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BILATERAL AGRICULTURAL AID TO GHANA AND UGANDA: DONOR PRACTICES UNDER DIFFERENT INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY

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ABSTRACT

Agriculture has been the backbone of African economies, and agricultural development has the potential to drive overall economic growth. Considering the importance of agriculture in Africa, foreign aid donors have supported the sector to help push economic growth and reduce poverty. Studies indicate governance quality of a recipient country is an important factor for agricultural aid. Building upon this, the paper explores how bilateral donors provided agricultural aid to two African countries that have different institutional quality, Ghana and Uganda. The analysis of agricultural aid in those two countries was carried out with bilateral aid-profile data from 2011 to 2022. Despite the similar economic importance of agriculture in Ghana and Uganda, donors to Ghana invested the largest amount in agriculture among aid sectors, followed by health. On the other hand, donors to Uganda supported mainly health-relevant sectors with agriculture being ranked only fifth. Donors in both countries implemented agricultural aid mostly as project types. Yet, donors disbursed their aid funds through different aid channels. Donors to Ghana disbursed 48% of agricultural aid funds through the public sector institutions channel (or the state channel). By contrast, donors to Uganda disbursed only 24% of agricultural aid funds through the state channel, essentially bypassing Ugandan public agencies. They instead provided 76% of agricultural aid through the non-state channels such as non-governmental organizations, multilateral organizations, and private entities. Similar donor preferences of the aid disbursement channels were observed with total aid across all aid sectors. Overall, the donor aid profiles suggested donors provided Ghana with more flexible agricultural aid, while in Uganda they controlled agricultural aid more tightly. There could exist multiple underlying reasons for this, but the different level of institutional quality is highly likely one of the possible reasons. For foreign aid, governance quality is an important issue equally to both donors and recipients.

Key words: Africa, agriculture, aid channel, bilateral aid, foreign aid, Ghana, governance, Uganda



INTRODUCTION

Agricultural development has the potential to drive overall economic growth especially in the early stages of development [1, 2]. The contribution of agricultural development to economic growth may be larger when a higher proportion of the population depends on agriculture for their livelihoods, and when people engaged in agriculture are poorer than those engaged in non-agricultural sectors [2, 3]. Agriculture has been the backbone of African economies. The sector contributes an average 15% to the continent's gross domestic product (GDP), and over 50% of the population derives their livelihoods solely from agriculture [2, 4]. Considering Africa's reliance on agriculture, foreign aid donors have supported the sector to help push growth and reduce poverty [5, 6].

Literature indicates provision of agricultural aid to a recipient country is not random [4]. In Africa, Alabi [7] suggests governance quality is an important factor for agricultural aid, showing positive associations between agricultural aid and improved governance. Similarly, Ssozi *et al.* [8] indicate more agricultural aid goes where public institutions are more effective. Building upon those studies, this paper explores how bilateral donors provided agricultural aid to two African countries that have different institutional quality.

Among the African countries, the paper compares Ghana and Uganda for three reasons. First, the economies of the two countries rely on agriculture, in particular on dominant export crops, cocoa for Ghana and coffee for Uganda. Second, the two countries show considerable differences in governance quality, Ghana with generally better governance quality than Uganda. Third, the two countries continue to receive substantial amounts of foreign aid including agricultural aid. With this backdrop, the paper proceeds as follows. Section two builds a theoretical background, section three introduces relevant contexts of Ghana and Uganda, and section four explains data sources and analysis methods. Section five discusses findings from aid profile analyses, and section six concludes.

AGRICULTURE, FOREIGN AID AND GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA

A body of literature recognizes the importance of agricultural development for many developing countries. In Africa, agriculture's contribution to meaningful economic growth remains debatable [1]. On the one hand, proponents of agriculture suggest there is a strong correlation between agricultural growth and GDP in African countries and Africa as a whole. This highlights synergies between agricultural development and African economies [9]. Positive impact of agricultural growth is shown particularly stronger in countries where smallholder farms dominate agriculture, which is the case in Africa [6, 10]. Additionally, proponents of



agriculture indicate there are few viable alternatives to agriculture that can drive aggregate growth because many African countries have weak industrial sectors [6].

