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FROM LONDON TO BUCHAREST: THE MILITARY PEDAGOGY OF SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH GREEK DIPLOMACY AND THE RISE OF THE GREEK ARMY (1864–1913)

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the conditions that shaped the territorial and political development of Greece from the Treaty of London (1864) to the Treaty of Bucharest (1913), with an emphasis on the interplay between military strategy and diplomacy. Framed within the concept of pedagogy, the manuscript underscores how the Greek experience provides transferable lessons in statecraft and sovereignty. Each treaty is analyzed as a milestone in Greece's pursuit of national ambitions, highlighting the country's ability to navigate great power politics, leverage military preparedness, and adapt to evolving geopolitical contexts. Key themes include the role of military training in achieving diplomatic success, the strategic alignment of alliances, and the readjustment of objectives following setbacks. This approach positions Greece as a case study in balancing ambition with pragmatism, offering valuable insights for nations striving to establish sovereignty and influence the international order. The findings contribute to broader discussions on diplomacy, military strategy, and the art of state-building.

Keywords: Treaties, Convention, Protocol, Sovereignty, Diplomacy, Territory, Military Strategy, Geopolitics

1. INTRODUCTION

The establishment of Greece as an independent state following the Protocol of London (1832) marked the beginning of a complex journey toward sovereignty and territorial expansion. Emerging from centuries of Ottoman rule, Greece faced the daunting tasks of consolidating its nascent state, cultivating a cohesive national identity, and pursuing the "Great Idea" (Megali Idea)—a vision for unifying all Greeks into a single nation-state. In the ensuing decades, Greece navigated a turbulent geopolitical landscape, engaging in diplomatic and military campaigns that would redefine its borders and its role in Europe. The treaties that punctuated this journey—from the Treaty of London (1864) to the Treaty of Bucharest (1913)—serve as landmarks, reflecting Greece's evolving strategic and diplomatic capabilities.

This manuscript delves into the conditions underlying these milestones, focusing on the dynamic interplay between Greece's military strategy and diplomatic negotiations. It examines how Greece adapted to shifting circumstances, leveraging military training, strategic alliances, and geopolitical foresight to secure territorial and political gains. Framed through a pedagogical lens, this analysis seeks to uncover the lessons embedded in Greece's actions—lessons that provide valuable insights into the art of state-building. Each treaty is assessed not merely as a historical event but as a case study in balancing military preparedness with diplomatic acumen.

The significance of this study lies in its ability to illuminate the broader dynamics of sovereignty and statecraft. Greece's experience during this period offers a unique perspective on how smaller nations can navigate great power politics, align military resources with national aspirations, and recalibrate their objectives in response to challenges. By emphasizing the educational value of these historical milestones, the manuscript enriches our understanding of the intricate interplay between diplomacy and military strategy, providing valuable guidance for both scholars and practitioners of international relations.

Through this research, the study positions Greece's historical trajectory as an exemplary model, shedding light on enduring principles of sovereignty, resilience, and pragmatic decision-making in the international arena.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Theoretical framework

The modern Greek state, established in 1832 through the Protocol of London, emerged as a fragile entity amidst the collapse of Ottoman control in southeastern Europe. While Greece secured independence through the War of Independence (1821–1829), the new state was geographically and politically constrained. The borders established in 1832 included only a fraction of the territories inhabited by Greek-speaking populations, leaving many under Ottoman rule. This territorial limitation fueled the "Great Idea" (Megali Idea)—an irredentist vision of uniting all Greek-speaking peoples within a single state.

Internally, the nascent kingdom faced weak infrastructure, economic dependence on European loans, and political instability. The imposed monarchy, first under King Otto and later King George I, grappled with challenges from a fragmented population, regional loyalties, and limited state capacity. Externally, Greece's survival relied heavily on navigating the influence of the Great Powers—Britain, France, and Russia. These powers, eager to maintain control over the Eastern Mediterranean and manage the decline of the Ottoman Empire, often treated Greece as a pawn in their geopolitical strategies.

Despite these constraints, this period laid the foundation for crucial aspects of Greek statecraft: reliance on alliances with the Great Powers, efforts to modernize the military, and a persistent focus on territorial expansion. These elements would come to define Greece’s approach to diplomacy and military strategy, setting the stage for significant developments like the Treaty of London (1864).

Between 1878 and the Balkan Wars (1912–1913), the Treaty of Berlin (1878) marked a pivotal moment in the geopolitical restructuring of the Balkans following the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878). Although Greece had limited direct influence during the negotiations, the treaty underscored the growing momentum of Balkan nationalism and set a precedent for future territorial realignments. Greece’s diplomatic efforts during this period, though yielding limited success, reflected its emerging ability to navigate and exploit regional instability.

The Convention of Constantinople (1881) was a significant diplomatic victory for Greece, resulting in the cession of Thessaly and parts of Epirus from the Ottoman Empire. This achievement, largely brokered by European powers, demonstrated Greece’s capacity to achieve goals through international diplomacy without military confrontation. However, it also exposed the limitations of external reliance, as the terms of the agreement were shaped by Ottoman interests, preserving key strategic areas such as Ioannina.

Greece's military deficiencies became starkly apparent during the Greek-Turkish War of 1897, initiated by Crete's desire to unite with Greece. The poorly trained and ill-equipped Greek forces suffered a humiliating defeat. This failure exposed the inadequacies of the country's military infrastructure and prompted substantial reforms, including the professionalization of the officer corps and the modernization of equipment. These reforms, coupled with strategic alliances, enabled Greece to play a decisive role in the Balkan Wars.

The Balkan Wars (1912–1913) were transformative for Greece, culminating in the Treaties of London and Bucharest (1913). These treaties doubled Greece's territory and population, solidifying its status as a regional power in the Balkans. The integration of a modernized army with effective diplomatic strategies under leaders like Eleftherios Venizelos led to significant victories, including the capture of critical regions such as Thessaloniki and Epirus.

From 1832 to 1913, Greece's journey toward regional dominance highlights the dynamic interaction between diplomacy and military strategy. Early reliance on external powers, evident in the treaties of 1832, 1878, and 1881, gradually gave way to a more balanced approach as Greece developed its military capabilities. By the Balkan Wars, this dual strategy had reached its peak, enabling Greece to secure its territorial and political ambitions.

