@article{Gandelman:37120,
      recid = {37120},
      author = {Gandelman, Nestor},
      title = {Community Tax Evasion Models: A Stochastic Dominance Test},
      journal = {Journal of Applied Economics},
      address = {2005-11},
      number = {1510-2016-130975},
      pages = {19},
      year = {2005},
      abstract = {In a multi community environment local authorities compete  for tax base. When monitoring is imperfect, agents may  decide not to pay in their community (evasion), and save  the tax difference. The agent decision on where to pay  taxes is based on the probability of getting caught, the  fine he eventually will have to pay and the time cost of  paying in a neighbor community. First, we prove that if the  focus of the agents’ decision is the probability of getting  caught and the fine, only the richest people evade. If  instead, the key ingredient is the time cost of evading,  only the poorest cheat. Second, we test the evasion pattern  on the Automobile Registration System in Uruguay using two  stochastic dominance tests. The evidence favors in this  case the hypothesis that richer people are the evaders.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/37120},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.37120},
}