On the other hand, skeptics of agriculture point out that many African countries suffer low agricultural productivity, slow market development, weak institutional capacity for rural development, and high vulnerability to climate change [11]. These issues likely prevent agriculture from contributing to economic growth, reinforcing skeptical views on the role of agriculture in Africa. Additionally, skeptics suggest the linkage between agriculture and growth in Africa is probably weaker, compared to the linkage during Asia's successful Green Revolution, partly due to limited agricultural input resources and their usage in Africa [9].

Despite the ongoing debates on effectiveness of agricultural development for African economies, roles of agriculture in a country's economic growth may essentially depend on specific contexts of that country [12]. For instance, agriculture likely plays a bigger role in economic development of the country: when agriculture generates a substantial share of national GDP: when a large portion of the poor lives in rural areas relying heavily on agriculture for their livelihoods: when the country has good agro-ecological environments, whereas limited with other resources for foreign exchange revenues: when sound policies for agricultural development are put in place.

African governments tend to underinvest in agriculture [6]. Records on public expenditures for agricultural sectors imply African governments do not sufficiently appreciate contributions of agriculture to their economies because policies to increase public investment in agriculture have been of little success [3, 5]. The 2003 Maputo Declaration (also known as the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme) required the African Union member states allocate 10% of total government budgetary resources to agriculture and rural development [3]. By 2008, eight countries spent 10% of their annual budget on agriculture, nine other countries spent between 8-10%, and the majority of the countries spent between 3-6% [5]. The African Union member states recommitted to the 10% goal under the 2014 Malabo Declaration [3]: the 2024 biennial review report of the Malabo Declaration shows the overall achievement is 4.6, still noticeably short of meeting the 10% commitment goal [13]. With the inadequate public expenditures on agriculture in Africa, foreign direct investment (FDI) may provide resources necessary for agricultural development. Adom *et al.* [14] show FDI has a direct positive effect on agricultural output in 28 African countries. At the same time, the study cautions FDI to be complementary, not a substitute for domestic public investment. Similarly, Dhahri *et al.* [3] indicate FDI should be consolidated with other resources since FDI alone is insufficient to drive agricultural growth.



Foreign aid has been an important resource for agricultural development [7]. Yet the existing studies that focus on efficacy of agricultural aid in Africa show mixed findings. Barkat *et al.* [15] find a positive effect of agricultural aid on agricultural production, while the positive effect mainly comes from food production, not from non-food production. Ssozi *et al.* [8] conclude agricultural aid increases production of export crops, whereas it decreases food crop production. The study argues agricultural aid would go where agricultural productivity could more likely increase, such as industrial or export crops. In this case, large-scale commercialized farmers may benefit more from agricultural aid than subsistence smallholders. Alabi [7] shows increased agricultural productivity is explained only by two-year lagged agricultural aid, indicating positive impact of agricultural aid is not immediate on agricultural productivity. Gyimah-Brempong *et al.* [16] similarly conclude long-run estimates of agricultural aid appear much larger in absolute magnitude than short-run estimates, highlighting agricultural aid should be justified with longer-term positive impact on Africa's agricultural growth.

Gyimah-Brempong *et al.* [16] also suggest individual components in agricultural aid have different impacts on agricultural output. Aid for agricultural research, education and training, livestock development, agricultural development, and agricultural water development appear to have positive effects on agricultural output. However, aid for agriculture land development and agricultural input provision has insignificant impact in Africa [16]. Regarding the insignificant effect of agricultural input provision aid, Mary *et al.* [2] explain large-scale producers generally have better access to seeds, agro-chemicals and farm machinery provided by agricultural aid, therefore limiting smallholder producers' access to them, although smallholder producers are mostly the aid target. Different from this conclusion, McArthur *et al.* [17] suggest agricultural aid with agricultural input packages helps generate positive effects on productivity, income, and welfare in Africa. Finally, Barkat *et al.* [15] find agricultural aid responds more positively to agricultural development and poverty reduction in low-income African countries. It is reasoned that agriculture in low-income African countries probably plays a more crucial role in their economies than middle-income African countries.

