TRADE POLICIES AND THEIR EFFECT ON FARMING:

A VIEW FROM AFRICA

BY

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PREAMBLE

When I accepted to present a paper on this subject at the Conference, little did I know that I could lose my freedom for no just cause, a risk which most leaders in non-democratic developing world run. However, I am happy that this paper will be presented by a professional for whom I have tremendous regards and who shares my views substiantially.

INTRODUCTION

The agricultural sector is an important sector in the economic development of the Less Developed Countries (LDC's). The Sub- Saharan African (SSA) countries are no exception. The sector plays major roles in the economic development of most LDCs through contribution to Gross Domestic Product (GDP); employment of high proportion of the labour force; earning of foreign exchange; provision of food for the citizens and raw materials for the industries.

In the SSA , the average agricultural contribution to the GDP ranged between 20 and 37 percent between 1983 and 1992 (table 1). For some countries, the contribution was much higher. Thus for Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, Mali , and Burkina-Faso agriculture's share of the GDP are 55, 44, 58 and 44 per cent respectively in 1980 and 55, 63 , 51, 44 and 44 per cent in 1991. Agriculture grew by a lower rate than total GDP from 1985. The rate of population growth increase was also higher than that of agricultural production, warranting therefore the importation of cereals to meet food need.

With respect to exports, table 2 shows the values of export in 1992 as a percentage of the GDP, and annual average growth rate for the periods 1970 to 1980, and 1980 - 1992; and for the years 1987/88 to 1991/92. The percentage shares of export in 1992 for shown countries range between the lowest of 1 percent for Sudan to the highest of 24 percent for Zambia. Average for all is 12.1 percent.

For the countries in table 2, no trend is observable. Whereas some high growth rates are shown in some years by certain countries, like Burkina-Faso in 1989/90; Burundi, in 1987/88; Chad, 1989/90; Malawi, 1989/90; Gambia 1991/92 to mention only a few, some strong negative movements are also shown by some of the countries. Such countries are:

Burundi, 1991/92; Gambia 1988/89 ; Zaire 1989/90. We could thus conclude that the level of export of most of the countries comprises a small proportion of their respective GDP, except perhaps for Malawi and Zambia where 22 and 24 percent of GDP are contributed by exports. Petroleum exporting countries like Nigeria and Gabon, as well as strong cash crops exporters like Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Ghana will likely show higher shares.

The unstable and low growth rate of export suggests that these countries could not have depended on agricultural export for financing their development aspirations. Table 3 shows similar data as table 2 with respect to imports. Generally the import levels are higher than exports in 1992. The exceptions are Uganda, Zambia, and Zaire, The figure for Nigeria is .09 in 1992.

Table 1: Some Basic Indicators- Sub-Saharan Africa (1983-1992)

GDP (billion $)	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
	180	184	198	168	151	164	171	180	164	270
Average Annual Growth Rate of GDP %	-1.5	-1.7	5.8	3.2	.1	2.5	3.5	2.7	2.4	1.8
Agric GDP %	32	37	34	34	30	31	32	32	31	20
Average Annual growth Rate of Agriculture	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.2	2.9	2.9	1.5	1.8	1.7
Cereals Import ('000 Metric tonnes)	4859	4849	10205	8730	7805	8214	7411	7838	40626	18512
Food Imports as % Share of Merchandise Trade	20	20	18	12	12	16	16	16	16	12

Source: World Bank: World Bank Report - various issues.

An undefined pattern of positive and negative growth are observed. Both imports and exports as measured by GDP contribution therefore may be said to have been unimportant contributors to the national development aspirations of the selected countries. The picture thus painted is that of a group of economies, most of which are small; whose trade volume as represented by export and import contribute little to GDP; that have agriculture growing by less than population growth rate and that have had to depend on food aid and food import to meet the food needs of their citizens.

The share of Africa in world agricultural trade was shown in table A1, while table A2 shows the share of agriculture in African International Trade.
Africa's share of world trade in agriculture is in the order of 5.6 per cent in 1970 and 3.5 per cent and 3.6 per cent in 1990. Not only is the share relatively low, it has been declining since 1970 (Table A1).

Table 2: Percent Export Share of GDP in 1992; Average Annual Growth Rate of Export 1970-1980; 1980-1992; 1987-1992

	Export Share of GDP %	Average Growth Rate (%) of Export						
Country/year	1992	1970-1980	1980-1992	1987-1988	1988-1989	1989-1990	1990-1991	1991-1992
Burkina-Faso	5	8.4	7.4	-8.4	-33.1	43.2	3.7	2.8
Burundi	8	17.2	.2	47.8	-41.4	-3.8.	21.3	-34.1
Chad	15	14	9.7	27	9.9	48.4	-15.7	
Gambia	11	11.9	3.6	50	-55	51.9	4.9	86
Malawi	22	16.4	3.9	2.2	-6	56.6	13.2	-20.5
Mali	14	21.1	8	39.1	8.8	24.7	4.7	1.7
Nigeria	205	41.32	35.95	12.41	99.37	90.03	10.24	71.37
Sudan	1	7	-.1	1	32	-18.2	-1.8	5.6
Togo	18	21.1	2.6	-.8	1.2	14.3	3.6	3.4
Tanzania	10	7.5	-5	-4.6	38.7	-11.3	-7.6	-8.5
Uganda	7	4.6	-5.9	14.1	-8.8	-39.2	32.2	-20.4
Zambia	24	3.5	0.4	34.9	14.3	-33.3	2.3	19.6
Zaire	10	6.2	-1.8	14.2	12.7	-20	-16.7	-39.9
All Developing Countries	27	25.9	3.9	13.3	13	13.1	5.3	8.2

Source: UNCTAD (1994), The LDC 1993-1994 Report.

