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
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Forced-Urbanization: The Alienation of Urbanization in China

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ABSTRACT

Aims: Forced-urbanization that deviates from the intended purposes can lead to the alienation of some societies, especially those that had been forced to migrate to urban areas. This holds potential threats to the sustainable development of the urbanized communities. This likelihood mainly comes through the erosion of well being rights and lack of improvement of social welfare for migrated communities. Rooted in GDP-oriented mechanical paradigm, forced-urbanization damages the dynamic mechanism of urban. The New-style Urbanization strategy proposed by Chinese Government in 2011 which seeks to curb the forced-urbanization. The research tries to answer the question i.e. could the New-style Urbanization really curb the forced-urbanization in China?

Study Design: China' urbanization is a process of wellbeing rights erosion which is described as Forced-urbanization. The research begins with the harm caused by Forced-urbanization, and then focuses on the generation logic of Forced-urbanization. After that, a discussion about the effect of New-Style Urbanization Strategy to curb the Forced-urbanization is taken.

Methodology: This research did a random survey of 210 landless farmers in some provinces such

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as Jiangsu, Shandong, Sichuan and Fujian etc. in 2010 and 2011. The main aim of the survey was to understand some special issues, such as the identity and role confirmation, recognition of urban life and the emotional memory of the respondents.

Results: Forced-urbanization has caused serious harm to farmers, including restriction on economic rights, violation of political rights, and deprivation of migrants' cultural rights. The foundation of civil social supports was damaged as well in the process. The primary reason of forced-urbanization is that the value paradigm of urbanization in China was GDP-oriented rather than wellbeing-oriented. In order to curb the forced-urbanization, Chinese Government established New-style Urbanization Strategy in 2012. The random survey shows that some kinds of risks of forced-urbanization still exist in the implementation process of New-style Urbanization strategy.

Conclusion: It is necessary to avoid the unintended purposes of New-style Urbanization by breaking the generation logic of forced-urbanization. Some local governments have offered certain successful experiences. But there is still a long way to go because of some real constraints. However, the way out of forced-urbanization in China is still urbanization but preferably through the New-style Urbanization strategy that takes various possibilities into consideration.

Keywords: *Forced-urbanization; new-style urbanization; wellbeing improvement; wellbeing rights.*

1. INTRODUCTION

In a universal sense, urbanization entails rural population migrating into cities, with a corresponding adjustment in their life style, income structure and mind state. Due to its direct economic effects, urbanization promotion is generally seen as a way to improve wellbeing [1]. A research on population migration and urbanization by the World Bank verifies that the most effective way for poverty alleviation and economic development is to move rural population into cities where the infrastructure is fully provided by the government [2].

In the true sense, China's urbanization began in 1949 with the foundation of the People's Republic of China (PRC). It has witnessed huge achievements that include the rapid growth of urban population, national income, consumption and investment. China's urban population increased by 18.9 million in 2011, the urbanization rate increased from 10.64% in 1949 to 53.7% in 2013. Compared with 2002, urban social retail sales of consumer goods grew by 4 trillion yuan to 15.9 trillion yuan in 2011 and there was also improvement of public service including medical treatment and social security. National Bureau of Statistics of PRC verified that the New Rural Cooperative Medical Service System experimented in 2003 had initially accommodated about 80 million rural populations into public services.

However, this kind of urbanization is also a process of wellbeing rights erosion [3] and cities become monsters at the cost of villagers. For example, there are 25 million migrants that live in

cities without enjoying equal rights as city dwellers because of household registration requirements. Thus the actual rate of urbanization in China is about 20-25% lower than in most developed countries.

This abnormal urbanization phenomenon did not catch enough attention until 2002. Some Chinese scholars such as Lin et al. [4] proposed a concept of Passive-Urbanization to describe it. It was the first time that the negative effect of government intervention in China's urbanization had drawn serious attention. From then on, land-lost farmers' issues such as non-agricultural employment and the transition of social structure of rural areas became the research themes of urbanization [5].

In theoretical framework of Passive-Urbanization, land-lost farmers' urban adaptability [6], spatial perception [7], life space remodeling [8], self-identity [9] and community governance participation [10] had been discussed extensively. Nonetheless, the terminology of Passive-Urbanization could not factually describe the features of dehumanization such as capital-oriented, government-led and controlled by interest groups. Those features existed widely during urbanization in China, and they were the indications of deviation from the intended purposes of urbanization.