For relations between agricultural aid and governance quality, some studies find stronger institutional quality attracts more agricultural aid. In Africa, Asiedu *et al.* [4] show a percentage point increase in governance quality is associated with up to 64 percent increase in agricultural aid. Among the governance quality indicators, the rule of law and the corruption control seem positively associated with inflows of agricultural aid. Alabi [7] shows governance quality in Africa has generally a positive relationship with agricultural aid, yet in this study the corruption control does not explain agricultural aid.



Other studies find the governance indicators have little or mixed association with receipt of agricultural aid. Ssozi *et al.* [8] cautiously mention institutions in and of themselves are weak determinants of the amount of agricultural aid a country receives. Alabi [7] finds governance index coefficients are significant only in multilateral agricultural aid, implying multilateral donors consider governance issues more important than bilateral donors.

COUNTRY CONTEXTS OF GHANA AND UGANDA

Ghana is a coastal West African country with agriculture as a major economic sector. About 45% of its active labor force and 83% of rural households are engaged in agriculture. The sector contributed to average 20% of GDP over the last decade and 75% of foreign exchange revenues [18, 19]. Cocoa is a key export crop for the country's foreign exchange revenues, and other export products include cashew nuts, oil palm, rubber, and oilseeds [20, 21]. Agriculture in Ghana is dominated by smallholders with less than 2 ha, which limits commercialized agricultural production [18]. Other challenges that Ghana's agriculture faces include decreasing soil fertility, low use of improved agricultural technologies, pest-disease emergencies, inadequate extension and financial services, lack of relevant infrastructure, unpredictable climate change [19]. Those challenges attribute to Ghana being a net food importer with the 2022 import bill reaching USD 2.6 billion [19, 20].

Uganda is a landlocked East African country with agriculture being key to rural livelihoods and economic development. The sector employs 70% of Ugandan labor forces, contributing an average 25% of GDP [21]. Agriculture of Uganda mainly consists of smallholders except for the northern region with pastoral-based agriculture [23]. Similar to Ghana, agriculture accounts for a large share of Uganda's foreign exchange revenues up to 50%, and coffee is the primary export crop [24]. Other cash crops include cocoa, cotton, sugarcane and tobacco [23]. Agricultural development of Uganda is impeded by similar challenges to those of Ghana. Yet, lack of relevant infrastructure, especially irrigation systems, is a particular concern since over 95% of cultivated crops in Uganda come from rain-fed agricultural systems [24, 25].

The two countries, while having a comparable economic structure (heavy reliance on agriculture and presence of dominant cash crops), support agriculture and their major export crops differently. Ghana invests substantial portions of public finance in the cocoa industry over which the government has a monopoly control through the Ghana Cocoa Board. The government oversees the cocoa industry by controlling cocoa quality, seed sales, producer prices, export and marketing of



cocoa beans, extension services, and research programs. Different from Ghana, the Ugandan coffee industry receives rather limited support from the government, such as coffee production promotion, quality control, and market information provision [21].

The two countries show noticeable differences with foreign aid. Over the last decade, donor governments provided Uganda with larger total aid than Ghana: USD 14.7 billion to Uganda in total, and USD 8.8 billion to Ghana [26]. Despite the large difference in total aid, donors provided more agricultural aid to Ghana in absolute terms. Sserunjogi [21] argues Ghana is a better agricultural-aid recipient than Uganda due partly to Ghana's stronger public support to its export crop. On the other hand, agricultural indicators such as the agriculture share of government expenditure (AGE) and the agriculture orientation index (AOI) show the Ugandan government spends relative more public resources compared to economic values of agriculture than Ghana: AGE of Uganda is average 3.85 across 2010-2021 and Ghana 0.93; AOI of Uganda is average 0.43 and Ghana 0.22 [27]. Higher values indicate more public finance going towards overall agriculture in proportion to the sector's economic value or contribution.

