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# Unlocking the Trade Facilitation Agreement: Implementation Challenges, GVC Integration, and Implications for Future WTO Negotiations

Sandro Steinbach and Carlos Zurita

Selected presentation for the International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium's (IATRC's) 2023 Annual Meeting: The Future of (Ag-) Trade and Trade Governance in Times of Economic Sanctions and Declining Multilateralism, December 10-12, 2023, Clearwater Beach, FL.

Copyright 2023 by Sandro Steinbach and Carlos Zurita. All rights reserved. Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for noncommercial purposes by any means, provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies. Unlocking the Trade Facilitation Agreement: Implementation Challenges, GVC Integration, and Implications for Future WTO Negotiations

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North Dakota State University Center for Agricultural Policy and Trade Studies

> IATRC 2023 Annual Meeting December 10-12, 2023 Clearwater Beach, FL



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- Results also suggest that out of the 12 Articles in Section I of the TFA, only three articles enhance agri-food GVC flows.

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- Gravity regression results suggest that at **lower levels** of common TFA implementation between country pairs, there are neutral (or positive) relationships, but **these relationships turns negative at higher levels.**
- Results also suggest that out of the 12 Articles in Section I of the TFA, only three articles enhance agri-food GVC flows.
- We estimate that achieving full TFA implementation may take at least another 11 years, roughly equivalent to the duration of its negotiation.

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- This is **relevant to agri-food GVCs**, where goods often traverse multiple borders (Balié et al. 2019; Greenville, Kawasaki, and Beaujeu 2017; OECD 2018)
- The TFA introduces an "à la carte" approach, allowing developing countries to make commitments based on their capabilities.

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- Developing countries categorize provisions as A, B, or C. In the last two categories, they may request time or assistance for implementation.
- Countries provide implementation dates for provisions but may request extensions, introducing uncertainties to the implementation timelines.

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- If the TFA has positive effects on GVC flows, when could its full implementation be crystallized?

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- We disaggregate TFA implementation levels by quartiles, and by Article.



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- Large body of literature using the OECD's Trade Facilitation Indicators (TFI) and the UN Global Survey on TF.

Citations

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
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- To analyze implementation rates, we use **country characteristics**, such as income, obtained from USITC's Dynamic Gravity Dataset (DGD).



#### Evolution of Notified TFA Implementation



Developed Countries - - Developing Countries - - All Countries

Note. The figure shows the evolution of the notified TFA implementation. We have a total of 163 countries, 40 of which are developed and have full implementation.

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- We aggregate into 3 sectors: **agriculture**, **food & beverages** and **all sectors**.
- We have bilateral GVC flows covering 189 countries and three sectors, from 2000 to 2021.

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- The gap to full implementation  $(M_{Max} M_t)$  as a proportion of  $M_t$  evolves according to

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- Our goal is to **estimate** r.
- The model is limited.

• We specify the following **OLS regression**:

$$\ln\left(\frac{M_{Max} - M_{it}}{M_{it}}\right) = \beta_0 - rt + \lambda \ln\left(\frac{M_{Max} - M_{i0}}{M_{i0}}\right) + \gamma(X_i * t) + \beta X_i + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

*i* refers to country member, and  $t \ge 0$  is the year of observation (2017 to 2021).

- $X_i$  is a vector of **country characteristics** such as the log of per capita GDP  $(GDP_{pc})$ , per capita aid received to support trade facilitation  $(AFT_{pc,i})$ , or one of the GVC flows  $(FVA_i, DVX_i, GIE_i)$ .
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- We also estimate (2) using **PPML and fixed effects (FE) Panel Regression**.

# TFA implementation rate - Summary of Results

- The estimate of the implementation rate,  $\hat{r}$ , is between -0.181 and -0.385.
- At the average of 165 measures notified as implemented in 2021, these rates translate to **9 to 18 additional measures notified as implemented in 2022.**



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- At the average of 165 measures notified as implemented in 2021, these rates translate to **9 to 18 additional measures notified as implemented in 2022.**
- We find evidence suggesting that these rates **do not change with country characteristics or GVC flows.**
- For example, countries with higher incomes are not implementing measures faster.

Result Details

• Following Anderson and Wincoop (2003), we depict trade flows from exporter *i* to importer *j* in year *t* like:

$$X_{ijt} = \frac{Y_{it}E_{jt}}{Y_t} \left(\frac{\varphi_{ijt}}{\Pi_{it}P_{jt}}\right)^{1-\sigma}$$
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- $\Pi_{it}$  and  $P_{jt}$  are the multilateral resistance terms, and  $\sigma > 1$  is the elasticity of substitution.



We define bilateral trade costs by

$$\varphi_{ijt} = \exp\left(\beta_1 WTO_{ijt} + \beta_2 \mathbf{TFA}_{ijt} + \lambda_{ij}\right) \tag{4}$$

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 $WTO_{ijt}$  is an indicator that *i* and *j* are WTO members.  $\lambda_{ij}$  is a fixed-effect. **TFA**<sub>*ijt*</sub> is a vector that includes one of the following:

•  $Imp. TFA_{ijt}$ : the share of all 238 TFA provisions commonly notified as implemented by i and j at time t. It takes a value between 0 and 1.

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- *Imp. Art.*  $r_{ijt}$ : the share of **provisions in Article** r commonly notified as implemented by i and j at time t.
- $t_{TFA}$ : is the number of years since *i* and *j* had common TFA measures notified as implemented. We also interact  $t_{TFA}$  with  $Imp. TFA_{ijt}$ .

Following Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), we use **Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML)** to estimate

$$X_{ijt} = \exp\left(\alpha_0 + \alpha_1 WTO_{ijt} + \alpha_2 \mathbf{TFA}_{ijt} + \zeta_{it} + \eta_{jt} + \theta_{ij}\right) + \varepsilon_{ijt}.$$
 (5)

- $\alpha_0$ , is an intercept term.
- $\alpha_2 = (1 \sigma)\beta_2$  is the trade elasticity with respect to TFA<sub>*ijt*</sub>.
- $\zeta_{it} = -(1 \sigma) \ln(\Pi_{it}) + \ln(Y_{it})$  and  $\eta_{jt} = -(1 \sigma) \ln(P_{it}) + \ln(E_{jt})$  are exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects, respectively.
- $\theta_{ij} = (1 \sigma)\lambda_{ij}$  is a country-pair fixed effect that controls for several time-invariant unobservables.
- $\varepsilon_{ijt}$  is a mean-zero error term.