A new concept of Forced-Urbanization was proposed in 2011 to illustrate this alienation of urbanization in China [11]. Compared with the term of Passive-Urbanization, the terminology of Forced-Urbanization means not only the forced attribute but also the unconscious and rejected

characters. They could be observed in some areas like land-urbanization, industrial structure transition, rural culture and psychological change. All of them separated from population urbanization and were not mentioned in previous studies.

In order to curb the forced-urbanization, Chinese Government led by President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang put forward the New-style Urbanization strategy in 2012. According to the policy outline, New-style Urbanization should be people-oriented, aiming at promoting urban culture and public services, emphasizing wellbeing improvement.

But two potential uncertainties arise. For one thing, will the New-style Urbanization strategy eliminate the harm caused by forced-urbanization in China? For another, Could the New-style Urbanization really curb the forced-urbanization in China?

As one part of the project named New-style Urbanization & China Minsheng Development supported by China National 985 Fund, this research did a random survey of 210 landless farmers in some provinces such as Jiangsu, Shandong, Sichuan and Fujian etc. in 2010 and 2011. The main aim of the survey was to understand some special issues, such as the identity and role confirmation, recognition of urban life and the emotional memory of the respondents.

The results show that most of the respondents were forced to lose their land and were converted to urban citizens. Though they admitted that housing conditions had been improved, they felt alienated and uncomfortable with the unfamiliar neighborhoods' relationship in urban environment. Some respondents indicated that they could not enjoy same benefits as those native urban citizens.

These phenomena lead the study further to analyze in details the harm caused by forced-urbanization and its generation logic. In addition, the study attempts to explore possible future of forced-urbanization in China against the background of the New-style Urbanization strategy.

2. THE HARM CAUSED BY FORCED-URBANIZATION IN CHINA

Chinese Urbanization process has gone through initiation, stagnation, exploration,

redeveloping and bloom stages since 1949. From the perspective of national income and consumption growth, urbanization in China did improve wellbeing, but it cannot be denied that there were some serious forced-urbanization problems that encroached on wellbeing rights. In short, the harm caused by forced-urbanization to farmers can be categorized into following four ways.

2.1 Restriction on Economic Rights of Farmers and Land-lost Farmers

There is a typical dualistic urban-rural structure based on household registration system in China, the economic rights of farmers and land-lost farmers are always restricted.

The strategy of industrialization had given priority to urban areas from 1950s to 1990s. A typical evidence of urban priority or urban superiority was the Price-Scissors the agricultural sector endured. From the mid-1990s onwards, urbanization in China accelerated. The reality is that with current expropriation system, the land contract and management right of peasants is not recognized. Similarly, the current system does not recognize peasants home ownership rights as property rights. These give no protection to farmers' economic rights.

In the process of land requisition and relocation, the compensation regulated by government is not totally distributed to lost-land farmers. Based on random survey data in provinces such as Shandong, Sichuan and Jiangsu etc., the one-off monetary compensation provided to the farmers according to official standards is ¥50,000 per mu of land.¹ One family can usually get about ¥200,000 as compensation for giving up their limited land. If farmers choose to exchange their land for pension, they can get about ¥20,000 to ¥30,000 with a pension of ¥220 per month, which they can only access to at the retirement age.

In real terms, a farmer who has lost his land will get a compensation of no more than ¥70,000, assuming that farmers' average life expectancy is 70 years and retirement age is 55. Because of the unique state-owned and collective-owned land system, the collective-owned land should be firstly changed into state-owned land through the national collection or acquisition, and then state-owned land can be used for commercial

¹ Mu is a kind of measure of land in China; one mu is equal to about 0.067 hectares.

development or construction after the auction. The economic value added by changing land's usage is distributed to government at 60-70%, to village-level economic organization at 25-30%, and to farmers only 5-10%. This finding was also confirmed by Zhu D.K.& Shi G.Q. [12].

In the past, when farmers had land as means of production, they could do farming to sustain themselves during peak farming season and do part-time jobs to earn a living in cities during off-season. Though not rich, they had the rights of independent choice and transaction. The outstanding question is how farmers could earn a living after they had been dispossessed of their land. This question is also the potential flashpoint of conflict between the city administration and vendors from land-lost farmers.

In most instances, the land-lost group because of forced-urbanization has difficulties to adapt to the demands of urban occupation with low level of education and simple job skills. Most of them can only earn a simple living as dustmen, gardeners, builders, security guards, street vendors or driving unlicensed taxies. Their average wage is only about ¥1,500 per month, which is lower than or equivalent to the local minimum wage.