As a final point, Ghana and Uganda have different standings with governance quality. Measured by the World Bank governance index, Ghana shows overall higher quality in governance compared to Uganda. Ghana has averaged 52.4% in percentile rank over the last decade, and Uganda has average 29.7%. Higher numbers correspond to higher ranks, indicating better governance. The largest difference among the governance indicators comes from the corruption control: Uganda is ranked bottom 15% and Ghana 53% [28]. With this backdrop, the paper argues differences in governance quality partly led to differences in agricultural aid between the two countries, and bilateral aid donors controlled agricultural aid more tightly in Uganda due probably to the fear of aid misuse under comparatively weaker institutions of Uganda.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

The paper utilized a descriptive/summative analysis method to describe and compare characteristics of bilateral donors' practices in Ghana and Uganda. For the analysis of aid allocation profiles, data sets were extracted from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) statistics [26]. Bilateral donors subject to data collection were members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) who report aid data annually to the Creditor Reporting System (CRS). As such, non-DAC donors who do not report aid data on a regular basis were not included.



Aid disbursement records covered from 2011 and 2022. This range was based on the data availability to match the paper objective. In the earlier than the year 2011, part of data for aid types and channels was missing from the OECD statistics. The basic unit of the aid profile analysis was each annual aid disbursement, or an aid fund actually transferred from a donor to a recipient in a given year [29]. Those aid disbursement records were summarized to identify bilateral donors' behaviors collectively and individually in their agricultural assistance to Ghana and Uganda.

For the detailed analysis of each aid sector, aid type and aid channel, aid disbursement data were sorted by CRS codes. The aid-sector analysis was conducted with CRS purpose codes. For agricultural aid, the sector code 310 (covering agriculture, forestry, and fishing sectors) was used. The aid-type analysis was conducted with CRS capital-alphabet aid-type codes. The aid-channel (for disbursing aid funds) analysis was conducted with CRS numeric channel identification codes. Analysis results with those aid sectors, types and channels in Ghana and Uganda were compared to identify differences in bilateral agriculture assistance under their different institutional quality. As explained in the previous section, the source of institutional quality measurement was the World Bank governance index [28].

Aid profile comparisons between Ghana and Uganda focused on lead donor groups. Lead donors are referred to as donor groups that cumulatively account for around 90% of total aid in a recipient country [30]. Ghana's lead donor group includes eight countries: Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Korea, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States of America (USA). Uganda's lead donor group includes ten countries: Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Norway, Sweden, UK, and USA.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

From 2011 through 2022, Uganda received much larger total aid than Ghana. Differences in annual total aid were smaller in the earlier years, but gradually broadened in the later years (Table 1). This might reflect that foreign aid often corresponds to relative needs of recipient countries. Ghana experienced a faster per capita income growth (33% for Ghana and 14% for Uganda), with a higher average GDP per capita (USD 1811 in constant 2015 USD for Ghana and USD 877 for Uganda). The poverty ratio at USD 2.15 per day per person was average 26% in Ghana, whereas 41% in Uganda [27].

For lead donor groups, the two countries shared six donors in common: Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, UK and USA. The USA was the largest donor in both Ghana and Uganda, yet the donor's dominance was more prominent in Uganda



(Table 1). Top aid sectors in Ghana included agriculture, health, education, government & civil society, and energy in the order of sectoral aid total (Table 2). Top aid sectors in Uganda included population policies/programs & reproductive health, health, emergency response, government & civil society, and agriculture. Overall, donors to Ghana invested the largest amount in agriculture closely followed by health, whereas donors to Uganda supported mostly health-relevant sectors (Table 2).

For agricultural aid, lead donors to agriculture were different in the two countries, sharing Netherlands and USA in common (Table 3). The USA was the largest donor to agriculture, accounting for 44% of total agricultural aid in Ghana, and 40% in Uganda. Among the sub-sectors in agricultural aid, two sub-sectors (agricultural development, and agricultural policy & administrative management) received the largest support (Table 3). The two sectors collectively accounted for 65% of agricultural aid to Ghana, and 78% to Uganda. The largest donor, USA, seemed to prefer these two sub-sectors as the donor invested the largest amounts in them in Ghana and Uganda.

Donors utilized different aid channels to disburse agricultural aid in the two countries (Table 4). Donors to Ghana disbursed 48% of agricultural aid through the public sector institutions channel (or the state channel as aid goes through government agencies). By contrast, donors to Uganda disbursed only 24% of agricultural aid through the state channel, essentially bypassing Ugandan public agencies for agricultural aid. They instead provided 76% of agricultural aid through non-state channels such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), multilateral organizations, and private entities. Similar donor preferences of the aid disbursement channels were observed with total aid across all aid sectors: 56% of total aid to Ghana was disbursed through the state channel, whereas only 36% of total aid to Uganda was disbursed through the state channel.

