4	1	0	5	26
1985	11	15	2	21	1	8	3	2	0	5	1	0	4	26
1986	6	26	1	19	1	8	3	3	0	5	1	0	2	26
1987	4	33	2	13	1	9	4	3	0	3	1	0	2	25
1988	5	29	1	22	1	5	2	3	0	3	1	0	2	25
1989	5	23	1	30	1	6	2	2	0	3	1	0	2	24
1990	4	24	1	25	1	8	3	2	0	4	1	0	2	25
1991	3	20	1	26	1	8	3	2	0	5	1	0	2	27
1992	3	24	1	24	0	10	2	2	0	5	1	0	2	25
1993	2	27	1	24	0	7	1	2	0	8	1	0	2	24
1994	2	25	1	25	0	8	3	2	0	7	1	0	2	24
1995	3	24	1	28	0	7	4	1	0	5	1	0	2	24
1996	4	22	1	27	0	8	2	2	0	6	1	0	3	24
1997	4	20	1	27	0	9	1	2	0	7	1	0	3	25
1998	2	23	1	26	0	7	2	2	0	7	1	0	2	26
1999	3	24	1	25	0	6	3	2	0	7	1	0	2	26
2000	4	20	1	29	0	7	1	2	0	7	1	0	2	25
2001	4	15	1	34	0	9	1	2	0	6	1	0	2	24
2002	3	16	1	30	1	8	2	3	0	7	1	0	3	26
2003	4	17	1	30	0	6	2	3	0	6	1	0	3	27
2004	4	19	1	31	0	6	2	2	0	6	1	0	3	25
2005	6	27	2	6	0	12	2	4	0	10	1	0	5	24
2006	5	17	2	30	1	7	2	2	0	6	0	0	4	24
2007	9	15	1	28	1	7	3	2	0	6	0	0	5	24

a. At farmgate undistorted prices

Appendix Table 7 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **Ireland**, 1956 to 2007
 (d) Trade status of covered products^a

	Barle y	Beef	Egg	Milk	Oat	Pigm eat	Potat o	Poult ry	Rape seed	Shee pmea t	Sugar	Toma to	Whea t
1956	M	na	na	X	M	X	na	na	na	na	M	na	M
1957	M	na	na	X	M	X	na	na	na	na	M	na	M
1958	M	na	na	X	M	X	na	na	na	na	M	na	M
1959	M	na	na	X	M	X	na	na	na	na	M	na	M
1960	M	na	na	X	M	X	na	na	na	na	M	na	M
1961	M	na	na	X	M	X	X	na	na	na	M	na	M
1962	M	na	na	X	M	X	X	na	na	na	M	na	M
1963	M	na	na	X	M	X	X	na	na	na	M	na	M
1964	M	na	na	X	M	X	X	na	na	na	M	na	M
1965	M	na	na	X	M	X	X	na	na	na	M	na	M
1966	M	na	na	X	M	X	X	na	na	na	M	na	M
1967	M	na	na	X	M	X	X	na	na	na	M	na	M
1968	M	na	na	X	M	X	X	na	na	na	M	na	M
1969	M	na	na	X	M	X	X	na	na	na	M	na	M
1970	M	na	na	X	M	X	X	na	na	na	M	na	M
1971	M	na	na	X	M	X	X	na	na	na	M	na	M
1972	M	na	na	X	M	X	X	na	na	na	M	na	M
1973	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	M
1974	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	M
1975	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1976	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1977	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1978	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1979	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1980	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1981	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1982	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1983	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1984	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1985	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1986	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1987	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1988	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1989	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M
1990	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M
1991	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M
1992	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	M
1993	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	M
1994	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M
1995	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M
1996	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X
1997	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X
1998	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X
1999	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X
2000	X	M	X	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X
2001	X	M	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	X
2002	X	M	X	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X
2003	X	M	X	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X
2004	X	M	X	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X
2005	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X
2006	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X
2007	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X

a. Exportables (X), import-competing products (M) and nontradables (H).

Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on author's spreadsheet

Appendix Table 7: Annual distortion estimates, **Italy**, 1956 to 2007

(a) Nominal rates of assistance to covered products

	(percent)									
	Barley	Beef	Egg	Maize	Milk	Oat	Pigeon	Potato	Poultry	Rapeseed
1956	-12	-25	5	-17	211	-61	26	na	25	-38
1957	1	-9	24	-24	284	-72	24	na	16	-33
1958	13	-2	25	-11	215	-69	16	na	3	-28
1959	4	-7	6	-21	264	-64	15	na	-8	-38
1960	1	26	7	-23	224	-60	1	na	-2	-35
1961	17	4	10	-1	325	-61	11	na	-5	-43
1962	75	127	22	47	421	49	120	na	80	0
1963	69	103	11	44	339	51	117	na	73	0
1964	60	86	25	41	277	41	87	na	57	0
1965	52	62	32	45	320	48	133	na	61	0
1966	54	51	16	36	296	42	149	na	59	0
1967	69	53	15	49	310	43	129	na	51	0
1968	99	73	20	77	337	54	132	na	51	0
1969	54	73	16	66	307	41	152	na	48	0
1970	54	71	-4	41	308	48	142	na	43	0
1971	89	69	3	48	317	31	136	na	162	0
1972	37	89	-5	73	300	14	114	54	106	0
1973	-7	34	-17	19	208	0	106	57	74	0
1974	3	-4	30	2	210	7	69	18	54	0
1975	23	11	16	22	264	23	65	49	60	0
1976	20	26	5	39	366	10	122	327	69	0
1977	56	11	41	72	598	35	65	71	61	0
1978	49	11	13	81	488	74	78	-15	49	0
1979	75	0	41	67	440	80	109	17	38	0
1980	17	-1	22	62	434	-27	71	7	37	0
1981	7	23	2	43	330	-2	148	73	72	0
1982	8	49	18	66	313	22	125	95	99	0
1983	32	264	40	29	287	-1	129	87	73	0
1984	6	265	3	15	311	8	81	-24	95	0
1985	18	293	8	28	282	-6	22	11	91	0
1986	157	188	31	110	361	83	40	17	79	153
1987	233	107	21	170	533	77	11	17	90	145
1988	85	80	21	79	192	14	34	17	69	112
1989	45	79	29	62	84	15	14	17	66	140
1990	94	98	12	108	125	48	7	16	100	200
1991	119	157	13	120	128	39	20	16	83	97
1992	103	93	15	103	118	63	0	17	118	0
1993	105	63	10	69	123	44	18	17	110	0
1994	100	53	0	45	117	43	18	16	114	0
1995	41	69	12	53	79	40	16	15	129	0
1996	2	68	5	14	70	34	16	14	77	0
1997	7	117	1	19	78	25	13	12	55	0
1998	64	121	11	32	100	50	22	11	51	0
1999	44	125	16	39	106	84	57	11	90	0
2000	3	113	3	27	57	59	32	10	57	1
2001	0	140	0	14	40	29	24	10	52	0
2002	0	157	0	9	75	0	24	10	56	0
2003	1	157	0	34	70	1	33	10	54	0
2004	1	92	0	39	62	23	27	10	101	0
2005	0	109	0	19	33	24	19	10	69	0
2006	0	86	0	19	24	0	14	10	69	0
2007	0	66	0	23	0	0	17	10	99	0

	Rice	Sheep meat	Soybea n	Sugar	Sunflo wer	Tomato	Wheat	Wine	All cover ed
1956	-53	89	14	-11	5	1	15	-43	4
1957	-54	99	13	-31	15	-2	6	-53	-1
1958	-59	126	13	46	20	23	-3	2	23
1959	-81	120	12	59	9	-13	7	-52	-3
1960	-89	105	12	-30	9	11	23	-53	0
1961	-87	117	11	12	3	-6	9	-33	12
1962	-15	279	na	185	0	22	78	4	52
1963	-20	231	na	13	0	22	86	4	46
1964	-19	226	na	63	0	22	70	4	45
1965	8	203	na	330	0	22	74	4	51
1966	-12	372	na	410	0	22	63	4	49
1967	-24	373	na	319	0	22	64	4	47
1968	-2	382	na	232	0	22	73	4	55
1969	25	386	na	183	0	22	62	4	49
1970	43	372	na	100	0	22	24	4	42
1971	-12	367	na	47	0	22	55	4	50
1972	-31	385	na	46	0	22	-2	4	44
1973	-61	322	0	-30	0	22	-30	4	17
1974	-55	255	0	-51	0	22	-23	4	12
1975	-19	267	0	28	0	22	-9	4	26
1976	0	342	0	99	0	22	-16	4	40
1977	-10	281	0	230	0	22	-21	4	38
1978	16	263	0	230	0	22	23	4	40
1979	-15	230	0	70	0	22	35	4	37
1980	-38	207	0	13	0	22	45	4	34
1981	1	183	0	74	0	11	44	17	51
1982	17	181	0	152	0	31	51	15	64
1983	-10	203	0	196	0	19	28	10	65
1984	41	172	0	268	0	26	20	7	58
1985	105	95	0	297	0	26	31	-25	48
1986	127	134	211	247	144	17	119	9	74
1987	190	211	169	301	150	15	143	9	74
1988	162	215	108	201	96	15	94	7	57
1989	148	167	118	90	150	0	31	6	36
1990	152	154	147	109	143	2	57	8	44
1991	144	128	159	191	111	0	146	9	51
1992	143	112	0	212	0	0	65	13	42
1993	106	38	0	169	0	8	58	13	42
1994	133	55	0	129	0	11	48	10	37
1995	88	77	0	119	0	0	16	4	31
1996	33	45	0	140	0	2	0	4	23
1997	31	27	0	147	0	0	0	5	27
1998	18	38	0	186	0	0	26	3	30
1999	0	37	0	245	0	0	37	2	33
2000	1	26	0	176	0	0	11	2	24
2001	42	48	0	138	0	0	4	2	22
2002	24	35	0	161	0	0	0	2	26
2003	18	46	0	240	0	2	2	2	27
2004	1	33	0	238	0	2	2	1	23
2005	2	54	0	168	0	0	0	2	10
2006	3	74	0	66	0	0	0	1	8
2007	1	68	0	99	0	0	0	1	8

Appendix Table 7 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **Italy**, 1956 to 2007

(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all^a agricultural products, to exportable^b and import-competing^b agricultural industries, and relative^c to non-agricultural industries (percent)

	NRA, all agric products, ^a by component					NRA, agric tradables			NRA, all non-ag tradable goods (9)	RRA ^b (10)
	NRA, covered products (1)	NRA, non-covered products (2)	NRA, non-product-specific support (3)	NRA, all ag products (incl NPS and decoupled) (4)=1+2+3 (5)	NRA, all ag products (incl NPS and decoupled) (5)	NRA, ag exportables (6)	NRA, ag import-competing (7)	NRA, all agric tradable goods ^c (8)=6+7		
1956	4	2	na	3	3	-35	36	3	3	0
1957	-1	1	na	-1	-1	-43	41	-1	3	-4
1958	23	10	na	20	20	-1	36	20	4	15
1959	-3	1	na	-2	-2	-45	43	-2	4	-5
1960	0	2	na	0	0	-45	50	0	3	-3
1961	12	7	na	11	11	-31	52	11	3	8
1962	52	47	na	51	51	14	101	51	3	47
1963	46	39	na	45	45	13	83	45	3	41
1964	45	37	na	44	44	12	67	44	3	39
1965	51	41	na	49	49	14	75	49	2	46
1966	49	38	na	47	47	13	69	47	2	44
1967	47	37	na	45	45	11	69	45	2	42
1968	55	42	na	52	52	13	79	52	2	50
1969	49	40	na	47	47	13	72	47	1	45
1970	42	32	na	40	40	11	58	40	1	38
1971	50	38	na	48	48	13	70	48	1	46
1972	44	31	na	42	42	9	60	42	1	40
1973	17	11	na	16	16	-1	27	16	1	15
1974	12	9	na	12	12	1	17	12	1	11
1975	26	19	na	24	24	8	33	24	1	24
1976	40	26	na	37	37	12	47	37	0	37
1977	38	28	na	37	37	13	48	37	0	36
1978	40	30	na	38	38	15	50	38	0	38
1979	37	31	12	48	50	15	47	48	0	48
1980	34	28	12	45	47	14	40	45	0	45
1981	51	34	10	58	59	28	55	58	0	58
1982	64	42	9	69	71	29	72	69	0	69
1983	65	42	9	69	72	21	79	69	0	69
1984	58	37	8	62	64	20	69	62	0	62
1985	48	39	10	56	59	2	67	56	0	56
1986	74	55	3	74	76	31	90	74	0	74
1987	74	58	3	74	77	36	87	74	0	74
1988	57	40	3	58	60	27	66	58	0	58
1989	36	23	3	36	39	11	53	36	0	36
1990	44	30	4	45	48	15	66	45	0	45
1991	51	36	5	54	58	15	82	54	0	54
1992	42	32	5	45	52	18	61	45	0	45
1993	42	31	5	45	58	20	58	45	0	45
1994	37	28	4	39	54	18	51	39	0	39
1995	31	24	5	34	51	10	47	34	0	34
1996	23	16	4	25	42	7	38	25	0	25
1997	27	19	4	30	46	7	44	30	0	30
1998	30	23	4	33	49	8	54	33	0	33
1999	33	27	4	36	53	9	66	36	0	36
2000	24	17	3	26	43	5	47	26	0	26
2001	22	15	4	24	41	4	40	24	0	24
2002	26	18	5	29	46	5	50	29	0	29
2003	27	19	5	30	49	5	55	30	0	30
2004	23	18	4	27	45	4	49	27	0	27
2005	10	5	4	12	31	1	31	12	0	12
2006	8	5	4	11	32	1	24	11	0	11
2007	8	4	4	10	29	0	21	10	0	10

- a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and via inputs and other forms of non-product-specific (NPS) assistance without and (in column (5)) with decoupled support.
- b. The Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA) is defined as $100 * [(100 + \text{NRA}_{\text{ag}}^t) / (100 + \text{NRA}_{\text{nonag}}^t) - 1]$, where NRA_{ag}^t and $\text{NRA}_{\text{nonag}}^t$ are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors (columns 8 and 9), respectively, so it excludes decoupled payments but includes all NPS support.
- c. Including NPS but excluding decoupled payments, so more than the weighted average of columns (6) and (7).

Appendix Table 7 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **Italy**, 1956 to 2007(c) Value shares of primary production of covered^a and non-covered products,

(percent)

	Barley	Beef	Egg	Maize	Milk	Oat	Pigmea t	Potato	Poultry	Rapese ed
1956	1	2	1	6	7	1	5	na	0	0
1957	1	2	1	5	6	1	5	na	1	0
1958	1	2	1	5	9	1	5	na	1	0
1959	1	2	1	5	7	1	5	na	1	0
1960	0	2	1	5	8	1	6	na	1	0
1961	0	2	1	4	6	1	6	na	1	0
1962	0	5	4	3	3	1	3	na	3	0
1963	0	6	5	4	3	1	3	na	4	0
1964	0	6	4	4	4	0	4	na	4	0
1965	0	8	5	4	4	1	3	na	5	0
1966	0	9	5	4	4	0	3	na	5	0
1967	0	10	4	4	4	1	3	na	4	0
1968	0	10	4	3	4	0	3	na	5	0
1969	0	10	4	4	3	0	3	na	4	0
1970	0	10	5	4	3	0	3	na	4	0
1971	0	11	5	4	4	0	3	na	3	0
1972	0	10	5	3	4	0	4	1	3	0
1973	0	10	5	4	3	0	3	1	3	0
1974	0	13	3	5	3	0	3	1	4	0
1975	0	11	3	5	3	0	4	1	4	0
1976	1	12	4	5	3	0	4	1	4	0
1977	0	14	3	5	2	0	6	1	5	0
1978	1	13	4	4	2	0	5	1	5	0
1979	0	15	2	4	3	0	4	1	5	0
1980	1	16	3	4	3	1	5	1	5	0
1981	1	14	4	6	4	0	5	1	5	0
1982	1	13	4	6	5	0	5	1	5	0
1983	1	5	3	7	4	0	5	1	5	0
1984	2	5	3	7	4	0	6	1	4	0
1985	1	5	3	6	4	0	8	1	4	0
1986	1	7	3	4	4	0	7	1	5	0
1987	1	9	3	3	3	0	9	1	4	0
1988	1	10	3	4	6	0	7	1	5	0
1989	1	8	2	3	8	0	8	1	4	0
1990	1	8	3	3	7	0	9	1	3	0
1991	1	6	3	3	7	0	8	1	4	0
1992	1	8	3	3	7	0	10	1	3	0
1993	1	10	3	4	8	0	8	1	3	0
1994	0	10	3	4	7	0	7	1	3	0
1995	1	9	2	4	9	0	7	2	2	0
1996	1	7	3	5	8	0	8	1	3	0
1997	1	6	3	5	9	0	9	1	4	0
1998	0	6	2	4	8	0	6	1	3	0
1999	0	6	2	4	8	0	4	1	2	0
2000	1	6	3	5	10	0	6	1	3	0
2001	1	4	3	5	11	0	8	1	3	0
2002	1	5	3	6	9	0	7	1	3	0
2003	0	5	4	4	9	0	7	1	3	0
2004	1	6	3	5	9	0	7	1	2	0
2005	1	2	3	4	3	0	7	1	1	0
2006	1	3	3	4	3	0	8	1	1	0
2007	1	3	2	5	7	0	6	1	1	0