	Agriculture				Food		All					
	GIE	FVA	DVX	GIE	FVA	DVX	GIE	FVA	DVX			
Panel A: Share of commo	Panel A: Share of common implementation in levels											
WTO	0.242***	0.270***	0.406***	0.249***	0.321***	0.316***	0.340***	0.192***	0.195***			
	(0.059)	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.061)	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.051)	(0.040)	(0.040)			
Imp. TFA	-1.202***	-0.900***	-0.722***	-0.648***	-1.054***	-1.648***	-0.995***	-0.838***	-0.854***			
	(0.11)	(0.064)	(0.067)	(0.123)	(0.070)	(0.072)	(0.12)	(0.064)	(0.065)			
Observations	785,862	785,485	784,542	785,862	784,354	784,354	785,862	784,354	784,354			
$Pseudo-R^2$	0.9996	0.9992	0.9992	0.9993	0.9993	0.9990	0.9995	0.9992	0.9992			
Panel B: Share of commo	n implement	ation by usi	ng quartile i	ndicators								
WTO	0.244***	0.262***	0.411***	0.247***	0.324***	0.322***	0.307***	0.175***	0.178***			
	(0.060)	(0.035)	(0.043)	(0.060)	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.049)	(0.040)	(0.040)			
$0 < Imp.\ TFA < 0.25$	-0.104	0.029	-0.192*	-0.184	-0.232*	-0.0711	0.661***	0.252***	0.246***			
	(0.150)	(0.072)	(0.099)	(0.181)	(0.134)	(0.085)	(0.186)	(0.066)	(0.065)			
$0.25 \leq$ Imp. TFA $< 0.50$	-0.300*	-0.051	-0.169*	-0.155	-0.240*	-0.178*	0.513**	0.247***	0.246***			
	(0.157)	(0.083)	(0.097)	(0.199)	(0.134)	(0.092)	(0.202)	(0.086)	(0.089)			
$0.50 \leq$ Imp. TFA $< 0.75$	-0.599***	-0.299***	-0.094	-0.483***	-0.504***	-0.674***	0.122	0.083	0.072			
	(0.159)	(0.078)	(0.105)	(0.168)	(0.128)	(0.072)	(0.190)	(0.067)	(0.066)			
$0.75 \leq$ Imp. TFA $\leq 1$	-0.974***	-0.651***	-0.607***	-0.647***	-0.919***	-1.250***	-0.407**	-0.422***	-0.434***			
	(0.162)	(0.072)	(0.083)	(0.170)	(0.127)	(0.062)	(0.189)	(0.057)	(0.055)			
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$Pseudo-R^2$	0.9995	0.9992	0.9992	0.9993	0.9993	0.9990	0.9994	0.9992	0.9992			

Note: WTO is an indicator that both i and j are WTO members at time L. Imp. TFA represents the share of all TFA measures simultaneously implemented by i and j at time t. a  $\leq$  Imp. TFA. be represents indicator that Imp. TFA is between and b. All estimates are obtained in point settings with the PPML estimator, exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects, international border variables, as well as country-pair fixed effects. For presentation purposes, we omit the estimates of all fixed effects and the constraint. Standard errors clustered at the importer-exporter level in parentheses. \* p < 0.01, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01.

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Panel B: Share of commo	n implementa	ation by usin	g quartile ind	icators						
WTO	0.244***	0.262***	0.411***	0.247***	0.324***	0.322***	0.307***	0.175***	0.178***	
	(0.060)	(0.035)	(0.043)	(0.060)	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.049)	(0.040)	(0.040)	
0 < Imp. TFA < 0.25	-0.104	0.029	-0.192*	-0.184	-0.232*	-0.0711	0.661***	0.252***	0.246***	
	(0.150)	(0.072)	(0.099)	(0.181)	(0.134)	(0.085)	(0.186)	(0.066)	(0.065)	
$0.25 \leq$ Imp. TFA $< 0.50$	-0.300*	-0.051	-0.169*	-0.155	-0.240*	-0.178*	0.513**	0.247***	0.246***	
	(0.157)	(0.083)	(0.097)	(0.199)	(0.134)	(0.092)	(0.202)	(0.086)	(0.089)	
$0.50 \leq$ Imp. TFA $< 0.75$	-0.599***	-0.299***	-0.094	-0.483***	-0.504***	-0.674***	0.122	0.083	0.072	
	(0.159)	(0.078)	(0.105)	(0.168)	(0.128)	(0.072)	(0.190)	(0.067)	(0.066)	
$0.75 \leq Imp. TFA \leq 1$	-0.974***	-0.651***	-0.607***	-0.647***	-0.919***	-1.250***	-0.407**	-0.422***	-0.434***	
	(0.162)	(0.072)	(0.083)	(0.170)	(0.127)	(0.062)	(0.189)	(0.057)	(0.055)	
Observations	785,862	785,485	784,542	785,862	784,354	784,354	785,862	784,354	784,354	
$Pseudo-R^2$	0.9995	0.9992	0.9992	0.9993	0.9993	0.9990	0.9994	0.9992	0.9992	

Note: WTO is an indicator that both i and j are WTO members at time t. Imp. TFA represents the share of all TFA measures simultaneously implemented by i and j at time t. a  $\leq \text{imp. TFA} < b$  represents indicator that Imp. TFA is between a and b. All estimates are obtained in panel settings with the PPML estimator, exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects, international border variables, as well as country-pair fixed effects. For presentation purposes, we omit the estimates of all fixed effects and the constant. Standard errors clustered at the importer-exponent level in part effects. For proceedings - 0.01.

	Agriculture Food All												
	GIE	FVA	DVX	GIE	FVA	DVX	GIE	FVA	DVX				
Panel A: Share of common	Panel A: Share of common implementation in levels												
WTO	0.242***	0.270***	0.406***	0.249***	0.321***	0.316***	0.340***	0.192***	0.195***				
	(0.059)	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.061)	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.051)	(0.040)	(0.040)				
Imp. TFA	-1.202***	-0.900***	-0.722***	-0.648***	-1.054***	-1.648***	-0.995***	-0.838***	-0.854***				
	(0.11)	(0.064)	(0.067)	(0.123)	(0.070)	(0.072)	(0.12)	(0.064)	(0.065)				
Observations	785,862	785,485	784,542	785,862	784,354	784,354	785,862	784,354	784,354				
$Pseudo-R^2$	0.9996	0.9992	0.9992	0.9993	0.9993	0.9990	0.9995	0.9992	0.9992				
Panel B: Share of commo	n implemen	tation by u	sing quartil	e indicators									
WTO	0.244***	0.262***	0.411***	0.247***	0.324***	0.322***	0.307***	0.175***	0.178***				
	(0.060)	(0.035)	(0.043)	(0.060)	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.049)	(0.040)	(0.040)				
0 < Imp. TFA < 0.25	-0.104	0.029	-0.192*	-0.184	-0.232*	-0.0711	0.661***	0.252***	0.246***				
	(0.150)	(0.072)	(0.099)	(0.181)	(0.134)	(0.085)	(0.186)	(0.066)	(0.065)				
$0.25 \leq$ Imp. TFA $< 0.50$	-0.300*	-0.051	-0.169*	-0.155	-0.240*	-0.178*	0.513**	0.247***	0.246***				
	(0.157)	(0.083)	(0.097)	(0.199)	(0.134)	(0.092)	(0.202)	(0.086)	(0.089)				
$0.50 \leq Imp. TFA < 0.75$	-0.599***	-0.299***	-0.094	-0.483***	-0.504***	-0.674***	0.122	0.083	0.072				
	(0.159)	(0.078)	(0.105)	(0.168)	(0.128)	(0.072)	(0.190)	(0.067)	(0.066)				
$0.75 \leq Imp. TFA \leq 1$	-0.974***	-0.651***	-0.607***	-0.647***	-0.919***	-1.250***	-0.407**	-0.422***	-0.434***				
	(0.162)	(0.072)	(0.083)	(0.170)	(0.127)	(0.062)	(0.189)	(0.057)	(0.055)				
Observations	785,862	785,485	784,542	785,862	784,354	784,354	785,862	784,354	784,354				
$Pseudo-R^2$	0.9995	0.9992	0.9992	0.9993	0.9993	0.9990	0.9994	0.9992	0.9992				