Literature argues aid channel decisions by donors are likely deliberate with the quality of a recipient's governance and institutions. Dietrich [31] finds donors bypass recipient governments when their governance quality is low. Poor governance in recipient countries probably alerts donors to the possibility of aid misuse. Therefore, donors may seek out alternative partners that allow donors to restrict aid misuse by recipient governments. Acht *et al.* [32] also conclude bypassing recipient governments is a donor response to weak state institutions of recipient countries.

Based on those findings, the differences in governance quality might have been attributed to the different donor channel choices in Ghana and Uganda. Implementing agricultural aid often requires participation of central and/or local



governments because it needs to be fine-tuned to localities with diverse aid elements. When donors consider central and local governments ineffective, they may bypass the state channel for aid efficacy [33]. However, this argument with Uganda's case must be verified with further evidence.

For a different explanation about the donor aid channel choices, one could argue the characteristics of sub-sectors in agricultural aid might have played a role because some agricultural sub-sectors necessitate stronger engagement of government agencies. For instance, large-scale construction of irrigation systems or post-harvest facilities demands sustained involvement of recipient governments. It is unclear if this argument could fit to the cases of Ghana and Uganda since the top agricultural sub-sectors were the same. Yet, if individual projects in the same sub-sectors had different components in the two countries, this might be a possible explanation of the donor aid-channel preferences. Dissecting individual projects for a detailed examination is beyond the scope of the paper.

For aid types in agricultural aid, two points are worth noting. First, Ghana received a relatively large share of budget support in agricultural aid (13% in Table 5) as well as in total aid (11% not in Table). In contrast, Uganda received nearly none of the budget support both in agricultural aid (0% in Table 5) and in total aid (2% not in Table). Second, Ghana and Uganda received most agricultural aid as project-type aid (Table 5).

First, regarding the budget support, studies assert a degree of budget support indicates a degree of donor trust on recipients' policies and institutions as budget support provides recipient governments with little restrictive funding [34]. To donors, budget support can be risky because the fungible nature of budget support makes it prone to aid misuse [34]. Ghana's much larger receipt of total budget support from ten donors, UK being the largest provider, implies a level of donor trust on Ghana's governance compared to Uganda. With agricultural aid, the positive association between Ghana's governance quality and its receipt of budget support may not be confirmed in this paper. Agricultural budget support to Ghana came from only one donor, Canada, and this was hardly a collective action of the donor community. For Uganda, little budget support to agricultural aid as well as to total aid was probably indicative of a low level of donor confidence in the country's policies and institutions. The UK was the largest budget supporter to Uganda. After the 2012 corruption scandal involving the Office of Prime Minister, the donor completely ceased its budget support. The donor's aid strategy for Uganda indicated resuming the financial aid would depend on assessments of Uganda's anti-corruption practices while funding channels would be carefully chosen [36]. Similarly, the USA stated in its cooperation strategy that corruption was a



threatening obstacle to Uganda's development, generating high levels of inefficiency. The donor thus suggested anti-corruption mechanisms be incorporated in USA's aid programs in Uganda [37, 38].

Second, regarding project-type aid in agriculture, both Ghana and Uganda received the majority of agricultural aid as projects (Table 5). Donors to the two countries appeared to generally prefer project-type aid because the share of project-type aid across all aid sectors was similar to that of agricultural aid (71% in Ghana, and 74% in Uganda). A study reveals that bilateral donors offer proportionally more project-type aid to recipient governments when donors have lower confidence in the recipients' institutional quality [34]. A logic for this is that project-type aid may guarantee a higher level of donor control over aid resources and implementation terms than other types of aid. To Ghana and Uganda, this was not applicable due to their similar shares of project type aid. Nonetheless, there was some indication of donors being more flexible with project aid in Ghana.