This period offers a theoretical framework for understanding the balance between national aspirations, military capacity, and the constraints imposed by great power politics. It positions Greece's historical trajectory as a case study in state-building, underscoring pedagogical lessons in managing sovereignty through adaptive and pragmatic strategies.

2.2 Research studies on the period under investigation (1864–1913) towards London to Bucharest

The period from the Treaty of London (1864) to the Treaty of Bucharest (1913) has been extensively studied across various historical, political, and diplomatic contexts. Scholars have thoroughly analyzed individual treaties, Greece's territorial expansions, and the broader geopolitics of the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean. However, a significant gap persists in the literature: the lack of a comprehensive linkage between these treaties and the interconnected dynamics of Greece's diplomatic and military developments. These dynamics not only shaped Greece's sovereignty but also contributed to its national cohesion, stability, and gradual integration into the European state system.

While specific treaties, such as the Treaty of London (1864) or the Treaty of Berlin (1878), are often studied in isolation, the continuum of diplomatic negotiations and military strategies that underpin them remains underexplored as a cohesive framework. For instance, John Koliopoulos and Thanos Veremis (Koliopoulos & Veremis, 2010) provide detailed accounts of Greece's territorial gains but do not delve deeply into how military reforms after Greece's 1897 defeat laid the groundwork for its successes in the Balkan Wars (1912–1913). Similarly, Barbara Jelavich (Jelavich, 2009) highlights the influence of European powers on the Treaty of Berlin, but does not fully explore how this treaty catalyzed Greece's recalibration of its diplomatic and military priorities in the subsequent decades.

The interconnected nature of Greece's military and diplomatic advancements becomes particularly evident when tracing its trajectory toward regional stability. The treaties from London to Bucharest were not merely territorial milestones; they marked pivotal moments where Greece balanced appeasing European powers with strengthening its internal cohesion. For example, the Convention of Constantinople (1881), which ceded Thessaly to Greece, showcased the effectiveness of diplomatic skill and European mediation in achieving territorial expansion without direct military

conflict. Yet, the Greco-Turkish War of 1897 revealed the limitations of relying solely on diplomacy, exposing Greece's military vulnerabilities and prompting a profound modernization of its armed forces.

The reforms initiated after 1897, including professionalizing the officer corps and modernizing military infrastructure, directly influenced Greece's ability to secure territorial gains during the Balkan Wars. This period also saw the forging of a modern Greek national identity, shaped by the interplay between military preparedness and diplomatic acumen. The Megali Idea (Great Idea) unified Greek policy, but its realization depended on synchronized actions in both military and diplomatic arenas. For instance, the Balkan Wars were not just military triumphs but also diplomatic achievements that allowed Greece to assert its regional influence. Scholars such as Richard Hall (Hall, 2000) detail the military campaigns of these wars but often overlook how victories were underpinned by prior alliances, such as the Balkan League, which required meticulous diplomatic coordination.

Existing studies tend to focus on the outcomes of these treaties rather than their connections to preceding agreements and policies. While the historical significance of each treaty is well-documented, the lack of an integrated analysis connecting them to Greece's diplomatic and military evolution leaves a critical void in the scholarship. By treating this period as a series of isolated events, existing works fail to capture how Greece's evolving strategies coalesced into a unified state-building process, transforming it from a fragile kingdom to a stabilized regional power by 1913.

This manuscript seeks to fill this historiographical gap by linking these treaties to the broader themes of stability, development, and national identity. It positions the treaties not only as milestones of territorial change but as reflections of a deliberate and adaptive strategy that allowed Greece to navigate shifting dynamics of great-power politics, regional conflict, and internal modernization. This perspective offers a more nuanced understanding of the era's pedagogical value, illuminating lessons in statecraft, diplomacy, and the interplay of military strategy with national ambitions.

3. DATA AND METHOLOGY

3.1 Research methodology

The research methodology reflects the nature of the material and the study's objectives, employing a historical-pedagogical framework combined with detailed source analysis. Within the contexts of diplomacy, military education, and the Greek armed forces' role in shaping modern Greek history, the study encompasses the following areas:

a) The history of Greek military education, including systems, institutions, and the organization of Military training.
b) Analysis of educational standards in diplomacy and political affairs.
c) Examination of political challenges across different periods, such as conflicts, territorial changes, and the shifting policies of major powers.
d) Critique of educational systems and strategic planning.
e) Historical analysis of educational policies (Borg & Gall, 1989).

This qualitative research systematically investigates diplomatic issues in modern Greek history, focusing on treaties that secured Greece's grow and contributed to the establishment of the modern Greek state. Primary archival sources are used to explore the risks and uncertainties during periods of shifting alliances and the competing national interests of the Great Powers. D. Mavroskoufis

distinguishes primary sources, originating from the studied period, from secondary sources, which consist of subsequent interpretations (Mavroskoufis, 2005).

The research is both theoretical and practical, contending with incomplete historical records and the analysis of long-past events, which present unique challenges (Verdi, 2015; Athanasiou, 2003). It seeks answers to complex historical questions, aligning with Jaspers' notion that modern science embarks on an endless process of inquiry (Jaspers, 1950).

Historical analysis serves as the primary method, focusing on establishing facts, critiquing evidence, and determining chronological sequences (Mialaret, 1999). This approach investigates causes, consequences, and the institutions and attitudes of various eras (Athanasiou, 2003). Cohen and Manion describe historical research as "the systematic and objective identification, evaluation, and synthesis of evidence" to critically reconstruct past events (Cohen & Manion, 1977). It functions as a tool for understanding the past, interpreting the present, and forecasting future developments (Nova-Kaltsouni, 2006).

Primary sources, characterized by their originality, and secondary sources complement each other in this study (Cohen & Manion, 1977). Hill and Kerber emphasize the benefits of historical research, including:

a) Solving contemporary problems through insights from the past.
b) Identifying and understanding historical trends.
c) Highlighting cultural interactions and influences.
d) Reassessing and refining past theories (Hill & Kerber, 1967).

This study examines international treaties, protocols, and conventions of the 19th and early 20th centuries that secured the establishment of the modern Greek state after centuries under Ottoman rule. Its objective is to gain a deep understanding of human experiences while analyzing the symbolic interactions within the society of the period (Verdi, 2015).