	Rice	Sheep meat	Soybea n	Sugar	Sunflo wer	Tomato	Wheat	Wine	Non- covere d
1956	3	1	0	0	0	2	19	30	22
1957	3	1	0	0	0	3	17	34	21
1958	3	1	0	0	0	4	21	24	23
1959	3	1	0	0	0	3	16	35	21
1960	3	1	0	0	0	3	13	36	21
1961	3	1	0	0	0	4	16	31	22
1962	2	1	na	1	0	9	11	38	16
1963	2	1	na	2	0	9	9	36	16
1964	2	1	na	1	0	11	9	33	16
1965	1	1	na	1	0	10	10	33	17
1966	1	0	na	1	0	11	10	29	17
1967	2	0	na	1	0	10	10	31	17
1968	2	0	na	1	0	10	9	30	17
1969	1	0	na	1	0	10	9	32	17
1970	1	0	na	1	0	9	11	29	17
1971	2	0	na	2	0	10	10	28	17
1972	2	0	na	2	0	9	13	24	18
1973	4	0	0	2	0	9	12	25	16
1974	3	0	0	3	0	11	12	22	16
1975	2	0	0	2	0	11	11	24	17
1976	2	0	0	2	0	11	13	18	19
1977	2	1	0	1	0	11	10	21	18
1978	2	1	0	1	0	13	9	22	18
1979	2	1	0	2	0	14	7	22	17
1980	2	1	0	3	0	15	7	15	18
1981	2	1	0	3	0	14	8	12	20
1982	2	1	0	1	0	13	8	16	20
1983	2	1	0	1	0	17	8	18	20
1984	2	1	0	1	0	18	9	17	20
1985	1	1	0	1	0	18	7	21	19
1986	1	1	1	1	1	17	5	23	18
1987	1	1	2	1	0	16	5	22	19
1988	1	1	2	1	1	14	4	20	19
1989	1	1	2	2	0	17	5	20	18
1990	1	1	2	1	0	18	4	20	18
1991	1	1	1	1	0	19	4	21	19
1992	1	1	1	1	0	15	4	22	18
1993	1	1	1	1	0	15	4	20	18
1994	1	1	1	1	1	16	4	22	18
1995	1	1	1	1	1	14	4	23	18
1996	2	1	1	1	0	16	5	21	18
1997	2	1	1	1	1	15	4	20	18
1998	2	1	1	1	1	17	4	25	17
1999	2	1	1	1	0	20	3	25	18
2000	2	1	1	1	0	21	3	20	18
2001	1	1	1	1	0	17	3	21	18
2002	1	1	1	1	0	18	4	22	18
2003	1	1	0	0	0	20	3	22	19
2004	2	1	1	1	0	17	4	23	19
2005	1	0	1	0	0	20	4	28	24
2006	2	0	1	0	0	18	4	27	24
2007	2	0	1	0	0	18	6	21	24

a. At farmgate undistorted prices

Appendix Table 7 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **Italy**, 1956 to 2007(d) Trade status of covered products^a[illegible]

	Rice	Sheep meat	Soybe an	Sugar	Sunflo wer	Tomat o	Wheat	Wine
1956	X	M	M	M	M	X	M	X
1957	X	M	M	M	M	X	M	X
1958	X	M	M	M	M	X	M	X
1959	X	M	M	M	M	X	M	X
1960	X	M	M	M	M	X	M	X
1961	X	M	M	M	M	X	M	X
1962	X	M	na	M	M	X	M	X
1963	X	M	na	M	M	X	M	X
1964	X	M	na	M	M	M	M	X
1965	X	M	na	M	M	M	M	X
1966	X	M	na	M	M	M	M	X
1967	X	M	na	M	M	M	M	X
1968	X	M	na	M	M	M	M	X
1969	X	M	na	M	M	M	M	X
1970	X	M	na	M	M	M	M	X
1971	X	M	na	M	M	M	M	X
1972	X	M	na	M	M	M	M	X
1973	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	X
1974	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	X
1975	X	M	M	M	X	M	M	X
1976	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	X
1977	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	X
1978	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	X
1979	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	X
1980	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	X
1981	X	M	M	M	X	M	M	X
1982	X	M	M	M	X	M	M	X
1983	X	M	M	M	X	M	M	X
1984	X	M	M	M	X	M	M	X
1985	X	M	M	M	X	M	M	X
1986	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	X
1987	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	X
1988	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	X
1989	X	M	M	M	M	X	M	X
1990	X	M	M	M	M	X	M	X
1991	X	M	M	M	M	X	M	X
1992	X	M	M	M	M	X	M	X
1993	X	M	M	M	M	X	M	X
1994	X	M	M	M	M	X	M	X
1995	X	M	M	M	M	X	M	X
1996	X	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
1997	X	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
1998	X	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
1999	X	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
2000	X	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
2001	X	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
2002	X	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
2003	X	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
2004	X	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
2005	X	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
2006	X	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
2007	X	M	M	M	M	X	X	X

a. Exportables (X), import-competing products (M) and nontradables (H).

Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on author's spreadsheet

Appendix Table 8: Annual distortion estimates, **Netherlands**, 1956 to 2007

(a) Nominal rates of assistance to covered products

(percent)

	Barle y	Beef	Egg	Maiz e	Milk	Oat	Pigm eat	Potat o	Poult ry	Rape seed	Shee pmea t	Suga r	Tom ato	Whe at	All cove red
1956	-23	61	-32	na	149	1	43	na	82	na	110	103	53	-48	46
1957	-12	89	-25	na	221	6	54	na	72	na	97	48	41	-67	61
1958	5	82	-15	na	121	11	39	na	74	na	38	125	28	-68	48
1959	-9	86	-24	na	204	16	52	na	70	na	7	163	30	-82	58
1960	2	114	-25	na	132	3	35	na	67	na	16	164	33	-73	45
1961	-9	100	-28	na	244	27	52	na	38	na	73	173	36	-88	61
1962	75	127	22	47	421	49	120	na	80	0	279	185	22	78	135
1963	69	103	11	44	339	51	117	na	73	0	231	13	22	86	114
1964	60	86	25	41	277	41	87	na	57	0	226	63	22	70	105
1965	52	62	32	45	320	48	133	na	61	0	203	330	22	74	123
1966	54	51	16	36	296	42	149	na	59	0	372	410	22	63	118
1967	69	53	15	49	310	43	129	na	51	0	373	319	22	64	117
1968	99	73	20	77	337	54	132	na	51	0	382	232	22	73	128
1969	54	73	16	66	307	41	152	na	48	0	386	183	22	62	121
1970	54	71	-4	41	308	48	142	na	43	0	372	100	22	24	110
1971	89	69	3	48	317	31	136	na	162	0	367	47	22	55	125
1972	37	89	-5	73	300	14	114	54	106	0	385	46	22	-2	107
1973	-7	34	-17	19	208	0	106	57	74	0	322	-30	22	-30	68
1974	3	-4	30	2	210	7	69	18	54	0	255	-51	22	-23	50
1975	23	11	16	22	264	23	65	49	60	0	267	28	22	-9	75
1976	20	26	5	39	366	10	122	327	69	0	342	99	22	-16	128
1977	56	11	41	72	598	35	65	71	61	0	281	230	22	-21	101
1978	49	11	13	81	488	74	78	-15	49	0	263	230	22	23	91
1979	75	0	41	67	440	80	109	17	38	0	230	70	22	35	93
1980	17	-1	22	62	434	-27	71	7	37	0	207	13	22	45	75
1981	7	23	2	43	330	-2	148	73	72	0	183	74	11	44	107
1982	8	49	18	66	313	22	125	95	99	0	181	152	31	51	122
1983	32	264	40	29	287	-1	129	87	73	0	203	196	19	28	145
1984	6	265	3	15	311	8	81	-24	95	0	172	268	26	20	110
1985	18	293	8	28	282	-6	22	11	91	0	95	297	26	31	93
1986	157	188	31	110	361	83	40	17	79	153	134	247	17	119	114
1987	233	107	21	170	533	77	11	17	90	145	211	301	15	143	95
1988	85	80	21	79	192	14	34	17	69	112	215	201	15	94	78
1989	45	79	29	62	84	15	14	17	66	140	167	90	0	31	46
1990	94	98	12	108	125	48	7	16	100	200	154	109	2	57	51
1991	119	157	13	120	128	39	20	16	83	97	128	191	0	146	63
1992	103	93	15	103	118	63	0	17	118	0	112	212	0	65	52
1993	105	63	10	69	123	44	18	17	110	0	38	169	8	58	58
1994	100	53	0	45	117	43	18	16	114	0	55	129	11	48	51
1995	41	69	12	53	79	40	16	15	129	0	77	119	0	16	44
1996	2	68	5	14	70	34	16	14	77	0	45	140	2	0	41
1997	7	117	1	19	78	25	13	12	55	0	27	147	0	0	45
1998	64	121	11	32	100	50	22	11	51	0	38	186	0	26	55
1999	44	125	16	39	106	84	57	11	90	0	37	245	0	37	66
2000	3	113	3	27	57	59	32	10	57	1	26	176	0	11	44
2001	0	140	0	14	40	29	24	10	52	0	48	138	0	4	34
2002	0	157	0	9	75	0	24	10	56	0	35	161	0	0	46
2003	1	157	0	34	70	1	33	10	54	0	46	240	2	2	48
2004	1	92	0	39	62	23	27	10	101	0	33	238	2	2	43
2005	0	109	0	19	33	24	19	10	69	0	54	168	0	0	28
2006	0	81	0	19	25	0	15	10	42	0	74	66	0	0	21
2007	0	66	0	23	0	0	18	10	100	0	68	99	0	0	16

Appendix Table 8 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **Netherlands**, 1956 to 2007 (b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all^a agricultural products, to exportable^b and import-competing^b agricultural industries, and relative^c to non-agricultural industries (percent)

	NRA, all agric products, ^a by component					NRA, agric tradables			NRA, all non-ag tradable goods (9)	RRA ^b (10)
	NRA, covered products (1)	NRA, non-covered products (2)	NRA, non-product-specific support (3)	NRA, all ag products (incl NPS) (4)=1+2+3	NRA, all ag products (incl NPS and decoupled) (5)	NRA, ag exportables (6)	NRA, ag import-competing (7)	NRA, all agric tradable goods ^c (8)=6+7		
1956	46	14	na	38	38	27	39	38	3	34
1957	61	16	na	48	48	37	50	48	3	44
1958	48	16	na	39	39	29	41	39	3	35
1959	58	19	na	47	47	32	51	47	3	43
1960	45	11	na	36	36	25	38	36	3	33
1961	61	20	na	50	50	32	54	50	3	46
1962	135	64	na	114	114	63	126	114	3	108
1963	114	53	na	97	97	54	106	97	3	92
1964	105	50	na	90	90	62	94	90	3	84
1965	123	60	na	106	106	74	111	106	3	100
1966	118	58	na	101	101	68	107	101	3	95
1967	117	55	na	100	100	63	106	100	4	93
1968	128	58	na	108	108	65	115	108	3	102
1969	121	60	na	104	104	67	110	104	3	98
1970	110	56	na	95	95	63	100	95	3	90
1971	125	56	na	106	106	69	113	106	3	101
1972	107	53	na	94	94	61	99	94	3	89
1973	68	34	na	60	60	37	63	60	3	56
1974	50	28	na	45	45	43	45	45	2	42
1975	75	41	na	67	67	60	68	67	2	63
1976	128	67	na	113	113	99	115	113	2	109
1977	101	56	na	90	90	87	91	90	2	87
1978	91	48	na	80	80	67	82	80	2	77
1979	93	49	12	94	95	73	83	94	1	92
1980	75	41	12	79	80	64	67	79	1	77
1981	107	53	10	103	105	67	97	103	1	101
1982	122	60	9	115	117	74	111	115	1	113
1983	145	72	9	135	137	72	134	135	1	132
1984	110	56	8	105	107	50	103	105	1	103
1985	93	46	10	92	95	56	85	92	1	90
1986	114	60	3	104	106	77	103	104	1	101
1987	95	53	3	88	90	80	85	88	1	85
1988	78	41	3	72	75	53	71	72	1	70
1989	46	23	3	43	46	22	44	43	1	42
1990	51	26	4	49	53	27	49	49	1	48
1991	63	31	5	61	65	27	61	61	1	59
1992	52	28	5	51	58	31	49	51	1	49
1993	58	30	5	56	69	33	55	56	1	55
1994	51	26	4	49	64	30	48	49	1	48
1995	44	22	5	44	60	21	42	44	1	42
1996	41	20	4	40	56	17	40	40	1	38
1997	45	22	4	44	60	18	44	44	1	42
1998	55	27	4	52	69	24	54	52	1	51
1999	66	34	4	62	79	25	65	62	1	60
2000	44	23	3	43	60	12	48	43	1	41
2001	34	18	4	34	51	8	37	34	1	33
2002	46	23	5	45	62	11	50	45	1	43
2003	48	25	5	47	67	11	54	47	1	46
2004	43	21	4	42	60	10	47	42	1	40
2005	28	14	4	25	44	0	32	25	1	24
2006	21	11	4	20	41	0	23	20	1	19
2007	16	8	4	17	35	0	19	17	1	15

- a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and via inputs and other forms of non-product-specific (NPS) assistance without and (in column (5)) with decoupled support.
- b. The Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA) is defined as $100 * [(100 + \text{NRA}_{\text{ag}}^t) / (100 + \text{NRA}_{\text{nonag}}^t) - 1]$, where NRA_{ag}^t and $\text{NRA}_{\text{nonag}}^t$ are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors (columns 8 and 9), respectively, so it excludes decoupled payments but includes all NPS support.
- c. Including NPS but excluding decoupled payments, so more than the weighted average of columns (6) and (7).

Appendix Table 8 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **Netherlands**, 1956 to 2007(c) Value shares of primary production of covered^a and non-covered products,
(percent)

	Barl ey	Beef	Egg	Maiz e	Milk	Oat	Pigm eat	Potat o	Poult ry	Rape seed	Shee pme at	Suga r	Tom ato	Whe at	Non- cove red
1956	2	9	17	na	16	4	17	na	1	na	0	2	1	3	27
1957	2	8	17	na	14	4	16	na	2	na	0	3	2	3	28
1958	2	9	16	na	17	3	16	na	2	na	0	2	3	3	27
1959	2	8	20	na	14	2	15	na	2	na	0	2	3	4	27
1960	2	7	18	na	16	2	16	na	3	na	0	2	3	4	27
1961	2	8	19	na	12	2	17	na	3	na	0	2	4	3	27
1962	2	10	16	0	12	4	14	na	5	0	1	2	4	3	29
1963	2	11	16	0	12	3	14	na	5	0	0	3	3	3	27
1964	2	11	11	0	14	2	15	na	6	0	0	3	5	3	27
1965	2	14	11	0	13	2	15	na	6	0	1	1	4	3	27
1966	2	14	10	0	14	2	14	na	7	0	0	1	4	3	28
1967	2	14	8	0	13	2	15	na	8	0	0	2	5	3	28
1968	1	14	9	0	13	1	16	na	8	0	0	2	4	3	28
1969	2	14	9	0	13	1	15	na	8	0	0	2	4	3	28
1970	1	14	9	0	12	1	16	na	9	0	0	3	4	3	28
1971	1	15	9	0	13	1	17	na	5	0	0	4	4	3	28
1972	1	11	8	0	13	0	15	9	6	0	0	4	4	3	25
1973	1	12	8	0	12	0	15	9	5	0	0	6	4	4	24
1974	1	16	4	0	12	1	15	8	5	0	0	7	4	3	23
1975	1	17	5	0	12	0	18	8	5	0	1	4	4	2	24
1976	1	16	7	0	11	0	16	7	5	0	0	3	5	4	25
1977	1	17	6	0	7	0	20	9	5	0	1	2	4	3	24
1978	1	16	7	0	9	0	18	10	5	0	1	2	4	2	24
1979	1	19	6	0	9	0	15	10	5	0	1	3	4	2	24
1980	1	17	8	0	9	0	16	9	5	0	1	5	4	2	24
1981	1	15	10	0	13	0	14	8	5	0	1	3	4	2	25
1982	1	13	10	0	15	0	14	8	5	0	0	2	4	2	26
1983	0	6	10	0	17	0	16	9	6	0	0	2	4	3	26
1984	1	6	11	0	14	0	18	12	4	0	0	2	4	3	25
1985	0	5	9	0	13	0	25	10	4	0	0	1	4	2	25
1986	0	8	7	0	12	0	23	10	5	0	0	2	5	1	25
1987	0	11	8	0	8	0	26	11	4	0	0	1	4	1	25
1988	0	11	6	0	16	0	21	9	5	0	0	2	4	1	25
1989	0	8	5	0	20	0	23	8	3	0	0	2	4	2	23
1990	0	8	6	0	16	0	25	9	3	0	0	2	5	1	23
1991	0	7	6	0	17	0	22	11	4	0	0	2	5	1	25
1992	0	9	5	0	18	0	27	7	3	0	0	1	4	1	24
1993	0	12	6	0	18	0	22	6	4	0	1	2	4	1	24
1994	0	11	6	0	17	0	20	11	4	0	0	2	4	1	24
1995	0	10	4	0	20	0	19	14	3	0	0	2	3	1	23
1996	0	9	6	0	20	0	22	7	5	0	0	1	3	2	23
1997	0	7	6	0	21	0	21	7	6	0	1	2	3	2	24
1998	0	8	6	0	21	0	19	9	6	0	0	1	4	1	25
1999	0	7	5	0	20	0	14	16	5	0	1	1	4	1	26
2000	0	6	7	0	24	0	18	8	5	0	1	1	4	1	24
2001	0	4	6	0	26	0	19	8	6	0	1	1	4	1	23
2002	0	4	7	0	23	0	17	9	6	0	1	1	5	1	24
2003	0	4	7	0	25	0	15	9	5	0	1	1	5	2	25
2004	0	5	6	0	25	0	15	13	4	0	1	1	4	2	24
2005	1	6	9	0	5	0	23	12	7	0	1	1	8	2	24
2006	0	4	6	0	22	0	16	13	5	0	1	1	6	2	24
2007	1	4	6	0	21	0	15	15	5	0	0	1	6	3	24

a. At farmgate undistorted prices

Appendix Table 8 (cont.): Annual distortion estimates, **Netherlands**, 1956 to 2007
 (d) Trade status of covered products^a

	Barley	Beef	Egg	Maize	Milk	Oat	Pigmeat	Potato	Poultry	Rape seed	Sheepmeat	Sugar	Tomato	Wheat
1956	M	M	M	0	M	M	M	na	M	na	M	M	X	M
1957	M	M	M	0	M	M	M	na	M	na	M	M	X	M
1958	M	M	M	0	M	M	M	na	M	na	M	M	X	M
1959	M	M	M	0	M	M	M	na	M	na	M	M	X	M
1960	M	M	M	0	M	M	M	na	M	na	M	M	X	M
1961	M	M	M	0	M	M	M	na	M	na	M	M	X	M
1962	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	X	M	M	X	M
1963	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	M	X	M
1964	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	X	M	M	M	M
1965	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	M	M	M
1966	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	M	M	M
1967	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	M	M	M
1968	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	M	M	M
1969	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	M	M	M
1970	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	M	M	M
1971	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	M	M	M
1972	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1973	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1974	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1975	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1976	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1977	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1978	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1979	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1980	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1981	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1982	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1983	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1984	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1985	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1986	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1987	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1988	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1989	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M
1990	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M
1991	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M
1992	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	M
1993	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	M
1994	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M
1995	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M
1996	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X
1997	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X
1998	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X
1999	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X
2000	X	M	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X
2001	X	M	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	X
2002	X	M	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X
2003	X	M	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X
2004	X	M	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X
2005	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	X	M	M	X	X
2006	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	X	M	M	X	X
2007	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X

a. Exportables (X), import-competing products (M) and nontradables (H).

Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on author's spreadsheet

Appendix Table 9: Annual distortion estimates, **Norway**, 1956 to 2007

(a) Nominal rates of assistance to covered products

(percent)

	Barle y	Beef	Egg	Milk	Oat	Pigm eat	Potat o	Poult ry	Shee pmea t	Whea t	Wool	All cover ed
1956	426	385	355	284	244	252	169	431	119	169	na	249
1957	426	385	355	284	244	252	169	431	119	169	na	259
1958	426	385	355	284	244	252	169	431	119	169	na	258
1959	426	385	355	284	244	252	169	431	119	169	na	256
1960	426	385	355	284	244	252	169	431	119	169	na	257
1961	426	385	355	284	244	252	169	431	119	169	na	258
1962	426	385	355	284	244	252	169	431	119	169	na	264
1963	426	385	355	284	244	252	169	431	119	169	na	260
1964	426	385	355	284	244	252	169	431	119	169	na	270
1965	426	385	355	284	244	252	169	431	119	169	na	262
1966	426	385	355	284	244	252	169	431	119	169	na	261
1967	426	385	355	284	244	252	169	431	119	169	na	269
1968	426	385	355	284	244	252	169	431	119	169	na	270
1969	426	385	355	284	244	252	169	431	119	169	na	269
1970	426	385	355	284	244	252	169	431	119	169	na	271
1971	426	385	355	284	244	252	169	431	119	169	na	275
1972	426	385	355	284	244	252	169	431	119	169	na	275
1973	426	385	355	284	244	252	169	431	119	169	na	275
1974	426	385	355	284	244	252	169	431	119	169	na	274
1975	426	385	355	284	244	252	169	431	119	169	na	280
1976	426	385	355	284	244	252	169	431	119	169	na	278
1977	426	385	355	284	244	252	169	431	119	169	na	278
1978	426	385	355	284	244	252	169	431	119	169	na	279
1979	416	385	355	441	374	252	169	431	119	236	281	324
1980	242	385	355	377	194	252	169	431	119	181	na	287
1981	284	385	355	315	133	252	169	431	119	311	na	283
1982	454	385	355	235	234	252	169	431	119	344	na	291
1983	358	385	355	251	264	252	169	431	119	210	na	292
1984	269	385	355	300	170	252	169	431	119	155	na	276
1985	391	385	355	433	226	252	169	431	119	196	na	314
1986	507	506	387	593	287	252	na	431	206	198	147	405
1987	666	347	239	620	241	207	na	529	318	317	91	372
1988	352	272	356	271	142	289	na	431	355	310	64	272
1989	245	262	357	227	146	179	na	417	281	210	101	226
1990	360	319	247	486	234	179	na	390	287	309	221	329
1991	329	482	240	391	161	210	na	362	259	420	330	329
1992	295	300	303	304	156	127	na	512	213	237	357	254
1993	287	213	209	350	112	200	na	372	100	214	352	247
1994	286	181	175	307	143	166	na	301	97	235	207	224
1995	155	167	234	175	143	125	na	277	127	120	205	161
1996	79	205	97	219	104	98	na	197	70	77	207	153
1997	112	315	120	246	116	97	na	167	47	131	181	179
1998	231	294	173	297	171	200	na	201	82	134	227	239
1999	189	286	254	279	238	297	na	244	91	220	236	252
2000	93	242	94	179	161	148	na	253	73	136	168	163
2001	92	386	94	151	110	102	na	174	83	121	163	151
2002	140	420	116	323	74	187	na	439	70	165	216	237
2003	111	382	56	161	102	205	na	395	69	140	192	170
2004	89	234	99	123	117	140	na	446	39	98	187	129
2005	112	193	141	110	144	106	na	310	42	148	216	127
2006	104	205	139	105	74	123	na	442	68	111	227	130
2007	12	206	114	16	31	153	na	247	93	29	261	65

Appendix Table 9 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **Norway**, 1956 to 2007

(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all^a agricultural products, to exportable^b and import-competing^b agricultural industries, and relative^c to non-agricultural industries (percent)

	NRA, all agric products, ^a by component					NRA, agric tradables			NRA, all non-ag tradable goods (9)	RRA ^b (10)
	NRA, covered products (1)	NRA, non-covered products (2)	NRA, non-product-specific support (3)	NRA, all ag products (incl NPS) (4)=1+2+3	NRA, all ag products (incl NPS and decoupled) (5)	NRA, ag exportables (6)	NRA, ag import-competing (7)	NRA, all agric tradable goods ^c (8)=6+7		
1956	249	63	na	184	184	0	223	184	2	179
1957	259	65	na	191	191	0	231	191	2	184
1958	258	65	na	190	190	0	231	190	2	184
1959	256	64	na	189	189	0	229	189	2	183
1960	257	65	na	189	189	0	230	189	2	183
1961	258	65	na	190	190	0	231	190	2	184
1962	264	66	na	194	194	0	236	194	2	188
1963	260	65	na	191	191	0	232	191	2	186
1964	270	68	na	198	198	0	241	198	2	193
1965	262	66	na	193	193	0	234	193	2	188
1966	261	66	na	192	192	0	234	192	2	188
1967	269	68	na	197	197	0	240	197	1	194
1968	270	68	na	198	198	0	241	198	1	195
1969	269	68	na	197	197	0	240	197	1	195
1970	271	68	na	199	199	0	242	199	1	197
1971	275	69	na	201	201	0	245	201	1	200
1972	275	70	na	202	202	0	246	202	1	200
1973	275	70	na	202	202	0	246	202	0	200
1974	274	69	na	201	201	0	244	201	0	200
1975	280	71	na	205	205	0	250	205	0	204
1976	278	70	na	203	203	0	248	203	0	203
1977	278	70	na	203	203	0	248	203	0	202
1978	279	71	na	205	205	0	249	205	0	204
1979	324	71	25	276	444	186	276	276	0	276
1980	287	68	21	247	394	131	257	247	0	246
1981	283	70	20	241	389	173	266	241	0	240
1982	291	70	15	241	389	231	216	241	0	240
1983	292	70	15	243	394	235	212	243	0	241
1984	276	69	13	229	375	214	218	229	0	228
1985	314	70	12	248	420	223	249	248	0	246
1986	405	73	43	319	344	12	347	319	0	317
1987	372	70	44	301	326	8	323	301	0	300
1988	272	49	39	230	254	6	237	230	0	229
1989	226	39	34	195	216	8	197	195	0	194
1990	329	63	39	264	288	10	280	264	0	263
1991	329	60	44	267	297	0	277	267	0	266
1992	254	46	44	222	255	0	218	222	0	220
1993	247	45	43	217	252	0	212	217	0	216
1994	224	41	44	204	240	0	194	204	0	203
1995	161	28	40	159	187	0	141	159	0	157
1996	153	26	44	155	182	0	133	155	0	154
1997	179	33	53	181	212	0	155	181	0	180
1998	239	47	59	227	261	0	206	227	0	226
1999	252	51	58	232	274	0	216	232	0	231
2000	163	31	49	168	209	3	143	168	0	167
2001	151	29	47	156	197	0	132	156	0	155
2002	237	46	58	223	278	4	203	223	0	221
2003	170	38	34	156	235	3	149	156	0	154
2004	129	31	29	124	191	3	115	124	0	123
2005	127	28	11	116	201	149	126	116	0	115
2006	130	28	11	117	199	146	129	117	0	116
2007	65	14	8	60	119	122	63	60	0	60

- a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and via inputs and other forms of non-product-specific (NPS) assistance without and (in column (5)) with decoupled support.
- b. The Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA) is defined as $100 * [(100 + \text{NRA}_{\text{ag}}^t) / (100 + \text{NRA}_{\text{nonag}}^t) - 1]$, where NRA_{ag}^t and $\text{NRA}_{\text{nonag}}^t$ are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors (columns 8 and 9), respectively, so it excludes decoupled payments but includes all NPS support.
- c. Including NPS but excluding decoupled payments, so more than the weighted average of columns (6) and (7).

Appendix Table 9 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **Norway**, 1956 to 2007(c) Value shares of primary production of covered^a and non-covered products,

(percent)

	Barle y	Beef	Egg	Milk	Oat	Pigme at	Potato	Poultr y	Sheep meat	Whea t	Wool	Non- cover ed
1956	3	6	3	19	3	5	22	0	4	1	na	35
1957	4	6	3	21	2	6	18	0	4	1	na	35
1958	4	6	3	21	2	6	18	0	4	1	na	35
1959	4	6	3	21	2	6	20	0	4	0	na	35
1960	4	6	3	21	2	6	19	0	4	0	na	35
1961	5	6	3	19	3	6	19	0	4	0	na	35
1962	4	7	3	21	2	7	16	0	4	0	na	35
1963	5	6	3	20	2	6	19	0	4	0	na	35
1964	6	7	3	22	2	6	14	0	4	0	na	35
1965	5	6	3	20	2	6	18	0	4	0	na	35
1966	4	7	3	21	1	6	18	0	4	0	na	35
1967	6	6	3	22	2	7	14	0	5	0	na	36
1968	7	6	3	21	3	7	14	0	4	0	na	36
1969	5	7	3	21	2	7	14	0	4	0	na	35
1970	6	6	3	20	3	7	13	0	4	0	na	36
1971	6	7	3	22	4	8	11	0	4	0	na	36
1972	6	7	3	22	4	9	10	0	4	0	na	36
1973	5	7	3	22	5	8	10	0	4	0	na	36
1974	6	7	2	20	4	8	11	0	4	1	na	36
1975	4	9	3	24	3	9	6	0	4	1	na	36
1976	4	8	3	25	3	9	7	0	4	1	na	36
1977	5	8	2	23	4	9	7	0	4	1	na	36
1978	5	8	3	23	4	9	7	0	5	1	na	36
1979	4	18	7	6	3	23	6	3	1	1	1	29
1980	6	14	6	6	4	21	10	3	1	1	na	28
1981	5	13	7	10	7	18	6	3	2	0	na	29
1982	4	14	7	14	5	18	6	2	1	0	na	29
1983	5	14	7	13	4	19	5	2	1	1	na	29
1984	6	10	7	11	7	18	6	2	1	2	na	29
1985	4	11	7	10	5	18	6	3	2	2	na	32
1986	4	10	4	16	5	12	na	1	6	2	2	39
1987	3	12	4	15	6	13	na	0	4	3	2	38
1988	4	11	2	26	5	8	na	1	3	1	2	36
1989	5	11	2	26	5	10	na	1	3	2	1	35
1990	6	11	3	17	6	11	na	1	3	2	1	39
1991	5	8	3	22	6	11	na	1	3	2	0	39
1992	3	10	2	25	3	13	na	1	3	2	0	36
1993	4	13	3	21	4	9	na	1	6	3	0	36
1994	3	14	3	24	2	10	na	1	6	2	0	35
1995	4	12	2	28	3	10	na	1	4	3	0	33
1996	7	10	3	23	3	11	na	1	5	3	0	33
1997	6	8	3	23	3	12	na	1	6	3	0	35
1998	4	10	2	24	3	10	na	1	5	3	0	37
1999	5	11	2	24	2	8	na	1	6	2	0	38
2000	5	10	3	27	2	9	na	1	6	3	0	34
2001	6	7	3	28	2	11	na	2	6	2	0	33
2002	6	8	3	21	3	10	na	1	7	3	0	38
2003	5	7	4	25	3	9	na	1	6	3	0	37
2004	5	9	3	25	2	9	na	0	7	3	0	35
2005	6	12	3	34	3	13	na	3	6	4	0	18
2006	6	12	3	33	3	14	na	2	6	4	0	18
2007	7	8	2	40	3	9	na	2	4	5	0	19

a. At farmgate undistorted prices

Appendix Table 9 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **Norway**, 1956 to 2007
 (d) Trade status of covered products^a

	Barle y	Beef	Egg	Milk	Oat	Pigm eat	Potat o	Poult ry	Shee pmea t	Whea t	Wool
1956	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na
1957	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na
1958	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na
1959	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na
1960	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na
1961	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na
1962	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na
1963	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na
1964	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na
1965	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na
1966	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na
1967	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na
1968	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na
1969	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na
1970	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na
1971	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na
1972	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na
1973	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na
1974	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na
1975	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na
1976	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na
1977	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na
1978	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na
1979	M	M	X	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1980	M	M	M	X	X	M	M	M	M	M	na
1981	M	M	M	X	X	X	M	M	M	M	na
1982	X	X	M	X	X	X	M	M	M	M	na
1983	M	X	X	X	M	X	M	M	M	M	na
1984	M	X	X	M	X	X	M	M	M	M	na
1985	M	M	X	X	M	X	M	M	M	M	na
1986	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	X
1987	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	X
1988	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	X
1989	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	X
1990	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	X
1991	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	M
1992	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	M
1993	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	M
1994	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	M
1995	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	M
1996	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	M
1997	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	M
1998	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	M
1999	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	M
2000	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	X
2001	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	M
2002	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	X
2003	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	X
2004	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	X
2005	M	M	X	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	X
2006	M	M	X	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	X
2007	M	M	X	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	X

a. Exportables (X), import-competing products (M) and nontradables (H).

Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on author's spreadsheet

Appendix Table 10: Annual distortion estimates, **Portugal**, 1956 to 2007

(a) Nominal rates of assistance to covered products

	(percent)									
	Barley	Beef	Egg	Maize	Milk	Oat	Pigmea t	Potato	Poultry	Rice
1956	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
1957	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
1958	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
1959	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
1960	na	42	na	45	0	na	na	na	na	2
1961	na	52	na	12	0	na	na	na	na	4
1962	na	53	na	14	0	na	na	na	na	-36
1963	na	58	na	19	0	na	na	na	na	-3
1964	na	26	na	19	0	na	na	na	na	5
1965	na	24	na	39	0	na	na	na	na	24
1966	na	40	na	27	0	na	na	na	na	11
1967	na	66	na	27	22	na	na	na	na	6
1968	na	77	na	24	19	na	na	na	na	9
1969	na	67	na	23	18	na	na	na	na	31
1970	na	46	na	7	19	na	na	na	na	27
1971	na	42	na	33	9	na	na	na	na	-12
1972	na	42	na	47	12	na	na	na	na	37
1973	na	66	na	0	12	na	na	na	na	-16
1974	na	55	na	-22	11	na	na	na	na	-39
1975	na	123	na	30	5	na	na	na	na	-12
1976	na	151	na	30	4	na	na	na	na	0
1977	na	140	na	35	3	na	na	na	na	-10
1978	na	122	na	32	2	na	na	na	na	-6
1979	na	123	na	24	2	na	na	na	na	7
1980	na	86	na	18	5	na	na	na	na	13
1981	na	63	na	14	7	na	na	na	na	-21
1982	na	41	na	34	6	na	na	na	na	1
1983	na	69	na	35	31	na	na	na	na	13
1984	na	38	na	31	3	na	na	na	na	18
1985	na	38	na	31	3	na	na	na	na	18
1986	157	188	31	110	361	83	40	17	79	127
1987	233	107	21	170	533	77	11	17	90	190
1988	85	80	21	79	192	14	34	17	69	162
1989	45	79	29	62	84	15	14	17	66	148
1990	94	98	12	108	125	48	7	16	100	152
1991	119	157	13	120	128	39	20	16	83	144
1992	103	93	15	103	118	63	0	17	118	143
1993	105	63	10	69	123	44	18	17	110	106
1994	100	53	0	45	117	43	18	16	114	133
1995	41	69	12	53	79	40	16	15	129	88
1996	2	68	5	14	70	34	16	14	77	33
1997	7	117	1	19	78	25	13	12	55	31
1998	64	121	11	32	100	50	22	11	51	18
1999	44	125	16	39	106	84	57	11	90	0
2000	3	113	3	27	57	59	32	10	57	1
2001	0	140	0	14	40	29	24	10	52	42
2002	0	157	0	9	75	0	24	10	56	24
2003	1	157	0	34	70	1	33	10	54	18
2004	1	92	0	39	62	23	27	10	101	1
2005	0	109	0	19	33	24	19	10	69	2
2006	0	86	0	11	25	0	14	10	69	3
2007	0	71	0	21	0	0	18	10	100	1

	Sheep meat	Sugar	Sunflo wer	Tomato	Wheat	Wine	All cover ed
1956	na	-16	na	na	na	0	0
1957	na	-44	na	na	na	0	0
1958	na	-6	na	na	na	0	0
1959	na	7	na	na	na	0	0
1960	8	5	na	0	56	0	14
1961	16	5	na	0	52	0	11
1962	12	10	na	0	48	0	6
1963	16	-63	na	0	51	0	9
1964	18	-50	na	0	46	0	6
1965	14	44	na	0	83	0	10
1966	25	89	na	0	65	0	10
1967	31	53	na	0	60	0	13
1968	29	20	na	0	68	0	13
1969	33	8	na	2	79	0	16
1970	30	-18	na	6	56	0	12
1971	33	-42	4	11	88	0	17
1972	29	-46	4	12	59	0	19
1973	30	-69	3	0	-10	0	5
1974	27	-80	2	62	-26	0	18
1975	32	-41	2	41	-8	0	34
1976	35	3	2	11	4	0	26
1977	27	83	3	0	17	0	27
1978	24	130	3	7	20	0	30
1979	31	0	3	26	39	0	31
1980	16	-41	3	37	24	0	30
1981	4	51	2	24	11	0	21
1982	8	126	2	7	27	0	14
1983	14	57	2	4	27	0	14
1984	5	115	1	13	38	0	13
1985	5	218	2	13	38	0	10
1986	134	247	144	17	119	9	55
1987	211	301	150	15	143	9	55
1988	215	201	96	15	94	7	56
1989	167	90	150	0	31	6	31
1990	154	109	143	2	57	8	28
1991	128	191	111	0	146	9	38
1992	112	212	0	0	65	13	36
1993	38	169	0	8	58	13	37
1994	55	129	0	11	48	10	32
1995	77	119	0	0	16	4	27
1996	45	140	0	2	0	4	21
1997	27	147	0	0	0	5	22
1998	38	186	0	0	26	3	23
1999	37	245	0	0	37	2	29
2000	26	176	0	0	11	2	22
2001	48	138	0	0	4	2	19
2002	35	161	0	0	0	2	23
2003	46	240	0	2	2	2	25
2004	33	238	0	2	2	1	23
2005	54	168	0	0	0	2	16
2006	74	62	0	0	0	1	13
2007	68	99	0	0	0	1	13

Appendix Table 10 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **Portugal**, 1956 to 2007

(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all^a agricultural products, to exportable^b and import-competing^b agricultural industries, and relative^c to non-agricultural industries (percent)

	NRA, all agric products, ^a by component					NRA, agric tradables			NRA, all non-ag tradable goods (9)	RRA ^b (10)
	NRA, covered products (1)	NRA, non-covered products (2)	NRA, non-product-specific support (3)	NRA, all ag products (incl NPS and decoupled) (4)=1+2+3 (5)	NRA, all ag products (incl NPS and decoupled) (5)	NRA, ag exportables (6)	NRA, ag import-competing (7)	NRA, all agric tradable goods ^c (8)=6+7		
1956	0	-22	na	-7	-7	-5	-16	-7	10	-15
1957	0	-20	na	-7	-7	-5	-16	-7	9	-14
1958	0	-12	na	-4	-4	-2	-13	-4	9	-12
1959	0	-13	na	-5	-5	-3	-14	-5	10	-13
1960	14	-14	na	8	8	-3	19	8	10	-2
1961	11	-14	na	5	5	-4	14	5	10	-4
1962	6	-13	na	2	2	-3	8	2	10	-8
1963	9	-20	na	3	3	-5	13	3	10	-6
1964	6	-21	na	1	1	-5	8	1	8	-7
1965	10	-21	na	5	5	-5	16	5	9	-4
1966	10	-22	na	4	4	-7	12	4	8	-4
1967	13	-16	na	7	7	-5	16	7	8	-1
1968	13	-15	na	8	8	-4	19	8	8	0
1969	16	-15	na	9	9	-5	19	9	8	1
1970	12	-13	na	7	7	-3	16	7	9	-1
1971	17	-16	na	11	11	-5	22	11	7	3
1972	19	-12	na	12	12	-3	22	12	7	5
1973	5	-11	na	2	2	-2	4	2	6	-3
1974	18	-13	na	12	12	-3	22	12	47	-24
1975	34	-6	na	25	25	-1	38	25	5	20
1976	26	-3	na	20	20	1	30	20	5	14
1977	27	4	na	22	22	6	29	22	4	17
1978	30	18	na	27	27	16	32	27	3	23
1979	31	11	na	27	27	8	41	27	2	24
1980	30	3	na	24	24	5	35	24	2	21
1981	21	1	na	17	17	4	24	17	2	14
1982	14	1	na	11	11	3	15	11	2	9
1983	14	3	na	11	11	3	16	11	2	9
1984	13	4	na	11	11	3	15	11	1	9
1985	10	-5	na	6	6	-4	14	6	1	5
1986	55	40	3	56	58	25	64	56	1	54
1987	55	44	3	57	59	27	66	57	1	54
1988	56	36	3	55	57	33	57	55	0	55
1989	31	21	3	32	35	10	46	32	0	32
1990	28	25	4	31	35	11	51	31	0	31
1991	38	28	5	41	46	13	62	41	0	41
1992	36	26	5	39	47	16	48	39	0	39
1993	37	27	5	40	52	18	49	40	0	40
1994	32	24	4	35	50	17	43	35	0	35
1995	27	20	5	31	47	9	41	31	0	31
1996	21	17	4	24	40	8	34	24	0	24
1997	22	18	4	26	42	7	37	26	0	26
1998	23	19	4	26	43	6	43	26	0	26
1999	29	24	4	32	49	7	56	32	0	32
2000	22	16	3	24	42	5	41	24	0	24
2001	19	14	4	22	39	4	34	22	0	22
2002	23	17	5	27	44	5	43	27	0	27
2003	25	19	5	28	48	5	47	28	0	28
2004	23	18	4	26	44	4	44	26	0	26
2005	16	9	4	16	35	1	37	16	0	16
2006	13	7	4	14	36	1	30	14	0	14
2007	13	7	4	14	32	1	26	14	0	14

- a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and via inputs and other forms of non-product-specific (NPS) assistance without and (in column (5)) with decoupled support.
- b. The Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA) is defined as $100 * [(100 + \text{NRA}_{\text{ag}}^t) / (100 + \text{NRA}_{\text{nonag}}^t) - 1]$, where NRA_{ag}^t and $\text{NRA}_{\text{nonag}}^t$ are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors (columns 8 and 9), respectively, so it excludes decoupled payments but includes all NPS support.
- c. Including NPS but excluding decoupled payments, so more than the weighted average of columns (6) and (7).

Appendix Table 10 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **Portugal**, 1956 to 2007
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered^a and non-covered products,
(percent)

	Barley	Beef	Egg	Maize	Milk	Oat	Pigmea t	Potato	Poultry	Rice
1956	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
1957	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
1958	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
1959	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
1960	na	4	na	5	3	na	na	na	na	6
1961	na	5	na	6	3	na	na	na	na	7
1962	na	4	na	6	2	na	na	na	na	4
1963	na	4	na	6	2	na	na	na	na	4
1964	na	4	na	6	3	na	na	na	na	4
1965	na	6	na	4	2	na	na	na	na	2
1966	na	8	na	6	3	na	na	na	na	4
1967	na	6	na	5	2	na	na	na	na	4
1968	na	6	na	4	2	na	na	na	na	3
1969	na	8	na	5	3	na	na	na	na	3
1970	na	8	na	5	2	na	na	na	na	2
1971	na	8	na	5	3	na	na	na	na	3
1972	na	7	na	4	3	na	na	na	na	4
1973	na	8	na	4	3	na	na	na	na	6
1974	na	10	na	5	3	na	na	na	na	3
1975	na	12	na	4	3	na	na	na	na	3
1976	na	10	na	4	3	na	na	na	na	2
1977	na	13	na	4	2	na	na	na	na	3
1978	na	15	na	4	2	na	na	na	na	2
1979	na	13	na	3	2	na	na	na	na	3
1980	na	15	na	4	2	na	na	na	na	4
1981	na	18	na	4	4	na	na	na	na	3
1982	na	15	na	4	4	na	na	na	na	3
1983	na	6	na	6	5	na	na	na	na	3
1984	na	5	na	6	4	na	na	na	na	2
1985	na	4	na	5	4	na	na	na	na	1
1986	0	5	2	3	3	1	8	7	5	1
1987	0	6	3	2	3	1	10	7	4	1
1988	0	9	3	4	7	1	9	6	5	1
1989	0	7	2	3	8	1	10	5	3	1
1990	0	4	2	2	6	0	11	4	2	1
1991	0	4	3	2	7	0	10	6	3	1
1992	0	6	3	2	8	0	16	5	4	1
1993	0	7	3	2	8	0	13	3	4	0
1994	0	5	3	2	7	0	11	6	4	1
1995	0	5	2	3	9	0	11	8	3	1
1996	0	4	3	3	9	0	12	3	4	1
1997	0	4	3	3	9	0	12	2	5	1
1998	0	3	2	3	7	0	8	4	5	1
1999	0	3	2	3	8	0	7	6	4	1
2000	0	3	3	3	11	0	9	3	5	1
2001	0	2	3	3	12	0	11	3	5	1
2002	0	3	3	3	10	0	10	4	5	1
2003	0	3	4	3	10	0	9	4	4	1
2004	0	4	3	2	10	0	8	5	3	1
2005	0	3	3	1	7	0	9	2	4	1
2006	0	2	4	2	7	0	8	3	4	1
2007	1	2	4	3	9	0	8	3	4	1

	Sheep meat	Sugar	Sunflo wer	Tomato	Wheat	Wine	Non- covere d
1956	na	0	na	na	na	70	30
1957	na	0	na	na	na	67	33
1958	na	0	na	na	na	65	35
1959	na	0	na	na	na	64	36
1960	2	0	na	7	12	39	22
1961	3	0	na	9	9	35	23
1962	2	0	na	7	7	48	21
1963	3	0	na	9	7	45	20
1964	3	0	na	13	5	43	19
1965	3	0	na	15	5	44	18
1966	2	0	na	21	4	33	20
1967	2	0	na	21	6	33	21
1968	1	0	na	18	6	38	20
1969	2	0	na	24	4	30	21
1970	2	0	na	18	6	36	21
1971	2	0	0	19	8	32	20
1972	2	0	0	24	8	27	21
1973	2	0	0	24	7	26	20
1974	2	0	0	21	6	30	20
1975	2	0	0	27	7	21	21
1976	2	0	0	24	10	24	22
1977	3	0	0	29	4	20	23
1978	3	0	0	30	3	18	23
1979	2	0	0	19	2	32	24
1980	3	0	0	20	3	24	23
1981	3	0	0	19	3	24	23
1982	3	0	0	19	4	25	23
1983	4	0	0	24	4	24	25
1984	3	0	1	26	5	22	27
1985	3	0	0	24	3	31	26
1986	2	0	0	21	2	20	19
1987	2	0	0	17	2	24	18
1988	2	0	1	19	2	11	21
1989	1	0	0	20	3	18	18
1990	1	0	0	19	1	31	15
1991	1	0	0	20	2	22	19
1992	2	0	0	15	1	18	19
1993	2	0	0	19	2	16	19
1994	2	0	0	19	1	19	18
1995	1	0	0	16	1	20	18
1996	2	0	0	17	2	23	17
1997	2	0	0	16	1	24	17
1998	2	0	0	21	0	25	17
1999	2	0	0	20	1	26	18
2000	2	0	0	19	1	23	18
2001	2	0	0	17	0	22	18
2002	2	0	0	17	1	23	18
2003	2	0	0	18	1	24	19
2004	2	0	0	17	1	24	18
2005	2	0	0	17	0	27	24
2006	2	0	0	16	1	25	24
2007	2	0	0	15	1	21	24

a. At farmgate undistorted prices

Appendix Table 10 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **Portugal**, 1956 to 2007
(d) Trade status of of covered products^a[illegible]

	Sheep meat	Sugar	Sunflo wer	Tomat o	Wheat	Wine
1956	na	M	na	na	na	X
1957	na	M	na	na	na	X
1958	na	M	na	na	na	X
1959	na	M	na	na	na	X
1960	M	M	na	M	M	X
1961	M	M	na	M	M	X
1962	M	M	na	M	M	X
1963	M	M	na	M	M	X
1964	M	M	na	M	M	X
1965	M	M	na	M	M	X
1966	M	M	na	M	M	X
1967	M	M	na	M	M	X
1968	M	M	na	M	M	X
1969	M	M	na	M	M	X
1970	M	M	na	M	M	X
1971	M	M	X	M	M	X
1972	M	M	X	M	M	X
1973	M	M	X	M	M	X
1974	M	M	X	M	M	X
1975	M	M	X	M	M	X
1976	M	M	X	M	M	X
1977	M	M	X	M	M	X
1978	M	M	X	M	M	X
1979	M	M	X	M	M	X
1980	M	M	X	M	M	X
1981	M	M	X	M	M	X
1982	M	M	X	M	M	X
1983	M	M	X	M	M	X
1984	M	M	X	M	M	X
1985	M	M	X	M	M	X
1986	M	M	M	M	M	X
1987	M	M	M	M	M	X
1988	M	M	M	M	M	X
1989	M	M	M	X	M	X
1990	M	M	M	X	M	X
1991	M	M	M	X	M	X
1992	M	M	M	X	M	X
1993	M	M	M	X	M	X
1994	M	M	M	X	M	X
1995	M	M	M	X	M	X
1996	M	M	M	X	X	X
1997	M	M	M	X	X	X
1998	M	M	M	X	X	X
1999	M	M	M	X	X	X
2000	M	M	M	X	X	X
2001	M	M	M	X	X	X
2002	M	M	M	X	X	X
2003	M	M	M	X	X	X
2004	M	M	M	X	X	X
2005	M	M	M	X	X	X
2006	M	M	M	X	X	X
2007	M	M	M	X	X	X

a. Exportables (X), import-competing products (M) and nontradables (H).

Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on author's spreadsheet

Appendix Table 11: Annual distortion estimates, **Spain**, 1955 to 2007

(a) Nominal rates of assistance to covered products

	(percent)									
	Barley	Beef	Egg	Maize	Milk	Oat	Pigmea t	Potato	Poultry	Rapese ed
1956	6	na	na	44	na	-16	16	na	na	na
1957	22	na	na	75	na	-11	25	na	na	na
1958	35	na	na	105	na	-8	24	na	na	na
1959	30	na	na	82	na	-3	22	na	na	na
1960	39	na	na	74	na	-14	45	na	na	na
1961	53	na	na	117	na	6	41	na	na	na
1962	27	na	na	31	na	-1	44	na	na	na
1963	24	na	na	17	na	-3	25	na	na	na
1964	9	na	na	13	na	-12	-1	na	na	na
1965	16	na	na	25	na	-5	-10	na	na	na
1966	24	na	na	30	na	-2	-16	na	na	na
1967	31	na	na	32	na	-3	-15	na	na	na
1968	65	na	na	58	na	10	-7	na	na	na
1969	37	na	na	53	na	8	-11	na	na	na
1970	28	na	na	24	na	1	-14	na	na	na
1971	58	na	na	38	na	-3	-11	na	na	na
1972	6	na	na	65	na	-9	-11	na	na	na
1973	-13	na	na	19	na	-21	-33	na	na	na
1974	4	na	na	-15	na	-29	-47	na	na	na
1975	19	na	na	30	na	18	-33	na	na	na
1976	0	na	na	33	na	-15	-29	na	na	na
1977	25	na	na	45	na	-3	-48	na	na	na
1978	15	na	na	50	na	32	-49	na	na	na
1979	48	na	na	60	na	62	-49	na	na	na
1980	-4	na	na	48	na	-40	-58	na	na	na
1981	-11	na	na	32	na	-17	-48	na	na	na
1982	-7	na	na	50	na	10	-32	na	na	na
1983	4	na	na	15	na	-16	55	na	na	na
1984	-2	na	na	8	na	-11	64	na	na	na
1985	13	na	na	24	na	-12	91	na	na	na
1986	157	188	31	110	361	83	40	17	79	153
1987	233	107	21	170	533	77	11	17	90	145
1988	85	80	21	79	192	14	34	17	69	112
1989	45	79	29	62	84	15	14	17	66	140
1990	94	98	12	108	125	48	7	16	100	200
1991	119	157	13	120	128	39	20	16	83	97
1992	103	93	15	103	118	63	0	17	118	0
1993	105	63	10	69	123	44	18	17	110	0
1994	100	53	0	45	117	43	18	16	114	0
1995	41	69	12	53	79	40	16	15	129	0
1996	2	68	5	14	70	34	16	14	77	0
1997	7	117	1	19	78	25	13	12	55	0
1998	64	121	11	32	100	50	22	11	51	0
1999	44	125	16	39	106	84	57	11	90	0
2000	3	113	3	27	57	59	32	10	57	1
2001	0	140	0	14	40	29	24	10	52	0
2002	0	157	0	9	75	0	24	10	56	0
2003	1	157	0	34	70	1	33	10	54	0
2004	1	92	0	39	62	23	27	10	101	0
2005	0	109	0	19	33	24	19	10	69	0
2006	0	81	0	11	25	0	14	10	69	0
2007	0	66	0	21	0	0	18	10	99	0