Table 3 : Percent Import Share of GDP in 1992, and Average Rate of Growth of Import, 1970-1980; 1980-1992; 1987-1992

Country/Year	Import Share of GDP %	Average Growth Rate (%) of Import						
	1992	1970-1980	1980-1992	1987-1988	1988-1989	1989-1990	1990-1991	1991-1992
Burkina-Faso	16	21.8	3.2	12.7	-34.2	30.4	7.1	4.4
Burundi	21	22.4	2.7	0	-8.7	25.5	5.1	-7.3
Chad	40	7.5	18.7	14.5	3.8	10.3	8.3	9.63
Zambia	57	25.5	5.8	10.7	19.3	20.5	14.4	12.6
Malawi	32	17.1	6.3	37.2	24.2	12.8	23.	-/.9
Mali	25	23.3	5.3	37.2	-5.2	20.0	1.7	4.9
Nigeria	143	40.22	36.19	19.55	44.39	47.90	95.86	60
Sudan	3	19.2	-2.3	14.1	14.2	-33.9	62.5	2.3
Togo	34	26.9	3.5	14.9	-3.1	27.1	-8.3	5.5
Tanzania	37	14.2	-1.1	-11	24	-30.1	-67.6	-1.7
Uganda	6	2.9	-4.3	-2	28.3	-24.9	-32.8	-44.2
Zambia	21	.9	.9	2	10.1	-4.4	-19.5	27.1
Zaire	8	5.6	-2.3	13.5	-7.2	-59.6	-35.6	-20.1
All Dev Countries	28	23.8	5.1	19.6	11.3	14.9	9.7	10.3

Source: UNCTAD (1994) The LDC 1993-94 Report

ELEMENTS OF TRADE POLICIES

Trade between nations should bring benefits to the participating nations. For developing countries it should be an "engine of growth" driving all other activities towards desirable economic improvement. International trade enables each country to specialise in the production of goods for which it has the lowest opportunity cost. In other words, each country would produce and export goods for which it has the greatest comparative advantage, and import goods for which it has the lowest advantage. If all things are equal and everything work well, all participating nations would be better off.

Specifically, international exchange makes available to buyers goods that would otherwise not be available, or which would be available at only very high costs. Such goods would include for instance tropical goods for temperate country consumers and vice- versa. Also as trade encourages specialisation, the principle of comparative advantage ensures that prices for the commodities would be lower than without trade. The purchasing power of the consumers would thus be higher. In addition to these benefits, consumers in each country would have a more divers and larger bundle of goods to choose from, as every good produced in every country would be available to them to purchase.

For the benefits of trade to hold however, a number of conditions need to be satisfied. Key among these are that: resources be fully in use; there be smooth and quick adjustment of resources to changing conditions within and across international borders. The reality of international trade however is that goods do not flow so freely across international boundaries particularly agricultural goods from developing countries into developed countries.

For political, economic, strategic and other reasons, nations restrict the flow of goods and services through their borders. Resources do not also adjust so easily to changes both within and across international borders. With particular respect to most African countries, colonialism had meant too, that they developed a pattern of trade which encouraged the production of raw materials for export to the colonising nations, while importing manufactured goods, quite oblivious of the direction of comparative advantages.

Be that as it may, nations commonly restrict trade across their borders. Most would rather export than import. The reasons for this restrictive situation are well known and include: protection of new industries and national health and security. Others are protection of the country from balance of payment problems from unfair trade practices of other nations and from painful economic adjustments.

The tendency towards protection is more frequent in agricultural trade. It is common practice for nations to pursue protective policies in agriculture because of their objectives of achievement of cheap food policy for the urban population, protection of rural farm income and achievement of self-reliance if not self-sufficiency in food. In other words, enhancement of national food security. Promotion of agro-industrial manufacturing is another major reason.

Trade protection is the rule rather than the exception, both in the developed and developing countries. In the European Community, agricultural trade policies since 1960's had aimed at the objectives of raising farm productivity, ensuring fair standard of living for the agricultural community; stabilization of market; provision of food security and ensuring of reasonable prices for the consumers. Pursuit of these objectives through a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) have been through variable levies on agricultural imports, which effectively protects domestic prices above world prices; official purchases; export subsidies and domestic production quotas for sugar and dairy. The outcome of all the protective actions is that the EEC countries have gone from being the major importers of agricultural commodities a few years ago to becoming major suppliers - even of commodities that could be more cheaply procured abroad.

In the United States, restrictive policies have a long history. Grains and oil seeds are supported by operations of the Commodity Credit Cooperation which provides concessional credit and sets the support price of farmers at which it would acquire these crops. An Export Enhancement Programme is also in place. This provides export subsidies for grains and oil seed. Dairy, sugar and beef production are protected by quota.

In Japan, the major objective of food policy is food security. Main instruments of protection have been control of imports by state trading enterprises, tariff and quotas (for beef).

Protective policies aimed at import restrictions do result in surplus production by inefficient farmers in the protecting country. These surpluses are thereafter dumped in the world market through various forms of export subsidies and support payments. The effect of such dumping is to distort international prices and so misdirect international resource allocation.

The institutional features of support policies differ greatly from country to country, but their principles are similar. Most involve primarily domestic measures, but these are almost always supplemented by trade actions. For example, domestic producer prices are raised by restriction of the supply entering the market through tariffs, import quotas and variable import levies as well as by domestic production controls. The cost of these measures are primarily borne by consumers and tax payers. The OECD estimates that the direct cost of the support policies of major agricultural producers was about $185 billion per year during 1984-1986. This is equivalent to almost 40% of the producers' income (Wingle, 1986).

Like other nations, the SSA countries have maintained a number of restrictive policies in trade that affect agriculture. These could be grouped into three major categories as: policies that affect export directly; policies that affect imports directly; policies that affect production, and thereby trade. A review of the trade policies of Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria highlights the major practices of trade policies. Among the policies that affect export are:

- export licensing and prohibition,
- tariffs, special charges and levies,
- export promotion including duties and tax concessions,
- cumbersome procedures for custom clearance as well as Central Bank regulations for and control of export proceeds.

The trade policies affecting imports are :

- registration and documentation procedures,
- tariffs and special import taxes,
- import prohibitions and licensing.

Other policies that affect production, trade and agriculture are macro-economic. These include exchange rate, money and fiscal policies; production subsidies and tax concessions. These policies may not be aimed directly at the agricultural sector, or indeed be deemed as trade policies. But they determine the terms of exchange in the economy, and the relative exchange rate. Hence they sometimes play the greater role in determining the direction of trade.