In the context of military education and training, historical research emphasizes the significance of historical interactions and the interconnectedness of politics, education, and society (Nova-Kaltsouni, 2006). It reevaluates and reconstructs past theories to provide insights applicable to present and future contexts. The key objectives include:

1. Drawing conclusions relevant to contemporary and future challenges.
2. Uncovering historical events, ideas, and societal contexts.
3. Applying the ideas of great thinkers to modern scenarios (Bitsaki, 2005; Melanitou, 1957).

This study aims not only to document historical facts but also to foster sensitivity to critical issues such as state sovereignty, peace, alliances, and the interplay of diplomacy and military education. Ultimately, it underscores the role of military education in cultivating national consciousness and shaping state-building processes.

4. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

4.1 The Treaties and their Impact: Treaty of London (1864)

After Greece gained its independence in 1832, the borders of the new state were initially limited to the area between Arta and Volos. In 1834, the capital was moved from Nafplio to Athens. Greece sought to expand its borders, as most of the Greek population—referred to as the "irredentist brothers of the Greeks"—lived outside the newly established state. Prime Minister Ioannis Kolettis

believed that Greece should claim these territories through military action. However, Greece was neither financially nor militarily prepared for such an endeavor. Kolettis' stance influenced the Greek people, who longed for territorial expansion. In 1844, Kolettis addressed Parliament, invoking the "Megali Idea" (Great Idea) of the Greeks. According to this ideology, the Greeks were destined not only to liberate their "unredeemed" brothers and sisters but also to restore the glory of Byzantium. The vision of the "Megali Idea" became the central ideological foundation of the Greek state until 1922. It was also exploited by political parties to rally public support and secure votes. On the other hand, Alexandros Mavrokordatos, an excellent diplomat but a controversial figure, and leader of the English party, opposed Kolettis. He believed that only a modern state with a solid infrastructure, a healthy economy, and a trained army could successfully claim new territories through military means. Until Greece achieved such a state, Mavrokordatos advocated for peaceful coexistence with the Ottoman Empire, arguing that any Greek-Turkish conflict would place the Greek population in Ottoman territories at significant risk. Mavrokordatos, however, was unpopular with the public, who sought immediate territorial expansion and were more inclined to adopt Kolettis' views.

King Otto, the Bavarian monarch, did not support Mavrokordatos' position either. Inexperienced due to his youth, Otto, alongside his wife Amalia, embraced the idea of liberating the "unredeemed" Greek brothers, hoping to win the favor of the Greek people. However, during Otto's reign, the country neither modernized nor expanded its borders. Otto's approach angered the British. For Britain, the Ottoman Empire was strategically important, and throughout the 19th century, Britain sought to prevent its dismantling.

As a result, Britain opposed any rebellions against the Ottomans and advised the Greeks to avoid inciting harmful and futile uprisings. The British believed that only through cooperation and patience could Greece eventually gain new territories. Otto, however, opposed this British stance and led the Greek people into grand idealism, which provoked the anger of the British, who were eager for an opportunity to remove him from power. That opportunity came in 1853 with the Crimean War (Figes, 2010), when Tsar Nicholas II attacked the Sultan. Otto made the critical mistake of joining the war on the side of the Russians, sending a "Greek Legion" of 1,000 men and, by extension, opposing the British, who had allied with the Sultan. The Great Powers punished Greece with a naval blockade that lasted for three years. As a result, Russia lost the war, and the Greek population, bearing the consequences of their country's actions, demanded the expulsion of the Bavarians from Greece.

On October 12, 1862, Otto and Amalia left Greece, devastated. The British quickly suggested that the second-born son of the Christian Prince of Denmark, who would reign in Greece as George I, be chosen as the new king. To secure the acceptance, cooperation, and affection of the Greek people for the new monarch, the British offered George I a dowry consisting of the Ionian Islands: Corfu, Kefalonia, Zakynthos, Lefkada, Ithaca, Kythera, Paxos, and their dependencies. These islands, with their predominantly Greek population, had not experienced the yoke of the Ottoman Empire, as they had been under Venetian control since 1386 (Hirst & Sammon, 2014). The exception was Lefkada, which was under Ottoman rule for two centuries until 1684, when it too passed into Venetian hands.

The Venetians were expelled from the Ionian Islands in 1797 by Napoleon. Their conquest was welcomed by the Ionian people, who embraced the ideas of the French Revolution, including freedom, equality, and education. The French occupation lasted for about two years. However, the French provided little to the Ionian people apart from revolutionary ideals and burdened them with the demands of maintaining the French army.

The situation was later exploited by the English, Ottomans, and Russians, who joined forces to expel the French from the Ionian Islands. In 1800, the French were defeated by the Russo-Turkish fleet. The Convention of Constantinople, signed on March 21, 1800, established the autonomous Ionian State (History of the Greek Nation, 1975), with its capital in Corfu, the birthplace of Kapodistrias. Though the Ionian Islands were still a tributary to the Sultan, this marked the founding of the first Greek state after 411 years of Venetian rule and nearly two years of French rule. The Convention brought joy and hope for positive developments among the Greeks.

This brief period of autonomy lasted until 1807. During this time, Ioannis Kapodistrias, the first Governor of the independent Greek state, began his political career. Appointed by the Tsar as Secretary of the Territory with responsibility for foreign policy and education, Kapodistrias effectively took over the government of the Ionian Islands after the death of Spyridon George Theotokis in 1803. However, in 1807, following Napoleon's victories, the islands were returned to the French by the Treaty of Tilsit, signed on July 9, 1807, as part of a secret article in addition to the 29 main articles of the treaty (Nikolaou, 1980). In 1808, disillusioned, Kapodistrias left his homeland and continued his career in Russia.

In 1812, Napoleon’s army was destroyed, and the Ionian Islands were abandoned until 1814. At the subsequent Congress of Vienna, one of the key issues was the future of the Ionian Islands. While England did not have an absolute need for them, it was determined not to allow Austria, Russia, or the Ottomans to claim them. In November 1815, a treaty was signed that placed the Ionian Islands under the exclusive protection of England as an undivided territory. England's policy in the Ionian Islands was harsh, enforcing a colonial regime and punishing dissidents with exile for their liberal ideas.

In 1850, members of the radical party of the Ionian Islands presented a resolution in Parliament advocating for the union of the Ionian Islands with Greece (Chiotis, 1877). The English response was swift and punitive, exiling those who had spoken out. England was unwilling to cede the Ionian Islands to Otto's Greece. However, the situation changed a decade later. The removal of King Otto, who had become deeply unpopular with the Greek people, was orchestrated due to both his humiliation during the Crimean War and his failure to manage the government effectively.

