Open crop residue burning creates serious environmental externalities, but the role of land
tenure institutions in farmers’ burning decisions remains unclear. This paper examines how two
major land reforms in rural China affected agricultural fires. Using county-level reform timing,
satellite-based fire data, and a staggered difference-in-differences design, we find that the Land
Contracting and Transfer Reform (LCTR) of 2003 increased agricultural fire occurrence and
intensity, while the Land Titling Reform (LTR) of 2014 reduced it. We explain these opposing
effects by showing that LCTR expanded production and limited the availability of labor,
increasing the pressure to dispose of agricultural residue. By contrast, LTR reduced fires by
changing planted area by strengthening tenure security, parcel level accountability and
incentives to program long-term soil productivity. The findings show that land tenure
institutions can affect pollution externalities in agriculture and that secure property rights can
generate environmental benefits beyond direct regulation.