Note: WTO is an indicator that both i and j are WTO members at time t. Imp. TFA represents the share of all TFA measures simultaneously implemented by it and j at time t.  $a \le Imp.$  TFA c bergessen indicator that Imp. TFA is between and b. All estimates are obtained in point estimation with the PPML estimator, exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects, international border variables, as well as country-pair fixed effects. For presentation purposes, we omit the estimates of all fixed effects and the constant. Standard errors clustered at the importer-exporter level in parentheses. \* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.01.

		Agriculture			Food		All					
	GIE	FVA	DVX	GIE	FVA	DVX	GIE	FVA	DVX			
Panel A: Share of common	implementati	on in levels										
WTO	0.242***	0.270***	0.406***	0.249***	0.321***	0.316***	0.340***	0.192***	0.195***			
	(0.059)	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.061)	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.051)	(0.040)	(0.040)			
Imp. TFA	-1.202***	-0.900***	-0.722***	-0.648***	-1.054***	-1.648***	-0.995***	-0.838***	-0.854***			
	(0.11)	(0.064)	(0.067)	(0.123)	(0.070)	(0.072)	(0.12)	(0.064)	(0.065)			
Observations	785,862	785,485	784,542	785,862	784,354	784,354	785,862	784,354	784,354			
$Pseudo-R^2$	0.9996	0.9992	0.9992	0.9993	0.9993	0.9990	0.9995	0.9992	0.9992			
Panel B: Share of commo	n implement	tation by usi	ng quartile	indicators								
WTO	0.244***	0.262***	0.411***	0.247***	0.324***	0.322***	0.307***	0.175***	0.178***			
	(0.060)	(0.035)	(0.043)	(0.060)	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.049)	(0.040)	(0.040)			
0 < Imp. TFA < 0.25	-0.104	0.029	-0.192*	-0.184	-0.232*	-0.0711	0.661***	0.252***	0.246***			
	(0.150)	(0.072)	(0.099)	(0.181)	(0.134)	(0.085)	(0.186)	(0.066)	(0.065)			
$0.25 \leq$ Imp. TFA $< 0.50$	-0.300*	-0.051	-0.169*	-0.155	-0.240*	-0.178*	0.513**	0.247***	0.246***			
	(0.157)	(0.083)	(0.097)	(0.199)	(0.134)	(0.092)	(0.202)	(0.086)	(0.089)			
$0.50 \leq \text{Imp. TFA} < 0.75$	-0.599***	-0.299***	-0.094	-0.483***	-0.504***	-0.674***	0.122	0.083	0.072			
	(0.159)	(0.078)	(0.105)	(0.168)	(0.128)	(0.072)	(0.190)	(0.067)	(0.066)			
$0.75 \leq Imp. TFA \leq 1$	-0.974***	-0.651***	-0.607***	-0.647***	-0.919***	-1.250***	-0.407**	-0.422***	-0.434***			
	(0.162)	(0.072)	(0.083)	(0.170)	(0.127)	(0.062)	(0.189)	(0.057)	(0.055)			
Observations	785,862	785,485	784,542	785,862	784,354	784,354	785,862	784,354	784,354			
$Pseudo-R^2$	0.9995	0.9992	0.9992	0.9993	0.9993	0.9990	0.9994	0.9992	0.9992			

Note: WTO is an indicator that both *i* and *j* are WTO members at time *t*. Imp. TFA represents the share of all TFA measures simultaneously implemented by *i* and *j* at time *t*. a  $\leq$  Imp. TFA < be represents indicator that Hmp. TFA is between a and b. All estimates are obtained in panel settings with the PPML estimator, exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects, international border variables, as well as country-pair fixed effects. For presentation upropose, we omit the estimates of all fixed effects and the constant. Standard errors clustered at the importer-exporter level in parentheses. \* p < 0.01, "\* p < 0.05, "\* p < 0.01."