By this time, the Ionian Islands had become less important to the British but were still a tool for enhancing the influence of their new monarch, George I, in Greece. The other Great Powers, in exchange for accepting the incorporation of the Ionian Islands into Greece, insisted that all the islands be granted neutrality status and that the fortresses be dismantled, due to their proximity to the Ottoman border. Ultimately, neutrality was limited to Corfu and Paxos, but the fortresses were indeed ordered to be demolished.

On 29 March 1864, the Treaty of London was signed regarding the incorporation of the Ionian Islands into Greece. The treaty consisted of ten articles (Hertslet, 1875). According to Article 1, England renounced its protectorate over the Ionian Islands—namely, Corfu, Kefalonia, Zakynthos, Santa Mavra, Ithaca, Serigo, and Paxi, along with their dependencies. These islands were designated in the same article to be incorporated into the independent Greek state under the institution of monarchy.

Article 2 stipulated the permanent neutrality of the islands. Article 3 maintained that there would be no changes to the prevailing regime concerning navigation, trade, and postal communication. Article 4 guaranteed complete freedom of religious worship, recognizing the Orthodox Greek Church as the dominant religion in the islands. It further established the principle of full civil and

political equality between nationals of different denominations, as already practiced in Greece, and it was extended to the Ionian Islands.

Article 5 specified that the new King of Greece would receive an annual payment of £10,000 in monthly installments for the performance of his duties, benefiting the Greek State. Article 6 clarified that England, Ireland, France, and Russia each agreed to waive the claim to £4,000 per year, which Greece had pledged to pay them annually since June 1860. This amount was instead regarded as a personal gift to King George I. Commercial contracts already in effect remained unchanged, and no obligations from these contracts were altered by the accession of the new King of Greece.

Article 7 committed the new King to honor all pre-existing financial and commercial obligations, including those outlined in Article 7 of the Convention of 7 May 1832 (No. 159), regarding the loan to the Powers. Article 8 stipulated that the King of Greece was responsible for paying pensions and allowances to the beneficiaries. Additionally, a new contract was established to provide payments to the Ionian subjects as compensation.

Article 9 provided for the withdrawal of British forces from the Ionian Islands, and Article 10 outlined the procedures for the ratification of the treaty.

The Treaty of London (1864) exemplifies how diplomacy was strategically employed by the Great Powers to reshape territorial boundaries while maintaining the European balance of power. Britain's decision to cede the Ionian Islands to Greece was not a simple act of goodwill, but a calculated maneuver designed to serve broader geopolitical goals. The transfer of the Ionian Islands symbolized the formal recognition of Greece's status as a stable, sovereign European monarchy under King George I (a Danish prince chosen with British backing). This move solidified Greece's role as a buffer state between Ottoman and European interests. In light of Britain's withdrawal strategy, the cession of the islands marked a shift in imperial policy. Instead of maintaining direct control over the islands, Britain sought to align Greece as a friendly ally, thereby preserving its influence in the region without the financial and political burdens of direct governance.

Furthermore, by facilitating the treaty, Britain, France, and Russia—three Great Powers involved in Greece's independence—used the Ionian Islands' transfer as a demonstration of their cooperative influence. This diplomatic gesture projected unity while subtly competing for influence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Treaty of London (1864) illustrates how the Great Powers manipulated territorial changes to serve their broader interests, while cloaking their motivations in idealistic rhetoric. Britain's decision to relinquish the Ionian Islands coincided with the rising significance of other imperial holdings, such as Egypt and India. By reducing its Mediterranean commitments, Britain could redirect resources to more critical areas, while ensuring Greece's alignment as a friendly state.

The Ionian Islands' integration into Greece fulfilled one aspect of Greek irredentist aspirations, aligning with the "Megali Idea." However, it also served to placate Greek nationalism without destabilizing Ottoman territorial integrity. The Great Powers sought to maintain peace in the region, using Greece as a buffer against Ottoman instability. While the treaty appeared as a united diplomatic effort, it concealed underlying rivalries. Britain's gesture strengthened its influence in Greece but was balanced by Russia and France's involvement in Greek affairs, preventing any one power from dominating the Eastern Mediterranean.

The transfer of the Ionian Islands illustrates several key themes in 19th-century geopolitics: Greece's acquisition of territory not through conquest, but by aligning its interests with those of the

Great Powers. Greece's monarchy and foreign policy were carefully managed to ensure that the country remained a pliable partner in Great Power politics. Unlike earlier periods, where territorial expansion often required military conquest, the Ionian Islands' transfer underscores how diplomacy—supported by the threat of force and strategic calculation—could achieve similar results.

The treaty also reveals that Greece's sovereignty remained subject to Great Power approval. Even as Greece gained territory, its autonomy was constrained by the geopolitical limits imposed by Britain, France, and Russia. The integration of the Ionian Islands into Greece marked a significant step in the country's territorial evolution, but it also foreshadowed future tensions over regions like Crete and Macedonia. The selective support of the Great Powers for Greek expansion maintained the region in a state of controlled instability.

Moreover, the transfer of the Ionian Islands highlights the role of military strategy in territorial negotiations. Britain had used the islands as a naval outpost to secure trade routes and monitor the Eastern Mediterranean. By ceding them, Britain placed the responsibility of defense and governance on Greece, a nation still in the process of developing its military capabilities. The neutrality and demilitarization of Corfu and Paxos provided an additional incentive for Greece to reorganize and strengthen its military for the defense of these territories. This arrangement also served British interests, as it facilitated the future provision of military and naval training, further bolstering Britain's strategic presence in the region.

4.2 Treaty of Berlin (1878)

The Treaty of Berlin (Sluglett & Yavuz, 2011), signed on July 13, 1878, was a pivotal moment in the reshaping of the Balkan region following the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878). While the treaty primarily aimed to address the Eastern Question—the geopolitical struggle over the fate of the declining Ottoman Empire—it also had significant implications for Greece's territorial ambitions and its regional positioning.