OVERALL EFFECTS OF TRADE POLICIES ON AGRICULTURE

I have summarised in the preceding section, measures which nations take to regulate trade, thereby deviating from free trade. The international trade regulating agencies(GATT; IMF), as well as the agencies granting assistance in development (e.g: the World Bank) frown at these measures and practices and believe, in fact, these to be the main cause of the deterioration in the economies of the LDCs. According to a view within the bank,

"...The African crisis started in the 1970s when internal policy mistakes and adverse external developments combined to produce the current (bad) situation."

The mistakes and development were in form of: rapid increase in public sector expenditure(including parastatals) without corresponding increase in public revenue; policy biases against agriculture; declining domestic savings coupled with ready availability in 1970s of concessionary and non-concessionary finance, most of which were supply-driven; over-valued exchange rates dampening the incentive for production for export (Mills, 1989).

As a result of worsened economic condition and pressure from the international community, developing countries of SSA have been forced to emplace economic recovery programmes. In Kenya the programme espoused in a government's 1986 sessional paper incorporated an agricultural adjustment programme whose main thrust was the liberalisation of pricing and marketing, as well as lower degree of Government intervention in production structure. The major policy direction in trade have been to liberalise through removal of import licensing; reduction of tariff and VAT on imports used for production for export; imposition of export duties on various raw materials export in order to encourage value added production (GATT, Kenya Trade Review). In Ghana, the core objectives of economic recovery programme were to: shift relative prices in favour of production, particularly for exports, and efficient import substitution industries; move progressively away from direct controls and intervention toward greater reliance on market forces: restore fiscal and monetary discipline: initiate the rehabilitation of the production base and social and economic reconstruction; and to encourage private savings and investment, largely through structural and institutional reforms to enhance economic efficiency (GATT, Review of Trade Policy for Ghana , 1992).

In Nigeria, the key elements of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) were market-determination of the exchange rate of the Naira.; liberalization of trade; commercialization and privatization of government enterprises.

The common element in all of these programmes are thus ; the liberalization of trade, removal of subsidies on production, and reduction of Government intervention in production. The measures presuppose that errors in domestic policies are responsible for the economic problems of the developing economies. Hence corrections are mostly to be carried out in the domestic economies. This belief has been used to justify the emphasis on unilateral trade liberalization, irrespective of the progress or otherwise being made at the multilateral and bilateral negotiations going on under GATT. Furthermore the LDCs that needed assistance from the World Bank, IMF, and other international donor agencies, have been pressurised to liberalize as a condition for receiving needed assistance, in spite of the reluctance of all developed countries to liberalize trade in primary commodities in which the LDCs have interest.

Questions have of course been raised on the logic and efficacy of the programme for recovery. African participants in a World Bank seminar have put it quite aptly:

> "...the Bank's diagnosis and emphasis on internal policy mistakes implies that a strong export promotion strategy based on comparative advantage is the only effective course of action. However, Africa's dependence on international trade is excessive, the economies are excessively sensitive to terms of trade movements because of the high ratio of import/export value of the GDP. They are characterized by heavy dependence on primary exports, import dependent production systems, externally oriented transport systems, heavy reliance on expatriate skills and fragmented domestic markets. These structural weaknesses do not date from the

1970s. They are the results of economic structures inherited from colonialism and perpetuated by decades of ill-advised economic policies" (Mills, 1989).

The implication is that a Structural Adjustment Programme that is linked to trade liberalization and that hinges the trade interest of African nations on export of primary commodities is not likely to succeed. This is particularly so because progress in reduction of trade barriers in agriculture by the developed world has been very slow and disappointingly little. Preferences offered for products of tropical origin are mere voluntary paliatives which are discriminatory, and have often been reprotected by quotas and restrictions. It is clear that the developed economies would continue to take restrictive trade policies for agriculture, ostensibly to protect their consumers, farmers and sensitive industries. Their markets will thus remain shielded for a long time from developing countries, who may have comparative advantage in the production of primary (especially tropical) agricultural commodities. Some economic advisors hold the view that unilateral liberalization is beneficial to the liberalizing country. While this view might be true from the economic point of view, there should be no doubt that it is a most difficult advise to sell, particularly for a small developing economy, politically. Farm lobbies are weak and mostly ineffective in Africa. But they exist, just as they do in the developed countries.

The elements of SAP in all countries embody trade and other policies that bear directly and indirectly on agriculture. These are not peculiar to SAP period but in some form predated SAP. Those that have been highlighted as affecting agriculture are: protective policy for industries, monetary and fiscal policies; some sector specific policies like taxes and subsidies. In the remaining parts of this presentation, I will elaborate on the manner in which these influence agriculture.

The Effect of Protective Industrial Policy on Agriculture

The place of agriculture in trade policy- making is closely related to the adoption in many developing countries of a development strategy which aims at promoting industrialization and feeding of the populace through a cheap food policy. Protection of industry is characterised by the maintenance of higher prices for industrial goods relative to the non-industrial commodities. The direct implication is that agriculture's productivity vis-a-vis the manufactured goods is reduced. The prices of industrial goods which are inputs of agricultural production are also increased, thereby further reducing the profitability of the agricultural sectors. Protection of the industrial sector is thus an implicit tax on agriculture. Table 4 shows the relative level of protection of the industrial and agricultural sector. Although the figures in the table are outdated, however, it is indicative of the effects of protective industrial policy on agriculture.

TABLE 4: Protection of Agriculture Compared with Manufacturing in Selected Developing Countries

Country/Period	Year	Relative Protection Ratio
Philippines	1974	0.76
Colombia	1978	0.49
Brazil	1980	0.65
Mexico	1980	0.88
Nigeria	1980	0.35
Egypt	1981	0.57
Peru	1981	0.68
Turkey	1981	0.77
Korea	1982	1.36
Ecuador	1983	0.65

World Bank: <u>World Development Report. 1986</u>

It indicates that with the exception of Korea, the industrial sectors of listed countries have largely been protected more than the agricultural sector. Nigeria, Colombia, and Egypt had especially high protection for the industrial sector(World Bank, 1986). Promotion of local sourcing of raw material is another fallout on the agricultural sector of industrial promotion strategy. Policies to supply raw materials aim at providing it at a cheap rate, and this often entails paying farmers lower market prices.