	Rice	Sheep meat	Soybea n	Sugar	Sunflo wer	Tomato	Wheat	Wine	All cover ed
1956	-11	na	na	191	0	0	17	0	11
1957	-16	na	na	94	0	0	23	0	15
1958	-20	na	na	177	0	0	29	0	20
1959	-24	na	na	211	0	0	31	0	19
1960	-30	na	na	202	0	0	35	0	23
1961	-33	na	na	223	0	0	40	0	24
1962	-29	na	na	212	0	0	56	0	23
1963	-34	na	na	13	0	0	29	0	11
1964	-44	na	na	79	0	0	13	0	3
1965	-19	na	na	427	0	0	30	0	12
1966	-31	na	na	556	0	0	28	0	10
1967	-45	na	na	393	0	0	23	0	10
1968	-33	na	na	308	0	0	41	0	22
1969	-4	na	na	264	0	0	44	0	19
1970	7	na	-39	150	0	0	3	0	7
1971	-32	na	-36	88	0	0	32	0	16
1972	-47	na	-31	66	0	0	-10	0	1
1973	-71	na	-18	-1	0	0	-31	0	-17
1974	-65	na	-16	-43	0	0	-32	0	-21
1975	-21	na	55	76	0	0	-2	0	0
1976	-18	na	35	168	0	0	-16	0	-3
1977	-38	na	-1	251	0	0	-28	0	-10
1978	-21	na	10	171	0	0	0	0	-7
1979	-32	na	23	45	0	0	40	0	-7
1980	-49	na	37	-6	0	0	43	0	-18
1981	-22	na	46	105	0	0	38	0	-14
1982	-9	na	49	201	0	0	45	0	-2
1983	-28	na	17	159	0	0	8	0	19
1984	15	na	2	269	0	0	16	0	17
1985	63	na	13	268	0	0	43	0	30
1986	127	134	211	247	144	17	119	9	75
1987	190	211	169	301	150	15	143	9	76
1988	162	215	108	201	96	15	94	7	63
1989	148	167	118	90	150	0	31	6	35
1990	152	154	147	109	143	2	57	8	40
1991	144	128	159	191	111	0	146	9	52
1992	143	112	0	212	0	0	65	13	38
1993	106	38	0	169	0	8	58	13	42
1994	133	55	0	129	0	11	48	10	39
1995	88	77	0	119	0	0	16	4	32
1996	33	45	0	140	0	2	0	4	21
1997	31	27	0	147	0	0	0	5	22
1998	18	38	0	186	0	0	26	3	30
1999	0	37	0	245	0	0	37	2	36
2000	1	26	0	176	0	0	11	2	22
2001	42	48	0	138	0	0	4	2	22
2002	24	35	0	161	0	0	0	2	24
2003	18	46	0	240	0	2	2	2	27
2004	1	33	0	238	0	2	2	1	24
2005	2	54	0	168	0	0	0	2	15
2006	3	74	0	62	0	0	0	1	13
2007	1	68	0	99	0	0	0	1	10

Appendix Table 11 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **Spain**, 1956 to 2007

(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all^a agricultural products, to exportable^b and import-competing^b agricultural industries, and relative^c to non-agricultural industries (percent)

	NRA, all agric products, ^a by component					NRA, agric tradables			NRA, all non-ag tradable goods (9)	RRA ^b (10)
	NRA, covered products (1)	NRA, non-covered products (2)	NRA, non-product-specific support (3)	NRA, all ag products (incl NPS and decoupled) (4)=1+2+3 (5)	NRA, all ag products (incl NPS and decoupled) (5)	NRA, ag exportables (6)	NRA, ag import-competing (7)	NRA, all agric tradable goods ^c (8)=6+7		
1956	11	1	na	8	8	-1	16	8	13	-4
1957	15	3	na	12	12	-1	22	12	13	-1
1958	20	4	na	16	16	-1	29	16	14	1
1959	19	5	na	16	16	-2	30	16	3	12
1960	23	6	na	19	19	-2	35	19	6	12
1961	24	8	na	20	20	-3	44	20	6	13
1962	23	7	na	18	18	-2	40	18	6	12
1963	11	3	na	9	9	-3	20	9	5	3
1964	3	1	na	3	3	-3	9	3	5	-2
1965	12	3	na	9	9	-1	19	9	4	5
1966	10	3	na	8	8	-2	17	8	5	3
1967	10	2	na	8	8	-4	16	8	4	3
1968	22	5	na	17	17	-2	32	17	4	13
1969	19	5	na	15	15	0	27	15	4	11
1970	7	2	na	6	6	0	9	6	3	2
1971	16	4	na	13	13	-2	24	13	3	9
1972	1	0	na	1	1	-3	3	1	4	-3
1973	-17	-6	na	-14	-14	-8	-18	-14	3	-17
1974	-21	-6	na	-17	-17	-5	-25	-17	2	-19
1975	0	0	na	0	0	-1	0	0	2	-3
1976	-3	-1	na	-2	-2	-1	-3	-2	2	-4
1977	-10	-3	na	-8	-8	-2	-11	-8	3	-10
1978	-7	-2	na	-6	-6	-1	-9	-6	2	-8
1979	-7	-2	na	-6	-6	-2	-8	-6	2	-8
1980	-18	-5	na	-15	-15	-4	-21	-15	3	-18
1981	-14	-4	na	-12	-12	-2	-17	-12	3	-14
1982	-2	-1	na	-2	-2	-1	-3	-2	3	-5
1983	19	2	na	14	14	-1	23	14	3	11
1984	17	2	na	13	13	1	18	13	3	10
1985	30	5	na	23	23	2	33	23	4	19
1986	75	50	3	73	75	29	85	73	3	69
1987	76	51	3	74	77	32	86	74	2	71
1988	63	38	3	61	64	30	66	61	0	61
1989	35	22	3	35	39	11	46	35	0	35
1990	40	27	4	42	45	14	56	42	0	42
1991	52	33	5	53	57	16	67	53	0	53
1992	38	28	5	41	48	19	47	41	0	41
1993	42	30	5	45	57	20	51	45	0	45
1994	39	26	4	40	55	19	45	40	0	40
1995	32	22	5	34	51	11	40	34	0	34
1996	21	14	4	24	40	7	32	24	0	24
1997	22	16	4	25	41	8	32	25	0	25
1998	30	22	4	33	50	9	44	33	0	33
1999	36	27	4	39	56	10	58	39	0	39
2000	22	16	3	24	42	5	41	24	0	24
2001	22	14	4	24	41	5	34	24	0	24
2002	24	16	5	27	44	5	40	27	0	27
2003	27	17	5	30	49	5	46	30	0	30
2004	24	17	4	27	45	5	42	27	0	27
2005	15	8	4	16	35	1	35	16	0	16
2006	13	7	4	14	35	1	29	14	0	14
2007	10	6	4	12	31	0	27	12	0	12

- a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and via inputs and other forms of non-product-specific (NPS) assistance without and (in column (5)) with decoupled support.
- b. The Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA) is defined as $100 * [(100 + \text{NRA}_{\text{ag}}^t) / (100 + \text{NRA}_{\text{nonag}}^t) - 1]$, where NRA_{ag}^t and $\text{NRA}_{\text{nonag}}^t$ are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors (columns 8 and 9), respectively, so it excludes decoupled payments but includes all NPS support.
- c. Including NPS but excluding decoupled payments, so more than the weighted average of columns (6) and (7).

Appendix Table 11 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **Spain**, 1956 to 2007(c) Value shares of primary production of covered^a and non-covered products,

(percent)

	Barley	Beef	Egg	Maize	Milk	Oat	Pigmea t	Potato	Poultry	Rapese ed
1956	7	na	na	3	na	2	6	na	na	na
1957	8	na	na	2	na	3	6	na	na	na
1958	7	na	na	2	na	2	6	na	na	na
1959	7	na	na	2	na	2	6	na	na	na
1960	8	na	na	3	na	2	5	na	na	na
1961	6	na	na	2	na	2	6	na	na	na
1962	7	na	na	3	na	2	6	na	na	na
1963	7	na	na	4	na	2	8	na	na	na
1964	6	na	na	4	na	1	9	na	na	na
1965	7	na	na	4	na	1	10	na	na	na
1966	6	na	na	3	na	1	12	na	na	na
1967	7	na	na	3	na	1	14	na	na	na
1968	8	na	na	4	na	1	13	na	na	na
1969	11	na	na	4	na	1	13	na	na	na
1970	8	na	na	5	na	1	14	na	na	na
1971	9	na	na	5	na	1	13	na	na	na
1972	11	na	na	4	na	1	12	na	na	na
1973	10	na	na	4	na	1	15	na	na	na
1974	11	na	na	4	na	1	18	na	na	na
1975	12	na	na	3	na	1	16	na	na	na
1976	11	na	na	3	na	1	17	na	na	na
1977	10	na	na	3	na	1	21	na	na	na
1978	12	na	na	3	na	1	23	na	na	na
1979	8	na	na	3	na	1	28	na	na	na
1980	13	na	na	3	na	2	28	na	na	na
1981	10	na	na	4	na	1	31	na	na	na
1982	11	na	na	3	na	1	29	na	na	na
1983	14	na	na	4	na	1	14	na	na	na
1984	21	na	na	5	na	2	11	na	na	na
1985	19	na	na	7	na	1	11	na	na	na
1986	5	4	4	3	4	0	12	4	5	0
1987	4	5	5	2	2	0	14	4	4	0
1988	8	5	4	3	5	1	12	3	5	0
1989	6	4	3	2	7	0	14	4	4	0
1990	5	4	3	2	5	0	15	4	3	0
1991	5	3	4	2	6	0	15	5	4	0
1992	3	5	3	2	6	0	20	3	3	0
1993	5	6	3	1	7	0	16	2	3	0
1994	4	6	4	2	7	0	16	4	3	0
1995	3	6	3	2	8	0	18	5	3	0
1996	7	4	3	3	6	0	16	2	3	0
1997	5	4	3	3	6	0	17	1	3	0
1998	4	4	2	2	6	0	14	2	4	0
1999	4	5	2	2	6	0	12	3	3	0
2000	6	4	3	2	6	0	14	1	3	0
2001	3	3	3	3	8	0	18	2	4	0
2002	4	3	3	3	7	1	16	2	4	0
2003	5	3	4	2	7	0	14	1	4	0
2004	5	4	3	2	7	0	15	2	3	0
2005	2	3	3	2	6	0	12	1	3	0
2006	5	3	3	2	5	1	12	2	3	0
2007	11	2	2	2	5	1	10	2	2	0

	Rice	Sheep meat	Soybea n	Sugar	Sunflo wer	Tomato	Wheat	Wine	Non- covere d
1956	2	na	na	1	0	8	22	22	26
1957	2	na	na	2	0	9	25	18	26
1958	3	na	na	1	0	10	25	18	27
1959	3	na	na	1	0	11	23	20	26
1960	3	na	na	2	0	12	22	16	28
1961	4	na	na	2	0	14	17	19	27
1962	3	na	na	1	0	13	17	21	27
1963	3	na	na	2	0	12	16	20	26
1964	3	na	na	2	0	14	12	23	26
1965	2	na	na	1	0	13	15	20	28
1966	3	na	na	1	0	12	14	20	27
1967	3	na	na	1	0	11	16	15	27
1968	3	na	na	1	0	12	15	15	28
1969	2	na	na	1	0	12	13	14	28
1970	1	na	0	2	1	14	13	13	27
1971	2	na	0	3	1	14	13	12	27
1972	2	na	0	3	1	14	15	11	26
1973	4	na	0	4	1	13	13	11	24
1974	2	na	0	4	1	15	12	8	24
1975	2	na	0	3	2	18	11	7	26
1976	2	na	0	3	1	17	14	5	26
1977	2	na	0	1	1	18	13	4	26
1978	1	na	0	2	1	17	9	6	26
1979	2	na	0	2	1	14	7	8	26
1980	2	na	0	3	1	13	7	5	24
1981	2	na	0	2	1	14	5	5	25
1982	1	na	0	2	2	13	7	5	26
1983	1	na	0	3	3	16	9	5	29
1984	1	na	0	1	4	13	10	4	27
1985	1	na	0	1	3	14	8	5	29
1986	1	3	0	1	2	11	4	17	20
1987	1	3	0	1	2	11	4	17	21
1988	1	2	0	1	2	10	5	11	21
1989	0	2	0	1	1	12	5	15	19
1990	0	2	0	1	2	13	3	19	19
1991	1	2	0	1	1	12	3	16	21
1992	1	2	0	1	2	10	3	17	19
1993	0	4	0	1	2	11	3	15	20
1994	0	4	0	1	2	13	3	12	20
1995	0	3	0	1	1	11	3	13	20
1996	1	3	0	1	1	11	5	15	19
1997	1	4	0	1	2	11	3	18	18
1998	1	3	0	1	2	13	3	18	19
1999	1	4	0	1	1	14	3	20	19
2000	1	3	0	1	1	12	4	20	18
2001	1	3	0	1	1	12	3	16	19
2002	1	4	0	1	1	13	4	16	19
2003	1	4	0	0	1	13	4	16	21
2004	1	4	0	0	1	11	4	17	20
2005	1	3	0	0	0	14	2	24	24
2006	1	3	0	0	1	11	3	24	24
2007	1	2	0	0	1	10	6	19	24

a. At farmgate undistorted prices

Appendix Table 11 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **Spain**, 1956 to 2007
(d) Trade status of covered products^a

[illegible]

	Rice	Sheep meat	Soybe an	Sugar	Sunflo wer	Tomat o	Wheat	Wine
1956	X	na	na	M	M	X	M	X
1957	X	na	na	M	M	X	M	X
1958	X	na	na	M	M	X	M	X
1959	X	na	na	M	M	X	M	X
1960	X	na	na	M	M	X	M	X
1961	X	na	na	M	M	X	M	X
1962	X	na	na	M	M	X	M	X
1963	X	na	na	M	M	X	M	X
1964	X	na	na	M	M	X	M	X
1965	X	na	na	M	M	X	M	X
1966	X	na	na	M	M	X	M	X
1967	X	na	na	M	M	X	M	X
1968	X	na	na	M	M	X	M	X
1969	X	na	na	M	M	X	M	X
1970	X	na	M	M	M	X	M	X
1971	X	na	M	M	M	X	M	X
1972	X	na	M	M	M	X	M	X
1973	X	na	M	M	M	X	M	X
1974	X	na	M	M	M	X	M	X
1975	X	na	M	M	M	X	M	X
1976	X	na	M	M	M	X	M	X
1977	X	na	M	M	M	X	M	X
1978	X	na	M	M	M	X	M	X
1979	X	na	M	M	M	X	M	X
1980	X	na	M	M	M	X	M	X
1981	X	na	M	M	M	X	M	X
1982	X	na	M	M	M	X	M	X
1983	X	na	M	M	M	X	M	X
1984	X	na	M	M	M	X	M	X
1985	X	na	M	M	M	X	M	X
1986	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	X
1987	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	X
1988	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	X
1989	X	M	M	M	M	X	M	X
1990	X	M	M	M	M	X	M	X
1991	X	M	M	M	M	X	M	X
1992	X	M	M	M	M	X	M	X
1993	X	M	M	M	M	X	M	X
1994	X	M	M	M	M	X	M	X
1995	X	M	M	M	M	X	M	X
1996	X	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
1997	X	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
1998	X	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
1999	X	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
2000	X	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
2001	X	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
2002	X	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
2003	X	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
2004	X	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
2005	X	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
2006	X	M	M	M	M	X	X	X
2007	X	M	M	M	M	X	X	X

a. Exportables (X), import-competing products (M) and nontradables (H).

Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on author's spreadsheet

Appendix Table 12: Annual distortion estimates, **Sweden**, 1956 to 2007

(a) Nominal rates of assistance to covered products

	(percent)												
	Barle y	Beef	Egg	Milk	Oat	Pigm eat	Potat o	Poult ry	Rape seed	Shee pmea t	Suga r	Whe at	All cover ed
1956	17	83	na	269	-17	69	46	33	26	65	97	10	77
1957	34	121	na	335	-18	61	131	33	27	65	65	18	102
1958	54	118	na	225	10	54	204	33	27	65	92	15	100
1959	44	120	na	324	42	49	220	33	24	65	104	14	115
1960	43	168	na	265	21	40	65	33	23	65	101	25	96
1961	68	167	na	401	29	62	250	33	21	65	108	33	131
1962	66	174	na	462	43	109	223	33	20	65	104	83	155
1963	70	131	na	354	37	114	289	33	19	65	38	80	144
1964	64	86	na	297	55	96	329	33	19	65	55	65	121
1965	60	64	na	381	54	133	286	33	17	65	142	82	132
1966	57	61	na	377	52	157	270	33	16	65	166	72	138
1967	74	78	na	404	65	133	281	33	16	65	130	63	132
1968	91	108	na	457	77	139	276	33	17	65	99	66	147
1969	64	112	na	430	50	154	282	33	16	65	83	64	141
1970	36	105	na	417	25	160	218	33	16	65	59	5	111
1971	69	109	na	454	20	152	208	33	15	65	42	33	121
1972	19	116	na	448	9	121	184	33	13	65	34	-12	94
1973	-2	65	na	356	-11	106	136	33	10	65	18	-36	60
1974	-8	30	na	349	-15	92	126	33	8	65	10	-33	42
1975	24	43	na	406	20	79	135	33	9	65	23	-9	74
1976	17	62	na	554	2	132	159	33	9	65	34	-18	82
1977	53	45	na	885	21	87	129	33	8	65	48	-26	89
1978	37	48	na	749	53	127	122	33	9	65	42	3	112
1979	53	33	na	667	62	168	111	33	9	65	20	14	119
1980	6	28	na	633	-34	121	97	33	10	65	12	28	74
1981	8	45	na	401	-1	165	138	33	8	65	21	39	83
1982	3	63	na	371	22	165	144	33	8	65	29	45	92
1983	17	299	na	345	-10	157	68	33	8	65	26	15	103
1984	5	315	na	363	-5	107	86	33	5	65	35	23	82
1985	29	334	na	334	3	47	82	33	6	65	35	47	88
1986	163	52	69	267	87	35	95	33	11	65	254	134	115
1987	223	76	58	213	54	52	68	45	17	187	227	144	117
1988	97	103	87	167	17	32	76	53	12	177	127	85	91
1989	70	89	86	150	36	26	53	51	12	173	97	65	78
1990	105	78	82	218	63	27	66	35	141	165	143	129	103
1991	121	172	177	230	44	35	73	32	136	210	219	147	121
1992	108	112	154	176	47	38	99	21	131	98	160	75	103
1993	74	102	173	146	2	52	44	13	51	54	102	40	81
1994	102	75	351	144	39	26	70	11	115	59	125	41	83
1995	41	69	12	79	40	16	15	129	0	77	119	16	46
1996	2	68	5	70	34	16	14	77	0	45	140	0	36
1997	7	117	1	78	25	13	12	55	0	27	147	0	40
1998	64	121	11	100	50	22	11	51	0	38	186	26	61
1999	44	125	16	106	84	57	11	90	0	37	245	37	76
2000	3	113	3	57	59	32	10	57	1	26	176	11	45
2001	0	140	0	40	29	24	10	52	0	48	138	4	35
2002	0	157	0	75	0	24	10	56	0	35	161	0	44
2003	1	157	0	70	1	33	10	54	0	46	240	2	45
2004	1	92	0	62	23	27	10	101	0	33	238	2	40
2005	0	109	0	33	24	19	10	69	0	54	168	0	25
2006	0	81	0	24	0	14	10	42	0	74	62	0	19
2007	0	66	0	0	0	17	10	99	0	68	99	0	10

Appendix Table 12 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **Sweden**, 1956 to 2007

(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all^a agricultural products, to exportable^b and import-competing^b agricultural industries, and relative^c to non-agricultural industries (percent)

	NRA, all agric products, ^a by component					NRA, agric tradables			NRA, all non-ag tradable goods (9)	RRR ^b (10)
	NRA, covered products (1)	NRA, non-covered products (2)	NRA, non-product-specific support (3)	NRA, all ag products (incl NPS and decoupled) (4)=1+2+3 (5)	NRA, all ag products (incl NPS and decoupled) (5)	NRA, ag exportables (6)	NRA, ag import-competing (7)	NRA, all agric tradable goods ^c (8)=6+7		
1956	77	40	na	68	68	19	126	68	2	64
1957	102	55	na	90	90	25	170	90	2	86
1958	100	51	na	87	87	30	154	87	3	83
1959	115	62	na	101	101	35	186	101	3	96
1960	96	50	na	85	85	29	153	85	3	80
1961	131	75	na	117	117	41	226	117	3	111
1962	155	83	na	136	136	63	232	136	3	130
1963	144	70	na	124	124	63	192	124	2	118
1964	121	63	na	106	106	59	168	106	2	101
1965	132	68	na	115	115	65	180	115	2	110
1966	138	66	na	119	119	73	169	119	2	114
1967	132	68	na	115	115	68	178	115	2	111
1968	147	77	na	129	129	75	202	129	2	125
1969	141	72	na	123	123	69	192	123	2	119
1970	111	61	na	98	98	46	174	98	1	95
1971	121	68	na	107	107	54	187	107	1	104
1972	94	62	na	86	86	27	188	86	1	84
1973	60	40	na	55	55	8	133	55	1	53
1974	42	28	na	39	39	1	99	39	1	38
1975	74	43	na	67	67	24	131	67	1	65
1976	82	53	na	75	75	21	168	75	1	74
1977	89	57	na	81	81	25	176	81	1	80
1978	112	60	na	99	99	47	171	99	0	98
1979	119	57	na	103	103	64	146	103	0	102
1980	74	41	na	66	66	20	130	66	0	65
1981	83	46	na	74	74	33	133	74	0	73
1982	92	51	na	82	82	39	146	82	0	81
1983	103	66	na	94	94	33	202	94	0	93
1984	82	64	na	78	78	21	201	78	0	77
1985	88	64	na	82	82	25	199	82	0	82
1986	115	78	0	108	108	109	105	108	0	108
1987	117	76	1	110	110	108	113	110	0	109
1988	91	43	1	82	82	84	63	82	1	81
1989	78	23	2	68	68	71	37	68	0	67
1990	103	39	5	91	91	93	56	91	0	91
1991	121	61	9	113	113	102	110	113	0	112
1992	103	51	5	95	95	88	94	95	1	93
1993	81	48	2	75	75	70	79	75	1	73
1994	83	0	2	65	65	88	69	65	1	63
1995	46	0	5	40	56	na	46	40	1	39
1996	36	17	4	35	51	8	42	35	1	34
1997	40	20	4	40	56	11	46	40	1	39
1998	61	30	4	58	74	27	61	58	1	56
1999	76	38	4	70	87	34	74	70	1	69
2000	45	23	3	43	61	11	54	43	1	42
2001	35	18	4	35	52	7	42	35	1	34
2002	44	21	5	43	61	8	54	43	1	42
2003	45	23	5	44	64	8	57	44	1	43
2004	40	19	4	39	57	7	50	39	1	38
2005	25	13	4	24	42	0	38	24	1	23
2006	19	9	4	19	40	0	25	19	1	18
2007	10	5	4	12	30	0	17	12	1	11

- a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and via inputs and other forms of non-product-specific (NPS) assistance without and (in column (5)) with decoupled support.
- b. The Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA) is defined as $100 * [(100 + \text{NRA}_{\text{ag}}^t) / (100 + \text{NRA}_{\text{nonag}}^t) - 1]$, where NRA_{ag}^t and $\text{NRA}_{\text{nonag}}^t$ are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors (columns 8 and 9), respectively, so it excludes decoupled payments but includes all NPS support.
- c. Including NPS but excluding decoupled payments, so more than the weighted average of columns (6) and (7).

Appendix Table 12 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **Sweden**, 1956 to 2007
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered^a and non-covered products,
(percent)

	Barle y	Beef	Egg	Milk	Oat	Pigm eat	Potat o	Poult ry	Rape seed	Shee pmea t	Suga r	Whe at	Non- cover ed
1956	6	8	na	13	12	13	9	1	0	0	2	10	25
1957	5	8	na	13	9	16	7	1	3	0	3	8	25
1958	5	8	na	15	9	17	6	1	3	0	2	8	26
1959	6	9	na	13	9	20	5	1	2	0	2	7	26
1960	6	7	na	15	8	18	8	1	3	0	1	9	25
1961	7	7	na	11	12	16	6	2	3	0	2	9	25
1962	8	9	na	10	11	13	7	2	3	0	1	8	26
1963	9	10	na	11	10	12	7	2	2	0	3	6	27
1964	10	10	na	12	10	12	4	1	3	0	2	8	26
1965	11	12	na	11	10	10	5	1	5	0	1	8	26
1966	11	16	na	12	9	11	5	2	2	0	1	5	27
1967	10	13	na	10	10	10	4	2	5	0	1	9	26
1968	10	12	na	9	10	11	5	2	5	0	1	8	26
1969	12	14	na	10	8	11	3	2	4	0	1	7	26
1970	13	12	na	8	11	10	5	1	4	0	2	9	25
1971	12	11	na	9	13	10	4	1	5	0	2	7	25
1972	13	9	na	8	11	10	4	1	6	0	3	11	24
1973	12	10	na	8	8	10	3	1	6	0	4	14	23
1974	13	11	na	7	9	8	3	1	6	0	6	14	22
1975	11	13	na	8	8	12	3	1	6	0	3	12	24
1976	12	12	na	7	9	10	3	1	4	0	2	18	23
1977	9	14	na	5	8	13	4	1	5	0	1	16	23
1978	12	15	na	6	7	12	5	2	5	0	2	9	25
1979	11	17	na	7	7	11	5	2	4	0	3	7	26
1980	12	15	na	6	14	10	4	1	4	0	4	6	24
1981	16	13	na	8	13	8	3	1	4	0	2	6	24
1982	17	12	na	10	10	9	3	1	5	0	2	8	24
1983	14	5	na	12	11	10	4	2	5	0	2	13	24
1984	18	4	na	9	13	10	5	1	7	0	1	10	22
1985	14	4	na	10	12	15	4	1	6	0	1	8	23
1986	6	13	4	17	5	19	4	2	3	0	2	6	18
1987	4	12	4	21	6	18	4	2	2	0	1	6	19
1988	6	10	3	21	7	17	4	1	2	0	2	5	21
1989	7	9	3	19	6	16	4	2	3	0	2	7	22
1990	6	10	3	15	6	16	6	2	3	0	2	7	25
1991	6	7	2	16	7	18	6	3	2	0	1	4	28
1992	4	10	2	20	4	17	5	3	2	0	2	6	26
1993	5	9	2	19	6	14	4	3	3	0	2	7	25
1994	11	9	1	18	5	16	5	3	1	0	2	5	24
1995	9	7	3	20	4	14	4	2	1	0	2	10	24
1996	9	7	3	20	4	14	4	2	1	0	2	10	23
1997	8	6	3	20	4	16	3	2	1	0	2	9	24
1998	5	7	3	21	4	13	7	3	1	0	2	9	25
1999	7	8	3	23	3	10	7	2	1	0	2	7	26
2000	7	7	4	25	3	11	3	2	1	0	2	10	24
2001	7	5	3	27	3	13	4	3	1	0	2	10	24
2002	7	5	4	22	6	12	4	3	2	0	2	9	24
2003	7	5	4	23	4	11	4	3	1	0	1	11	25
2004	7	6	3	24	3	11	5	2	2	0	1	11	24
2005	9	7	5	13	3	14	5	3	2	1	1	13	24
2006	6	5	4	23	4	11	5	2	3	0	2	11	24
2007	11	4	3	17	5	8	5	2	3	0	1	18	24

a. At farmgate undistorted prices

Appendix Table 12 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **Sweden**, 1956 to 2007
 (d) Trade status of covered products^a

	Barle y	Beef	Egg	Milk	Oat	Pigm eat	Potat o	Poult ry	Rape seed	Shee pmea t	Sugar	Whea t
1956	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	M	X	M	M	X
1957	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	M	X	M	M	X
1958	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	M	X	M	M	X
1959	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	M	X	M	M	X
1960	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	M	X	M	M	X
1961	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	M	X	M	M	X
1962	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	M	X	M	M	X
1963	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	M	X	M	M	X
1964	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	M	X	M	M	X
1965	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	M	X	M	M	X
1966	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	M	X	M	M	X
1967	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	M	X	M	M	X
1968	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	M	X	M	M	X
1969	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	M	X	M	M	X
1970	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	M	X	M	M	X
1971	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	M	X	M	M	X
1972	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	M	X	M	M	X
1973	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	M	X	M	M	X
1974	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	M	X	M	M	X
1975	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	M	X	M	M	X
1976	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	M	X	M	M	X
1977	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	M	X	M	M	X
1978	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	M	X	M	M	X
1979	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	M	X	M	M	X
1980	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	M	X	M	M	X
1981	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	M	X	M	M	X
1982	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	M	X	M	M	X
1983	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	M	X	M	M	X
1984	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	M	X	M	M	X
1985	X	M	na	M	X	X	M	M	X	M	M	X
1986	X	X	X	X	X	X	M	X	X	M	X	X
1987	X	X	X	X	X	X	M	X	X	M	M	X
1988	X	X	X	X	X	X	M	X	X	M	X	X
1989	X	X	X	X	X	X	M	X	X	M	X	X
1990	X	X	X	X	X	X	M	X	X	M	X	X
1991	X	M	X	X	X	X	M	X	X	M	M	X
1992	X	M	X	X	X	X	M	X	X	M	M	M
1993	X	M	X	X	X	X	M	X	X	M	X	X
1994	X	M	X	X	X	X	M	X	X	M	M	M
1995	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1996	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X
1997	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X
1998	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X
1999	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X
2000	X	M	X	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X
2001	X	M	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X
2002	X	M	X	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X
2003	X	M	X	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X
2004	X	M	X	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X
2005	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X
2006	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X
2007	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X

a. Exportables (X), import-competing products (M) and nontradables (H).

Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on author's spreadsheet

Appendix Table 13: Annual distortion estimates, **Switzerland**, 1956 to 2007

(a) Nominal rates of assistance to covered products

(percent)

	Barle y	Beef	Egg	Maiz e	Milk	Oat	Oilse ed	Pigm eat	Poult ry	Shee pmea t	Suga r	Whe at	All cove red
1956	na	252	285	156	295	na	na	160	334	124	384	296	255
1957	na	252	285	156	295	na	na	160	334	124	384	296	256
1958	na	252	285	156	295	na	na	160	334	124	384	296	256
1959	na	252	285	156	295	na	na	160	334	124	384	296	256
1960	na	252	285	156	295	na	na	160	334	124	384	296	255
1961	na	252	285	156	295	na	na	160	334	124	384	296	253
1962	na	252	285	156	295	na	na	160	334	124	384	296	256
1963	na	252	285	156	295	na	na	160	334	124	384	296	253
1964	na	252	285	156	295	na	na	160	334	124	384	296	253
1965	na	252	285	156	295	na	na	160	334	124	384	296	251
1966	na	252	285	156	295	na	na	160	334	124	384	296	251
1967	na	252	285	156	295	na	na	160	334	124	384	296	251
1968	na	252	285	156	295	na	na	160	334	124	384	296	249
1969	na	252	285	156	295	na	na	160	334	124	384	296	246
1970	na	252	285	156	295	na	na	160	334	124	384	296	246
1971	na	252	285	156	295	na	na	160	334	124	384	296	244
1972	na	252	285	156	295	na	na	160	334	124	384	296	244
1973	na	252	285	156	295	na	na	160	334	124	384	296	241
1974	na	252	285	156	295	na	na	160	334	124	384	296	242
1975	na	252	285	156	295	na	na	160	334	124	384	296	240
1976	na	252	285	156	295	na	na	160	334	124	384	296	242
1977	na	252	285	156	295	na	na	160	334	124	384	296	240
1978	na	252	285	156	295	na	na	160	334	124	384	296	241
1979	405	252	285	156	295	444	481	160	334	124	384	296	237
1980	303	202	232	137	243	296	542	160	309	120	230	222	204
1981	256	230	234	89	169	199	499	160	347	75	102	175	178
1982	305	287	293	137	166	268	597	160	369	133	194	240	194
1983	422	369	351	131	228	418	589	160	420	181	339	273	234
1984	292	398	310	102	257	270	275	160	409	168	414	209	242
1985	384	423	329	134	437	313	423	160	398	164	472	254	298
1986	1092	454	554	192	712	na	440	160	578	305	334	278	398
1987	1770	314	469	249	795	na	746	218	702	476	365	315	419
1988	1148	242	599	297	826	na	499	260	604	545	353	312	432
1989	609	236	502	217	248	na	452	141	529	464	283	218	230
1990	605	329	441	194	548	na	646	206	596	524	213	248	349
1991	1057	473	432	201	418	na	639	245	536	485	271	248	367
1992	609	191	513	154	264	na	616	115	591	399	345	264	224
1993	520	209	457	175	385	na	432	207	600	251	321	282	299
1994	579	295	460	118	319	na	321	225	613	262	323	267	292
1995	617	191	574	130	153	na	397	154	643	368	277	283	184
1996	274	100	377	92	271	na	353	157	499	178	244	153	201
1997	na	129	393	116	252	na	277	140	388	132	231	196	201
1998	na	134	422	151	256	na	259	210	459	183	195	230	225
1999	na	120	463	131	270	na	385	278	492	173	217	206	239
2000	na	221	292	92	197	na	322	187	463	147	280	143	198
2001	na	194	283	58	174	na	259	138	409	147	229	56	161
2002	na	147	237	101	233	na	253	181	527	117	225	81	198
2003	na	126	178	117	160	na	232	214	534	92	263	67	166
2004	na	172	263	78	122	na	234	182	581	65	279	48	142
2005	na	156	287	91	131	na	287	131	464	37	251	48	136
2006	na	176	261	78	57	na	na	118	492	71	145	64	98
2007	na	69	202	22	14	na	na	82	376	70	124	34	44

Appendix Table 13 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **Switzerland**, 1956 to 2007
(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all^a agricultural products, to exportable^b and import-competing^b agricultural industries, and relative^c to non-agricultural industries
(percent)