The Treaty consists of 62 articles, covering a range of issues affecting the various regions of the Balkans. Articles 1-12 and 22 pertain to Bulgaria, while Articles 13-21 address Eastern Rumelia. Article 25 refers to Bosnia and Herzegovina, followed by Articles 26-33, which relate to Montenegro. Articles 34-42 focus on Serbia, and Articles 43-51 deal with Romania. Articles 52-57 concern the freedom of navigation on the Danube and issues related to fisheries. Articles 58-60 establish the borders between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, with a concurrent territorial cession from the Ottoman Empire to Persia. Article 61 addresses Armenia, and the final Article 62 lays down general principles regarding the protection of religious and national minorities, as well as the preservation of the Holy Mountain's privileges.

On the Greek question, the treaty contains a vague reference to a potential border correction between Greece and the Ottoman Empire, though without clear specifications. This reference is linked to the 13th Protocol of the Congress of Berlin (Hertslet, 1875) under Article 24. The preceding Article 23 concerns Crete. According to Article 23, the Sublime Porte was obliged to implement the organic law of 1868 in Crete, which granted certain privileges to the Christian population. These included amnesty for revolutionaries, tax relief, participation of Christians in administrative roles and the composition of courts, as well as the recognition of Greek as an official language alongside Turkish in administration (Hertslet, 1875).

By the mid-19th century, Greece's national policy was profoundly shaped by the Megali Idea (Great Idea), which aimed at the unification of all Greek-speaking populations under one state. However,

the Treaty of Berlin (1878) largely bypassed Greek interests, instead focusing on the redistribution of Ottoman territories among the great powers favored Balkan states.

The Treaty of Berlin revised the earlier Treaty of San Stefano (1878), which had granted significant territories to a Russian-backed Bulgaria, threatening the balance of power in the Balkans. The European powers—Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, and Germany—reduced Bulgaria's size and granted independence or autonomy to Serbia, Montenegro, and Romania. Despite these adjustments, Greece received no immediate territorial gains, a decision that reflected both its limited diplomatic leverage and the competing priorities of the great powers.

Greece had hoped to expand into Thessaly and Epirus, regions with substantial Greek populations still under Ottoman control. Although these aspirations were not fulfilled in the treaty, the discussions at Berlin set the stage for future territorial negotiations. A clause within the treaty encouraged Greece and the Ottoman Empire to negotiate the transfer of Thessaly and parts of Epirus, marking a modest acknowledgment of Greek ambitions—though it was deferred and contingent on diplomatic efforts rather than direct territorial acquisition.

This treaty was a critical episode in the Eastern Question, the geopolitical struggle surrounding the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the fate of its territories. For Greece, the Treaty of Berlin highlighted the complexities of navigating this volatile landscape, dominated by the competing interests of the European great powers.

Regarding the rivalries among the Great Powers, Britain sought to limit Russian expansion into the Eastern Mediterranean, while Austria-Hungary and Germany aimed to preserve stability in the Balkans to safeguard their spheres of influence. Greece, as a small state with limited military power, found itself needing to align its territorial aspirations with the broader geopolitical dynamics of the time.

The rise of nationalism among Balkan states such as Serbia and Bulgaria created both opportunities and challenges for Greece. While these states shared a common goal of weakening Ottoman control, their competing territorial claims often conflicted with Greek ambitions, as evidenced in the scramble for Macedonia and Thrace.

At the Berlin Congress, Greece faced a diplomatic environment in which its aspirations were overshadowed by the interests of larger powers. Nevertheless, the Greek delegation worked to position the country as a viable regional player. The limited reference to Thessaly and Epirus in the treaty reflected Greece's persistence in asserting its territorial claims, even in the face of significant opposition.

Although the Treaty of Berlin fell short of directly addressing Greek territorial ambitions, it marked a turning point in several key respects:

The treaty's endorsement of negotiations for Thessaly and Epirus paved the way for the Convention of Constantinople (1881), where Greece successfully acquired these territories through diplomacy rather than war. This achievement underscored the effectiveness of combining persistent diplomatic engagement with the leverage of European mediation.

The treaty also highlighted Greece's limitations in the face of great-power politics, prompting a reassessment of its military capabilities and alliances. This realization would later inform Greece's military reforms and strategic approaches during the Balkan Wars.

While the Treaty of Berlin did not fully satisfy Greek territorial aspirations, it served to partially recognize Greek claims, reinforcing the national narrative of eventual unification and keeping the Megali Idea alive as a central principle of Greek policy.

In the broader context of the Eastern Question, the treaty exposed the precarious position of small states like Greece, caught between the ambitions of larger powers and the shifting dynamics of Balkan nationalism. For Greece, the treaty was a moment of both frustration and opportunity—a reminder of its geopolitical constraints, but also a stepping stone toward its eventual territorial expansion and regional influence.

By situating Greek ambitions within the broader framework of the Eastern Question, the Treaty of Berlin exemplifies the delicate balance of diplomacy, military limitations, and the strategic use of great-power rivalries in shaping the course of modern Greek history.

4.3 Convention of Constantinople (1881)

The Convention of Constantinople (1881) marked a significant milestone in Greece's territorial expansion, granting it Thessaly and parts of Epirus (History of Greek Nation, 1977). This diplomatic success was the culmination of Greece's persistent efforts to assert its claims over territories with substantial Greek populations while navigating the complexities of Ottoman resistance and great-power politics.

Signed on May 24, 1881, the Convention of Constantinople (Hertslet, 1875) was a unanimous decision by the Six Powers: the United Kingdom, Prussia, Austria-Hungary, the French Republic, Italy, and Russia. Its purpose was to settle the frontier dispute between Greece and the Ottoman Empire, and it contained 19 articles. This agreement followed Turkey's repeated refusal to implement the provisions of the 13th Protocol of the Congress of Berlin (1878) (British and Foreign State Papers, 1883). The Convention was ratified by a separate agreement on July 2, 1881.

The Treaty began with a detailed description of the new borders between Greece and the Ottoman Empire, as outlined in Article 1, which ceded to Greece the areas of Thessaly, Punta, and surrounding regions in Epirus. Article 2 specified that Punta and its surrounding territory, as defined by the first article of the Act signed at Constantinople on July 21, 1832, would also be ceded to Greece. Moreover, the fortifications commanding the entrance to the Gulf of Arta, both on the side of Preveza and Punta, were to be disarmed within three months.

Article 3 granted the inhabitants of the newly ceded areas, who would remain under Greek administration, the same rights as native Greeks. Article 4 stipulated that all Turkish property titles in the ceded territories would be recognized by the Hellenic Government. Article 5 provided the Sultan with the option to dispose of imperial estates under certain conditions.