Apart from the above implicit taxes on agriculture, protective policies for the industries also affects agriculture through the real exchange rate (the ratio of prices of traded goods to the prices of non-traded goods). Industrial protection lowers the real exchange rate of traded agricultural commodities. This situation encourages a shift of resources from traded agricultural goods to the non-traded goods. As the resource shift takes place, rural wages rise increasing the cost of labour intensive farming. (World Bank, 1986). The tendency is thus for production of traded agricultural commodities to decline with a consequent loss of tax and foreign exchange revenue. Several studies have confirmed the effects of protection of industry on agricultural product prices compared with the prices of industrial and non-traded agricultural goods. In the Philippines during 1950-1980, heavy protection of industrial products had brought prices of agricultural exports down to 44 and 71 percent lower than manufactured product prices and 33 and 35 percent lower relative to the prices of non traded good. In Peru, a 10% increase in tariffs of non-agricultural importable was found to decrease the prices of traded agricultural goods by 10% relative to the prices of those importables and by 5.6 to 6.6 percent relative to the prices of non-tradable goods. Similar results have been obtained for many other countries including Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Nigeria and Zaire. (World Bank, 1986).

Effects of Monetary and Fiscal Policies

Policies on money supply, credit and public expenditures as well as foreign borrowing, investment and exchange rate regimes have indirect effects. Expansive monetary and fiscal policies have the tendencies to fuel domestic rates of inflations, relative to the international rates. If the currency is not realigned with foreign currencies to reflect the relative rates of domestic and foreign inflation, the domestic currency become effectively over-valued. Domestic produce is consequently more expensive with implication for trade. Agriculture suffers more as the industrial sector is usually the sector favoured by the protection.

During the 1970s, most LDCs pursued expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. These brought about a higher rate of inflation at home than abroad. The Countries showed strong reluctance to adjust to the real exchange rate to equalise domestic and foreign inflation rates. Instead, policies that increased protection of import through quotas, exchange controls and licensing were pursued. Usually policy makers tried to solve the created problem by increasing sectoral taxes on agricultural outputs, while reducing subsidies on input and other agricultural programmes.

Agricultural Sector-Specific Policies

A number of policies that are specific to agriculture also affect agriculture. Although construed to promote agricultural activities or to reduce the effect of adverse macro-policies, they may not be strong enough to reverse these effects, and do in fact sometimes worsen the situations they attempt to ameliorate. Some of these policies include trade duties, government tax and subsidies; and pricing policies of public sector marketing agencies.

Subsidies may be direct as per cases when government procures and supplies inputs to farmers at lower prices than procurement or implicit as measured by the difference between farm gate prices and adjusted border prices. Taxes and subsidies arise as a result of the difference between border prices of traded commodities and their adjusted farm gate prices, all valued at the official exchange rate. The commodity is taxed if the farm gate price is lower than the border price and is subsidised otherwise(World Bank, 1986). Public sector marketing agencies are major culprits in this mode of taxation.

Some taxation may be direct border export tax or quota, but is commonly through the pricing policy of marketing agencies in the public sector. These are often ways of revenue generation for the Government. They also have been used to encourage agro-industrial development through provision of cheap raw materials. The effect of low prices is to discourage agricultural production.

In pursuit of the objectives of self-sufficiency in food, many governments have protected producers of import substitutes. The policy objectives include the provision of cheap food for the urban population. In most cases however, the producers were paid lower prices than world prices. The tendency has been for the producers to find alternative more lucrative markets, with consequent loss of supply to the economy, and revenue when foreign exchange is spent on importing food from more expensive foreign sources.

Sectoral Policies and Real Exchange Rate

The real foreign exchange rate of a country determines the value of prices received by its producers. Since the 1970's the exchange rate of most developing countries have been overvalued. Over-valuation has the effect of reducing the real prices received by farmers even in situations of rising nominal prices. The governments were most reluctant to devalue their currencies. This is typical of most national policies, where devaluation is considered unacceptable and a reflection of lower national prestige. It has never been a popular adjustment measure, irrespective of what economic wisdom would suggest. Faced with falling prices , farmers respond by withdrawing resources from the production of tradable commodities.

TRADE POLICIES IN NIGERIA AND THEIR EFFECTS ON FARMING

The preceding sections have outlined the place of agriculture in development of the economies of the LDCs, the common trade policy measures, and their effects on farming. The Nigerian situation will now be used to illustrate the pattern of trade policies and to analyze its effects on agriculture. Between 1980 and 1995, Nigeria has gone through a period of extreme protection, then economic austerity measures, followed by World Bank/IMF sponsored Structural Adjustment Programme(SAP). For convenience in describing the development in trade policies, the period will be divided into three. That is: 1984-1986 (pre-SAP period); 1987-1992 (SAP period); 1993-1995 (post SAP period. Data for the post-SAP period is available for only 1993. This year will therefore stand for the entire post-SAP era!

Trade Policies During the Pre SAP Period (1984-1986)

The period 1980 to 1986 was a period during which Nigeria experienced varying annual balance in its foreign exchange reserves. Following the deficit during 1976 to 1979, a policy of import restriction was pursued in 1979. This policy achieved the immediate objective of foreign exchange surplus and moderation of excessive consumption. It also brought about some side effects of smuggling, and under-utilization of some productive capacity in the face of a high percentage of excess capacity existing in some proportion of domestic manufacturing plants. Hardship was imposed on producers and consumers alike in form of high prices, (CBN, Annual Report, 1980.) A change of government in the last quarter of 1979 also brought about a change of policies. A form of recession was witnessed in the economy following beginning around 1980 the petroleum oil glut which reduced foreign exchange earnings. Several measures to reverse the situation were attempted without adequate attention to ameliorate the economic situation.

General macro-economic measures included a relaxation of foreign exchange control; all previously banned imports were put on licensing instead; measures to enhance effective protection for local industries, encourage the greater use of local raw materials,generate more government revenue, curtail expenditure and maximize budgetary deficit. Also the number of foods that could be imported duty free was reduced.The major agriculture specific policy measure was the ban placed on the importation of rice.

