@article{Berck:43915,
      recid = {43915},
      author = {Berck, Peter and Costello, Christopher},
      title = {Overharvesting the traditional fishery with a captured  regulator},
      address = {2000-12},
      number = {1557-2016-133034},
      series = {CUDARE Working Paper},
      pages = {26},
      year = {2000},
      abstract = {Rent dissipation in open access fisheries is a well  studied problem (Gordon 1954; Homans and Wilen 1997).  Regulation is seen as a possibly remedy to the externality  of entry, which eventually leads to zero profits and  depressed stocks. Despite regulation, drastic declines have  occurred in many regulated fisheries worldwide, prompting a  discussion of economic, biological, and environmental  phenomena that may lead to declines. We explore one case  when a regulator permits overfishing in the context of a  traditional fishery model. Influenced by industry to reduce  effort restrictions, regulators often rely on gear, season  length, and other efficiency restrictions to achieve  management goals. Under standard assumptions we find that  when the regulator is "captured" by the members of the  industry, he unambiguously allows overfishing by reaching a  lower stock and higher effort than is socially optimal.  This steady state has zero rents, but a higher stock and  higher effort than the open access steady state.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/43915},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.43915},
}