According to Article 6, no one could be deprived of their property unless for public utility, with compensation provided by the Greek State. Article 7 established the right for free grazing of herds across the new borders. Article 8 guaranteed religious freedom in the newly ceded territories. Article 9 provided for the resolution of any disputes concerning public property and private interests, which would be decided by a committee. Finally, Article 10 stipulated that Greece would bear a portion of the Ottoman Public Debt, proportional to the revenues from the ceded territories.

Article 11 did not exempt Muslims from disarmament, while Article 12 urged the Greek parliament to pass a law against robbery. Article 13 granted natives the right to transfer their residence to the Ottoman Empire within three years. During this period, Muslims would also be exempt from military service. Articles 14, 15, and 16 addressed administrative matters such as taxes, evacuation

procedures, and the work of technical commissioners. Article 17 stipulated that both Turkey and Greece would grant a full and complete amnesty to all persons implicated in political events prior to the present Convention, particularly those related to the territorial dispute. Article 18 indicated that a new formal treaty, with the same provisions, would follow. Finally, Article 19 mandated that the present Convention be ratified within three weeks.

Evaluating the Convention of Constantinople (1881), it formalized the transfer of most of Thessaly and a portion of Epirus from the Ottoman Empire to Greece. This outcome was partly influenced by the Treaty of Berlin (1878), which encouraged negotiations between Greece and the Ottoman Empire for territorial adjustments. The entirety of Thessaly, with the exception of a small strip near the Ottoman border, was ceded to Greece. This was a significant territorial gain, adding fertile land and a large population to the Greek state. However, Greece's broader aspirations for Epirus were thwarted by Ottoman resistance and the geopolitical interests of the great powers. The territory ceded to Greece in Epirus was limited to a small portion near Arta.

This territorial acquisition marked a substantial expansion of Greece's landmass and population, enhancing its agricultural capacity and strategic depth. Yet, it also heightened tensions with the Ottoman Empire and posed challenges for the integration of the newly acquired regions into the Greek state.

The success of the Convention of Constantinople was not accidental; it was the result of a carefully coordinated combination of diplomatic maneuvers and military readiness. Greece relied on the support of European powers, particularly Britain and France, to mediate the negotiations. These powers were motivated by a desire to stabilize the Balkans and prevent renewed conflict following the Treaty of Berlin. Greek diplomacy emphasized the alignment of its territorial claims with the broader European goal of weakening Ottoman influence in the Balkans. By framing its aspirations as part of a larger geopolitical strategy and as a european Interest, Greece gained crucial support from key powers. Although the Treaty of Berlin did not immediately grant Greece any territory, Greek diplomats used its clauses as a foundation for sustained negotiations, ultimately leading to the 1881 agreement. Following its defeat in the Crimean War of 1854 and subsequent neglect of military affairs, Greece undertook efforts to modernize its armed forces in the late 19th century. While still not strong enough to challenge the Ottoman Empire directly, this modernization provided a credible deterrent that supported its diplomatic stance. The Greek government strategically demonstrated its willingness to mobilize troops, a signal to both the Ottomans and the great powers that it was prepared to assert its claims if necessary. This readiness increased the urgency for a diplomatic resolution.

The acquisition of Thessaly and part of Epirus reinforced the narrative of the Megali Idea, boosting morale and fostering a sense of progress toward unifying all Greek-speaking lands. The success of achieving territorial gains through diplomacy rather than war set an important precedent for Greece, which it would leverage in future negotiations. While the convention temporarily reduced hostilities, it deepened the Ottoman Empire's distrust of Greece, laying the groundwork for future conflicts. The integration of the new territories posed administrative, social, and economic challenges, requiring significant effort to bring these regions in line with the rest of Greece.

The Convention of Constantinople (1881) exemplifies Greece's ability to combine diplomatic persistence with credible military posturing to achieve its goals. It also reflects the importance of great-power mediation in shaping the geopolitics of the Balkans, demonstrating how small states like Greece could navigate the complex interplay of regional and international interests to advance their national ambitions.

4.4 Treaties of London and Bucharest (1913): Outcomes of the Balkan Wars and Strategic Military Alliances

The Treaties of London and Bucharest in 1913 were pivotal in reshaping the Balkan region after the Balkan Wars (1912–1913), marking the culmination of territorial struggles among Balkan states, the weakening of Ottoman control in Europe, and significant territorial and political gains for Greece.

The transformation of the Greek army, from the humiliating defeat in the Greco-Turkish War of 1897 to its remarkable success in the Balkan Wars, was the result of comprehensive reforms in military, political, and organizational spheres. The defeat in 1897 exposed critical weaknesses within the Greek armed forces, including poor leadership, inadequate training, outdated equipment, and ineffective strategies (Kyriakidis, 2021). This national humiliation acted as a catalyst for reform, driven both by domestic resolve and international support.

In the early 1900s, Greece invited a French military mission to reorganize the army. The mission introduced modern training techniques, improved discipline, and standardized military protocols (Kyriakidis, 2016). The acquisition of modern weaponry, such as Krupp artillery and Mannlicher–Schönauer rifles, significantly enhanced Greece's combat capabilities. Command structures were professionalized, and merit-based promotions were introduced to reduce political interference in military appointments. Key figures such as Crown Prince Constantine played a pivotal role in revitalizing military morale and strategy.

A renewed national purpose, influenced by the Megali Idea (Great Idea), motivated both the military and the civilian population. Improvements in infrastructure, particularly railways, enhanced troop mobility, ensuring greater operational efficiency. These military reforms, paired with effective diplomacy led by Eleftherios Venizelos, positioned Greece to take a leading role in the Balkan Wars, securing decisive victories against both the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria (Kyriakidis, 2016).

This period of reform and modernization transformed Greece from a nation struggling to assert its military strength into a powerful regional player, shaping the political and territorial landscape of the Balkans in the early 20th century.

During the First Balkan War (1912–1913), the Balkan League, composed of Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro, united with the aim of expelling the Ottoman Empire from its European territories. Greece's military campaigns played a pivotal role, especially with the liberation of Thessaloniki and Epirus. The Hellenic Navy was crucial in controlling the Aegean Sea, preventing Ottoman reinforcements from reaching their troops. The war ended with the Treaty of London (May 1913), which forced the Ottoman Empire to cede nearly all its European territories west of the Ainos-Medea line to the Balkan victors (Kyriakidis, 2021). However, the treaty left unresolved disputes among the allies over the division of these newly acquired lands, particularly in Macedonia and Thrace.