-	-									
	Agriculture				Food		All			
	GIE	FVA	DVX	GIE	FVA	DVX	GIE	FVA	DVX	
WTO	0.252***	0.278***	0.422***	0.248***	0.335***	0.319***	0.315***	0.183***	0.186***	
	(0.058)	(0.034)	(0.041)	(0.056)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.048)	(0.039)	(0.039)	
Imp. Art. 1: Publication of Information	-0.538***	-0.288***	-0.145	-0.970***	-0.274***	-0.273***	-0.365***	-0.270***	-0.264***	
	(0.094)	(0.065)	(0.096)	(0.127)	(0.082)	(0.076)	(0.092)	(0.082)	(0.081)	
Imp. Art. 2: Opp. to Comment and Consultations	-0.031	0.061	0.170*	0.344**	-0.0168	-0.063	0.140	0.076	0.084	
	(0.103)	(0.071)	(0.089)	(0.139)	(0.100)	(0.090)	(0.118)	(0.090)	(0.090)	
Imp. Art. 3: Advance Rulings	0.018	0.065*	-0.079	0.663***	0.074	0.094*	0.304***	0.096*	0.098*	
	(0.063)	(0.038)	(0.058)	(0.086)	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.063)	(0.051)	(0.051)	
Imp. Art. 4: Appeal or Review Procedures	-0.078	-0.001	-0.278***	0.623***	0.037	0.041	0.286***	0.071	0.080	
	(0.093)	(0.052)	(0.084)	(0.118)	(0.076)	(0.094)	(0.089)	(0.071)	(0.070)	
Imp. Art. 5: Non-Discrim. and Transp. Measures	-0.746***	-0.334***	-0.227***	-0.213*	-0.515***	-0.676***	-0.187**	-0.139*	-0.157**	
	(0.113)	(0.068)	(0.084)	(0.112)	(0.068)	(0.076)	(0.091)	(0.080)	(0.080)	
Imp. Art. 6: Disciplines on Fees and Charges	0.733***	0.409***	0.932***	-0.074	0.514***	0.924***	0.571***	0.622***	0.617***	
	(0.133)	(0.084)	(0.117)	(0.132)	(0.093)	(0.114)	(0.129)	(0.114)	(0.111)	
Imp. Art. 7: Release and Clearance of Goods	0.164	0.302***	0.662***	0.286	0.624***	0.356**	-0.445**	0.0471	0.0422	
	(0.152)	(0.109)	(0.127)	(0.267)	(0.167)	(0.148)	(0.207)	(0.193)	(0.188)	
Imp. Art. 8: Border Agency Cooperation	-0.347***	-0.351***	-0.559***	-0.009	-0.239***	-0.477***	-0.260***	-0.203**	-0.219***	
	(0.081)	(0.066)	(0.090)	(0.098)	(0.067)	(0.081)	(0.089)	(0.084)	(0.085)	
Imp. Art. 9: Mov. of Goods under Customs Control	0.080	0.324***	0.329***	0.199	0.276**	0.411***	1.100***	0.702***	0.693***	
	(0.129)	(0.067)	(0.111)	(0.151)	(0.118)	(0.099)	(0.163)	(0.089)	(0.088)	
Imp. Art. 10: Import, Export, and Transit Formalities	-0.146	-0.527***	-0.763***	-0.834***	-0.719***	-1.060***	-1.210***	-0.838***	-0.827***	
	(0.248)	(0.159)	(0.259)	(0.298)	(0.180)	(0.252)	(0.317)	(0.258)	(0.249)	
Imp. Art. 11: Freedom of Transit	-0.107	-0.392***	-0.755***	-0.505***	-0.663***	-0.441***	-0.481***	-0.730***	-0.715***	
	(0.128)	(0.079)	(0.114)	(0.165)	(0.094)	(0.106)	(0.128)	(0.098)	(0.097)	
Imp. Art. 12: Customs Cooperation	-0.074	-0.043	0.0970	-0.137	-0.0789	-0.172**	-0.0259	0.0177	0.0104	
	(0.082)	(0.054)	(0.086)	(0.102)	(0.064)	(0.071)	(0.087)	(0.078)	(0.076)	
Observations	785,862	785,485	784,542	785,862	784,354	784,354	785,862	784,354	784,354	
Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.9996	0.9993	0.9992	0.9994	0.9993	0.9990	0.9995	0.9993	0.9992	

#### Table 2: PPML Gravity Regressions: 2000 - 2021. Disagreggated by Article.

Note:  $WTO_{ijt}$  is an indicator that both i and j are WTO members at time t. Imp. Art  $r_{ijt}$  represents the share of TFA article's r measures simultaneously notified as implemented by i and j at time t. All estimates are obtained in panel settings with the PPML estimator, exporter time and importer-time fixed effects, international border variables, as well as country-pair fixed effects. The presentation purposes, we omit the estimates of all fixed fixes that Sharded errors clustered at the importer-exporter level in parentheses. \* p < 0.01, \* p < 0.01.

		Agriculture			Food		All		
	GIE	FVA	DVX	GIE	FVA	DVX	GIE	FVA	DVX
WTO	0.252***	0.278***	0.422***	0.248***	0.335***	0.319***	0.315***	0.183***	0.186***
	(0.058)	(0.034)	(0.041)	(0.056)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.048)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Imp. Art. 1: Publication of Information	-0.538***	-0.288***	-0.145	-0.970***	-0.274***	-0.273***	-0.365***	-0.270***	-0.264***
	(0.094)	(0.065)	(0.096)	(0.127)	(0.082)	(0.076)	(0.092)	(0.082)	(0.081)
Imp. Art. 2: Opp. to Comment and Consultations	-0.031	0.061	0.170*	0.344**	-0.0168	-0.063	0.140	0.076	0.084
	(0.103)	(0.071)	(0.089)	(0.139)	(0.100)	(0.090)	(0.118)	(0.090)	(0.090)
Imp. Art. 3: Advance Rulings	0.018	0.065*	-0.079	0.663***	0.074	0.094*	0.304***	0.096*	0.098*
	(0.063)	(0.038)	(0.058)	(0.086)	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.063)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Imp. Art. 4: Appeal or Review Procedures	-0.078	-0.001	-0.278***	0.623***	0.037	0.041	0.286***	0.071	0.080
	(0.093)	(0.052)	(0.084)	(0.118)	(0.076)	(0.094)	(0.089)	(0.071)	(0.070)
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	(0.113)	(0.068)	(0.084)	(0.112)	(0.068)	(0.076)	(0.091)	(0.080)	(0.080)
Imp. Art. 6: Disciplines on Fees and Charges	0.733***	0.409***	0.932***	-0.074	0.514***	0.924***	0.571***	0.622***	0.617***
	(0.133)	(0.084)	(0.117)	(0.132)	(0.093)	(0.114)	(0.129)	(0.114)	(0.111)
Imp. Art. 7: Release and Clearance of Goods	0.164	0.302***	0.662***	0.286	0.624***	0.356**	-0.445**	0.0471	0.0422
	(0.152)	(0.109)	(0.127)	(0.267)	(0.167)	(0.148)	(0.207)	(0.193)	(0.188)
Imp. Art. 8: Border Agency Cooperation	-0.347***	-0.351***	-0.559***	-0.009	-0.239***	-0.477***	-0.260***	-0.203**	-0.219***
	(0.081)	(0.066)	(0.090)	(0.098)	(0.067)	(0.081)	(0.089)	(0.084)	(0.085)
Imp. Art. 9: Mov. of Goods under Customs Control	0.080	0.324***	0.329***	0.199	0.276**	0.411***	1.100***	0.702***	0.693***
	(0.129)	(0.067)	(0.111)	(0.151)	(0.118)	(0.099)	(0.163)	(0.089)	(0.088)
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	(0.128)	(0.079)	(0.114)	(0.165)	(0.094)	(0.106)	(0.128)	(0.098)	(0.097)
Imp. Art. 12: Customs Cooperation	-0.074	-0.043	0.0970	-0.137	-0.0789	-0.172**	-0.0259	0.0177	0.0104
	(0.082)	(0.054)	(0.086)	(0.102)	(0.064)	(0.071)	(0.087)	(0.078)	(0.076)
Observations	785,862	785,485	784,542	785,862	784,354	784,354	785,862	784,354	784,354
Pseudo- $R^2$	0.9996	0.9993	0.9992	0.9994	0.9993	0.9990	0.9995	0.9993	0.9992

#### Table 2: PPML Gravity Regressions: 2000 - 2021. Disagreggated by Article.

Note:  $WTO_{ijt}$  is an indicator that both i and j are WTO members at time l. Imp. Art  $r_{ijt}$  represents the share of TFA article's r measures simultaneously notified as implemented by i and j at time l. All estimates are obtained in panel attings with the PPML estimator, exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects, international bored variables, as well as country-pair fixed effects. For presentation purposes, we omit the estimates of all fixed effects and constants. Standard errors clustered at the time often presentes.  $\mathbf{y} = 0.01, \mathbf{v} = 0.05, \mathbf{v} = 0.01$ 

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- The start of the event is when a country-pairs have at least one common TFA measure notified as implemented.