From 1984 to 1986, the economic situation worsened. Low domestic output, inflation and unemployment intensified while foreign exchange earning decreased further. Retrenchment of workers in both the private and public sector became frequent. Management of the foreign sector continued to be a major problem. A number of crash programmes were implemented in the bid to solve the problems, including countertrade arrangement, issuance of import licenses that were not valid for foreign exchange ; ban on importation of rice and maize. Negotiations with export creditors for the refinancing of outstanding trade arrears owed to insured creditors produced little results as the creditors continued to insist that Nigeria accept an IMF-sponsored economic stabilization programme (CBN, Annual Report, 1986).

The key objective of trade policy then was to stimulate increased agricultural production, especially staple food items, and basic raw materials. The aim was to increase industrial production so as to reduce the high level of dependence on the external sectors, reduce the rate of price inflation to a tolerable level and to achieve a healthy balance of payment position. This was the period(1986) when the World Bank sponsored SAP was started.

The SAP Period (1987-1992)

The SAP was introduced late in 1986.It was to terminate in 1988, but the major instruments could be said to have continued till 1992. The major problems of the economy then were high inflation, rising interest rate, domestic supply shortages, limited employment opportunities, inadequate foreign exchange resources and large external debt burden. Policy objectives were to reduce inflation, reduce the pressure on the external sector and stabilise the exchange rate. Stimulation of private sector productive capacity was also a major objective. The objectives were pursued through the introduction of a market determined interest rate for the Naira. All exchange rate controls were abolished as well as the use of import licensing. Government adopted tight fiscal policies. Emphasis was placed on manufacturing for export. High effective protection for local industries was sought . Local sourcing of raw material inputs was promoted.

With respect to agriculture, the commodity marketing boards were disbanded. A ban was placed on the exportation of raw materials, especially hides and skins, and such other materials that could be used by the local industries. A ban was also placed on the exportation of the major staple foods of rice, cowpeas, and Sorghum.

This period was clearly dominated by a policy to promote industrial production for export while agriculture was constrained to production of raw materials for domestic industry and food for local consumption.

The Post SAP Period (1993-1995)

The post SAP period was marked mostly by the return to a fixed exchange rate policy for the Naira. The exchange rate was fixed even though an autonomous market exists at the same time. The economic environment was markedly jolted by political crisis and reduced foreign exchange earning even as international creditors were reluctant to reschedule Nigeria's debt for agriculture, the major change in policy was the lifting of the ban placed on Wheat importation in 1994, and rice importation in 1995. Government also announced a policy of withdrawal from importation of fertilizer. allowing the private sector to take over this function. This directly removes the subsidy on price of imported fertilizer. It is yet early to know the full effects of this policy.

THE EFFECTS OF TRADE POLICY ON AGRICULTURE IN NIGERIA

It is neither easy nor possible to isolate all the effects of all trade policy actions on agriculture. At best, we will identify the major ones and their main influences. The major instruments of policy in Nigeria have included both regular tariff barriers, as well as the non-tariff varieties, such as import licensing, import, as well as export restrictions. There have been a number of outright bans of commodity importation and exportation. During the period, the abolishing of the Marketing Board had paved the way for improved pricing of agricultural produce.

Macro-economic policies have been largely in terms of expansionary monetary and fiscal policy, but also through policies on foreign exchange control, as well as interest rate regulation. We will look at the changes caused by these policies on production, prices and trade of agricultural produce.

Effect of Trade Policies on Exports and Imports of Agricultural Commodities.

The share of major commodity groups in the merchandise trade of Nigeria are shown in table A2 - A3 in the appendix.

During the pre-SAP period when trade policy was characterised by relatively restrictive policy, involving tight foreign exchange control measures, import licensing, and ban on importation of rice and maize the share of agriculture of Nigeria's total import was 11% while for export it was 2.3%. During 1987-1992 period which we have characterised as the SAP period, agriculture's share of import was 8.3 percent (down from 11% in the previous period). The share for export was 3.5%. In 1993 the immediate post-SAP period, the value of import remained stable from previous period while export volume fell. The strict restrictive macro-economic policy including in particular a return to fixed exchange rate regime, and the political crisis during this period must have produced this result. In general, the import level remained unchanged during the period, except for the chemicals category. The rise in the chemicals category must be attributed to the industrial promotion during the period.

During the SAP period, agricultural export increased. In particular for the cash crops of Nigeria, which were responsible for much of the rise in non-petroleum export, this must be due to the freeing of the restriction in their export and the abolishing of the Commodity Marketing Boards. The influence of prices in this change is dominant as these are tree crops which respond with a lag of three to seven years. What happened however was an increased and more efficient exploitation of existing plantations. The twin effects of more liberal export and more realistic foreign exchange rate formation are in play here. The realistic pricing and export of the produce increased the income received by the farmers, and must have led to increased planting even though in some cases the world price of these commodities did not change much if at all.

The Effects of Trade Policies on Output and Prices of Agricultural Output

The effect of trade policies on the output and prices of traded and non-traded agricultural commodities are shown in tables A4 and A5 in the appendix.

Table A5 shows a remarkable increase in production for all traded commodities between the pre-SAP and the SAP periods, ranging from a 16% change for rubber to a 245% change for coffee. As mentioned above, the rise should be attributed to better exploitation of existing plantations, in response to improved pricing. The increases are sustained up to the post-SAP era, with rubber maintaining a higher rate of growth than others to justify the interpretation of better exploitation. Table A6 reflects the increased prices.

With respect to the non-traded commodities, these are largely annual crops. They could respond on a shorter time to improved environment as provided by their changed prices in table A6. All but sorghum have responded by increases. The case of sorghum is however better interpreted as a result of the competition between it, maize and millet. Much of the increases recorded in maize took place the same geographical areas where sorghum is produced. At a point when a ban was placed on the importation of maize, and when the exchange rate was deregulated, the resultant higher price of maize had to call for higher production. Farmers responded and shifted their resources from sorghum to maize, and to a less extent to millet.

The response of rice is even more remarkable. It rose from 212,000 metric tons in pre-SAP period to 3,400,000 metric tons in the post-SAP era. Through SAP period, Rice importation was banned and its price had soared by 65 per cent change, calling for a very high output in response to rising domestic demand.