The Treaty of London, signed on 17/30 May 1913, consisted of 7 articles (British and Foreign State Papers, 1917):

Article 1 outlined the intention to establish peace between the signatory countries.

Article 2 defined the boundary between Greece and the Ottoman Empire, following the Ainos - Medea line.

Article 3 granted the Great Powers the authority to draw the borders of Albania and settle all related issues.

Article 4 stipulated that the Ottoman Empire would relinquish all rights to the island of Crete to the Great Powers.

Article 5 declared that the fate of the islands of the Eastern Aegean (except Crete) and the Athos Peninsula would be determined by the Great Powers.

Article 6 provided for reparations related to the war, to be discussed at a future conference.

Article 7 stated that future conventions would address the issues of prisoners.

The Treaty of London (1913) formalized the Ottoman Empire's loss of almost all its European territories, marking a significant shift in the region's political map. It solidified Greece's sovereignty over Crete, securing its position in the southern Aegean. However, the treaty's ambiguous territorial allocations led to tensions among the Balkan allies, particularly over the division of Macedonia and Thrace. These unresolved disputes would later contribute to the Second Balkan War (1913), in which Bulgaria, dissatisfied with its share of the spoils, turned against its former allies, including Greece.

This treaty was ratified by the Peace Convention of Athens, which aimed to establish peace and restore normal relations between Greece and Turkey. It was signed in Athens on November 1/14, 1913, and ratified by Law No. 4213 of the DSH (Gazette of the Government of the Kingdom of Greece, 1913).

It consisted of 16 articles, 3 protocols, and a declaration, essentially elaborating on the provisions of the Treaty of London of May 30, 1913, in greater detail (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic, 1913).

According to Article 1, diplomatic relations between the Ottoman Empire and Greece were resumed, and consulates could be established along the new borders by both countries.

Article 2 reinstated treaties, conventions, and agreements that were in force before the interruption of diplomatic relations due to hostilities.

Article 3 granted amnesty to individuals from both countries involved in political events, annulling their convictions.

Under Article 4, inhabitants of Ottoman territories now under Greek sovereignty became Greek citizens, with the right to opt for Ottoman citizenship within three years, provided they moved their residence outside Greece.

According to Article 5, acquired rights, judicial acts, and official documents issued by the Ottoman authorities prior to the occupation of the new territories would remain valid unless proven otherwise.

Article 6 allowed residents choosing Ottoman citizenship and emigrating permanently from Greece to retain their property in Greece. They could lease or entrust its management to a third party. Civil and agricultural property rights, as well as Ottoman-titled estates held by individuals before the border changes, were to be recognized by the Greek government. Any individual deprived of proven ownership for reasons of public utility was entitled to compensation.

Article 7 safeguarded the private estates of the Sultan, granting the right to sell or lease them through his family members. Any disputes would be settled at the Hague.

Article 8 provided for the reciprocal exchange of prisoners within a month.

Article 9 required the Ottoman Empire to release all Greek-flagged steamships and ships that it had retained, with an obligation to repair any material damage in the presence of appointed committees.

Article 10 stipulated that the Hague Tribunal would resolve the Ottoman Empire's claim for the return of arms belonging to Ottoman soldiers from the garrison of Thessaloniki, which was now under Greek control following the city's protocol of surrender on October 26, 1912.

Article 11 guaranteed the protection of the lives, property, religion, and customs of inhabitants in territories now under Greek rule, with specific reference to the protection of Muslim customs as part of religious tolerance.

Article 12 ensured that Vakoufia estate properties would be respected unless sold by Muslim authorities or compensated. Disputes related to these properties would also be referred to the Hague.

Article 13 stipulated mutual respect for soldiers' cemeteries, allowing relatives unhindered recovery of their remains.

Article 14 referred financial obligations concerning Ottoman debts to railway companies operating in Thessaloniki and surrounding areas, now belonging to Greece, to the Economic Commission for Balkan Affairs in Paris.

Article 15 obligated both countries to uphold the terms of the Treaty of London of May 30, 1913.

Article 16 stated that the treaty would take effect immediately upon its signature by the parties.

The First Protocol to the convention granted inhabitants of the new territories six months to declare their wish to acquire Greek citizenship.

The Second Special Protocol entrusted the Hague Tribunal with resolving ownership disputes over former Ottoman lands in areas now under Greek sovereignty.

The Third Protocol clarified that the Ottoman Empire had no claim to Christian churches that had been converted into mosques under Ottoman rule but were now returning to their original religious use. It also provided for the establishment of schools for naipides (Muslims with knowledge of religious doctrine and law), ensuring functional conditions for these institutions. Furthermore, it mandated the compulsory teaching of Greek alongside Turkish in these schools.

Finally, the declaration stated that the Ottoman Empire had not confiscated any Greek-flagged ships seized prior to the war.

The Second Balkan War erupted in June 1913 (General Staff of the Army, 1988), just months after the conclusion of the First Balkan War, as tensions escalated among the victorious Balkan allies over the division of former Ottoman territories. Dissatisfied with its share of the spoils, particularly in Macedonia, Bulgaria launched a surprise attack on its former allies, Greece and Serbia, igniting the new conflict.

Under the command of King Constantine I, the Greek Army swiftly mobilized and launched counteroffensives against the Bulgarian forces. Key battles, such as the Battle of Kilkis-Lahanas (June 19–21, 1913), marked decisive Greek victories, showcasing superior strategy, well-organized forces, and high morale (Cassavetti, 1914). The Battle of Kresna Gorge further solidified Greek advances despite the challenging terrain and heavy casualties.

The Hellenic Navy also played a vital role by securing control over the Aegean Sea, preventing Bulgarian reinforcements from reaching critical fronts. This naval superiority ensured the Greek military's operational success during the war.

The Second Balkan War marked a turning point for Greece, nearly doubling its territory and population. Success in the war solidified its control over Macedonia and parts of Thrace, boosting its regional standing. It was a military and diplomatic triumph, demonstrating the effectiveness of Greece's reformed military and strategic alliances. The war also underscored the fragility of alliances in a region marked by overlapping territorial claims and nationalist ambitions (Svolopoulos, 2014).