In provinces like Fujian, Anhui, Guangxi, Hunan and Sichuan etc., communities of land-lost farmers are almost confined to the fringe sections of urban areas. They are far away from downtown. Even though dwelling space and living conditions there are acceptable, job opportunities are limited. This illustrates that the financial situation and the quality of life of land-lost farmers decline once they are forced to adopt urban lifestyle through forced urbanization.

2.2 Violation of Farmer's Political Rights

Farming is a profession but also a political identity with which a farmer enjoys unique political right known as villagers autonomy. Villager's autonomy fully entrenches farmers' principal position in politics. This System has improved peasant's political apathy, political participation awareness and ability since its full implementation in 1987.

Pursuant to Village Committee Organization Law of PRC, villagers would achieve self-management, self-education and self-service. They could implement democratic election, democratic decision, democratic management and democratic supervision with the help of

village committee. "Decision on important issues of promoting rural reform and development" published in the 3rd plenary session of the 17th National Congress of Communist Party of China (CPC) went a further step in asserting peasant's autonomy. It claimed that peasants have the right to supervise village affairs and finance through democratic decision mechanism such as Villagers Conference, Villagers Representative Conference, Villagers Procedure and Masses Comments. These mechanisms ensured that peasants exercise autonomy independently.

Nevertheless, villager's autonomy was affected because of restricted land trading rights. Villager's aspirations are either exercised or manipulated by elite class or local government instead of villagers themselves [13]. In some instances, villager's representatives are designated by superior officer.

Land and villager's autonomy are external anchors on which peasants use to identify their social role, role norms, rights and obligations. From this perspective, Land and villager's autonomy are the fountainhead of Chinese peasants' self-determination. Once the land is requisitioned, peasant status and political rights linked to it disappear simultaneously. This fact confirmed the viewpoint of identity theory which emphasizes identity of social role has some link with external societies in the first place [14].

In a random survey conducted in 2010 and 2011, data collected from land-lost farmers in Jiangsu and Sichuan provinces reflected that 65.7% of farmers were confused about their identity and role in urban space. They did not know whether they were farmers or urban citizens. This confusion is a resultant effect of removing external structure and internal identity mechanism for self-determination and identification [15,16].

Whether land-lost farmers could enjoy the same benefits as urban citizens such as hourly-salary, retirement age, social insurance, health-care, community management, children right to education etc. is the external manifestation of identity. In any case, role conflict between farmer and urban citizen is likely to be a persistent challenge facing land-lost farmers in a long term.

2.3 Deprivation of the Cultural Rights of Migrants

Cultural rights are the premise and foundation for individuals or groups to take part in cultural

activities and enjoy cultural achievement. Based on the vast geography and ethnic diversity, there has developed diverse cultural types fitting with local natural environment and humanistic features across China. However these different types of cultures are thought of belonging to two categories i.e. urban and rural.

Traditionally, people always think Chinese rural culture is noisy, out-of-order and far away from the peaceful and beautiful rural image. Noisy actually reflects the acquaintance-based interactive relationship among peasants. Daily activities of farmers including dropping by, chatting, playing jokes with each other, telling family gossip, going to fair together etc. constitute the cornerstone of rural culture.

Chinese rural culture manifests strong colorful spring festival pictures, high-tone folk songs and fireworks. It also contains traditional superstition just like wizard and exorcism. Its presentation form contains materials like ancestral hall, temple and opera stage. Immortal such as Marriage ceremony and funeral ceremony are also the presentation. Some intangible traditions like folklore and village regulations are also included.

The random survey conducted among farmers in sampled provinces showed that 68.3% agreed that dropping round, the festival spring couplets or pictures, ancestor worship, fireworks and folk operas were the most memorable characters of their rural cultures.

Urban culture entails in cinema, theater, concert, exhibition and TV channels. Its keynote is generally ordered and elegant, however, what hide behind the character of politeness and respectfulness is distance and loneliness.

By contrast, rural traditional culture is regarded too vulgar to be endured, ignorant and backward in modern society. In many rural areas, local theatre stages and ancestral halls are demolished under the guidance of government. Without such artifact foundation, rural culture market could not take off. The migrants have to withdraw, or they are forced to accept urban culture. Spirit Island phenomenon appears and would last a long time.

2.4 Destruction of the Foundation of Civil Social Supports

In a typical urban-rural dual structure in China, peasant's rights to live and develop are seriously

suppressed. However, farmers have constructed a relatively stable, closer and more complicated social support network. Its formation is directly related to genetic, geographical and ethical relationship.

