@article{Dimitrov:37523,
      recid = {37523},
      author = {Dimitrov, Dinko and Lazarova, Emiliya A.},
      title = {Coalitional Matchings},
      address = {2008-05},
      number = {826-2016-55131},
      series = {Nota Di Lavoro},
      pages = {36},
      year = {2008},
      abstract = {A coalitional matching is a two-sided matching problem in  which agents on each side of the market may form coalitions  such as student groups and research teams who - when  matched - form universities. We assume that each researcher  has preferences over the research teams he would like to  work in and over the student groups he would like to teach  to. Correspondingly, each student has preferences over the  groups of students he wants to study with and over the  teams of researchers he would like to learn from. In this  setup, we examine how the existence of core stable  partitions on the distinct market sides, the restriction of  agents’ preferences over groups to strict orderings, and  the extent to which individual preferences respect common  rankings shape the existence of core stable coalitional  matchings.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/37523},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.37523},
}