The war concluded with the signing of the Treaty of Bucharest on August 10, 1913, which reshaped the Balkan map (British and Foreign State Papers, 1917). The treaty contained 10 articles (Gazette of the Government of the Kingdom of Greece, 1913):

Article 1: Stated the intention of peace between Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia.

Article 2: Laid down the territorial arrangements between Bulgaria and Romania.

Articles 3 and 4: Defined the territorial arrangements between Bulgaria and Serbia.

Article 5: Established the new border between Bulgaria and Greece, from the ridge of Mount Beles to the Aegean Sea at the mouth of the river Nestos. A special commission was tasked with drawing the boundary line and settling issues concerning real estate and funds.

Article 6: Stipulated the immediate withdrawal of Bulgarian troops within their own borders.

Article 7: Called for the demobilization of the Bulgarian army and the evacuation of both old and new Bulgarian territories within 15 days.

Article 8: Allowed the Bulgarian army to withdraw using railways free of charge, with provisions for the protection of sick and wounded troops.

Article 9: Provided for the mutual exchange of prisoners.

Article 10: Established the procedure for the ratification of the treaty.

The Treaty of Bucharest (August 1913) formalized the outcome of the Second Balkan War, cementing Greece's territorial gains in Macedonia and Thrace, and establishing new borders in the region. However, the treaty also contributed to continued instability, as Bulgaria was dissatisfied with the terms, particularly the loss of key territories. This discontent would later influence Bulgaria's role in World War I. The Treaty was a landmark agreement that concluded the Second Balkan War and solidified Greece's emergence as a regional power in the Balkans. Its importance lies not only in its territorial acquisitions but also in the interplay of military transformation, diplomatic finesse, and the broader lessons it offers for state-building and strategy. The treaty granted Greece significant territorial gains, including southern Macedonia, with the vital port city of Thessaloniki, parts of Epirus, and access to the Aegean coastline. This expansion nearly doubled Greece's size and population, transforming it into a more cohesive and strategically positioned state. Greece took Eastern Macedonia up to Kavala, Epirus, the islands of the northern and eastern Aegean and Crete. The area of the country increased by 70% from 63,211 sq km to 120,308 sq km. The population increased by 80% from 2,631,952 inhabitants in 1911 to 4,718,211.

However, there was one drawback. On February 13, 1914, Greek troops were withdrawn from Northern Epirus at the request of the Great Powers (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic, 1914). In return, the Great Powers recognized Greece's sovereignty over the islands of the Eastern Aegean, except for Imbros, Tenedos, and Kastelorizo, which were ordered to be returned to the Ottomans, despite having a predominantly Greek population and already being under Greek occupation. Northern Epirus was to be lost. The acquisition of fertile lands and key economic hubs strengthened Greece's agrarian and commercial potential. Control over Thessaloniki and adjacent territories positioned Greece as a dominant force in the region, countering Bulgarian ambitions and securing a foothold in the power dynamics of the Balkans.

The Greek army's performance in the Balkan Wars was a direct result of reforms initiated after the humiliating defeat in the Greco-Turkish War of 1897. These reforms, driven by national determination and foreign expertise (notably from the French military mission), transformed the Greek armed forces into a professional and effective military power (Kyriakidis, 2022). Adoption of advanced weaponry, training protocols, and strategic doctrines allowed Greece to achieve decisive victories in key battles. King Constantine, I provided decisive leadership, leveraging the army's renewed capabilities to secure critical victories that shaped the outcome of the Second Balkan War.

The military's transformation offers a pedagogical lesson in how strategic investments in modernization, combined with effective leadership, can overcome historical weaknesses and achieve national objectives.

On the other hand, the role of Eleftherios Venizelos in shaping Greece's trajectory during this period cannot be overstated. As Prime Minister, his diplomatic acumen ensured Greece's position in the Balkan League and later safeguarded its territorial gains during peace negotiations. Venizelos adeptly navigated the fragile alliances of the Balkan League, balancing competing interests with Serbia and Romania while countering Bulgarian ambitions. At the Bucharest conference, Venizelos leveraged Greece's military victories and strategic importance to secure favorable terms, ensuring the country's expanded borders. Venizelos's focus on long-term stability, rather than immediate gains, reflected a nuanced understanding of diplomacy as a tool for sustainable state-building. The pedagogical value of Venizelos's diplomacy lies in its balance of pragmatism and idealism, demonstrating the importance of flexibility, coalition-building, and the alignment of military success with diplomatic goals.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The evolution of Greek sovereignty and territory from the Treaty of London (1864), which granted the Ionian Islands to Greece, through to the Treaty of Bucharest (1913) demonstrates a strategic progression of state-building efforts that combined military modernization and diplomatic finesse. This period reflects the dynamic and multidimensional path Greece took toward nationhood and regional influence.

The Treaty of London (1864) marked the beginning of this transformative period, as Britain ceded the Ionian Islands to Greece, symbolizing early diplomatic recognition and territorial expansion. Subsequent treaties, including the Convention of Constantinople (1881) and the Balkan War treaties of 1913, facilitated further expansions, such as Thessaly and parts of Macedonia, solidifying Greek territorial integrity. By 1913, Greece had nearly doubled in size and population, achieving strategic control over vital regions and fulfilling elements of the Megali Idea.

Military reform after 1897 led to a professional, well-equipped army capable of decisive victories in the Balkan Wars. Modern training, improved discipline, and strategic foresight were vital in these

successes. Diplomacy, under leaders like Eleftherios Venizelos, was crucial in securing and legitimizing these military gains, balancing alliances, and negotiating favorable outcomes in international forums. This dual approach underscores the necessity of combining hard power with strategic diplomatic engagement, showing how effective diplomacy can translate military success into long-term sovereignty.

Greece's journey shows the value of adapting military and diplomatic strategies in response to failures, exemplified by the recovery from the defeat of 1897. The focus on aligning military actions with diplomatic goals teaches the importance of cohesive national strategy. Venizelos's charismatic leadership reveals the role of visionary diplomacy in achieving and solidifying gains, providing a model for how leaders can navigate complex alliances and rivalries. From an initial state of disorganization, the Greek army became a modern force capable of securing critical victories, demonstrating how sustained reform can change a nation's strategic posture. The army became an embodiment of national resilience, fostering pride and contributing to the Greek sense of unity and purpose.

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