- Event studies help to capture **anticipated and delayed reactions to the notified implementation of commitments.**
- The start of the event is when a country-pairs have at least one common TFA measure notified as implemented.
- We estimate the following using PPML:

$$X_{ijt} = \exp\left(\beta_0 + \beta_1 WTO_{ijt} + \sum_{\substack{\ell = -6\\\ell \neq -1}}^4 \mathbb{1}\left\{\tau_{ijt} = \ell\right\}\beta_\tau^\ell + \zeta_{it} + \eta_{jt} + \theta_{ij}\right) + \varepsilon_{ijt}.$$
 (6)

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 (6)


•  $\tau_{ijt}$  represents the number of years at time t before or after the event.

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- The start of the event is when a country-pairs have at least one common TFA measure notified as implemented.
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$$X_{ijt} = \exp\left(\beta_0 + \beta_1 WTO_{ijt} + \sum_{\substack{\ell=-6\\\ell\neq -1}}^4 \mathbb{1}\left\{\tau_{ijt} = \ell\right\}\beta_{\tau}^{\ell} + \zeta_{it} + \eta_{jt} + \theta_{ij}\right) + \varepsilon_{ijt}.$$
 (6)

- $\tau_{ijt}$  represents the number of years at time t before or after the event.
- $\sum_{\substack{\ell=-6\\ \ell\neq -1}}^{4} \mathbbm{1} \{ \tau_{ijt} = \ell \} \beta_{\tau}^{\ell}$  measures the treatment dynamics on GVC outcomes.

#### Treatment Dynamics Results - Agriculture



(a) DVX Agriculture.


Pseudo R-souared: 0.999 Observations: 784,542

(b) FVA Agriculture.

(c) GIE Agriculture.

Note. The figure shows the dynamic treatment parameters, 95 percent confidence intervals, and uniform sup-t bands for the event-time coefficients.

#### Treatment Dynamics Results - Food



Note. The figure shows the dynamic treatment parameters, 95 percent confidence intervals, and uniform sup-t bands for the event-time coefficients.



# Time to Full Implementation

•  $\hat{r}$  from OLS (and FE) regression results ranges between -0.18 and -0.385. I make projections assuming that  $\hat{r}$  remains unchanged.

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TFA-Completion Index	Logistic Gro	Logistic Growth Model				
· · ·	r = -0.181	r = -0.385	WTO (2023)			
80	2045	2030	2026			
90	2049	2032	2031			
95	2053	2034	2039			

Table 3: Estimated Year to reach TFA-Completion Index

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## Conclusions i

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# Conclusions i

- We analyze how the common implementation of TFA provisions between country pairs relates with agri-food GVC flows.
- At lower levels of common TFA implementation, this relationship is positive or neutral, but **it turns negative at higher levels.**
- If countries initially prioritize the least costly provisions for implementation, reaching higher levels entails implementing the more costly ones.
- We find evidence suggesting that only measures found in Articles 6, 7, and 9 of the TFA have positive effects agri-food GVC flows.
- Provisions within these articles are conducive to agri-food trade and necessitate minor procedural changes.



• Event studies suggest that there are negative lasting effects of common TFA implementation on agriculture GVC flows (*needs further revision*).

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- The rate at which countries implement measures is **not affected by country characteristics.**
- We estimate that (close to) full TFA implementation may be achieved by 2034 at the earliest. This is **11 years from the time of writing and 17 years from the agreement's entry-into-force.**
- TFA negotiations lasted between 10-13 years (Neufeld, 2014).

- Event studies needs further scrutiny. Remove trends?
- Lasso regression using 36 policy areas in the TFA.
- Improved model of TFA implementation considering strategic behavior in the notification of implementation dates by countries.

# Questions and comments are highly appreciated

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# Appendix - Contribution with Citations

- Extensive literature exploring the connection between trade agreements and trade flows for agricultural and food products (Disdier, Fontagné, and Cadot 2014; Duvaleix et al. 2021; Grant and Lambert 2008; Huysmans and Swinnen 2019; Mujahid and Kalkuhl 2016; Scoppola, Raimondi, and Olper 2018; Sun and Reed 2010).
- Other literature using other data sources, such as the OECD's Trade Facilitation Indicators (TFI) (Beverelli, Neumueller, and Teh 2015; Fontagné, Orefice, and Piermartini 2020; Hillberry and Zhang 2018; Moïsé and Sorescu 2013) and the UN Global Survey on TF (Masood and Martínez-Zarzoso 2023)

# Appendix - Measures Notified as Implemented

- The TFA entered into force on February 22, 2017.
- We record a measure as implemented in year  $t \ge 2017$  if the *notified* definitive implementation date is on February 22 of year t or before.
- For provisions that have no definitive implementation dates, we consider them as not implemented, even if there is a *tentative* implementation date.



# Appendix - Evolution of Implementation by Article

#### Table 4: Evolution of Implementation Levels by Article in Section I of the TFA

TFA Article	No. of	No. of Imp.	Imple	mentati	on by Y	′ear (Pe	rcent)	$\Delta$ 2017-2021
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i	Measures	Meas. Poss	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	(Percent)
Art. 1: Publication of Information	22	3,586	53.3	57.5	58.1	60.5	65.6	12.4
Art. 2: Opportunity to Comment and Consultations	4	652	58.4	64.3	66.0	68.6	72.5	14.1
Art. 3: Advance Rulings	19	3,097	50.4	54.7	54.7	57.3	61.2	10.8
Art. 4: Appeal or Review Procedures	9	1,467	65.8	74.0	74.0	75.2	78.9	13.0
Art. 5: Non-Discrimination and Transparency Measures	8	1,304	53.8	60.4	61.3	62.7	66.5	12.7
Art. 6: Disciplines on Fees and Charges	14	2,282	63.0	69.5	70.0	71.7	75.8	12.8
Art. 7: Release and Clearance of Goods	55	8,965	54.3	58.9	59.6	61.4	65.3	11.0
Art. 8: Border Agency Cooperation	6	978	53.4	53.4	54.1	54.1	58.5	5.1
Art. 9: Movement of Goods under Customs Control	1	163	73.0	87.1	87.7	89.0	90.8	17.8
Art. 10: Import, Export, and Transit Formalities	30	4,890	62.8	70.8	71.3	73.3	75.4	12.6
Art. 11: Freedom of Transit	21	3,423	63.1	69.3	69.7	71.2	75.7	12.6
Art. 12: Customs Cooperation	49	7,987	57.3	63.4	64.6	66.7	70.2	12.9
Total	238	38,794	57.4	63.1	63.8	65.7	69.4	12.0

Note: The Number of Measures by Area is the number of paragraphs in each article. The Number of Implemented Measures Possible (No. of Imp. Possible) is the Number of Implemented Measures by Article multiplied by the total number of countries in the sample (163). Implementation by Year is the share of total measures that are implemented, multiplied by 100 for each year in the sample. The  $\Delta$  2017-2021 is the difference between the percentages of implementation (implementation levels) of 2021 and 2017.