This kind social connection has both instrumental and emotional features. Farmers could gain mutual financial assistance, neighborhood help and psychological support in this mixed relationship, while developing an organized village-community. Village-community is always regulated by traditional moral customs, habits or local rules but not official laws. It provides some good social governance experiences beneficial to overcome government failure and market failure.

Unfortunately, more than 900,000 villages disappeared because of forced-urbanization between 2000 and 2010, which made it particularly difficult for village-community to be continued. The same thing happened to old urban communities where social supports collapsed due to urban redesign and demolition. The outsiders could hardly predict the damage caused by forced-urbanization to social support. In a familiar community, residents at all levels support one another such as taking care of children, informal lending, and mediating family disputes and so on. In our survey, about 50% of respondents had experienced getting help from neighbors or helping neighbors. It is not easy to leave from such closed social support network. These connections based on genetic, geographical and ethical relationship would fizzle away with the forced-urbanization.

3. THE GENERATION LOGIC OF FORCED-URBANIZATION IN CHINA

Urbanization mechanism in China is different from the western developed countries and other developing countries such as India and Brazil. Its most salient feature is government-led based on the authority of administration and Chinese Communist Party, whose purpose is to promote economic growth. Its value paradigm was GDP-oriented performance rather than wellbeing rights and economic freedom in the past decades. This goes against the spirit of urbanization.

3.1 The Essence of Urbanization and the Urbanization Mechanism

Urban formed with human settlement. Its original function was a military defense. But it gradually transformed into economic center, business

center or industrial center because of commercial development and industrialization. A large number of population migrated from villages to urban areas is the outstanding manifestation. Industrial production and the output value of tertiary industry become the main sources of GDP in urban areas. It is widely acknowledged that urban is the symbol of prosperity and civilization. This is particularly obvious in famous metropolis of the world such as New York, Paris, London, Beijing and Mumbai.

However, the existence value of urban has long gone beyond the simple means of population concentration. Population migration and concentration is only the apparent character of urbanization. The essence of urbanization is the transformation of social and economic structure and the quality of life improvement.

Since 1980s, government intervention, globalization [17-19], FDI and multi-national corporation [20,21] had been thought to be the more complex urbanization mechanism in which economic freedom and integrity of wellbeing rights are the foundation.

Urban areas can make human beings rich. They may also make people's life more prosperous. Because of these benefits, urbanization is considered to be one of the exciting and unforgettable experiences [22].

According to the theory of urban sociology, urban is neither a collection of many single people nor a simple polymerization of urban infrastructure and social organizations [23]. Collection of individuals or urban facilities is just the external manifestation of urban. The soul of urban is the complicated tight emotional social network among citizens; and there is enough commercial space for people to make a living.

Tilly divided the pattern of migration into three types, i.e. circulation, occupation and linkage [24]. He stressed in particular that only linkage migration could provide a positive dynamic force for the urban sustainability. Because linkage migration emphasizes specific social support framework in which experienced migrants provide assistance for new migrants aiming at income growth and social status improvement.

The premise of linkage migration is economic freedom which means anyone has no authority to deprive others of the freedom of migration, and anyone has no right to prevent others from

pursuing a happier life. The essence of linkage migration is the integrity of wellbeing rights.

3.2 Features of Urbanization and Urbanization Mechanism in China

As Chinese people could not migrate freely between rural and urban areas because of the household registration system, thus all residents are divided into two parts, i.e. citizen and peasant. As a result, they enjoy different wellbeing rights. Before 2003, farmers did not enjoy any social security. The reason is only that they have land operation right.

During the era of comprehensive intervention of government before 1978, it was believed that focusing on the use of limited resources would help to realize the industrialization strategy. When cities lacked enough food, reallocation of educated urban youth to rural areas was necessary. At that time, the interests of peasants, villages and agriculture were ignored completely.

After 1980, China's urbanization sped up gradually due to globalization and FDI inflow [25,26]. It required lots of labor and land. Government allowed farmers to migrate to urban areas with integrant migrant worker certificate. State-owned land was sold by auction system in the name of urban operation.

From then on, farmers were regarded as cheap labor for urban infrastructure construction. The land auction led to land finance for local government. All of these urbanization measures plundered the interests of peasants, villages and agriculture once more. The income-gap between urban and rural areas became more and more wide. Data from China National Bureau of Statistics of PRC showed that the urban-rural income ratio was 2.90:1 in 2001, and it increased to 3.23:1 in 2010.