	NRA, all agric products, ^a by component					NRA, agric tradables			NRA, all non-ag tradable goods (9)	RRA ^b (10)
	NRA, covered products (1)	NRA, non-covered products (2)	NRA, non-product-specific support (3)	NRA, all ag products (incl NPS) (4)=1+2+3	NRA, all ag products (incl NPS and decoupled) (5)	NRA, ag exportables (6)	NRA, ag import-competing (7)	NRA, all agric tradable goods ^c (8)=6+7		
1956	255	246	na	252	252	310	210	252	5	236
1957	256	247	na	254	254	311	214	254	5	238
1958	256	247	na	253	253	311	212	253	5	235
1959	256	243	na	252	252	309	212	252	5	235
1960	255	241	na	251	251	308	211	251	6	233
1961	253	244	na	251	251	310	209	251	6	232
1962	256	247	na	253	253	311	214	253	5	235
1963	253	246	na	251	251	310	211	251	5	233
1964	253	244	na	250	250	311	212	250	5	232
1965	251	246	na	249	249	312	210	249	6	231
1966	251	247	na	250	250	312	210	250	6	232
1967	251	246	na	250	250	312	211	250	6	231
1968	249	245	na	248	248	312	209	248	6	229
1969	246	245	na	246	246	313	207	246	5	228
1970	246	245	na	246	246	312	207	246	4	232
1971	244	245	na	244	244	314	206	244	4	230
1972	244	245	na	244	244	315	206	244	5	229
1973	241	243	na	241	241	314	202	241	4	228
1974	242	246	na	243	243	316	206	243	3	232
1975	240	246	na	242	242	315	202	242	4	228
1976	242	242	na	242	242	313	204	242	4	229
1977	240	241	na	240	240	313	201	240	3	229
1978	241	243	na	242	242	314	203	242	4	230
1979	237	242	13	251	264	342	227	251	3	240
1980	204	243	12	223	237	344	199	223	3	215
1981	178	242	11	200	213	343	175	200	3	192
1982	194	238	12	213	227	337	189	213	3	204
1983	234	240	16	251	270	341	224	251	3	242
1984	242	243	16	258	277	344	231	258	2	249
1985	298	243	18	304	328	345	279	304	2	295
1986	398	242	37	393	411	558	261	393	3	381
1987	419	265	37	415	436	615	270	415	2	403
1988	432	264	32	418	440	632	269	418	2	406
1989	230	115	19	217	236	207	191	217	2	210
1990	349	211	21	332	354	443	244	332	2	323
1991	367	176	22	330	361	339	286	330	2	320
1992	224	111	17	209	236	219	170	209	3	201
1993	299	151	24	280	318	314	216	280	3	269
1994	292	140	27	274	319	264	235	274	3	263
1995	184	89	19	177	214	131	185	177	3	168
1996	201	105	20	195	249	224	139	195	3	186
1997	201	104	22	195	255	209	145	195	3	186
1998	225	114	22	214	275	212	175	214	3	205
1999	239	121	20	223	305	222	186	223	3	213
2000	198	94	17	186	259	163	173	186	3	177
2001	161	78	18	155	229	145	130	155	3	148
2002	198	92	19	186	270	190	146	186	3	177
2003	166	85	17	160	240	133	152	160	3	152
2004	142	68	15	137	208	101	143	137	3	130
2005	136	66	12	118	195	131	140	118	2	114
2006	98	48	11	87	155	57	140	87	2	83
2007	44	21	8	44	96	14	78	44	2	41

a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and via inputs and other forms of non-product-specific (NPS) assistance without and (in column (5)) with decoupled support.

- b. The Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA) is defined as $100 * [(100 + \text{NRA}_{\text{ag}}^t) / (100 + \text{NRA}_{\text{nonag}}^t) - 1]$, where NRA_{ag}^t and $\text{NRA}_{\text{nonag}}^t$ are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors (columns 8 and 9), respectively, so it excludes decoupled payments but includes all NPS support.
- c. Including NPS but excluding decoupled payments, so more than the weighted average of columns (6) and (7).

Appendix Table 13 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **Switzerland**, 1956 to 2007
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered^a and non-covered products, (percent)

	Barley	Beef	Egg	Maize	Milk	Oat	Oilseed	Pigmeat	Poultry	Sheep meat	Sugar	Wheat	Non-covered
1956	na	14	2	0	28	na	na	17	1	1	2	6	29
1957	na	13	2	0	27	na	na	17	1	1	2	8	29
1958	na	13	2	0	27	na	na	17	1	1	2	8	29
1959	na	12	2	0	27	na	na	17	1	1	2	8	29
1960	na	12	2	0	26	na	na	18	1	1	2	9	29
1961	na	13	2	0	26	na	na	18	1	1	2	8	29
1962	na	14	2	0	26	na	na	17	1	1	2	10	29
1963	na	14	2	0	26	na	na	18	2	1	2	7	29
1964	na	13	2	0	25	na	na	19	2	1	2	9	29
1965	na	12	2	0	25	na	na	20	2	1	2	8	28
1966	na	13	2	0	25	na	na	19	3	1	2	7	28
1967	na	13	2	0	24	na	na	20	3	1	1	8	28
1968	na	13	2	0	23	na	na	21	3	1	1	8	28
1969	na	13	2	1	23	na	na	22	3	1	1	7	28
1970	na	14	2	1	23	na	na	22	3	1	1	7	28
1971	na	13	2	1	22	na	na	23	3	1	1	7	28
1972	na	12	2	1	21	na	na	23	3	1	1	8	27
1973	na	12	2	2	21	na	na	24	3	0	1	7	27
1974	na	13	2	2	21	na	na	23	3	1	1	8	27
1975	na	13	2	2	22	na	na	24	3	1	1	6	28
1976	na	13	2	2	21	na	na	24	3	1	2	6	28
1977	na	13	2	1	21	na	na	25	3	1	2	5	28
1978	na	13	2	1	21	na	na	24	3	1	1	6	28
1979	1	17	2	1	24	0	0	30	1	1	1	4	19
1980	1	17	2	1	25	0	0	30	1	1	1	4	17
1981	1	13	2	1	31	0	0	26	1	1	2	4	16
1982	1	13	2	1	32	0	0	28	1	1	1	4	17
1983	1	11	2	1	30	0	0	28	1	0	1	4	19
1984	2	11	2	1	27	0	1	27	1	0	1	6	20
1985	1	12	2	2	21	0	1	31	1	1	1	6	21
1986	1	14	2	2	19	na	1	26	1	1	2	7	26
1987	0	18	2	2	18	na	1	24	0	0	1	6	27
1988	1	20	2	2	18	na	1	19	0	0	2	7	28
1989	1	13	1	2	29	na	1	18	0	0	1	6	28
1990	1	15	2	2	20	na	0	22	0	0	2	7	28
1991	1	11	1	2	26	na	1	18	0	0	1	7	31
1992	1	11	1	2	30	na	0	19	0	0	1	5	29
1993	2	15	1	2	26	na	1	16	1	1	1	6	29
1994	1	13	1	3	29	na	0	15	1	1	1	6	29
1995	1	12	1	2	38	na	0	12	0	0	1	5	28
1996	2	14	1	2	28	na	1	15	1	1	2	8	28
1997	na	11	1	2	30	na	1	16	1	1	2	6	29
1998	na	12	1	2	31	na	1	14	1	1	2	6	30
1999	na	13	1	2	32	na	1	11	1	1	2	5	30
2000	na	10	1	2	34	na	0	14	1	1	2	6	29
2001	na	8	1	2	36	na	0	15	1	1	1	6	28
2002	na	9	2	2	33	na	1	15	1	1	2	6	29
2003	na	8	2	1	38	na	1	13	1	1	1	5	29
2004	na	8	1	1	38	na	1	12	1	1	1	7	28
2005	na	15	1	1	36	na	1	15	1	1	2	6	22
2006	na	14	1	1	40	na	na	14	1	1	2	5	22
2007	na	16	1	1	43	na	na	12	1	1	2	5	19

a. At farmgate undistorted prices

Appendix Table 13 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **Switzerland**, 1956 to 2007
(d) Trade status of covered products^a

	Barle y	Beef	Egg	Maiz e	Milk	Oat	Oilse ed	Pigm eat	Poult ry	Shee pmea t	Sugar	Whea t
1956	na	M	M	M	X	na	na	M	M	M	M	M
1957	na	M	M	M	X	na	na	M	M	M	M	M
1958	na	M	M	M	X	na	na	M	M	M	M	M
1959	na	M	M	M	X	na	na	M	M	M	M	M
1960	na	M	M	M	X	na	na	M	M	M	M	M
1961	na	M	M	M	X	na	na	M	M	M	M	M
1962	na	M	M	M	X	na	na	M	M	M	M	M
1963	na	M	M	M	X	na	na	M	M	M	M	M
1964	na	M	M	M	X	na	na	M	M	M	M	M
1965	na	M	M	M	X	na	na	M	M	M	M	M
1966	na	M	M	M	X	na	na	M	M	M	M	M
1967	na	M	M	M	X	na	na	M	M	M	M	M
1968	na	M	M	M	X	na	na	M	M	M	M	M
1969	na	M	M	M	X	na	na	M	M	M	M	M
1970	na	M	M	M	X	na	na	M	M	M	M	M
1971	na	M	M	M	X	na	na	M	M	M	M	M
1972	na	M	M	M	X	na	na	M	M	M	M	M
1973	na	M	M	M	X	na	na	M	M	M	M	M
1974	na	M	M	M	X	na	na	M	M	M	M	M
1975	na	M	M	M	X	na	na	M	M	M	M	M
1976	na	M	M	M	X	na	na	M	M	M	M	M
1977	na	M	M	M	X	na	na	M	M	M	M	M
1978	na	M	M	M	X	na	na	M	M	M	M	M
1979	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1980	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1981	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1982	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1983	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1984	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1985	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1986	M	M	M	M	X	na	M	M	M	M	M	M
1987	M	M	M	M	X	na	M	M	M	M	M	M
1988	M	M	M	M	X	na	M	M	M	M	M	M
1989	M	M	M	M	X	na	M	M	M	M	M	M
1990	M	M	M	M	X	na	M	M	M	M	M	M
1991	M	M	M	M	X	na	M	M	M	M	M	M
1992	M	M	M	M	X	na	M	M	M	M	M	M
1993	M	M	M	M	X	na	M	M	M	M	M	M
1994	M	M	M	M	X	na	M	M	M	M	M	M
1995	M	M	M	M	X	na	M	M	M	M	M	M
1996	M	M	M	M	X	na	M	M	M	M	M	M
1997	na	M	M	M	X	na	M	M	M	M	M	M
1998	na	M	M	M	X	na	M	M	M	M	M	M
1999	na	M	M	M	X	na	M	M	M	M	M	M
2000	na	M	M	M	X	na	M	M	M	M	M	M
2001	na	M	M	M	X	na	M	M	M	M	M	M
2002	na	M	M	M	X	na	M	M	M	M	M	M
2003	na	M	M	M	X	na	M	M	M	M	M	M
2004	na	M	M	M	X	na	M	M	M	M	M	M
2005	na	M	M	M	X	na	M	M	M	M	M	M
2006	na	M	M	M	X	na	na	M	M	M	M	M
2007	na	M	M	M	X	na	na	M	M	M	M	M

a. Exportables (X), import-competing products (M) and nontradables (H).

Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on author's spreadsheet

Appendix Table 14: Annual distortion estimates, **UK**, 1956 to 2007(a) Nominal rates of assistance to covered products
(percent)

	Barle y	Beef	Egg	Milk	Oat	Pigm eat	Potat o	Poult ry	Rape seed	Shee pmea t	Suga r	Tom ato	Whe at	All cove red
1956	-11	20	-86	354	-6	67	104	53	na	78	480	0	-14	58
1957	42	34	-85	407	19	60	287	59	na	94	297	0	15	84
1958	52	56	-83	301	27	53	398	62	na	135	543	0	22	101
1959	51	60	-87	400	38	46	224	58	na	132	554	0	21	85
1960	50	93	-87	293	24	41	97	60	na	125	542	0	17	69
1961	40	66	-88	429	53	52	344	68	na	152	588	0	12	89
1962	22	73	-85	478	43	107	267	59	na	64	619	0	13	89
1963	30	37	-89	360	39	72	250	57	na	41	190	0	9	63
1964	25	40	-88	295	47	57	255	51	na	37	267	0	4	62
1965	9	23	-88	354	39	93	210	65	na	22	866	0	5	61
1966	3	7	-90	332	36	94	311	25	na	92	1046	0	3	61
1967	10	-1	-90	348	39	95	218	4	na	91	736	0	-2	53
1968	17	-28	-90	304	39	86	230	-2	0	95	575	0	0	48
1969	29	-32	-90	282	22	30	314	-1	0	98	180	0	-2	40
1970	-1	-29	-91	451	12	42	32	-10	0	56	105	0	-2	33
1971	18	-30	-91	419	13	41	27	53	0	60	56	0	3	39
1972	28	-25	-91	342	-12	42	40	-4	0	63	28	0	-7	33
1973	-7	34	-17	208	0	106	57	74	0	322	-30	22	-30	47
1974	3	-4	30	210	7	69	18	54	0	255	-51	22	-23	36
1975	23	11	16	264	23	65	49	60	0	267	28	22	-9	58
1976	20	26	5	366	10	122	327	69	0	342	99	22	-16	84
1977	56	11	41	598	35	65	71	61	0	281	230	22	-21	76
1978	49	11	13	488	74	78	-15	49	0	263	230	22	23	74
1979	75	0	41	440	80	109	17	38	0	230	70	22	35	77
1980	17	-1	22	434	-27	71	7	37	0	207	13	22	45	58
1981	7	23	2	330	-2	148	73	72	0	183	74	11	44	76
1982	8	49	18	313	22	125	95	99	0	181	152	31	51	87
1983	32	264	40	287	-1	129	87	73	0	203	196	19	28	113
1984	6	265	3	311	8	81	-24	95	0	172	268	26	20	81
1985	18	293	8	282	-6	22	11	91	0	95	297	26	31	86
1986	157	188	31	361	83	40	17	79	153	134	247	17	119	138
1987	233	107	21	533	77	11	17	90	145	211	301	15	143	137
1988	85	80	21	192	14	34	17	69	112	215	201	15	94	96
1989	45	79	29	84	15	14	17	66	140	167	90	0	31	60
1990	94	98	12	125	48	7	16	100	200	154	109	2	57	78
1991	119	157	13	128	39	20	16	83	97	128	191	0	146	96
1992	103	93	15	118	63	0	17	118	0	112	212	0	65	73
1993	105	63	10	123	44	18	17	110	0	38	169	8	58	68
1994	100	53	0	117	43	18	16	114	0	55	129	11	48	61
1995	41	69	12	79	40	16	15	129	0	77	119	0	16	51
1996	2	68	5	70	34	16	14	77	0	45	140	2	0	36
1997	7	117	1	78	25	13	12	55	0	27	147	0	0	39
1998	64	121	11	100	50	22	11	51	0	38	186	0	26	55
1999	44	125	16	106	84	57	11	90	0	37	245	0	37	65
2000	3	113	3	57	59	32	10	57	1	26	176	0	11	40
2001	0	140	0	40	29	24	10	52	0	48	138	0	4	35
2002	0	157	0	75	0	24	10	56	0	35	161	0	0	43
2003	1	157	0	70	1	33	10	54	0	46	240	2	2	44
2004	1	92	0	62	23	27	10	101	0	33	238	2	2	41
2005	0	109	0	33	24	19	10	69	0	54	168	0	0	26
2006	0	81	0	25	0	15	10	69	0	74	62	0	0	22
2007	0	66	0	0	0	17	10	100	0	68	99	0	0	13

Appendix Table 14 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **UK**, 1956 to 2007

(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all^a agricultural products, to exportable^b and import-competing^b agricultural industries, and relative^c to non-agricultural industries (percent)

	NRA, all agric products, ^a by component					NRA, agric tradables			NRA, all non-ag tradable goods (9)	RRA ^b (10)
	NRA, covered products (1)	NRA, non-covered products (2)	NRA, non-product-specific support (3)	NRA, all ag products (incl NPS) (4)=1+2+3	NRA, all ag products (incl NPS and decoupled) (5)	NRA, ag exportables (6)	NRA, ag import-competing (7)	NRA, all agric tradable goods ^c (8)=6+7		
1956	58	14	na	47	47	0	54	47	15	27
1957	84	21	na	67	67	0	77	67	15	45
1958	101	25	na	80	80	0	93	80	17	53
1959	85	21	na	68	68	0	78	68	17	43
1960	69	17	na	55	55	0	64	55	16	34
1961	89	22	na	71	71	0	82	71	18	44
1962	89	22	na	70	70	0	82	70	18	44
1963	63	16	na	51	51	0	59	51	18	28
1964	62	16	na	50	50	0	57	50	18	27
1965	61	15	na	49	49	0	57	49	18	27
1966	61	15	na	49	49	0	57	49	18	27
1967	53	13	na	43	43	0	49	43	17	22
1968	48	12	na	39	39	0	44	39	17	18
1969	40	10	na	33	33	0	37	33	18	13
1970	33	8	na	27	27	0	30	27	16	10
1971	39	10	na	32	32	0	37	32	16	14
1972	33	8	na	27	27	0	31	27	16	10
1973	47	23	na	41	41	8	52	41	9	30
1974	36	19	na	32	32	14	38	32	6	25
1975	58	31	na	52	52	33	57	52	7	41
1976	84	43	na	74	74	55	77	74	7	63
1977	76	40	na	67	67	54	71	67	7	57
1978	74	39	na	66	66	49	70	66	7	55
1979	77	41	12	81	82	64	70	81	6	70
1980	58	34	12	65	66	34	58	65	0	65
1981	76	40	10	77	79	30	80	77	0	77
1982	87	46	9	87	89	32	94	87	0	87
1983	113	57	9	108	111	43	118	108	0	108
1984	81	41	8	79	81	21	89	79	0	79
1985	86	43	10	86	89	32	90	86	0	86
1986	138	68	3	123	125	74	126	123	0	123
1987	137	68	3	122	124	83	124	122	0	122
1988	96	47	3	87	90	53	89	87	0	87
1989	60	29	3	55	58	26	56	55	0	55
1990	78	37	4	72	75	37	73	72	0	72
1991	96	46	5	88	92	45	89	88	0	88
1992	73	36	5	68	76	35	69	68	0	68
1993	68	34	5	65	77	35	64	65	0	65
1994	61	30	4	58	73	36	57	58	0	58
1995	51	25	5	49	66	25	47	49	0	49
1996	36	17	4	35	52	6	46	35	0	35
1997	39	19	4	38	54	9	47	38	0	38
1998	55	28	4	52	69	23	57	52	0	52
1999	65	33	4	61	78	30	66	61	0	61
2000	40	21	3	39	56	11	49	39	0	39
2001	35	19	4	35	52	7	42	35	0	35
2002	43	22	5	42	60	7	56	42	0	42
2003	44	23	5	44	63	7	58	44	0	44
2004	41	20	4	40	58	7	52	40	0	40
2005	26	13	4	24	43	0	39	24	0	24
2006	22	11	4	21	42	0	34	21	0	21
2007	13	7	4	14	33	0	24	14	0	14

a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and via inputs and other forms of non-product-specific (NPS) assistance without and (in column (5)) with decoupled support.