#### Appendix - Descriptive Statistics

#### Table 5: Descriptive Statistics

No. of	Countries	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Panel A: Measures Notified as Imp	olemented				
2017	163	136.65	97.22	0	238
2018	163	150.14	83.74	0	238
2019	163	151.77	83.54	0	238
2020	163	156.28	82.81	0	238
2021	163	165.23	79.60	0	238
Panel B: GVC Flows in USD million	ons (2016, e	excluding intr	a-national fle	ws)	
GIE Agriculture	189	282.43	585.26	0.00	5,949.27
FVA Agriculture	189	71.03	183.55	0.00	1,974.64
DVX Agriculture	189	28.10	71.78	0.00	583.50
GIE Food	189	441.75	1,059.29	0.00	7,784.48
FVA Food	189	22.98	66.39	0.00	672.45
DVX Food	189	98.54	243.79	0.00	1,696.95
GIE All Industries	189	10,441.67	28,026.87	0.00	2.2e+05
FVA All Industries	189	2,268.24	7,091.04	0.00	64,479.74
DVX All Industries	189	2,633.00	6,684.07	0.00	47,163.29
Panel C: Country Characteristics (	2016)				
$GDP_{pc}$ (USD thousands)	163	15.10	22.27	0.28	165.03
$ln(GDP_{pc})$	163	8.68	1.48	5.64	12.01
landlocked	163	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00
island	163	0.19	0.39	0.00	1.00
Population (millions)	163	42.68	153.96	0.04	1,378.67
ln (Population)	163	2.02	1.99	-3.28	7.23
$AFT_{pc}$	163	2.85	6.32	0.00	49.37
Openness	163	0.68	0.41	0.09	2.78

Note: Pavel A contain descriptive approximation of the annual number of measures notified as implemented for 1510 contrins, including JT contrins with article bandwarm in the WTO (2023). 30 devolgence contrins and 2 devolgence contrins with no data (Venandu and Venan). Devolgence contrins have the ITFA implementation contrins. Biglic controls have data or TMA examples of the Control of the Con

# Appendix - Eora

- This database is constructed from a multi-region input-output (MRIO) model that provides a time series of sectoral IO tables.
- The first step to decompose GIE is to identify the two main components, which are the domestic and foreign contents.
- The domestic content is share of domestic inputs used in producing exported goods, the foreign content is share of imported inputs used in GIE.
- To obtain the domestic value-added (DVA), the domestic content is multiplied by the value-added shares of all domestic industries.
- In contrast, the foreign value-added (FVA) calculation uses the share of value added by the sector generated in the foreign country and imported by the domestic country to obtain the domestic country's exports.
- "Indirect value-added" (DVX) represents the domestic value-added contained in intermediates exported to a foreign economy that are re-exported to a third economy and incorporated into other products.
- The DVX computation uses the exports by each domestic sector to foreign countries along with the exports of those foreign countries.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
t	-0.385*** (0.045)	-0.181*** 0.029)	-0.185*** (0.029)	-0.364*** (0.133)	-0.180*** (0.034)	-0.185*** (0.035)	-0.165*** (0.043)	-0.148*** (0.031)	-0.237*** (0.060)
$\ln[(M_{Max}-M_0)/M_0]$		0.653*** (0.030)	0.665*** (0.032)	0.696*** (0.044)	0.667*** (0.031)	0.656*** (0.029)	0.654*** (0.029)	0.649*** (0.030)	0.652*** (0.030)
$t \times \ln[(M_{Max} - M_0)/M_0]$			-0.005 (0.003)						
$t \times \ln(GDP_{pc})$				0.0211 (0.015)					
$\ln(GDP_{pc})$				0.142 (0.158)					
$t \times landlocked$					-0.005 (0.065)				
landlocked					-0.826* (0.437)				
$t \times island$						0.024 (0.055)			
island						0.825** (0.330)			
$t \times \ln(Population)$							-0.008 (0.020)		
$\ln(Population)$							-0.156** (0.070)		
$t \times AFT_{pc}$							. ,	-0.012* (0.006)	
$AFT_{pc}$								0.075***	
$t \times openness$								. ,	0.0831 (0.063)
openness									-0.416 (0.335)
Constant	-1.304*** (0.386)	-1.334*** (0.170)	-1.323*** (0.171)	-2.526* (1.358)	-1.159*** (0.195)	-1.488*** (0.189)	-1.019*** (0.197)	-1.552*** (0.189)	-1.054*** (0.297)
Observations $R^2$ Adjusted $R^2$	815 0.015 0.014	652 0.801 0.800	652 0.801 0.800	652 0.802 0.801	652 0.807 0.806	652 0.808 0.807	652 0.808 0.807	652 0.807 0.805	652 0.801 0.800

Note: The following regressions are based on the logistic growth model. To avoid losing observations with zero or 238 (full) implementation, we correct the dependent variable with a factor of 0.1 in the numerator and the denominator in the following way:  $\ln[(M_{Max} - M_t + 0.1)/(M_t + 0.1)]$ . Clustered standard errors at the country level in parentheses. \* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\* p <

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
t	-0.385*** (0.045)	-0.181*** 0.029)	-0.185*** (0.029)	-0.364*** (0.133)	-0.180*** (0.034)	-0.185*** (0.035)	-0.165*** (0.043)	-0.148*** (0.031)	-0.237*** (0.060)
$\ln[(M_{Max}-M_0)/M_0]$		0.653*** (0.030)	0.665*** (0.032)	0.696*** (0.044)	0.667*** (0.031)	0.656*** (0.029)	0.654*** (0.029)	0.649*** (0.030)	0.652*** (0.030)
$t \times \ln[(M_{Max} - M_0)/M_0]$			-0.005 (0.003)						
$t \times \ln(GDP_{pc})$				0.0211 (0.015)					
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$t \times landlocked$					-0.005 (0.065)				
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Note: The following regressions are based on the logistic growth model. To avoid losing observations with zero or 238 (full) implementation, we correct the dependent variable with a factor of 0.1 in the numerator and the denominator in the following way:  $\ln[(M_{Max} - M_t + 0.1)/(M_t + 0.1)]$ . Clustered standard errors at the country level in parentheses:  $\gamma = 0.01$ ,  $\gamma = 0.00$ ,  $\gamma = 0.01$ 