Obviously, China's urbanization has been led by the government in a large extent. Its purpose was to promote economic growth, and the value paradigm behind was GDP-oriented performance instead of wellbeing rights and economic freedom.

It was said that urban scale expansion could improve labor employment, especially help low-skilled labors get more benefit from the increasing of employment effect [27]. However, urbanization was stereotyped by government as a magic panacea for GDP improvement in a long

period. Potential negative effects of the land-enclosure movement related to government planning were ignored totally.

These potential negative effects mainly include three aspects. First, whether or not to be noticed, there is a huge pressure of wellbeing demand like housing, medical care and pension. Second, regional diversity related to rural culture would disappear with the villages fade. Third, traditional ethics morals decay, leading to discipline relaxation and some kind of social disorder.

3.3 Forced-Urbanization: A Logical Result of Erosion of Wellbeing Rights

Without total economic freedom, Government-dominated model and GDP-oriented value paradigm in China's urbanization process are inclined to erode wellbeing rights. Forced-Urbanization is the logical result of this evolution.

For example, migrants made great contributions to China's urbanization, but they could not enjoy the fruits of urban development. They didn't get any subsidy for urban housing, education, welfare for the aged or Medicare. Land-lost farmers near the suburban faced the same challenges.

But this problem became less prominent when the urbanization in China was distorted to land-urbanization at the beginning of 21st century. Driven by the local government to sell land for financial funds, land urbanization has far outpaced population urbanization. Local governments attached greater importance to land-transfer fees rather than wellbeing rights.

For instance, according to Land Administration Law of the PRC article 47, compensation for expropriated cultivated land shall include compensation for land, resettlement subsidies, and compensation for attachments and young crops on the expropriated land. The specific amount shall be six to ten times the average annual output value of the expropriated land, calculated on the basis of three years before the expropriation.

The standard in each province varies, but the survey samples showed that one-off monetary compensation was ¥50,000 per mu, a 3-person household usually got ¥200,000 or so. While auction prices of land are much higher. The price of land for industrial use is about ¥150,000 per

mu, for commercial housing is at least ¥600,000 per mu.

Obviously, people's economic freedom was suppressed in the process of land urbanization led by government, and the integrity of wellbeing rights was separated. Farmers were forced to transfer the farmland; citizens had to give up the ownership of housing land under the threat of violence in forced demolitions.

The process of China's urbanization has witnessed industrial and agricultural product price scissors, allocation urban youth to countryside, household registration system, urban and rural talent scissors [28], and the deprivation of rural land, the demolition of historical buildings. All these have added up to destroy integrity of wellbeing rights. Therefore, the dynamic urbanization mechanism is damaged.

4. THE FUTURE OF FORCED-URBANIZATION IN CHINA

In order to curb the forced-urbanization, Chinese Government led by President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang put forward New-style Urbanization Strategy in 2012. In the strategic framework, the New-style urban will focus on intensive, happy, smart, green, low-carbon, and effective development.

4.1 Could New-style Urbanization Curb Forced-Urbanization?

Accordingly, New-style Urbanization is designed to be people-centered, aiming to promote urban culture and public services, emphasizing wellbeing improvement. The New-style Urbanization Strategy seeks to provide some possibility to curb the forced urbanization. It seeks to help China to accelerate the modernization, promote economic sustainability, and leap beyond middle-income trap which is bothering China.

However, the New-style Urbanization strategy might alienate to forced-urbanization for some real constraints. At present, residents still have not enjoyed total freedom of migration. The biggest challenge is the path dependence on the GDP-oriented value paradigm which used to be the impulse of high-speed urbanization in China.

Some serious forced-demolitions have occurred against the spirit of New-style Urbanization

strategy. For example, On Oct. 25th, 2013, Mrs. Tan, a primary school teacher, was removed from school to Headquarters of Relocation by District Education Bureau, and was required to persuade her mother-in-law to demolish.

² Similar incidence happened on October 29th 2013, the Country Committee's Organization Department in Min'hou district Fujian province asked a couple of teachers to persuade parents-in-law to demolish their houses themselves.³ In November 2013, it was reported that Yan'cheng country in Shandong province established a regulation that those whose relatives don't move out of the village in time, the cadre will be suspended from their duties.⁴ On March 21st 2014, several villagers were burned in tend in Ping'du city Shandong province because they did not agree with the compensation for removal and they put up a campsite to stop the construction.⁵

Obviously, the New-style Urbanization strategy could not necessarily curb the trend of forced-urbanization if the generation logic of forced-urbanization is not eliminated. Only when it is wellbeing-oriented, government fulfills supervisory duties well; the New-style Urbanization strategy could achieve its original intentions.