When disbursing for agricultural aid projects, donors in Ghana and Uganda showed discernable aid channel preferences (Table 6). Donors to Ghana implemented approximately half of agricultural projects through the state channel, whereas donors to Uganda implemented agricultural projects mostly through the non-state channels or 71% of agricultural aid. The lead donor, USA appeared to be an important influencer. The USA preferred the state channel in Ghana for agricultural projects (38% of USA's agricultural projects in Ghana), whereas the donor rarely utilized the state channel for agricultural projects in Uganda (11%). As discussed previously, it was possible for donors to have designed individual agricultural projects differently: in Ghana, donors designed agricultural projects offering more room for the government's involvement, and in Uganda they hardly did.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT

Ghana and Uganda lay interesting contexts for aid studies. Both economies rely on agriculture with the dominant export crops for foreign exchange revenues. At the same time, the two countries show a wide gap in institutional quality, which literature often considers a critical factor for donor decisions on aid itself and aid practices. Focusing on agricultural aid, this paper explored how bilateral donors in Ghana and Uganda supported agriculture.

Ghana's agriculture received the largest sectoral support among all aid sectors. Agricultural support to Uganda was ranked fifth, distantly following health-relevant sectors. Donors to Ghana might have considered agricultural sectors in Ghana more effective for aid efficacy than other sectors. Donors to Uganda could have



deemed health-relevant sectors more urgent than agriculture, even though agriculture is the economic backbone of the country. Donors to the both countries implemented agricultural aid mostly as projects in similar agricultural sub-sectors, which the USA appeared to influence to a large extent. However, donors' aid-delivery paths differed widely: donors to Ghana preferred delivering aid via government agencies, whereas donors to Uganda mainly bypassed them. This finding implied donors placed more confidence in Ghana's public institutions and agricultural sectors. On the other hand, donors to Uganda seemed to control their agricultural aid more tightly by bypassing the Uganda government, instead by partnering non-state development actors directly.

Aid practices are part of the negotiated outcomes between a donor and a recipient. Bilateral donors, however, may have more control over aid resources and terms. With donors' upper hands, they appeared to offer more flexibility to Ghana with agricultural aid, compared to Uganda. There could exist multiple underlying reasons for this (for example, donors' own political or strategic reasons, and historical ties), yet the different level of institutional quality and capacity is highly likely one of the possible reasons.

The paper has limitations. First, it did not examine individual aid projects, which could reveal detailed insights into agricultural aid. Second, the paper focused on bilateral donors, and examination of multilateral donors might find different results. Third, China, considered a key investor in African agriculture, was not included due to the absence of aid data. Further research on those limitations should shed more light on associations between donor practices in agriculture and institutional quality in African countries.

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Conflict of interest

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Table 1: Yearly total aid and lead donors to Ghana and Uganda

Year	Year total ¹		Ghana			Uganda		
	Ghana	Uganda	Donor ²	Value	Donor % ³	Donor	Value	Donor %
2011	965.6	1056.7	USA	2717.4	31.0	USA	6945.8	47.2
2012	941.9	1000.2	Germany	1117.4	12.8	UK	1923.2	13.1
2013	773.0	1132.4	UK	1054.8	12.0	Germany	755.3	5.1
2014	633.1	1156.9	Canada	839.5	9.6	Japan	745.3	5.1
2015	726.3	1091.2	France	698.9	8.0	Sweden	666.3	4.5
2016	724.5	1212.2	Japan	613.6	7.0	Denmark	642.8	4.4
2017	687.4	1448.4	Denmark	500.4	5.7	Norway	575.9	3.9
2018	704.8	1354.7	Korea	332.1	3.8	France	429.6	2.9
2019	621.6	1275.0	Lead total ⁴	7874.0	89.9	Ireland	391.0	2.7
2020	619.5	1371.0				Netherlands	352.2	2.4
2021	815.8	1413.3				Lead total	13427.4	91.2
2022	547.3	1208.6	1) Constant prices in 2021 USD millions					
Average	730.1	1226.7	2) lead donors in Ghana or Uganda					
			3) % share of donor contribution to total aid, 4) total of lead donors					

Table 2: Top aid sectors in Ghana and Uganda

Top sector (Ghana) ¹	Value ²	Sector % ³	Top sector (Uganda)	Value	Sector %
31	1216.4	13.9	13	4427.8	30.1
12	1154.5	13.2	12	1719.5	11.7
11	920.7	10.5	72	1475.8	10.0
15	873.2	10.0	15	1288.3	8.8
23	769.6	8.8	31	1168.2	7.9