Rice is easily a case in point against advocates of absolute free trade for a developing country. The production capacity for efficient production of rice exists in Nigeria. Lacking however were the resources - research, extension and input to encourage the farmers, who also lacked finances to compete with other highly subsidised world producers/ exporters. Government provided this by the little protection the farmers got, and the farmers responded positively. It is remarkable that the response of the farmers gave the Government the confidence to lift the ban placed on rice during the post-SAP era.

Cassava is another crop whose production rose as a result of the technical support provided by the Government. A cassava improvement programme which is supported by IFAD provides improved planting materials and technology to farmers. This has been largely responsible for the increases obtained for cassava.

It is to be noted that prices rose sharply between the pre-SAP and SAP periods. This is largely due to the deregulation of the foreign exchange policy. This deregulation brought about an increase in prices which is responsible for the increases in production and exploitation of plantations witnessed.

CONCLUSIONS

Agriculture is an important sector for a developing country. It plays major roles in providing raw materials for the industry and food for the citizens. It employs a sizable part of the labour force. It is also a source of foreign exchange. Its contribution to the GDP of the developing African country is substantial, ranging between 20 and 37 percent for most African countries.

The share of Africa in world trade is quite small and comprises mostly trades in primary commodity. It lies between 5.6% in 1970 and 3.6% in 1991 (Table A1). The restrictive international trade policies of the developed world and their expansive production in policies at home presents an unfair environment for the developing countries to exploit production for export of primary commodities, for which they may have comparative advantage.

It has been noted that all countries protect their trade in agriculture. The use of tariffs quotas and licensing are common in most countries. But the developed countries' support of their domestic production is at the levels where the farmers seem to be making more, mostly for not producing than for producing. The cost of such protection, borne largely by consumers and tax payers seem prohibitive. The LDCS can in no way provide countervailing measure to such policies.

Agriculture is further discriminated against by the policies of countries which try to promote industrialization. Such promotion may be either by import restrictions on substitutes, or by provision of cheap raw materials and food for the labour force. The consequent result of these policies for domestic producers is to withdraw resources from production.

Macro-economic policies, especially foreign exchange control, monetary and fiscal policies also affect agriculture. Although not directly trade policies, they play effective roles in trade through the effects they have in terms of trade. Because of the habitual preferences to promote industrial manufactures, agriculture tends to be the unfavoured sector when Governments embark on policies of expansive monetary and fiscal policies.

In Nigeria, agricultural export is a small part of international trade in 1984 to 1993. The economy is dominated by petroleum oil. The share of the agricultural sector in import and export are largely affected by the policies in place at the time. It would appear that policies on foreign exchange control have influenced prices and agricultural production more. When trade restriction on commodities for which productive capacity exists were lifted, the export of such goods if they were tradable like cocoa, palm kernel palm oil e.t.c increased. For non-traded goods, which were largely annual crops, the prices and outputs also responded with increases. Trade policies clearly determined production of both agricultural and non agricultural commodities. But it should be emphasized however that they are reinforced by macro-economic policies, as well as sectoral policies that protect one sector relative to the other.

It has been suggested that developing countries should liberalize their agricultural trade, inspite of the reluctance of the developed economies to do so. This is because of the demonstrable theory that liberalization <u>per se</u> pays. In a situation however, where developed countries not only shield their markets, but encourage surplus production and dumping of produce in the world market, this option will be hard to sell to any developing economy.

One hopes that GATT succeeded by (WTO) would continue its effort to encourage multilateral trade liberalization by all nations. The most recent Uruguay round of trade negotiations achieved the placing of agriculture at the negotiating table. But its outcome has fallen short of expectations of most developing nations. Certainly, African developing nations cannot in the short- and medium-term claim to have got a good deal for their agricultural produce and development.

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TABLE A1: WORLD AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY TRADE BY MAJOR REGIONS (BILLION $) 1970-1991

A: World Export of All Agricultural Commodities 1970-1991 (billion $).

year	1970	1975	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
World total	62.41	144.77	252.7	249.57	262.72	250	278.95	308.9	360.17	378.65	405.13	406.61
North America	12.28	32.4	57.66	57.7	60.45	49.98	48.75	57.11	71.78	76.14	78.25	76.48
Europe(EEC)	17.03	44.24	82.07	79.73	82.17	83.64	103.71	124.43	136.12	143.74	165.38	170.97
Latin America	8.39	18.43	30.99	32.46	35.21	34.11	35.14	32.85	37.4	37.78	40.85	38.64
Africa	5.17	8.44	10.69	10.29	11.57	13	12.3	12.33	11.54	11.95	13.16	12.9
Asia	6.64	14.52	29.65	30.03	33.05	30.11	33.25	38.31	45.14	47.62	46.99	50.67
Soc Asia	2.41	5.7	7.76	7.84	8.24	8.99	10.68	11.7	13.99	14.16	13.74	13.95
E Europe	3.44	7.06	9.18	8.98	9	9	10.02	11.08	12.05	11.97	11.77	9.26

B: World Imports of Agricultural Commodities by Regions (billion$)

year	1970	1975	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
World total	69.82	164.1	286	278.64	292.02	283.38	310.7	352.76	397.43	418.72	447.15	446.55
North America	10.5	18.56	31.11	32.55	37.53	37.8	40.48	42.34	44	46.09	47.97	47.6
Europe(EEC)	32.89	72.02	115.54	110.49	110.76	113.77	138.68	164.15	180.17	181.97	209.09	215.8
Latin America	2.73	7.44	13.16	12.26	12.73	11.42	11.69	11.33	13.17	14.96	16.14	16.41
Africa	2.19	8.14	16.35	15.85	16.01	15.87	14.74	13.86	15.61	18.02	17.71	17.17
Asia	5.76	17.89	38.97	39.11	43.03	38.23	36.55	42.54	50.71	56.31	58.11	59.33
Soc Asia	6.69	18.6	31.76	30.6	31.36	29.47	27.14	27.95	31.05	32.43	30.59	22.29
E Europe	1.01	2.09	6.39	5.12	4.24	3.61	4.16	5.65	7.69	8.62	7.1	7.17