Reviewing the history of China's urbanization, wellbeing rights had been eroded for several times. To avoid the New-style Urbanization alienated to forced urbanization, it is necessary to establish a wellbeing-oriented value paradigm.

For migrants, the primary issue is to find a stable job which is the fundamental of economic and social status. Migrants would be familiar with the habits and mindset of local citizens step by step. They will really convert to citizens after they get used to the urban situation. They also may develop some kind of social support network in urban.

In the process, some proper protection from government is indispensable. Based on the characteristics of urban-rural binary structure in

China, first of all, government should provide same public services for all people.

The purpose of wellbeing development is compatible with Rawls' Theory of Justice and the Theory of Social Justice represented by Amartya Sen, emphasizing social opportunities and economic participation [29,30]. Both assume the integrity of wellbeing rights should not be violated for any reason.

Given that premise, it is possible for New-style Urbanization to curb the forced-urbanization. Resources, achievements and opportunities in urbanization could be reasonably distributed to all groups. Everyone's identity and social role could achieve consistency between inner cognitive and external validation [31].

4.2 The Effect of Government Actions to Curb Forced Urbanization

New-style Urbanization strategy has obvious intention to stop encroaching wellbeing rights. Comprehensive Reform of Certain Major Issue Decision established by the Third Plenary Session of 18th National Congress of CPC in 2012 stressed that New-style Urbanization should establish an impartial and sustainable social security system to benefit all people.

It stated specifically that farmers could participate equally in modernization process, and share the gains of urbanization. It also stressed peasants would have more rights over property than ever before. Price scissors is expected to be narrowed in the future.

But the statement of intention at the central government level is not sufficient to curb forced urbanization. It requires that local governments at all levels to take practical actions. Several local governments have made some efforts to guarantee wellbeing rights.

For example, the government of De'zhou city in Shandong provided conveniences for land-lost farmers to guarantee their own rights. Farmers could supervise community finance. They could involve in community projects as long as they are happy to do that.⁶

Another example is from Jiangsu province. Its government introduced a series of practices to develop wellbeing. A project named Groundwork

² http://www.jyb.cn/opinion/mtzl/201310/t20131029_557293.html

³ <http://news.big5.enorth.com.cn/system/2013/10/29/011408890.shtml>

⁴ http://heze.qlwb.com.cn/html/2013/xinwen_1120/1384.html

⁵ http://legal.gmw.cn/2014-03/27/content_10811428.htm, China Youth Daily, 2014-03-27, <http://news.cntv.cn/2014/03/26/ARTI1395763297652309.shtml>

⁶ <http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2011-07-23/084022862970.shtml>

focuses on employment assistance and employment training. Another project named Elevation focuses on entrepreneurship supporting. There are two measures especially for farmers named Accumulation Project and Security Project. The Accumulation Project concentrates on long-term mechanism of property and financial income improvement. The Security Project aims to ensure necessary security for land lost farmers.⁷

Those innovations of local governments offered some successful experiences to curb forced-urbanization, but there is still a long way to go, including but not limited to the followings.

Firstly, Migrants would merge into neighborhoods and businesses. They are not subject to discrimination and exclusion in urban. Secondly, the offspring of migrants could enjoy the same education with the urban children. Thirdly, government should be watchful of the reproduction of urban-rural dual structure in urban.

5. CONCLUSION

China has made great success in urbanization. But wellbeing rights, at the same time, have been severely eroded, especially for farmers.

Forced-urbanization has caused serious harm to farmers, including restriction on economic rights, violation of political rights, and deprivation of migrants' cultural rights. The foundation of civil social supports was damaged as well in the process.

The primary reason of forced-urbanization is that the value paradigm of urbanization in China was GDP-oriented rather than wellbeing-oriented. In order to curb the forced-urbanization, Chinese Government established New-style Urbanization Strategy in 2012. The random survey shows that some kinds of risks of forced-urbanization still exist in the implementation process of New-style Urbanization strategy.

The intention at the central government level is not sufficient. It requires the local governments at all levels to take practical actions. Some local governments have offered certain successful experiences. However, the way is still long to go.

The way out of forced-urbanization in China is still urbanization, but preferably through the New-style Urbanization strategy that takes various possibilities into consideration.

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The author has declared that no competing interests exist.

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⁷http://www.jshrss.gov.cn/xwzx/qddt/201305/t20130502_122686.htm

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