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
t	-0.385*** (0.045)	-0.181*** 0.029)	-0.185*** (0.029)	-0.364*** (0.133)	-0.180*** (0.034)	-0.185*** (0.035)	-0.165*** (0.043)	-0.148*** (0.031)	-0.237*** (0.060)
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$t \times \ln(GDP_{pc})$				0.0211 (0.015)					
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Constant	-1.304*** (0.386)	-1.334*** (0.170)	-1.323*** (0.171)	-2.526* (1.358)	-1.159*** (0.195)	-1.488*** (0.189)	-1.019*** (0.197)	-1.552*** (0.189)	-1.054*** (0.297)
Observations	815	652	652	652	652	652	652	652	652
R <sup>2</sup> Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.015 0.014	0.801 0.800	0.801 0.800	0.802 0.801	0.807	0.808	0.808	0.807	0.801 0.800

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$t \times openness$									0.0831 (0.063)
openness									-0.416 (0.335)
Constant	-1.304*** (0.386)	-1.334*** (0.170)	-1.323*** (0.171)	-2.526* (1.358)	-1.159*** (0.195)	-1.488*** (0.189)	-1.019*** (0.197)	-1.552*** (0.189)	-1.054*** (0.297)
Observations $R^2$ Adjusted $R^2$	815 0.015 0.014	652 0.801 0.800	652 0.801 0.800	652 0.802 0.801	652 0.807 0.806	652 0.808 0.807	652 0.808 0.807	652 0.807 0.805	652 0.801 0.800

Note: The following regressions are based on the logistic growth model. To avoid losing observations with zero or 238 (full) implementation, we correct the dependent variable with a factor of 0.1 in the numerator and the denominator in the following way:  $\ln[(M_{Max} - M_t + 0.1)/(M_t + 0.1)]$ . Clustered standard errors at the country level in parentheses. \* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\* p <

#### Appendix - Footnote to Estimation of r

*Note:* The following regressions are based on the logistic growth model.  $\ln$  is the natural logarithm.  $M_t$  is the number of TFA provisions notified as implemented, and  $M_{max} = 238$  is the total number of TFA provisions. In this way,  $(M_{max} - M_t)$  is the gap to full implementation, and  $[(M_{max} - M_t)/M_t]$  is the gap to full implementation expressed as a ratio of the measures notified as implemented.  $(\ln[(M_{max} - M_0)/M_0])$  is the gap to full implementation as a ratio of its level of implementation at t = 0.  $GDP_{pc}$  is per capita GDP. *landlocked* is an indicator if the country is landlocked. *island* is an indicator if the country is an island. Population is population size in millions.  $AFT_{pc}$  is a measure of per capita aid received to support trade facilitation between 2012 and 2021. openness is the total amount of trade (imports + exports) over GDP. For column 1, we consider all years, for the remaining columns we only consider years t > 0 because we include the initial level of notified implementation measures. Clustered standard errors at the country level in parentheses. \* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\*

Table 7: OLS Regression.  $\ln[(M_{Max} - M_t)/M_t]$  on GVC Flows.

		O	LS			PP	ML	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
t	-0.181*** (0.029)	-0.291 (0.202)	-0.306* (0.174)	-0.281** (0.123)	-0.009 (0.007)	-0.024 (0.067)	-0.039 (0.065)	-0.045 (0.064)
$\ln[(M_{Max}-M_0)/M_0]$	0.653*** (0.030)	0.607*** (0.039)	0.625*** (0.038)	0.612*** (0.042)	0.663*** (0.079)	0.694*** (0.104)	0.694*** (0.099)	0.768*** (0.115)
$t \times \ln(GIE)$		0.008 (0.015)				0.001 (0.005)		
$\ln(GIE)$		-0.194** (0.080)				0.172 (0.398)		
$t \times \ln(FVA)$			0.010 (0.014)				0.00278 (0.005)	
$\ln(FVA)$			-0.134* (0.073)				0.150 (0.338)	
$t \times \ln(DVX)$				0.008 (0.010)				0.003 (0.005)
$\ln(DVX)$				-0.137** (0.067)				0.430 (0.337)
Constant	-1.334*** (0.170)	1.359 (1.122)	0.280 (0.900)	0.267 (0.800)	0.261** (0.132)	-2.105 (5.566)	-1.561 (4.186)	-4.905 (4.287)
Observations $R^2$	652 0.801	620 0.809	620 0.807	616 0.808	652 0.077	620 0.084	620 0.088	616 0.122
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.800	0.808	0.806	0.807				

Note: The following regressions are based on the logistic growth model. In is the natural logarithm. To avoid loging observations with zero or 238 (full) implementation, we correct the dependent variable with a factor of 0.1 in the numerator and the denominator in the following way:  $\ln[(M_{Max} - M_t + 0.1)/(M_t + 0.1)]$ . Clustered standard errors at the country level in parentheses. \* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\*

Table 7: OLS Regression.  $\ln[(M_{Max} - M_t)/M_t]$  on GVC Flows.

		OI	S			PP	ML	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
t	-0.181*** (0.029)	-0.291 (0.202)	-0.306* (0.174)	-0.281** (0.123)	-0.009 (0.007)	-0.024 (0.067)	-0.039 (0.065)	-0.045 (0.064)
$\ln[(M_{Max}-M_0)/M_0]$	0.653*** (0.030)	0.607*** (0.039)	0.625*** (0.038)	0.612*** (0.042)	0.663*** (0.079)	0.694*** (0.104)	0.694*** (0.099)	0.768*** (0.115)
$t \times \ln(GIE)$		0.008 (0.015)				0.001 (0.005)		
$\ln(GIE)$		-0.194** (0.080)				0.172 (0.398)		
$t \times \ln(FVA)$			0.010 (0.014)				0.00278 (0.005)	
$\ln(FVA)$			-0.134* (0.073)				0.150 (0.338)	
$t \times \ln(DVX)$				0.008 (0.010)				0.003 (0.005)
$\ln(DVX)$				-0.137** (0.067)				0.430 (0.337)
Constant	-1.334*** (0.170)	1.359 (1.122)	0.280 (0.900)	0.267 (0.800)	0.261** (0.132)	-2.105 (5.566)	-1.561 (4.186)	-4.905 (4.287)
Observations $R^2$	652 0.801	620 0.809	620 0.807	616 0.808	652 0.077	620 0.084	620 0.088	616 0.122
Adjusted $R^2$	0.800	0.808	0.806	0.807				

Note: The following regressions are based on the logistic growth model. In is the natural logarithm. To avoid loging observations with zero or 238 (full) implementation, we correct the dependent variable with a factor of 0.1 in the numerator and the denominator in the following way:  $\ln[(M_{Max} - M_t + 0.1)/(M_t + 0.1)]$ . Clustered standard errors at the country level in parentheses. \* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.05

#### Appendix - Panel Regressions to estimate r

	(1) All <i>t</i>	(2) t > 0
t	-0.385***	-0.181***
	(0.045)	(0.029)
Constant	-1.304***	-1.918***
	(0.090)	(0.073)
Observations	815	652
$R^2$	0.179	0.149
Adjusted $R^2$	0.177	0.148

Table 8: Fixed Effects (FE) Panel regression results.  $\ln(M_{Max} - M_t)$  on t.