C: World Agricultural Trade,1970-1992(billion $)

year	1970		1982		1984		1986		1988		1990	
	$	Share of total		Share of total		Share of total		Share of total		Share of total		Share of to
World total	132.23	100	538.7	100	554.74	100	589.65	100	757.6	100	852.28	100
North America	22.78	17.23	88.77	16.48	97.98	17.66	89.23	15.13	115.78	15.28	126.22	14.81
Europe(EEC)	49.92	37.75	197.61	36.68	192.93	34.78	242.39	41.11	316.29	41.75	374.47	43.94
Latin America	11.12	8.41	44.15	8.20	47.94	8.64	46.83	7.94	50.57	6.68	56.99	6.69
Africa	7.36	5.57	27.04	5.02	27.58	4.97	27.04	4.59	27.15	3.58	30.87	3.62
Asia	12.4	9.38	68.62	12.74	76.08	13.71	69.8	11.84	95.85	12.65	105.1	12.33
Soc Asia	9.1	6.88	39.52	7.34	39.6	7.14	37.82	6.41	45.04	5.95	44.33	5.20
E Europe	4.45	3.37	15.57	2.89	13.24	2.39	14.18	2.40	19.74	2.61	18.87	2.21

Source: UNCTAD, Trade Year Book, (several issues)

TABLE A:2 : NIGERIA-MAJOR IMPORTS

MAJOR IMPORTS OF NIGERIA 1984-1993(Billion$)

A

Category/Year	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Food and live animal	1.052	0.686	0.534	1.874	1.694	2.006	3.763	7.79	11.74	13.91
Beverages and tobacco	0.007	0.006	0.013	0.03	0.085	0.154	0.181	0.179	0.286	0.497
Crude materials	0.143	0.185	0.159	0.8	0.579	0.895	1.587	2.15	3.58	4.306
Mineral fuels	0.111	0.1	0.036	0.077	0.214	0.216	0.317	0.447	0.715	0.828
Animal and vegetable oils and fat	0.085	0.08	0.199	0.066	0.064	0.092	0.136	0.717	1	1.325
Chemicals	0.852	0.1454	0.721	3.02	4.25	6.666	9.148	15.302	25.91	28.32
Manufactured goods	1.242	1.67	1.054	4.483	4.95	6.357	10.062	21.03	32.93	39.75
Machinery andTransport	3.257	3.44	2.519	6.83	8.6	13.208	18.62	37.67	59.84	70.23
Miscellaneous manufactured articles	0.418	0.234	0.234	0.68	0.97	1.256	1.859	4.117	7.01	6.29
Unclasified transactions	0.011	0.013	0.001	0.005	0.021	0.009	0.045	0.089	0.143	0.165
Total	7.178	7.931	5.47	17.861	21.45	30.86	45.72	89.49	143.15	165.63

B. SHARE OF TOTAL IMPORT %

Category/Year	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Food and live animal	14.656	8.650	9.762	10.492	7.897	6.500	8.231	8.705	8.201	8.398
Beverages and tobacc	0.098	0.076	0.238	0.168	0.396	0.499	0.396	0.200	0.200	0.300
Crude materials	1.992	2.333	2.907	4.479	2.699	2.900	3.471	2.403	2.501	2.600
Mineral fuels	1.546	1.261	0.658	0.431	0.998	0.700	0.693	0.499	0.499	0.500
Animal and vegetable oils and fat	1.184	1.009	3.638	0.370	0.298	0.298	0.297	0.801	0.699	0.800
Chemicals	11.870	1.833	13.181	16.908	19.814	21.601	20.009	17.099	18.100	17.098
Manufactured goods	17.303	21.057	19.269	25.099	23.077	20.599	22.008	23.500	23.004	23.999
Machinery andTransport	45.375	43.374	46.051	38.240	40.093	42.800	40.726	42.094	41.802	42.402
Miscellaneous manufactured articles	5.823	2.950	4.278	3.807	4.522	4.070	4.066	4.601	4.897	3.798
Unclasified transactions	0.153	0.164	0.018	0.028	0.098	0.029	0.098	0.099	0.100	0.100

Average Share of Imports By Economic Period(%)

Category/Year	Pre-SAP 1984-1986	SAP 1987-1992	POST- SAP 1993
Food and live animal	11.023	8.33775	8.398
Beverages and tobacc	0.137	0.310	0.300
Crude materials	2.411	3.076	2.600
Mineral fuels	1.155	0.637	0.500
Animal and vegetable oils and fat	1.944	0.461	0.800
Chemicals	8.961	18.922	17.098
Manufactured goods	19.209	22.881	23.999
Machinery andTransport	44.933	40.959	42.402
Miscellaneous manufactured articles	4.351	4.327	3.798
Unclasified transactions	0.112	0.075	0.100

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, ANNUAL REPORT(Several issues).

TABLE A3: NIGERIA_ MAJOR EXPORTS

A.

MAJOR EXPORTS OF NIGERA 1984-1993 (BILLION$)

Commodity/Year	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1990	1992	1993
Major Agricultural	0.208	0.259	0.199	1.589	1.794	2.131	2.429	3.425	3.051	3.437
Mineral products	8.845	10.891	8.273	28.207	28.435	55.017	106.627	116.857	201.385	213.979
Manufactures and semi manufactures of Agric Products	0.039	0.065	0.042	0.061	0.096	0.148	0.224	0.197	0.219	0.377
Tin metal				0.03	0.0087	0.007	0.0025	0.006	0.038	0.022
Other Manufactured exports						0.107	0.325	0.582	0.435	0.184
Other exports	0	0	0	0.474	0.8593	0.561	0.2785	0.467	0.485	0.766
Total	9.088	11.215	8.514	30.361	31.193	57.971	109.886	121.534	205.613	218.765

B SHARE OF TOTAL

Commodity/Year										
Major Agricultural	2.289	2.309	2.337	5.234	5.751	3.676	2.210	2.818	1.484	1.571
Mineral products	97.326	97.111	97.169	92.905	91.158	94.904	97.034	96.152	97.944	97.812
Manufactures and semi manufactures of Agric Products	0.429	0.580	0.493	0.201	0.308	0.255	0.204	0.162	0.107	0.172
Tin metal	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.099	0.028	0.012	0.002	0.005	0.018	0.010
Otheer Manufactured exports	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.185	0.296	0.479	0.212	0.084
Other exports	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.561	2.755	0.968	0.253	0.384	0.236	0.350
All	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Average Shares of Total Export
By Economic Period