- b. The Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA) is defined as $100 * [(100 + \text{NRA}_{\text{ag}}^t) / (100 + \text{NRA}_{\text{nonag}}^t) - 1]$, where NRA_{ag}^t and $\text{NRA}_{\text{nonag}}^t$ are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors (columns 8 and 9), respectively, so it excludes decoupled payments but includes all NPS support.
- c. Including NPS but excluding decoupled payments, so more than the weighted average of columns (6) and (7).

Appendix Table 14 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **UK**, 1956 to 2007
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered^a and non-covered products,
(percent)

	Barle y	Beef	Egg	Milk	Oat	Pigme at	Potato	Poultr y	Rapes eed	Sheep meat	Sugar	Tomat o	Wheat	Non- cover ed
1956	6	11	12	8	6	10	8	3	na	3	1	0	7	26
1957	6	11	13	8	5	10	6	3	na	3	1	0	7	28
1958	7	12	12	10	5	4	6	4	na	3	1	0	7	29
1959	8	10	15	8	5	4	6	5	na	4	1	0	7	27
1960	7	7	13	8	4	11	8	4	na	3	1	0	6	27
1961	9	9	14	7	3	10	5	5	na	4	1	0	6	28
1962	11	8	11	6	3	8	6	5	na	5	1	0	8	28
1963	11	9	13	7	2	9	5	5	na	5	2	0	6	26
1964	12	11	10	8	2	10	4	5	na	5	2	0	7	26
1965	13	12	11	7	2	8	5	5	na	5	1	0	7	26
1966	14	13	11	7	2	8	4	5	na	3	1	0	6	26
1967	14	13	12	7	2	7	4	5	na	3	1	0	7	25
1968	12	13	12	7	2	8	4	6	0	3	1	0	7	25
1969	11	13	12	8	2	8	4	7	0	3	1	0	6	24
1970	12	13	12	7	2	8	5	7	0	3	1	0	8	23
1971	11	13	12	8	2	8	5	4	0	3	2	0	8	24
1972	10	13	12	9	2	8	5	5	0	3	2	0	8	23
1973	12	13	10	8	1	7	4	4	0	3	3	0	11	23
1974	12	19	5	7	1	7	4	4	0	3	3	1	11	22
1975	10	23	6	8	1	7	3	5	0	4	1	1	8	23
1976	11	19	8	7	1	6	3	5	0	3	1	1	10	24
1977	10	20	6	5	1	8	5	5	1	3	1	1	12	24
1978	10	21	7	6	1	7	5	6	0	3	1	1	9	24
1979	9	23	5	6	0	6	5	6	1	4	2	1	9	24
1980	12	21	5	5	1	6	5	5	1	4	3	1	9	23
1981	14	17	6	8	1	5	4	5	1	4	2	1	10	23
1982	15	14	6	9	1	5	4	4	1	4	1	0	11	24
1983	13	7	5	10	1	6	5	6	2	5	1	1	15	25
1984	14	6	5	8	1	6	6	4	3	4	1	0	18	24
1985	12	6	5	9	1	9	5	5	3	5	1	1	14	25
1986	7	9	5	9	0	9	6	7	2	5	1	1	12	26
1987	5	14	6	7	0	11	6	7	2	4	1	1	10	26
1988	7	13	4	13	1	8	5	7	2	4	1	1	10	26
1989	6	11	3	17	1	9	5	5	1	4	1	1	13	23
1990	5	10	4	16	0	10	6	5	2	4	1	1	12	25
1991	5	8	4	16	0	10	7	6	2	4	1	1	9	26
1992	4	10	4	16	0	12	5	5	2	5	1	1	11	25
1993	3	11	4	16	0	9	4	6	2	7	1	1	10	25
1994	3	12	4	16	0	9	7	5	2	7	2	1	9	24
1995	4	11	3	17	0	8	8	4	2	5	1	0	12	24
1996	6	7	4	17	0	8	4	6	2	6	1	0	15	23
1997	6	5	4	17	0	10	4	7	2	7	2	0	13	24
1998	3	6	4	17	0	8	7	8	3	7	1	1	11	24
1999	4	6	3	18	0	6	9	6	3	8	1	1	10	25
2000	5	6	4	20	0	6	4	7	2	8	1	1	13	23
2001	5	4	4	24	0	7	5	8	2	5	1	0	10	23
2002	5	5	4	19	1	6	5	7	3	7	1	1	13	24
2003	5	5	5	20	1	5	5	8	3	7	1	0	12	25
2004	4	6	4	21	0	5	7	6	3	7	1	0	13	24
2005	6	5	7	13	1	7	5	5	4	7	1	0	15	24
2006	6	5	6	13	0	7	8	4	4	5	1	0	17	24
2007	8	4	3	19	0	5	4	3	4	4	1	0	21	24

a. At farmgate undistorted prices

Appendix Table 14 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, **UK**, 1956 to 2007(d) Trade status of covered products^a

	Barley	Beef	Egg	Milk	Oat	Pigmeat	Potato	Poultry	Rapeseed	Sheep meat	Sugar	Tomato	Wheat
1956	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	M
1957	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	M
1958	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	M
1959	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	M
1960	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	M
1961	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	M
1962	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	M
1963	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	M
1964	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	M
1965	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	M
1966	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	M
1967	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	na	M	M	M	M
1968	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1969	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1970	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1971	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1972	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1973	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1974	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1975	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1976	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1977	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1978	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1979	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1980	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1981	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1982	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1983	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1984	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1985	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1986	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1987	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1988	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
1989	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M
1990	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M
1991	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M
1992	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	M
1993	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	M
1994	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M
1995	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M
1996	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X
1997	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X
1998	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X
1999	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X
2000	X	M	X	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X
2001	X	M	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	X
2002	X	M	X	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X
2003	X	M	X	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X
2004	X	M	X	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X
2005	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X
2006	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X
2007	X	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	X	M	M	X	X

a. Exportables (X), import-competing products (M) and nontradables (H).

Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on author's spreadsheet

Appendix Table 15: Shares of the global value of production and consumption of key covered agricultural products, Western European economies^a, 2000-03 (percent)

		Austria	Denmark	Finland	France	Germany	Ireland	Italy	Netherlands	Norway	Portugal	Spain	Sweden	Switzerland	UK	Regional	World
Grains	Q	0.2	0.4	0.1	2.7	1.6	0.1	0.9	0.1	0.0	0.1	1.0	0.2	0.1	0.9	8.3	100
	C	0.2	0.3	0.1	1.6	1.5	0.1	1.2	0.3	0.1	0.2	1.3	0.2	0.1	0.8	7.3	100
Rice	Q				0.0			0.4			0.0	0.3				0.7	100
	C				0.2			0.2			0.1	0.2				0.6	100
Wheat	Q	0.2	0.8	0.1	6.0	3.7	0.1	1.2	0.2	0.1	0.0	1.1	0.4	0.2	2.5	16.6	100
	C	0.2	0.7	0.1	3.4	3.0	0.2	1.9	0.7	0.1	0.3	1.5	0.3	0.3	2.3	12.7	100
Maize	Q	0.3			2.9	0.7		1.9	0.0		0.2	0.8		0.0		6.8	100
	C	0.4			2.3	1.3		3.1	0.7		0.6	2.0		0.1		10.6	100
Barley	Q	0.7	3.0	1.4	8.0	9.4	1.0	0.9	0.3	0.5	0.0	7.1	1.3		4.9	38.4	100
	C	0.9	2.6	1.2	3.3	8.5	0.9	1.8	0.6	1.0	0.3	8.9	1.2		4.2	31.2	100
Oat	Q	0.5	1.1	5.1	2.3	4.4	0.5	1.3	0.1	1.3	0.2	3.5	4.2		2.7	27.0	100
	C	0.6	1.1	3.6	2.5	5.4	0.6	1.8	0.4	2.5	0.4	4.1	3.5		2.4	26.5	100
Oilseeds	Q	0.1	0.1	0.0	1.9	1.5	0.0	0.3	0.0		0.0	0.3	0.1		0.5	4.8	100
	C	0.1	na	na	1.7	3.8	na	0.9	na		0.1	1.9	na		na	8.9	100
Soybean	Q	na			0.1	0.0		0.4				0.0				0.6	100
	C				0.7	3.0		1.3				2.4				7.3	100
Rapeseed	Q	0.3	0.9	0.3	10.1	12.1	0.0	0.1	0.0			0.1	0.5		4.3	28.6	100
	C	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na			na	na		na	na	100
Sunflower	Q	0.3			7.5	0.3		1.6			0.1	3.9				13.8	100
	C	0.6			7.0	1.6		2.5			0.9	6.3				19.0	100
		Austria	Denmark	Finland	France	Germany	Ireland	Italy	Netherlands	Norway	Portugal	Spain	Sweden	Switzerland	UK	Regional	World
Tropical crops	Q	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.8	0.7	0.0	0.3	0.2		0.0	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.2	2.7	100
	C	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.4	0.6	0.0	0.3	0.2		0.1	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.4	2.2	100
Sugar	Q	0.2	0.3	0.1	2.4	2.1	0.1	0.8	0.5		0.0	0.6	0.2	0.1	0.7	8.2	100
	C	0.3	0.2	0.1	1.3	1.8	0.1	1.0	0.5		0.2	0.8	0.2	0.4	1.1	7.0	100
Livestock	Q	0.4	0.7	0.2	2.6	2.8	0.5	1.5	1.1	0.1	0.3	1.7	0.3	0.3	1.5	13.9	100
	C	0.4	0.4	0.2	2.9	3.3	0.4	2.1	0.9	0.2	0.4	1.8	0.4	0.4	2.2	13.9	100
Pigmeat	Q	0.6	1.7	0.2	2.3	4.1	0.2	1.5	1.4	0.1	0.3	3.0	0.3	0.2	0.8	16.9	100
	C	0.7	0.4	0.2	2.4	4.9	0.2	2.7	0.8	0.1	0.5	2.9	0.5	0.3	1.6	16.5	100
Milk	Q	0.6	0.9	0.5	4.8	5.4	1.0	2.1	2.1	0.3	0.4	1.4	0.6	0.7	2.8	23.6	100
	C	0.7	1.0	0.6	5.4	6.0	1.2	2.9	2.4	0.4	0.5	1.8	0.8	0.9	3.5	24.6	100
Beef	Q	0.2	0.2	0.1	1.9	1.5	0.7	1.3	0.5	0.1	0.1	0.8	0.2	0.2	0.8	8.6	100
	C	0.3	0.3	0.2	2.9	1.8	0.2	2.6	0.6	0.2	0.3	1.1	0.5	0.3	2.1	11.1	100
Poultry	Q	0.1	0.2	0.1	2.1	0.9	0.1	1.0	0.7	0.0	0.2	1.1	0.1	0.0	1.5	0.1	100
	C	0.2	0.1	0.1	2.0	1.5	0.1	1.3	0.3	0.0	0.3	1.5	0.3	0.1	2.3	0.3	100
Egg	Q	0.2	0.1	0.1	1.8	1.5	0.1	1.2	1.1	0.1	0.2	1.3	0.2	0.1	1.0	0.2	100
	C	0.1	0.1	0.1	1.3	1.4	0.0	0.9	0.4	0.0	0.2	0.9	0.1	0.1	0.8	0.1	100
Sheepmeat	Q	0.1	0.0	0.0	1.4	0.5	0.7	0.7	0.2	0.3	0.3	2.6	0.0	0.1	3.3	0.0	100

	C	0.1	0.1	0.0	3.7	1.1	0.3	1.2	0.3	0.5	0.5	3.4	0.1	0.2	5.1	0.1	100
Total of above	Q	0.3	0.5	0.2	2.4	2.2	0.3	1.1	0.6	0.1	0.2	1.2	0.2	0.2	1.2	0.2	100
	C	0.3	0.3	0.2	2.2	2.5	0.2	1.6	0.6	0.1	0.3	1.5	0.3	0.2	1.5	0.3	100
Production																	
All covered	Q	0.3	0.5	0.2	3.2	2.5	0.3	2.3	0.8	0.1	0.4	2.0	0.2	0.2	1.3	0.2	100
Non-covered	Q	0.2	0.3	0.1	1.7	1.6	0.2	1.1	0.5	0.1	0.2	1.0	0.2	0.1	0.8	0.2	100
All agriculture	Q	0.3	0.5	0.2	2.7	2.2	0.3	1.9	0.7	0.1	0.3	1.7	0.2	0.2	1.1	0.2	100

Source: Authors' calculations using Project data and FAO Production and Commodity Balance Data.

Appendix Table 16: Shares of the global value of exports and imports of key covered agricultural products, Western European economies^a, 2000-03 (percent)

[illegible]

		Austria	Denmark	Finland	France	Germany	Ireland	Italy	Netherlands	Norway	Portugal	Spain	Sweden	Switzerland	UK	Regional	World
Tropical crops	X	0.2	0.4	0.0	4.5	1.8	0.2	0.4	0.4		0.2	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.7	9.1	100
	M	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.8	0.8	0.1	1.2	0.2		0.5	0.9	0.1	0.2	2.6	7.8	100
Sugar	X	0.5	1.0	0.1	11.7	4.6	0.4	1.0	1.0		0.4	0.3	0.4	0.0	1.9	23.5	100
	M	0.2	0.4	0.4	2.0	2.1	0.3	3.3	0.5		1.4	2.4	0.2	0.5	6.8	20.3	100
Livestock products	X	1.4	6.6	0.5	9.3	9.2	3.7	2.8	9.3	0.1	0.2	2.5	0.3	0.5	2.2	48.6	100
	M	1.0	1.0	0.2	5.9	8.7	0.8	7.4	4.1	0.1	1.0	2.3	0.9	0.7	7.8	41.9	100
Pigmeat	X	1.9	19.8	0.3	6.6	7.7	1.8	4.2	9.1	0.0	0.2	5.9	0.3	0.0	1.3	59.3	100
	M	1.3	1.0	0.3	5.8	10.0	0.9	9.4	1.9	0.0	1.4	1.2	1.3	0.5	10.6	45.5	100
Milk	X	2.0	4.9	0.9	13.6	14.8	4.0	3.6	11.7	0.3	0.5	1.9	0.5	1.2	3.2	63.2	100
	M	1.2	1.0	0.4	6.7	10.8	0.9	8.8	6.0	0.1	0.9	3.5	0.8	0.7	6.1	47.9	100
Beef	X	1.0	1.7	0.1	4.5	6.4	6.1	1.5	7.1	0.0	0.0	1.8	0.1	0.1	0.3	30.6	100
	M	0.4	1.5	0.1	4.9	3.3	0.2	8.4	3.5	0.1	1.3	2.2	0.9	0.4	5.7	33.0	100
Poultry	X	0.5	2.1	0.1	11.6	3.8	1.9	1.9	10.1	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.1	0.0	2.8	35.9	100
	M	1.4	0.9	0.2	3.0	10.7	1.6	1.1	4.2	0.0	0.3	1.6	0.8	1.3	11.6	38.6	100
Sheepmeat	X	0.1	0.1	0.0	2.1	1.3	7.4	0.2	1.1	0.0	0.0	2.6	0.0	0.0	9.0	23.8	100
	M	0.4	0.8	0.2	19.4	7.0	0.2	4.0	1.9	0.2	1.1	1.4	0.7	2.4	12.9	52.5	100
Total of above	X	0.9	3.4	0.3	8.1	5.8	1.8	1.7	5.0	0.1	0.2	1.5	0.3	0.2	1.6	30.7	100
	M	0.6	0.7	0.2	3.4	5.1	0.5	4.7	2.9	0.1	0.9	2.2	0.5	0.4	4.7	26.8	100
All exports	X	0.9	2.2	0.3	7.9	6.0	1.5	3.9	7.3	0.1	0.4	3.7	0.5	0.5	3.5	38.5	100
	M	1.1	1.1	0.5	5.7	8.3	0.8	5.1	4.3	0.5	0.9	2.8	1.0	1.2	6.5	40.0	100

Source: Authors' derivation using trade value data from FAOSTAT.