1) 11: education, 12: health, 13: population policies/programs & reproductive health, 15: government & civil society, 23: energy, 31: agriculture, forestry, fishing, 72: emergency response
2) constant prices in 2021 USD million
3) % share of sectoral total aid

Table 3: Top donors to agriculture and top agricultural sub-sectors in Ghana and Uganda

Ag donor (Ghana) ¹	Value ²	Ag-aid % ³	Ag donor (Uganda)	Value	Ag-aid %
USA	530.4	43.6	USA	461.3	39.5
Canada	270.9	22.3	Denmark	191.4	16.4
Germany	100.4	8.3	Netherlands	161.8	13.9
Netherlands	77.8	6.4	United Kingdom	72.2	6.2
France	69.3	5.7	Japan	56.2	4.8
Ag sub-sector (Ghana) ⁴	Value	Sub-sec % ⁵	Ag sub-sector (Uganda)	Value	Sub-sec %
31120	431.2	37.4	31120	636.8	56.0
31110	296.4	25.7	31110	225.4	19.8
31191	97.6	8.5	31181	53.0	4.7
31161	75.5	6.6	31161	50.9	4.5
31166	61.0	5.3	31163	49.8	4.4

1) Top donors in agriculture
 2) constant prices in 2021 USD million
 3) % share of agricultural aid total
 4) 31110: agricultural policy & administrative management, 31120: agricultural development, 31161: food crop production, 31163: livestock, 31166: agricultural extension, 31181: agricultural education/training, 31191: agricultural services
 5) % share of sub-sector in agricultural aid

Table 4: Aid disbursement channels for agricultural aid in Ghana and Uganda

Ag-aid channel ¹		Ghana		Uganda	
		Value ²	% of ag-aid ³	Value	% of ag-aid
10000	State	587.1	48.3	277.5	23.8
20000	Non-state	317.7	26.1	419.4	35.9
30000		1.9	0.2	2.8	0.2
40000		101.9	8.4	121.2	10.4
50000		55.1	4.5	59.3	5.1
60000		73.6	6.0	199.3	17.1
90000		79.1	6.5	88.6	7.6

1) 10000: Public sector institutions, 20000: non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society, 30000: public-private partnerships and networks, 40000: multilateral organisations, 50000: university, college or other teaching institution, research institute or think tank, 60000: private sector institution, 90000: other
 2) constant prices in 2021 USD million
 3) % share of agricultural aid total

Table 5: Aid types for agricultural aid in Ghana and Uganda

Ag-aid type ¹	Ghana		Uganda	
	Value ²	% ³	Value	%
A	152.2	12.5	0.1	0.0
B	113.2	9.3	187.7	16.1
C	880.6	72.4	906.9	77.6
D	67.6	5.6	71.2	6.1
E	2.9	0.2	2.2	0.2

1) A: budget support, B: Core contributions and pooled programmes and funds, C: project-type interventions, D: experts and other technical assistance, E: scholarships and student costs in donor countries
 2) constant prices in 2021 USD million
 3) % share of agricultural aid total

Table 6: Aid disbursement channels for agricultural project-type aid in Ghana and Uganda

Ag-aid channel (project type aid) ¹		Ghana		Ag-aid channel (project type aid)		Uganda	
		Value ²	% ³			Value	%
10000	State channel	412.2	46.8	10000	State channel	260.5	28.7
20000	Non-state channel	265.8	30.2	20000	Non-state channel	309.2	34.1
30000		1.8	0.2	30000		2.8	0.3
40000		11	1.3	40000		14.4	1.6
50000		39.5	4.5	50000		42.4	4.7
60000		72.5	8.2	60000		196.3	21.7
90000		77.6	8.8	90000		81.3	9

1) 10000: public sector institutions, 20000: non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society, 30000: public-private partnerships and networks, 40000: multilateral organisations, 50000: university, college or other teaching institution, research institute or think tank, 60000: private sector institution, 90000: other
 2) constant prices in 2021 USD million
 3) % share of project-type agricultural aid total



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