Commodity/Year	Pre-SAP 1984-86	SAP 1987-92	Post-SAP 1993
Major Agricultural	2.312	3.529	1.57
Mineral products	97.202	95.016	97.81
Manufactures and semi manufactures of Agric Products	0.501	0.206	0.172
Tin metal	na	0.027	0.001
Other Manufactured exports	na	0.195	0.084
Other exports	na	1.026	0.35
All	100.000	100.000	100

Source:Central Bank of Nigeria, ANNUAL REPORT (several issues)

TableA4 : Prices of Major Tradable Commodities1984-93 (=N=/Ton)

Crop/yr	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Cocoa	1500	1600	3500	7500	11000	10100	8500	10158	12745	25278
Palm oil	600	600	1000	1200	1500	1301	1160	na	12472	20836
Palm Kernel	400	400	400	850	1000	1800	2000	2525	5692	10567
Rubber	750	750	1200	1000	1560	2000	1395	5300	12520	16290
Coffee	1405	1450	4000	5500	6000	7464	6589	8750	na	na
Groundnut	650	750	1000	2075	2250	4795	4320	6280	6843	9500
Cotton seed	700	850	1000	4000	4500	2433	2600	4163	3778	na

Crop/yr	Pre-SAP 1984-86 Y(1)	SAP 1987-92 Y(2)	Post-SAP 1993 Y(3)	Change Y(1)-(2)	Change Y(2)-(3)
Cocoa	2200	7876.33	25278	72.07	68.84
Palm oil	733.33	860.17	20836	14.75	95.87
Palm Kernel	400	1362.5	10567	70.64	87.11
Rubber	900	1875.83	16290	52.02	88.48
Coffee	2285	6860.6	na	66.69	na
Groundnut	800	3286.67	9500	75.66	65.40
Cotton seed	850	2949.33	na	71.18	na

B : Average Retail Prices of Some Non Tradable Crops(=N=/tonnes)

Crop/Yr	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Maize	973	795	714	838	1520	2735	2061	3318	5514	6606
Millet	930	829	576	595	1621	2096	1707	2365	5672	8674
Sorghum	792	837	635	615	1611	2017	1703	3648	6678	6606
Rice	1996	2447	2376	2358	3787	6322	6300	7544	12606	18184
Cowpeas	2170	1992	2079	2382	3737	5420	5632	7915	9709	17157
Cassava	1282	806	663	800	1793	2686	2479	2860	4432	10283
Yam	963	896	1045	855	1831	2430	2301		5942	10404

Crop/Yr	Pre-SAP 1984-1986 Y(1)	SAP 1987-1992 Y(2)	Post-SAP 1993 Y(3)	% Change Y(1)-Y(2)	Change (2)-(3)
Maize	827.33	2664.33	6606	68.95	147.94
Millet	778.33	2342.67	8674	66.78	270.26
Sorghum	754.67	2712.00	6606	72.17	143.58
Rice	2273.00	6486.17	18184	64.96	180.35
Cowpeas	2080.33	5799.17	17157	64.13	195.85
Cassava	917.00	2508.33	10283	63.44	309.95
Yam	968.00	2226.50	10404	56.52	367.28

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria' Annual Report'. (several issues)

TableA5 : Output of Major Non-Tradable Crops In Nigeria('000 tonnes) (1984-1993)

A

Crops/Yrs	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Maize	2058	1190	1336	4612	5268	5008	5768	5810	5578	6852
Millet	3349	3684	4111	3905	3720	5006	5768	5810	6346	6852
Sorghum	4608	4991	5455	5182	3298	4770	5136	4109	4234	4380
Rice	157	196	283	808	2081	3303	2500	3185	3500	3400
Cowpeas	477	611	732	688	1263	1232	1354	1352	1411	1421
Cassava	11800	13500	12288	13876	15540	17404	19043	20339	21437	22316
Yam	4600	4738	5209	4886	9132	9378	9887	16956	19305	23166

	Pre- SAP	SAP	Post- SAP	Change(1)-(2)	Change(2)-(3)
	'(1)	'(-2)	'(3)		
Crops/Yrs	1984-1986	1987-1992	1993		
Maize	1528	5340.67	6852	249.52	28.30
Millet	3714.67	5092.5	6852	37.09	34.55
Sorghum	5018	4454.83	4380	-11.22	-1.68
Rice	212	2562.83	3400	1108.88	32.67
Cowpeas	606.67	1216.67	1421	100.55	16.79
Cassava	12529.33	17939.83	22316	43.18	24.39
Yam	4849	11590.67	23166	139.03	99.87

Source: Computed from Central Bank of Nigeria 'Annual Report...'(various issues)

TABLE A5-B : OUTPUT OF SOME TRADABLE COMMODITIES('000 tonnes)

Crops/Yrs	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Cocoa	150	160	100	105	230	256	244	268	292	306
Palm oil	550	615	650	715	700	770	730	760	792	825
Palm Kernel	340	360	350	353	545	939	1190	1203	1321	1450
Rubber	58	226	190	180	211	132	147	215	220	225
Coffee	4	0	6	6	10	12	12	14	15	16
Groundnut	591	621	896	687	1086	1017	1166	1361	1297	1325
Cotton seed	108	114	30	32	194	187	276	309	346	378

Average Output of Tradables

Crop/yr.	PRE_ SAP 1984-1986	SAP 1987-1992	POST- SAP 1993	Change(1)-(2)	Change(2)-(3)
Cocoa	136.67	232.50	306.00	70.32	31.61
Palm oil	605.00	744.50	825.00	23.06	10.67
Palm Kernel	350.00	925.17	1450.00	164.29	56.73
Rubber	158.00	184.17	225.00	16.57	22.17
Coffee	3.33	11.50	16.00	245.34	39.13
Groundnut	702.67	1102.33	1325.00	56.88	20.2
Cotton seed	84.00	224.00	378.00	166.7	68.75

Source: Computed from Central Bank of Nigeria 'Annual Report...'(various issues)