@article{Caleman:341570,
      recid = {341570},
      author = {Caleman, Silvia Morales de Queiroz  and Zylbersztajn,  Decio },
      title = {Falta de Garantias e Falhas de Coordenação: evidências do  sistema agroindustrial da carne bovina},
      journal = {Revista de Economia e Sociologia Rural (RESR)},
      address = {2012-01},
      number = {2541-2024-1836},
      year = {2012},
      abstract = {The role of formal and informal institutions in the  economy of organizations is traditionally analyzed in terms  of efficient governance mechanisms which minimize  transaction costs. Based on a different perspective, this  paper focuses on coordination failures and the problem of  lack of guarantees in sequential transactions. In  particular, this research examines a bundle of guarantees  which supports the transaction between producers and the  meatpacking industry in the Mato Grosso do Sul state  regarding the inefficiencies in the trading of  ready-to-slaughter animals. A theoretical model based on  Barzel (1997) involving property rights, guarantees and  institutions is proposed for the understanding of  coordination failures. This model is empirically tested  with two multiple logistic regressions: i) an ordered logit  model based on the producer’s risk perception and ii) a  recursive bivariate probit model based on producer’s risk  perception and on the role of collective action. The  findings suggest that formal institutions and collective  actions play a relevant role in providing guarantees and,  thus, representing a source of transaction costs  minimization.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/341570},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.341570},
}