Note: The regressions are based on the logistic growth model. Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. \*p < 0.10, \*\*\*p < 0.05, \*\*\*\*p < 0.01

#### Appendix - PPML regressions

Table 9: Pooled PPML regression results.  $\ln[(M_{Max} - M_t)/M_t]$  on Country Characteristics.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
t	-0.845*** (0.273)	-0.009 (0.007)	-0.213*** (0.076)	-0.045 (0.076)	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.025 (0.021)	0.003 (0.013)	0.003 (0.018)
$\ln[(M_{Max} - M_0)/M_0]$		0.663*** (0.078)	0.600*** (0.079)	0.909*** (0.155)	0.713*** (0.078)	0.626*** (0.075)	0.639*** (0.078)	0.650*** (0.079)	0.664*** (0.081)
$t \times \ln[(M_{Max} - M_0)/M_0]$			0.027*** (0.010)						
$t \times \ln(GDP_{pc})$				0.00498 (0.010)					
$\ln(GDP_{pc})$				1.057* (0.604)					
$t \times landlocked$					-0.065* (0.039)				
landlocked					-3.524*** (0.589)				
$t \times island$						-0.109** (0.049)			
island						-2.128*** (0.730)			
$t \times \ln(Population)$							0.005 (0.005)		
$\ln(Population)$							0.302 (0.242)		
$t \times AFT_{pe}$								-0.014 (0.023)	
$AFT_{pc}$								-0.365 (0.408)	
$t \times openness$									-0.029 (0.049)
openness									-3.396 (2.352)
Constant	5.982*** (0.159)	0.261** (0.132)	0.744*** (0.236)	-9.041 (5.498)	0.379*** (0.138)	0.596*** (0.125)	-0.391 (0.741)	0.812*** (0.311)	1.894** (0.927)
Observations R <sup>2</sup>	815 0.092	652 0.077	652 0.077	652 0.157	652 0.140	652 0.082	652 0.082	652 0.108	652 0.122

Note: The following regressions are based on the logistic growth model. Clustered standard errors at the country level in parentheses. \* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

- $Y_{it} = \sum_{j} X_{ijt}$  is total export supply and includes intra-national trade
- $E_{jt} = \sum_{i} X_{ijt}$  is total expenditures from the importer, and it also includes intra-national trade.

• 
$$Y_t = \sum_i Y_{it} = \sum_j E_{jt}$$
 is Total world production.

#### Appendix - North-South Trade

	Agriculture			Food			All		
	GIE	FVA	DVX	GIE	FVA	DVX	GIE	FVA	DVX
WTO	0.233***	0.267***	0.396***	0.256***	0.320***	0.311***	0.336***	0.190***	0.193***
	(0.059)	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.060)	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.051)	(0.040)	(0.040)
$Imp.  TFA \times North-to-North$	-1.057***	-0.784***	-0.580***	-0.838***	-0.940***	-1.428***	-0.863***	-0.716***	-0.731***
	(0.117)	(0.069)	(0.064)	(0.119)	(0.076)	(0.071)	(0.132)	(0.060)	(0.061)
$Imp. \ TFA \times North-to-South$	-0.877***	-0.870***	-0.314**	-0.846***	-0.915***	-1.600***	-0.997***	-0.738***	-0.926***
	(0.173)	(0.118)	(0.147)	(0.268)	(0.221)	(0.113)	(0.193)	(0.131)	(0.102)
$Imp.  TFA \times South - to - North$	-1.279***	-0.802***	-0.213	-0.784***	-1.133***	-1.536***	-1.254***	-0.924***	-0.744***
	(0.136)	(0.0894)	(0.153)	(0.193)	(0.097)	(0.125)	(0.176)	(0.103)	(0.132)
$Imp. TFA \times South - to - South$	-1.571***	-1.238***	-0.528***	-0.173	-1.436***	-2.289***	-1.749***	-1.256***	-1.257***
	(0.139)	(0.103)	(0.161)	(0.277)	(0.200)	(0.131)	(0.178)	(0.133)	(0.135)
Observations	785,862	785,485	784,542	785,862	784,354	784,354	785,862	784,354	784,354
Pseudo- $R^2$	0.9995	0.9993	0.9992	0.9993	0.9993	0.9990	0.9995	0.9992	0.9992

#### Table 10: Pooled PPML Gravity Regressions: 2000 - 2021. North-South Trade

Note:  $WTO_{ijt}$  is an indicator that both i and j are WTO members at time t. Imp. TFA represents the share of all TFA measures simultaneously implemented by i and j at time t. All countries were divided into two groups, North and South, and we then assessed the treatment heterogeneity using interaction terms. All standard errors are clustered at the exporter-importe-sector level.  $T \approx 0.01$ ,  $*T \approx 0.01$ ,  $*T \approx 0.01$ .



#### Appendix - Time Since Common TFA Implementation


	Agriculture			Food			All		
	GIE	FVA	DVX	GIE	FVA	DVX	GIE	FVA	DVX
WTO	0.231***	0.262***	0.404***	0.248***	0.320***	0.311***	0.309***	0.176***	0.179***
	(0.059)	(0.035)	(0.043)	(0.060)	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.0496)	(0.040)	(0.040)
$Imp.~TFA_{ijt}$	-1.142***	-0.837***	-0.845***	-0.613***	-0.997***	-1.523***	-0.982***	-0.771***	-0.772***
	(0.103)	(0.066)	(0.071)	(0.120)	(0.0792)	(0.073)	(0.105)	(0.065)	(0.066)
Imp. $TFA_{ijt} \times t_{TFA}$	-0.083***	-0.060***	0.057***	-0.025	-0.037*	-0.084***	-0.214***	-0.122***	-0.129***
	(0.026)	(0.012)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.0202)	(0.011)	(0.029)	(0.014)	(0.014)
$t_{TFA}$	0.095*	0.053**	0.024	0.016	0.015	0.060**	0.384***	0.181***	0.179***
	(0.050)	(0.025)	(0.032)	(0.068)	(0.0340)	(0.028)	(0.070)	(0.028)	(0.029)
Observations	785,862	785,485	784,542	785,862	784,354	784,354	785,862	784,354	784,354
Pseudo- $R^2$	0.9995	0.9992	0.9992	0.9993	0.9993	0.9990	0.9995	0.9992	0.9992

#### Table 11: Pooled PPML Gravity Regressions: 2000 - 2021. TFA time index

Note:  $WTO_{ijt}$  is an indicator that both *i* and *j* are WTO members at time *t*. Imp. TFA represents the share of all TFA measures simultaneously implemented by *i* and *j* at time *t*.  $t_{TFA}$  is a time index that captures the number of years that have passed since the country pairs start having common TFA provisions implemented. All standard errors are clustered at the exporter-importer-sector level. \* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.00, \*\*\* p < 0.01.



# Appendix - Treatment Dynamics Results - All Sectors



Note. The figure shows the dynamic treatment parameters, 95 percent confidence intervals, and uniform sup-t bands for the event-time coefficients.

